In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. L. J., Parent

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A26-0346 In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. L. J., Parent. Filed August 31, 2026 Affirmed Harris, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-JV-25-2097 Brooke Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant-father T.L.J.) Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department) Nicole Billings, Solution-Focused Family Law, LLC, St. Louis Park, Minnesota (for respondent-mother K.S.L.H.) David Yates, Juvenile Justice Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem) Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Harris, Judge. SYLLABUS I. Under the Minnesota African American Family Preservation and Child Welfare Disproportionality Act (MAAFPA), Minnesota Statutes sections 260.61-.693 (2024), a district court may not terminate the parental rights of a parent of an African American or disproportionately represented child under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301 (2024), unless the allegations against a parent involve egregious harm or serious crimes specified under Minnesota Statutes section 260.67, subdivision 2(b).  II. Under Minnesota Statutes section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), a district court may terminate parental rights of a noncustodial parent even if a child remains with a custodial parent. OPINION HARRIS, Judge On appeal from the involuntary termination of his parental rights, appellant challenges the district court’s interpretation of the Minnesota African American Family Preservation and Child Welfare Disproportionality Act (MAAFPA), Minnesota Statutes sections 260.61-.693. Father argues that the district court erred by (1) interpreting section 260.67 as a two-path framework to terminate father’s parental rights, 1 (2) terminating his parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260.67 subdivision 3(a)(2), because the children will remain with their custodial parent, and (3) terminating his parental rights under both the juvenile protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.001-.637 (2024) (Chapter 260C), and the relevant provision of MAAFPA, section 260.67. We conclude that the district court correctly interpreted Minnesota Statutes section 260.67 by applying MAAFPA’s two-path framework to terminate father’s parental rights. We also conclude that the district court had authority to terminate father’s parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), and that its 1 The parties identify two paths for termination under MAAFPA. The first permits termination under section 260.67, subdivision 2(b), which modifies the general-applicable grounds to terminate parental rights listed in section 260C.301. The second, under section 260.67, subdivision 3(a), provides certain exceptions to the bases for termination under section 260.67, subdivision 2(b), when the prerequisites of that subdivision are not met. 2 determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS In August 2025, respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department (the county) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of appellant T.L.J. (father). The county’s asserted statutory bases for termination of parental rights included an allegation that father was palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3). The county also alleged that father had a prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child. The county designated this case as a MAAFPA phase‑in case. 2 The following factual summary is based on the findings of fact issued by the district court after trial, as well as portions of the record that are relevant to the parties’ arguments on appeal. Parties Father and respondent K.S.L.H. (mother) are not married and have three minor children together. Father is the adjudicated father of the three children involved in this appeal, C.A.J., A.S.J., and Q.K.J. Mother was not married at the time of their birth, and she is the children’s sole legal and sole physical custodian under Minnesota Statutes section 2 The petition was filed as a MAAFPA “phase-in” case. The legislature specified multiple effective dates for MAAFPA. For most counties in Minnesota, MAAFPA takes effect on January 1, 2027. See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 117, § 1, at 1922. But the legislature specified that, beginning on January 1, 2025, MAAFPA applies to a limited number of cases in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, with the number of cases in those counties increasing through January 1, 2027, when it will apply to all eligible cases. Id., § 20, at 1940. MAAFPA requires the commissioner of human services to create a plan to phase in application of MAAFPA in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties. Id. 3 257.541, subdivision 1 (2024). Throughout the proceedings, the children remained in mother’s care. Father’s Attempted Murder of Mother In May 2021, father asked mother if he could see the children. Mother agreed to bring the children to meet father at the home of a member of father’s family. When mother arrived, the family member removed C.A.J. from mother’s vehicle. A.S.J. and Q.K.J. remained in the vehicle. When father arrived, he got in the front passenger’s seat of mother’s vehicle and asked mother for $200. When mother refused, father pulled out a gun and told her to drive to the gas station to withdraw money from the ATM. Mother drove to the gas station, exited her vehicle, and walked into the gas station to call the police. Father followed mother into the gas station with the gun and shot her seven times before fleeing the scene. 