People v Wilkins

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v WILKINS Docket No. 167737. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 15, 2025. Decided July 22, 2026. Freddie Wilkins, III, was charged in the 63rd District Court with carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle, MCL 750.227. A Michigan State Police trooper pulled over defendant’s vehicle for speeding; defendant was driving, and there was a passenger in the front seat. As the trooper approached the vehicle, he noticed the smell of marijuana from the open passenger-side window, but he did not see marijuana in plain view and neither defendant nor the passenger was smoking marijuana or appeared intoxicated. The trooper learned that defendant and the passenger were under the age of 21, and when initially questioned, both denied having marijuana. However, the passenger later admitted that she had some “shake,” which the trooper understood to mean a small amount of marijuana, the possession of which in small amounts by a person under the age of 21 is a civil infraction under MCL 333.27965 of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA), MCL 333.27951 et seq. The trooper then searched the vehicle and found a firearm, which defendant admitted belonged to him. At his preliminary examination, defendant challenged the vehicle search on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the district court, Sara J. Smolenski, J., bound him over on the charged offense. In the Kent Circuit Court, defendant moved to suppress the gun on the same grounds. The circuit court, Scott A. Noto, J., denied defendant’s motion. Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals denied. Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration as on leave granted. 513 Mich 1052 (2024). On remand, in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued September 5, 2024 (Docket No. 367209), the Court of Appeals, SWARTZLE, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ., affirmed the circuit court’s holding that the search of defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Defendant again sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which directed and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 294 (2025). In an opinion by Justice THOMAS, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:  The warrantless search of defendant’s car was unlawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the trooper did not have probable cause to believe there was a criminal amount of marijuana in the vehicle. MCL 333.27965(3)(a) and (b) provide that “a person under 21 years of age who possesses not more than 2.5 ounces of marihuana . . . is responsible for a civil infraction” for a first or second violation; MCL 333.27965(4) retains criminal penalties for possession and other activities involving larger amounts of marijuana. The people of Michigan demonstrated a reduced state interest in enforcement of laws prohibiting marijuana possession and use when they took the offense out of the realm of criminal law through enactment of the MRTMA by ballot initiative. Probable cause to believe only that a defendant is responsible for a civil infraction does not establish probable cause to conduct a warrantless search under the automobile exception. Instead, a police officer performing a warrantless search under the automobile exception must have probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Because the amount of marijuana present defines the distinction between a civil infraction and a crime, the officer must have probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of marijuana is present; substances prohibited only by civil law are not “contraband” for purposes of supporting a warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the smell of marijuana does not per se provide probable cause regarding possession of a criminal amount. In this case, where the trooper had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained a small amount of marijuana—i.e., that a civil infraction had occurred, but not that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime—this probable cause was insufficient to support a warrantless search under the automobile exception. That the trooper smelled marijuana was also insufficient, alone or combined with the passenger’s statement indicating that she may have had a small amount of marijuana, to establish probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of marijuana was present in the car. Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. Justice WELCH, concurring, agreed with the majority’s Fourth Amendment analysis and joined the majority opinion in full, but wrote separately to express that she would have decided the case under Article 1, § 11 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution rather than under federal law. Defendant preserved and asserted his claim that the trooper’s actions violated his rights under Const 1963, art 1, § 11, and she would have reached those arguments. Because marijuana has remained illegal at the federal level, federal courts have not yet confronted the issues raised in this case, and Michigan’s Constitution would have provided a simpler basis to reach a decision. Accordingly, rather than relying on federal law, Justice WELCH would have done as other state courts have done when grappling with the interplay of marijuana legalization (or decriminalization) and the automobile exception: she would have rendered a decision based on the state Constitution. Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justice BERNSTEIN, dissenting, disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that it was unlawful for the trooper to conduct a warrantless search under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. Properly framed, the actual issue in this case is whether the trooper could lawfully search defendant’s vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement when he had probable cause to believe that marijuana contraband would be found in the vehicle, even if the amount in question turned out to be a noncriminal amount. This Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have consistently held that a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle under the automobile exception if the officer has probable cause to believe he will find contraband or evidence of a crime. An officer need not have probable cause as to the exact amount of marijuana contraband when no one in the vehicle can legally possess any amount of marijuana; further, the MRTMA provides for the forfeiture of marijuana possessed by any person under the age of 21, and the Supreme Court of the United States has included items subject to civil forfeiture within the meaning of “contraband” under the Fourth Amendment. Under the facts of this case, the trooper had probable cause to believe he would find marijuana contraband in the vehicle.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 22, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167737 FREDDIE WILKINS, III, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH THOMAS, J. In this case, a state trooper pulled defendant Freddie Wilkins over, smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle, and learned that both defendant and the other vehicle occupant were under the age of 21. The trooper ordered defendant out of the car and searched him, but the trooper did not recover any contraband. After questioning, the vehicle’s passenger said that she may have had a small amount of marijuana. The possession of a small amount of marijuana by a person under the age of 21 is, as of December 6, 2018, a civil infraction in our state. MCL 333.27965. The trooper then searched the vehicle and found a concealed firearm but did not recover any marijuana. At issue is whether the trooper could conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile exception. We hold that the search was unlawful. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was adopted after a history of colonial authorities conducting abusive searches in service of proving minor or imagined offenses. 1 In light of that history and our subsequent development of the law of search and seizure, which recognizes a required balancing between the interests of the state and the individual, we cannot say that the warrantless search of an automobile premised on probable cause to believe a civil infraction has been committed is reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has not applied the automobile exception to the warrant requirement for civil infractions, and this Court has not done so, either. Although a civil infraction is still a violation of law, it is of lesser severity than a criminal infraction. And the people of this state demonstrated a reduced state interest in enforcement of laws prohibiting marijuana possession and use specifically by taking the offense out of the realm of criminal law by ballot initiative. This reduced governmental interest in detecting and punishing civil infractions does not overcome the individual’s expectation of privacy in their vehicle under the Fourth Amendment, and the trooper here did not have probable cause concerning any criminal violation. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of our Court of Appeals affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. 1 Defendant also raised a challenge under Article 1, § 11 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution. Because our constitutional provision is at least as protective as the Fourth Amendment, we need not resolve whether our state Constitution provides a more protective independent basis for our decision here. 2  I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 16, 2023, a Michigan State Police trooper pulled over defendant’s vehicle for speeding. Defendant was driving, and there was another person in the front passenger seat. As the trooper approached the passenger side, he saw that the front passenger window was down, and he noticed the smell of marijuana. On cross-examination, the trooper said that “it didn’t smell like [defendant] had just smoked it[.]” 2 The trooper did not see any marijuana in plain view, and he did not see any signs that either the defendant or the passenger was intoxicated or smoking marijuana. Upon reaching the vehicle window, the trooper took the licenses of both occupants and learned that they were under the age of 21. The trooper then went back to his vehicle to request backup. Once the backup arrived, the trooper returned to defendant’s vehicle and asked the occupants whether they had marijuana. They denied that they did. He asked defendant to step out of the vehicle and searched him. Finding nothing on defendant, the trooper ordered the passenger out of the vehicle and questioned her. The passenger said she had “some shake,” which the trooper 2 On direct examination, the officer agreed that he “know[s] what marijuana, both fresh and burnt, smells like[.]” On cross-examination, he had the following exchange with defense counsel: Q. Okay. So was that the smell of fresh marijuana or burnt marijuana? A. It smelled like marijuana. It wasn’t—well, from my experience people often smoke in their cars. I mean, it could be minutes, it could be hours. I mean, it didn’t smell like he had just smoked it, it just smelled like marijuana. 3 understood to mean a “small amount of marijuana.” In light of that admission, the trooper decided to search the vehicle. During the search, the trooper discovered a backpack on the floor in front of the passenger seat. Inside the backpack, the trooper found empty ziplock cellophane packages and a loaded semiautomatic pistol with an extended magazine. Defendant admitted that the pistol was his. Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle. MCL 750.227. He challenged the search of the vehicle on Fourth Amendment grounds at his preliminary examination, but the district court bound him over on the charge. He again raised the issue before the circuit court in a motion to suppress. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion, and defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal in our Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the application. People v Wilkins, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 11, 2023 (Docket No. 367209). This Court subsequently remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the appeal as on leave granted. People v Wilkins, 513 Mich 1052 (2024); see also MCR 7.305(I)(1). On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s holding that the search of defendant’s vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See generally People v Wilkins, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 5, 2024 (Docket No. 367209). Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the application and asked the parties to address: (1) whether the search of the defendant’s person by Trooper [James] Tomkins exceeded the permissible scope of Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21, 30- 31[; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889] (1968); (2) if so, whether the discovery of the recovered weapon was causally connected to the search of the defendant’s person; and (3) whether the search of the defendant’s vehicle 4  was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, where the trooper had probable cause to believe that the defendant was responsible for a civil infraction for possessing marijuana while under 21 years of age contrary to the protections of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act, MCL 333.27951 et seq. [People v Wilkins, ___ Mich ___, ___; 18 NW3d 294, 294 (2025).] We hold that where the trooper had probable cause to believe only that defendant was responsible for a civil infraction, the search of the vehicle was not permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 3 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “When reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s factual findings.” People v Duff, 514 Mich 617, 629; 22 NW3d 476 (2024). And we review de novo any questions of constitutional law and the application of constitutional standards to uncontested facts. Id. at 629-630. III. MICHIGAN REGULATION AND TAXATION OF MARIHUANA ACT As we recognized last term, the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA) represents “[a] sea change regarding the legality of marijuana” in Michigan. People v Armstrong, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (Docket No. 165233) (April 2, 2025); slip op at 10. The people’s “general intent” in approving the MRTMA was “to decriminalize the use and possession of marijuana . . . .” Id. at ___; slip op at 10. 3 Though we asked the parties to brief the prolonging of a traffic stop, see Rodriguez v United States, 575 US 348; 135 S Ct 1609; 191 L Ed 2d 492 (2015), we do not answer that question because it is no longer necessary to do so in the instant appeal. Moreover, we note that the prosecution conceded that the search of defendant’s person exceeded the scope of Terry, 392 US 1, which allows for a frisk for weapons, and was not supported by probable cause. 5 However, this did not render possession or use of marijuana lawful in all contexts. Id. at ___; slip op at 11. Relevant here, “a person under 21 years of age who possesses not more than 2.5 ounces of marihuana or who cultivates not more than 12 marihuana plants . . . is responsible for a civil infraction” for a first or second violation. MCL 333.27965(3)(a) and (b). This is in accord with the other stated intent “to . . . prevent the distribution of marihuana to persons under 21 years of age[.]” MCL 333.27952. And the MRTMA retains criminal penalties for possession and other activities involving large amounts of marijuana. MCL 333.27965(4). IV. DISCUSSION With this background in mind, we turn to the parties’ request that we resolve how the Fourth Amendment applies to minors who are believed to be in possession of marijuana. See MCL 333.27965(3)(a) and (b). The question boils down to whether a police officer must have probable cause to believe a crime, as opposed to a civil infraction, has occurred to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle. In this case, where the trooper had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained a small amount of marijuana—i.e., that a civil infraction had occurred, but not that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime— such probable cause was insufficient to support a warrantless search under the automobile exception. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE SEARCH- WARRANT REQUIREMENT The Fourth Amendment of our United States Constitution provides as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 6  affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US Const, Am IV.] This amendment was adopted in the shadow of the American Revolution and not long after the states adopted our federal Constitution. Among the acts that culminated in our Declaration of Independence were the issuance of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants” by English officials. Boyd v United States, 116 US 616, 625-626; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886), overruled in part on other grounds by Md Penitentiary Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294 (1967). Writs of assistance were issued to revenue officers, “empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods[.]” Boyd, 116 US at 625. Similarly, general warrants were issued “for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner of the charge of libel.” Id. at 625-626. The antagonism of these acts, the United States Supreme Court has observed, is necessary context “to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures[.]’ ” Id. at 624-625. 4 The Framers sought to provide for “those safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from . . . [these] invasions of home and privacy of the citizens and the seizure of their private papers in support of [any] charges, real or 4 See also Md Penitentiary Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 301; 87 S Ct 1642; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967) (“We have examined on many occasions the history and purposes of the Amendment. It was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies . . . .”). 7 imaginary, [officials could] ma[ke] against them.” Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 390; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914). 5 Broadly, the Fourth Amendment “guarantees an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, 634; 983 NW2d 827 (2022). And warrantless searches are “presumed” unreasonable. Id. at 637. Although a warrantless search may be constitutional if “shown to be within one of several established exceptions,” id., these exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn” in light of the Framers’ intent, Jones v United States, 357 US 493, 499; 78 S Ct 1253; 2 L Ed 2d 1514 (1958). Evidence seized as the result of an unconstitutional search is generally excluded at trial. Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 485; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963). 6 Here, we are asked to consider the lawfulness of the search under the so-called automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The Fourth Amendment and its exceptions seek to balance the private interests of the individual against the government’s interest in fighting crime. See, e.g., Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US 740, 748-753; 104 S Ct 2091; 80 L Ed 2d 732 (1984) (addressing exigent circumstances to justify warrantless arrests in the home). Though one has “privacy interests in an automobile [that] are constitutionally protected,” the United States Supreme Court has said that this interest has “a lesser degree of protection” relative to an individual’s home or person. California v Carney, 471 US 386, 390; 105 S Ct 2066; 85 L Ed 2d 406 (1985). A person generally has 5 It is worth noting that we subsequently adopted the historical reasoning of Boyd and Weeks in interpreting our own Constitution’s search and seizure protections. See generally People v Marxhausen, 204 Mich 559; 171 NW 557 (1919) (decided under the 1908 Michigan Constitution); see also Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed), p 426. 6 See also United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347; 94 S Ct 613; 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974). 8 a decreased expectation of privacy in their vehicle because “the passenger compartment . . . is relatively open to plain view” and vehicles are subject to “pervasive regulation,” including the ability of police officers to make traffic stops. Id. at 391-392. 7 Moreover, the government has a heightened interest in an immediate search without obtaining a warrant because “ ‘the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.’ ” Id. at 391, quoting Chambers v Maroney, 399 US 42, 51; 90 S Ct 1975; 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970). For these reasons, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the automobile exception on the basis that vehicles present an “exigent circumstance[].” See 3 LaFave, Search & Seizure (6th ed), § 5.5(c), pp 338-353. Such “exigent circumstances,” it is said, make enforcement of the warrant requirement impracticable. Id. Thus, the automobile exception serves as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, meaning that “ ‘the prior approval of [a] magistrate is waived’ ” and officers may search the vehicle without a warrant. Carney, 471 US at 394, quoting United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 823; 102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982). This applies to the vehicle as well as any items or containers contained therein, Ross, 456 US at 824-825, 8 so long as the vehicle “ ‘is readily mobile,’ ” Armstrong, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8, quoting Pennsylvania v Labron, 518 US 938, 940; 116 S Ct 2485; 135 L Ed 2d 1031 (1996). However, a police 7 See also, generally, Colorado v Bannister, 449 US 1; 101 S Ct 42; 66 L Ed 2d 1 (1980) (upholding a warrantless search subject to the automobile exception where items matching the description of those recently stolen were in plain view from the officer’s vantage point outside of the vehicle). 8 Cf. California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 580; 111 S Ct 1982; 114 L Ed 2d 619 (1991) (holding that the automobile exception also applies to containers in an automobile where the probable cause relates to the container, specifically, rather than the vehicle as a whole). 9 officer performing a warrantless search under the automobile exception must have probable cause to believe that “ ‘contraband or evidence of a crime . . . will be found in a particular place.’ ” Armstrong, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8, quoting People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417-418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). 9 Probable cause exists when “there is a ‘substantial basis for inferring a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” Armstrong, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8 (some quotation marks omitted), quoting Kazmierczak, 461 Mich at 417-418. Just last term, we held that the smell of marijuana alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause to support a search because the people have voted to legalize the possession and consumption of marijuana. Armstrong, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 11-12. However, Armstrong does not tell us whether the automobile exception applies where possession would be a civil infraction. B. DOES THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION APPLY TO CIVIL INFRACTIONS? Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly said that the probable cause necessary to justify a warrantless search must relate to the presence of “ ‘contraband or evidence of a crime . . . in a particular place.’ ” People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 475; 739 NW2d 505 (2007), quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 238; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983); see also Armstrong, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8; Bufkin v Collins, 604 US 369, 384; 145 S Ct 728; 221 L Ed 2d 192 (2025). 10 Neither this Court nor the 9 See also Bannister, 449 US 1. 10 See also Maryland v King, 569 US 435, 449; 133 S Ct 1958; 186 L Ed 2d 1 (2013); Florida v Harris, 568 US 237, 243; 133 S Ct 1050; 185 L Ed 2d 61 (2013); United States v Grubbs, 547 US 90, 95; 126 S Ct 1494; 164 L Ed 2d 195 (2006); Levine, 461 Mich at 185. 10 United States Supreme Court has extended the automobile exception to allow for a warrantless search of a vehicle based on probable cause to believe that a civil infraction was committed. 11 Today, we decline to do so. The United States Supreme Court has not further defined what constitutes “contraband” and “evidence of a crime.” 12 A civil infraction is, by definition, not a crime, MCL 257.6a; MCL 600.113(1)(a), so probable cause to believe that a civil infraction occurred does not entail “evidence of a crime.” However, we must also examine whether a civil infraction for possession of marijuana allows a warrantless search because it is “contraband” under existing caselaw. We first look to Carroll v United States, 267 US 132; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543 (1925), which established the automobile exception. The case concerned federal officials’ ability to search a vehicle for alcohol banned by the National Prohibition Act (also known as the Volstead Act). Id. at 143-144, 153-154. The Carroll Court deemed such alcohol “contraband goods” and declared that police may search for any “contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile . . . without a warrant[.]” Id. at 153. 11 See generally Bannister, 449 US at 1-4 (upholding a warrantless search under the automobile exception where items matching the description of those recently stolen were in plain view from the officer’s vantage point outside of the vehicle); Ross, 456 US 798 (allowing a search of a container within a car when the search of the car was supported by probable cause to believe that narcotics were stored in the vehicle); Acevedo, 500 US at 580 (allowing a search of a closed bag in the trunk of an automobile when police had probable cause to believe the bag contained narcotics, but noting that a search of the rest of the vehicle would have been without probable cause and, therefore, unreasonable). 12 In Hayden, 387 US at 301, the United States Supreme Court eliminated the prior historic distinction between “ ‘mere evidence’ ” and “instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband” that can be seized under a search warrant. 11 Though it did not explicitly define the term “contraband,” the Court did make useful comparisons. For instance, it noted preexisting common-law rules allowing for the seizure of stolen goods and goods that went untaxed or were “concealed to avoid the duties payable on them[.]” 13 Id. at 149-150. And it compared the Volstead Act to the various customs statutes enacted by Congress under which searches for, and seizure of, contraband goods were authorized. Id. at 150-153. The cases Carroll cited in drawing these comparisons indicate that breaches of these statutes were violations of criminal law. See, e.g., Cotzhausen v Nazro, 107 US 215, 218-219; 2 S Ct 503; 27 L Ed 540 (1883) (recognizing that knowing violations of the postal treaty were punishable by fines “not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or . . . imprison[ment] for any time not exceeding two years, or both”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 Likewise, the Carroll Court explained that a person violating the Volstead Act was “to be arrested for a misdemeanor for his first and second offenses and for a felony if he offend[ed a] third time.” Carroll, 267 US at 154. Thus, Carroll only addressed the automobile exception with respect to contraband that was in violation of criminal law and did not consider its applicability to situations in which possession of an item is a mere civil infraction. 15 13 Though it also distinguished the latter common-law rule in holding that it “would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor” despite the fact that “[t]ravelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary . . . .” Carroll, 267 US at 153-154. 14 See also, e.g., Boyd, 116 US at 617. 15 We recognize that our sister court in Maryland has concluded to the contrary when faced with a statute decriminalizing possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana. See Robinson v State, 451 Md 94; 152 A3d 661 (2017). In addition to the slightly different legislative posture in Maryland, where the legislature specified that the decriminalization bill “may not be construed” to affect seizure law, the Maryland court failed to address the petitioners’ 12  Aside from relying on Carroll, the prosecution also cites the definition of the term “contraband” in Black’s Law Dictionary. It defines the term as meaning either “[i]llegal or prohibited trade; smuggling” or “[g]oods that are unlawful to import, export, produce, or possess.