3 The two children were still inside the vehicle, which was approximately ten feet away from the gas station’s main entrance. Mother believed the children could hear the gunshots and that the gunshots frightened them. Father was arrested and charged with attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and second-degree assault. Father pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree 3 Father shot mother in her leg, abdomen, and left hand. Mother was hospitalized for a month and a half recovering from the shooting. During her hospitalization, the children were placed in the care of mother’s family members. After being discharged from the hospital, mother continued her recovery, which required her to obtain assistance to care for the children. Mother had a lifting restriction that prevented her from holding Q.K.J., who was an infant at the time of the shooting. The shooting resulted in mother having lasting nerve damage in her leg, difficulties using her pointer finger on her left hand, posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. 4 murder and was sentenced to 164 months in prison. Father’s anticipated release date is July 2030. Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) Petition In August 2025, the county filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights. The petition alleged statutory grounds under sections 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3) (palpable unfitness), and 260C.503, subdivision 2(a)(4) (expedited termination of parental rights based on prior involuntary termination). In relevant part, the petition alleged: (1) In May 2021, father shot mother while two of the children were in the vehicle and fled, resulting in father being charged with attempted second-degree murder, as well as first-degree and second-degree assault; (2) father pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree murder and was sentenced to 164 months in prison; (3) father’s parental rights to another child had been involuntarily terminated; (4) mother was in favor of terminating father’s parental rights; and (5) the termination of father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The petition noted that the case was designated as a MAAFPA phase‑in case. Because the county designated the case as a phase‑in case, the district court found that MAAFPA applied and required the county to make active efforts to reunite the family. Motion to Dismiss the TPR Petition In October 2025, father moved to dismiss the petition for two reasons. He first argued that the county’s statutory basis for terminating his parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301 does not apply because MAAFPA’s termination requirements superseded Chapter 260C. Second, he argued that MAAFPA prohibits termination of 5 parental rights when the children will remain with their custodial parent because MAAFPA favors transfer of custody over termination of parental rights. At the motion hearing, the county orally moved to amend its petition to include Minnesota Statutes section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), as an additional basis to terminate father’s parental rights. The district court granted the motion to amend. Following the hearing, the district court issued an order denying father’s motion to dismiss. The district court reasoned that MAAFPA must be read harmoniously with Chapter 260C. It determined that MAAFPA could not function independently from Chapter 260C because MAAFPA and Chapter 260C “are part of a coherent legislative policy.” Applying the statute’s plain language, the district court concluded that MAAFPA “create[ed] two separate avenues for permitting termination of parental rights.” Under the first avenue—subdivision 2—the district court may terminate parental rights without regard to the exceptions contained in section 260.67, subdivision 3, when there are allegations of egregious harm or a serious crime pursuant to section 260.67, subdivision 2(b). And under the second avenue—subdivision 3—the district court may terminate parental rights if (1) transfer of permanent legal and physical custody is not possible because the child has no willing and able custodian to whom custody can be transferred and (2) one or more of the following conditions exists: abandonment, palpable unfitness, failure of active efforts, or egregious harm. TPR Trial and Order The TPR trial occurred in December 2025. The district court heard testimony from mother, a child protection investigator, a social worker, and a guardian ad litem. Father 6 appeared for the trial but did not testify. In January 2026, the district court issued its order terminating father’s parental rights, along with its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court determined that the county provided clear and convincing evidence that would allow the court to terminate father’s parental rights as a palpably unfit parent under either section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3), or section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), or both. The district court found that father had engaged in a consistent pattern of specific conduct that rendered him unable to care for the “ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child[ren].” It found that father lacked engagement with the children, physically abused mother and the children, and continued to threaten mother from prison. It also found that the “egregious act[s]” of shooting mother, then fleeing the scene and leaving her incapacitated and the children unattended, demonstrated a specific condition directly relating to the parent-child relationship and showed that father was unable to care for the children for the reasonably foreseeable future. The court further found that termination was in the children’s best interests and that the county made active efforts as required under MAAFPA. The court terminated father’s parental rights to all three children. Father’s Post-Trial Motion In January 2026, father moved for a new trial, amended findings of fact, and relief from the termination order under Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure 21 and 22. The district court denied father’s motion, reasoning that father advanced no new arguments to justify amended findings. The district court also found that father did not 7 assert any of the grounds that warrant a new trial under Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure 21.01, 21.04, and 22.02. Father appeals. ISSUES I. Can Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301 be read harmoniously with MAAFPA’s permanency provisions, or does MAAFPA, as the more specific statute, displace section 260C.301? II. Did the district court erroneously interpret Minnesota Statutes section 260.67 when it applied MAAFPA’s two-path framework to terminate father’s parental rights under section 260.67, subdivisions 2(b) and 3(a)(2)? III. Did the district court erroneously interpret Minnesota Statutes section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), to allow it to terminate father’s parental rights when the children remained with a custodial parent? IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by terminating father’s parental rights under both Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3), and 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), because the county did not present sufficient evidence? ANALYSIS Father appeals from the district court’s order terminating his parental rights to his three children, arguing that the district court erred in interpreting Minnesota Statutes section 260.67 as establishing two separate paths for terminating the parental rights of a parent of an African American or disproportionately represented child. To resolve this appeal, we first describe the statutory framework within the general juvenile protection statutes governing the termination of parental rights set forth in Chapter 260C. We then review the statutory scheme established by MAAFPA governing permanency proceedings involving African American and disproportionately represented children. After discussing the statutory schemes, we determine whether section 260C.301 8 and MAAFPA can be harmonized or whether MAAFPA, as the more specific statute, displaces section 260C.301. Next, we discuss whether the district court erred in its interpretation of section 260.67 by applying the statute’s two-path framework to terminate father’s parental rights. We then determine whether the district court had authority to terminate father’s parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2), based on the factual circumstances presented in this case. Finally, we consider whether the district court’s decision to terminate father’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Chapter 260C We begin our analysis with a review of the general juvenile protection statutes governing the termination of parental rights. Typically, termination of parental rights is governed by Chapter 260C of the Minnesota Statutes. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001-.637. A child’s best interests are “[t]he paramount consideration” in termination proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3. To involuntarily terminate parental rights, a district court must determine that (1) at least one of the eight enumerated statutory grounds for terminating parental rights exists; (2) termination is in the child’s best interests; and (3) the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or that such efforts were not required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8 (2024); see also In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) (stating that appellate courts will “affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best interests of the child, provided that the county has made 9 reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” (citations omitted)). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). As relevant to this appeal, one of the enumerated statutory grounds for terminating parental rights is: [the] parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship, either of which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3). MAAFPA In 2024, the legislature enacted MAAFPA to address the increased percentage of out-of-home placements and removals of African American and disproportionately represented children. Hearing on H.F. No. 912 Before the H. Children and Families Finance and Policy Comm. (Mar. 21, 2024) (statement of Rep. Agbaje). MAAFPA seeks to “protect the best interests of African American and disproportionately represented children,” “promote the stability and security of African American and disproportionately represented children and their families by establishing minimum standards to prevent the arbitrary and unnecessary removal of African American and disproportionately represented 10 children from their families,” and “improve permanency outcomes.” Minn. Stat. § 260.62(a)(1)-(3). MAAFPA defines “the best interests of an African American or disproportionately represented child” to mean that a social services agency will provide “a culturally informed practice lens that acknowledges, utilizes, and embraces the African American or disproportionately represented child’s community and cultural norms and allows the child to remain safely at home with the child’s family.” Minn. Stat. § 260.63, subd. 5. MAAFPA recognizes that the best interests of an African American or disproportionately represented child “support the child’s sense of belonging to the child’s family, extended family, kin, and cultural community.” Id. MAAFPA requires that, in juvenile-protection cases involving an African American or disproportionately represented child, a social services agency must “make active efforts to prevent the out-of-home placement of an African American or a disproportionately represented child, eliminate the need for a child’s removal from the child’s home, and reunify an African American or a disproportionately represented child with the child’s family as soon as practicable.” 4 Minn. Stat. § 260.64, subd. 1. The active-efforts standard is higher than the reasonable-efforts standard generally applicable in most juvenile- 4 This provision of MAAFPA parallels the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires a social services agency to make “active efforts” to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs before a child is placed out of the home. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 260.762, subd. 2a (2024) (requiring “active efforts” under the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA)). While MAAFPA was designed in a manner that appears to share some similarities with MIFPA, there are critical differences in the overall statutory scheme, as well as the details of each act. 11 protection cases to which MAAFPA does not apply. Minn. Stat. § 260.63, subd. 2. Active efforts are defined under the statute as the “rigorous and concerted level of effort that the responsible social services agency must continuously make throughout the time that the responsible social services agency is involved with an African American or a disproportionately represented child and the child’s family.” 5 Id. To provide active efforts, “the responsible social services agency must continuously involve an African American or a disproportionately represented child’s family in all services for the family, including case planning and choosing services and providers, and inform the family of the ability to file a report of noncompliance with this act.” Id. And “the responsible social services agency must consider an African American or a disproportionately represented child’s family’s social and cultural values at all times while providing services to the African American or disproportionately represented child and the child’s family.” Id. Under MAAFPA, “termination of parental rights” is defined as “an action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship under section 260C.301.” Minn. Stat. § 260.63, subd. 20. MAAFPA provides that, “Except as provided in subdivision 3, the [district] court “shall not terminate the parental rights of a parent of an African American or a disproportionately represented child in a placement proceeding unless the allegations against the parent involve . . . egregious harm” or allegations of a serious crime specified 5 This provision of MAAFPA is consistent with MIFPA’s definition of “active efforts.” Minn. Stat. § 260.755, subd. 1a (2024). 12 in the statute. 2026 Minn. Laws ch. 88, art. I, § 161 (to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subd. 2(b) (2026)). Additionally, MAAFPA states, a district court “may terminate the parental rights of a parent of an African American or a disproportionately represented child if a transfer of permanent legal and physical custody . . . is not possible because the child has no willing or able noncustodial parent or relative to whom custody can be transferred,” and if one or more conditions exist: (1) that the parent has abandoned the child; (2) that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship, either of which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child; (3) that following the child’s placement out of the home, active efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement. .... (4) that a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care. Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subd. 3. With this understanding of the background and statutory scheme of MAAFPA, we turn to the issues presented here. Father contends that: (1) MAAFPA provides a statutory framework separate from, and more restrictive than, the general termination provisions in Chapter 260C, and 13 therefore the district court erred by relying on section 260C.301 as an independent basis for termination; (2) under the MAAFPA framework, subdivisions 2 and 3 must be read together, such that termination is permitted only when the allegations involve a serious crime, the child has no willing or able noncustodial parent or relative to whom custody can be transferred, and one or more of the conditions identified in subdivision 3(a) exist; (3) termination of parental rights is permissible under subdivision 3(a)(2) “only when the children are in need of a permanent home and cannot be returned to their custodial parent”; and (4) the district court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights under both Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3), and 260.67, subdivision 3(a)(2). The county responds that section 260.67 establishes two distinct paths to termination. Under the first path, which is established by section 260.67, subdivision 2(b), the restrictions imposed by MAAFPA do not apply when the allegations against the parent involve egregious harm or a serious crime, allowing termination under the general provisions of section 260C.301. Under the second path, which is established by section 260.67, subdivision 3(a), termination may be authorized even in the absence of allegations involving egregious harm or a serious crime when other statutory prerequisites are satisfied. The county therefore contends that MAAFPA supplements, rather than displaces, Chapter 260C and that the district court correctly harmonized the two statutory schemes. 6 We address each argument in turn. 6 When the county filed the petition, section 260.67, subdivision 2(b), stated: “Except as provided in paragraph (c) a court shall not terminate the parental rights of a parent of an 14 I. Chapter 260C and MAAFPA can be read harmoniously. Father argues that because MAAFPA provides a statutory framework separate from, and more restrictive than, the general termination provisions in Chapter 260C, Chapter 260C does not apply to MAAFPA cases. Generally, courts construe statutes, when possible, to avoid irreconcilable conflicts between (or among) the statute being construed. D.W.H. ex rel. Mitchell v. Steele, 494 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d, 512 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. 