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed). That definition does not refer explicitly to criminal or civil law. Terms such as “illegal” 16 and “unlawful” 17 do not plainly encompass noncriminal conduct. And, in light of the “jealously guarded” exceptions to the warrant requirement, drawn from the Fourth Amendment’s history and our contemporary caselaw, we decline to extend “contraband” to include trade or goods related to a civil infraction without clearer authority. argument “that the contraband in Carroll . . . was a crime to possess,” other than to state, “The fallacy of this argument is that, in Carroll, the Supreme Court concluded that ability to search does not depend on the suspected offense being an offense for which arrest is authorized.” Id. at 129. However, the Carroll Court only so held in refusing to apply to the automobile exception the common-law rule that a police officer can only arrest for misdemeanors without a warrant where the violation occurred in their presence. See Carroll, 267 US at 156-159. Because both misdemeanors and felonies are violations of the criminal law, this analysis does not answer the question presented here. Justice ZAHRA cites a handful of other state court cases in his dissent. However, like Robinson, these cases fail to engage in a significant historical analysis of search protections and are largely distinguishable. See, e.g., State v Barclay, 398 A2d 794 (Me, 1979); State v Smalley, 233 Or App 263, 270-271; 225 P3d 844 (2010) (analyzing the search of the defendant’s backpack under the Oregon Constitution); People v Waxler, 224 Cal App 4th 712, 715 n 1, 723; 168 Cal Rptr 3d 822 (2014) (clarifying that while possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana was an “ ‘infraction’ ” punishable only by a fine, the California Penal Code categorizes an “infraction” as being “a ‘crime’ ” and holding Commonwealth v Cruz, 459 Mass 459; 945 NE2d 899 (2011), discussed later in this opinion, inapposite for that reason). 16 “Forbidden by law; unlawful . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed). 17 “Not authorized by law; illegal” or “[c]riminally punishable . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed). 13  The Framers did not enact the Fourth Amendment only in response to the unfettered discretion embodied in the writs of assistance during the colonial period; they also objected to the general warrants seeking libelous materials and evidence supporting minor charges. Boyd, 116 US at 625-626; see also Weeks, 232 US at 390. In analyzing its own declaration of rights, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed that, historically, “ ‘[s]earch warrants were . . . confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals.’ ” Commonwealth v Cruz, 459 Mass 459, 475-476; 945 NE2d 899 (2011) (ellipsis in Cruz), quoting Robinson v Richardson, 79 Mass 454, 456 (1859). 18 Professor Wayne LaFave also incorporates this understanding into his articulation of the probable-cause standard: “Two conclusions . . . must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.” 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure (6th ed), § 3.1(b), pp 8-9 (emphasis added). Such a history supports the conclusion that the “contraband” discussed in Caroll only refers to those goods the possession of which violates the criminal law. Moreover, this distinction comports with contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine. “ ‘[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.” ’ ” Lange v California, 594 US 295, 301; 141 S Ct 2011; 210 L Ed 2d 486 (2021), quoting Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 398, 403; 126 S Ct 1943; 164 L Ed 2d 650 (2006). As noted above, courts seek to balance the interests of the government against those of the 18 See also Levine, 461 Mich at 182 (observing that the same probable-cause analysis applies to both issuance of a search warrant and warrantless searches under the automobile exception). 14 individual in determining whether a search was reasonable. See generally Welsh, 466 US 740; Carney, 471 US at 390. Accordingly, police generally cannot make a warrantless entry into a suspect’s home to arrest them for a misdemeanor offense. Welsh, 466 US at 748-751. Similarly, some of our sister courts have held it unreasonable to initiate an investigative Terry stop for a civil infraction such as a failure to pay parking tickets, State v Holmes, 569 NW2d 181, 184-186 (Minn, 1997), or carrying an open container of alcohol in public, State v Duncan, 146 Wash 2d 166, 175; 43 P3d 513 (2002). In so holding, these cases noted important distinctions between criminal offenses and civil offenses. Reasonableness demands some proportionality between the violation being investigated and the acceptable intrusion into a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648, 654; 99 S Ct 1391; 59 L Ed 2d 660 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 19 To wit, this Court has said: These rights of the individual in his person and property should be held sacred, and any attempt to fritter them away under the guise of enforcing drastic sumptuary legislation (no matter how beneficial to the people it may be claimed to be) must meet with the clear and earnest disapproval of the courts. [Marxhausen, 204 Mich at 567.] And on the Fourth Amendment spectrum, criminal activity justifies a relatively greater level of intrusion than a civil offense. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed regarding its own statute, “[D]ecriminalizing possession of [a] small quantity of marijuana” signaled the people’s 19 See also Cruz, 459 Mass at 476-477. 15 intent to establish that such an offense was “no longer ‘a serious infraction worthy of criminal sanction[.]’ ” See Commonwealth v Rodriguez, 472 Mass 767, 777; 37 NE3d 611 (2015), quoting Cruz, 459 Mass at 471. Our courts, too, have recognized that civil infractions are less severe than criminal