1994); see Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2024) (“When a general provision in a law is in conflict with a special provision in the same or another law, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.”). Statutory provisions conflict irreconcilably only when they are “necessarily inconsistent”—that is, when they cannot “stand and be operative without repugnance to each other.” State v. City of Duluth, 56 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn. 1952). “If the conflict between the two provisions [is] irreconcilable, the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision was enacted” later in time. Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1. And if the provisions African American or a disproportionately represented child” unless certain conditions are met. Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subd. 2(b). The then-existing section 260.67, subdivision 2, however, did not contain a paragraph (c). In 2026, the legislature amended section 260.67, subdivision 2, to say: “Except as provided in subdivision 3, a court shall not terminate the parental rights of a parent of an African American or a disproportionately represented child.” 2026 Minn. Laws ch. 88, art. I, § 161, at 110 (emphasis added) (amending Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subd. 2(b) (2024)). And the amended version of the statute includes a “subdivision 3.” Because the amendment resolves the ambiguity asserted by father, we need not address this issue on appeal. 15 of two or more laws passed at different sessions are irreconcilable, the law latest in date of final enactment prevails. Id., subd. 4. Here, the parties agree that Chapter 260C supplies broad rules for all child protection matters, while MAAFPA provides more targeted provisions for African American and disproportionately represented children. Father, however, argues that MAAFPA, as the more specific statute, entirely displaces Chapter 260C unless it expressly incorporates Chapter 260C’s provisions. An assertion that MAAFPA entirely displaces Chapter 260C is inconsistent with both relevant caselaw and with the language of MAAFPA. Therefore, we reject father’s argument. Specifically, the supreme court has stated that: an exemption from the broad scope of [the earlier statute] is not presumed absent express statutory language to that effect. [The newer statute] contains no express language exempting it from the reach of [the older statute]. Instead, [the newer statute] expressly limits application of its provisions . . . to only that Act. State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584, 593 (Minn. 2021). Here, not only did the legislature not expressly exempt MAAFPA from Chapter 260C, it defined “termination of parental rights” under MAAFPA with reference to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301. Minn. Stat. § 260C.63, subd. 20. We are bound by that definition. State v. Bee, 17 N.W.3d 150, 154 (Minn. 2025). Accordingly, not only is the “express” exemption required by caselaw missing from MAAFPA, but any exemption—express, implied, or inferred—would be inconsistent with the way the legislature structured MAAFPA. We therefore cannot accept father’s argument. Instead, 16 the two statutory schemes must be construed, whenever possible, to give effect to both. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26 (2024). Applying MAAFPA’s definition of “termination of parental rights” to the termination provision in section 260.67, subdivision 2(b), results in MAAFPA saying that “a court shall not terminate the parental rights of a parent [under section 260C.301] of an African American or a disproportionately represented child . . . unless the allegations against the parent involve” one of the enumerated crimes. Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subd. 2(b). The plain language of subdivision 2(b) thus establishes a limitation on the application of section 260C.301 in MAAFPA cases: A court may not terminate parental rights under that provision unless the allegations against the parent involve one of the enumerated crimes. Where such allegations are present, however, the statutory limitation does not preclude application of section 260C.301. Accordingly, the provisions are not irreconcilable or otherwise in conflict. Likewise, applying MAAFPA’s definition of “termination of parental rights” to the termination provision in section 260.67, subdivision 3, results in MAAFPA saying that “a court may terminate the parental rights of a parent [under section 260C.301] of an African American or a disproportionately represented child . . . if a transfer of permanent legal and physical custody . . . is not possible” if one of the enumerated conditions exist. Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subd. 3. The plain language of subdivision 3 thus provides that a court may terminate the parental rights of a parent of an African American or disproportionately represented child under section 260C.301 if transfer of permanent legal and physical custody is not possible and one of the enumerated conditions exists. Where such a 17 condition is present, subdivision 3 does not preclude application of section 260C.301. Accordingly, the provisions are not irreconcilable or otherwise in conflict. The legislature has prescribed the circumstances in which section 260C.301 may be applied, and we are bound to apply the statute according to its plain language. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024). In sum, father does not identify an irreconcilable conflict between section 260C.301 and MAAFPA. And we do not perceive one. The two statutes can be read to give effect to both provisions. Even if father were correct that parts of MAAFPA conflict with parts of section 260C.301, the conflicts are not irreconcilable. Accordingly, both statutes can be construed harmoniously “so that effect may be given to both.” Minn. Stat § 645.26. II. The district court did not err in its interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 260.67 by applying the statute’s two-path framework to terminate father’s parental rights. Father first argues that the district court erred by interpreting Minnesota Statutes section 260.67 as a two-path framework for termination. Father asserts that, instead, subdivisions 2 and 3 of section 260.67, must be read together. Under father’s interpretation of the statute, termination is only possible if (1) the allegations against the parent involve a serious crime, (2) the child has no willing or able custodial parent to whom custody can be transferred, and (3) the district court finds that one or more of the conditions provided under subdivision 3(a) exist. Father also argues that the district court erroneously relied on Chapter 260C to terminate his parental rights because MAAFPA’s permanency provisions are “separate and distinct” from Chapter 260C. 18  The county contends that the district court correctly interpreted section 260.67 to provide a two-path framework to terminate the parental rights of a parent of an African American or a disproportionately represented child. More specifically, the county asserts that the first path—section 260.67, subdivision 2(b)—allows the court to rely on the broader termination authority provided under section 260C.301, while the second path— section 260.67, subdivision 3(a)—provides a narrower set of modified grounds to terminate parental rights under section 260C.301 when the conditions under subdivision 2(b) are not met. The county also argues that the plain language of section 260.67 unambiguously incorporates Chapter 260C as a baseline termination authority and that the legislature did not intend for section 260.67 to replace section 260C.301. The district court determined that the plain language of the statute did not support father’s interpretation. It reasoned that section 260.67 created two separate avenues to terminate parental rights: subdivision 2 and subdivision 3. Under the first avenue— subdivision 2—the district court determined that it could terminate parental rights without consideration of the exceptions contained in section 260.67, subdivision 3, if there are allegations of egregious harm or a serious crime pursuant to section 260.67, subdivision 2(b). It clarified that the plain language in subdivision 2(b) did not provide an entirely new basis to terminate, but instead acted as a “carve-out” to section 260C.301. In other words, if the requirements of subdivision 2(b) are met, the restrictions against termination in section 260.67, subdivision 3, do not apply and the district court can terminate parental rights under section 260C.301. 19  The district court also recognized a second avenue to terminate parental rights under the statute—section 260.67, subdivision 3. It reasoned that even if there were no allegations of egregious harm or a serious crime, the district court could still terminate parental rights if two conditions were both present: (1) transfer of permanent legal and physical custody was not possible because the child had no willing or able custodian to whom custody could be transferred, and (2) one or more of the following conditions existed: abandonment, palpable unfitness, failure of active efforts, or egregious harm. The district court also held that MAAFPA was intended to be read consistently with other child protection statutes contained in Chapter 260C. It reasoned that MAAFPA could not function independently from Chapter 260C because MAAFPA and Chapter 260C were “part of a coherent legislative policy.” The parties’ arguments require us to interpret provisions of MAAFPA. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G., 991 N.W.2d 874, 884 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “Under the de novo standard, we do not defer to the analysis of the court[] below, but instead we exercise independent review.” Id. (quotation omitted). When engaging in statutory interpretation, we start by analyzing whether the applicable statutory language is ambiguous on its face. Id. “A statute is ambiguous when its language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). When addressing whether statutory language is ambiguous, we give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (“We construe words and phrases according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved 20 usage.” (quotations omitted)). If a statute is unambiguous, we apply the statutory language. In re Welfare of Children of J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 2020). If the statute is ambiguous, “then we may apply the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). We cannot add words to an unambiguous statute under the guise of statutory interpretation. County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013); see also Great River Energy v. Swedzinski, 860 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn. 2015) (stating that we cannot add words to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted). “[W]hen a question of statutory construction involves a failure of expression rather than an ambiguity of expression, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.” In re E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted). Put differently, “we will not read into a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted, either purposely or inadvertently.” Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006). As is relevant to this appeal, section 260.67 is broken into five subdivisions: (1) Preference for permanency placement with a relative; (2) Termination of parental rights restrictions; (3) Termination of parental rights exceptions; (4) Voluntary termination of parental rights; and (5) Appeals. 7 Minn. Stat. § 260.67, subds. 1-5. At issue in this case 7 The subdivision headings are noted at the beginning of each subdivision in boldface. “The headnotes printed in boldface type before sections and subdivisions in editions of Minnesota Statutes are mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the section or subdivision and are not part of the statute.” Minn. Stat. § 645.49 (2024). 21 are the restrictions on termination of parental rights outlined in section 260.67, subdivision 2(b), and the exceptions out