Bowerman v Red Oak Management Co, Inc

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong BOWERMAN v RED OAK MANAGEMENT CO, INC Docket No. 167718. Argued on application for leave to appeal December 10, 2025. Decided July 20, 2026. Jan Bowerman brought an action in the Montcalm Circuit Court against Red Oak Management Co., Inc., Westveld Services, LLC, and Bob’s Asphalt & Paving, Inc., after she sustained an injury when she stepped into a shallow trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot of Stanton Park Apartments, an apartment building for elderly and disabled individuals where she resided, while taking out her trash before sunrise on October 30, 2021. Red Oak managed Stanton Park and contracted with Westveld to replace concrete in the parking lot; Westveld created the trench when replacing the concrete slab underneath a dumpster in the parking lot, and testimony indicated that the trench remained uncovered and unmarked for several weeks after Westveld completed its work on October 21, 2021. Red Oak also contracted with Bob’s Asphalt to fill in the trench with asphalt, but Bob’s Asphalt did not complete this work until November 10, 2021. Bowerman brought a three-count complaint, alleging that Red Oak breached its covenant under MCL 554.139(1) to keep the premises and all common areas fit for the use intended by the parties and in a reasonable state of repair and that Westveld and Bob’s Asphalt negligently failed to correct the trench or install adequate safeguards and warnings so that it would not constitute a trip hazard. Defendants each moved for summary disposition, and the trial court, Ronald J. Schafer, J., granted the motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10), holding that Red Oak did not breach its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because the trash-disposal area remained reasonably accessible and was therefore fit for the use intended by the parties and that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounded in premises liability and, as a matter of law, Westveld did not owe Bowerman any duty of care because the trench was an open and obvious hazard that lacked special aspects rendering it unreasonably dangerous. Bowerman did not challenge the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of Bob’s Asphalt, but she appealed the order granting summary disposition to Red Oak and Westveld. In a split, unpublished per curiam opinion, issued September 12, 2024 (Docket No. 366338), the Court of Appeals, GADOLA, C.J., and K. F. KELLY, J. (MARIANI, J., dissenting), affirmed, holding that Red Oak did not breach its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep the common areas fit for the use intended by the parties because tenants retained reasonable access to the trash-disposal area and the trench was a “mere inconvenience” that did not negate the area’s fitness for the use intended by the parties. The Court of Appeals further held that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounded in negligence rather than premises liability, such that Westveld had a duty to perform its work with ordinary care so as not to create an unreasonable risk of harm, and that Westveld did not breach its common-law duty as a matter of law. Bowerman sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 21 NW3d 186 (2025). In an opinion by Justice HOOD, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN and WELCH, and joined by Justice THOMAS as to Part III(A) only (concerning the claim of negligence against Westveld), the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 1. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Westveld breached its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others, and the Court of Appeals therefore erred by affirming the trial court’s order granting Westveld summary disposition of Bowerman’s negligence claim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bowerman, reasonable persons could conclude that Westveld personnel created an unreasonable risk of harm by digging the trench and leaving it uncovered and unmarked upon their departure from Stanton Park. Michigan law distinguishes between claims based upon theories of ordinary negligence and those based upon premises liability. Premises-liability claims arise from the condition of the land at issue, and they are predicated upon the defendant’s possession and control of such land. Ordinary negligence claims, on the other hand, are based on the underlying premise that a person has a duty to conform their conduct to an applicable standard of care when undertaking an activity. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounds in ordinary negligence rather than premises liability. Westveld lacked possession and control of the trash- disposal area when Bowerman’s injury occurred; Bowerman’s claim was therefore premised upon the alleged failure of Westveld’s personnel to conform their conduct to the applicable standard of care associated with replacing the concrete platform underneath the dumpster. The common law imposes on every person engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use due care, or to so govern their actions as not to unreasonably endanger the person or property of others. Generally, unless the court can conclude that all reasonable persons would agree the defendant did not create an unreasonable risk of harm, whether a defendant’s conduct in the particular case breached this general standard of care is a question of fact for the jury to decide. In this case, the record reflects that Westveld created the trench and left it uncovered and unmarked. Westveld’s owner acknowledged that the trench could pose a tripping hazard and that Westveld personnel typically marked conditions such as the trench with cones or caution tape. Westveld personnel also filled a different, smaller trench but did not fill the trench at issue. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on evidence regarding Bowerman’s acts and omissions; Bowerman’s acts and omissions are relevant to her degree of comparative fault but do not establish, as a matter of law, that Westveld personnel acted in accordance with their common- law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others. 2. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that Red Oak did not breach its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a). MCL 554.139(1)(a) provides that in every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor covenants that the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties. The parties in this case did not dispute that the trash-disposal area was a “common area” as provided in MCL 554.139(1)(a). Red Oak therefore had a statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep the trash-disposal area fit for the use or uses intended by the parties. The appropriate inquiry under MCL 554.139(1)(a) is whether the common area in question is fit (i.e., adapted, suited, or appropriate) for the use intended by the parties under the circumstances of the specific case; the extent to which a hazard poses a mere inconvenience of access under Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 430 (2008), may be relevant, but it is not dispositive. Stanton Park held itself out as specifically housing elderly and disabled tenants, and this narrow category of tenants matters because MCL 554.139(1)(a) requires courts to analyze the fitness of a common area not in the abstract but rather in light of the uses intended by the parties to a residential lease. There is a nexus between a common area’s fitness and the particular tenants at issue. Accordingly, Red Oak had a statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to ensure that elderly and disabled tenants had reasonable access to a means of disposing of their trash. The trench was uncovered and unmarked, and Red Oak did not install warnings or visual aids before Bowerman was injured. Furthermore, a property-management expert opined that the parking lot where the trash-disposal area was located was underlit, which supported Bowerman’s testimony characterizing the trench as difficult to see in the predawn hours when her injury occurred. On these facts, because reasonable persons could conclude that the trench posed a hazard to the elderly and disabled tenants sufficient to render the trash-disposal area unfit for the use intended by the parties, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Red Oak violated MCL 554.139(1)(a). Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Justice THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurred in full with Part III(A) of the majority opinion because she agreed that genuine issues of material fact exist as to Bowerman’s common-law negligence claim against Westveld, but she dissented from Part III(B) of the majority opinion because she would conclude that no reasonable jury could find that the trench rendered the common area unfit under MCL 554.139(1)(a). She argued that, while the common law places a duty as to any condition on the land that creates an unreasonable risk of harm, the statutory covenant of fitness under MCL 554.139(1)(a) focuses on the fitness of the premises or common areas more broadly. While the trench was approximately 10 feet long, it was less than a foot wide, and tenants could easily avoid it when throwing away their trash or when walking through the parking lot to access a vehicle. The majority’s analysis of Bowerman’s statutory claim against Red Oak wrongly conflates the covenant of fitness in MCL 554.139(1)(a) with a common-law negligence duty and with the covenant of reasonable repair in MCL 554.139(1)(b). Justice BOLDEN, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would have held that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounds in premises liability and fails as a matter of law given that Westveld did not possess and control the premises where Bowerman fell. Justice BOLDEN would have further held that even under ordinary-negligence principles, although a contractor possesses common-law duties while it is performing its work, such duties are limited to the scope of the work. Accordingly, Justice BOLDEN would have affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment as to Westveld but for different reasons. As to Red Oak, Justice BOLDEN would have affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment as well as its application of the “mere inconvenience” test articulated in Allison, 481 Mich at 430, unless or until Allison is overruled. The majority’s decision creates a new standard of interpreting Michigan’s premises-liability jurisprudence and creates confusion about which standard ought to apply in future premises-liability cases.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 20, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT JAN BOWERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 167718 RED OAK MANAGEMENT CO., INC., and WESTVELD SERVICES, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, and BOB’S ASPHALT & PAVING, INC., Defendant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH HOOD, J. This case is about the common-law duties and statutory covenants applicable to residential common areas. Plaintiff, Jan Bowerman, sustained an injury when she stepped into a shallow trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot of the Stanton Park Apartments, where she then resided. Defendant Red Oak Management Co., Inc., managed the Stanton Park Apartments and contracted with defendant Westveld Services, LLC, to replace the existing concrete in certain areas around the apartment building. Westveld personnel created the trench when replacing the concrete slab underneath the Stanton Park Apartments’ dumpster. Two issues are presently before this Court. The first is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Westveld breached a duty it owed to Bowerman. The second is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Red Oak violated MCL 554.139(1)(a) (codifying the lessors’ covenant that all common areas in leased residential premises will be fit for the use intended by the parties). On both questions, the Court of Appeals concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact and affirmed the order granting summary disposition in favor of Red Oak and Westveld under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree with the Court of Appeals. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Westveld breached the common-law duty it owed to Bowerman and whether Red Oak breached its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a). We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND This case started with Bowerman fracturing her ankle in her apartment’s parking lot. Around 7:15 a.m. on October 30, 2021, Bowerman stepped into a shallow trench 2 abutting the trash-disposal area in the parking lot of the Stanton Park Apartments, an apartment building for elderly and disabled individuals where she resided, and fractured her ankle. Red Oak had contracted with Westveld to replace existing concrete in certain areas around the building, and Westveld personnel created the trench at issue when they replaced the concrete platform underneath a dumpster. The trench, which measured approximately 10 feet in length and four inches in depth, spanned one edge of the newly poured concrete platform. Different parties were responsible for making the trench, filling the trench, and generally maintaining the property. Eric Koch, a licensed general contractor whom Red Oak employed as a construction specialist, testified during his deposition that the trench remained uncovered and unmarked for several weeks after Westveld personnel completed their work and departed the Stanton Park Apartments on October 21, 2021. Red Oak had also contracted with defendant Bob’s Asphalt & Paving, Inc., to fill the areas around the newly poured concrete with asphalt. It was not until November 10, 2021, that Bob’s Asphalt personnel filled the trench. Westveld’s owner, Randy Westveld, testified during his deposition that Westveld personnel typically marked conditions like the trench with cones or caution tape, but he could not specifically recall whether they did so before leaving the Stanton Park Apartments. He also acknowledged that the trench could pose a tripping hazard. And although Westveld personnel filled another smaller trench with sand so that a wheelchair-bound tenant could access the apartment building, they did not fill the trench at issue. Albertas Kerelis, a licensed architect and proposed property-management expert, testified during his deposition that he inspected the Stanton Park Apartments’ parking lot where the trash-disposal area was located after dark and concluded that it was underlit 3 according to standards promulgated by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IES). 1 Kerelis acknowledged, however, that he was not aware of any local ordinance or Michigan law that required residential premises to comply with IES standards. Bowerman was 75 years old when she stepped in the trench. She had lived at the Stanton Park Apartments for several years. And Red Oak had previously employed her as the site manager for the apartment building before her retirement. Bowerman kept personal notes regarding the condition of the Stanton Park Apartments even after she retired. Prior to her injury, Bowerman noted Westveld’s concrete replacement work and the location of the dumpster, which Westveld personnel had temporarily removed from the original concrete platform and placed in a nearby grassy area. During her deposition, Bowerman testified that she fractured her ankle while attempting to take trash to the dumpster shortly before sunrise. She knew the location of the newly poured concrete platform, the trench, and the dumpster but could not clearly see the area in the early morning light. To avoid crossing the concrete platform on her way to the dumpster, Bowerman left the sidewalk and walked in a semicircle through the parking lot. She described the incident as follows: I looked out the side door, and I noticed that I could see the sidewalk. It was still dark, but there was still light on the sidewalk. I went down the sidewalk, and when I—I knew I was going to have to go to the parking lot to miss some of the area, but—so I went out to the parking lot. And once I got in the middle of the parking lot, it was all black. I couldn’t see, so then I spotted the dumpster. They had moved it off the patio slab it was on. I—I seen that 1 Using a specialized tool, Kerelis concluded that 0.0 foot-candles reached the parking lot surface. That figure, according to Kerelis, fell below the IES minimum standard for asphalt parking lots: 0.5 foot-candles. 4  because it had like a reflector on it, and there was a little light coming from the trees from the streetlight. So I kept my eye on that dumpster, and I started walking toward it. And before—before I knew it, my foot went right to the edge. At that time, I didn’t know what it was, but it went right to the edge of that trash, and I fell right down—right down in the hole. Following the fall, paramedics took Bowerman to a hospital by ambulance, and she was treated for a fractured ankle. Photographs allegedly taken minutes after Bowerman’s fall depicted the trench as both uncovered and unmarked. Bowerman later filed a three-count complaint against Red Oak, Westveld, and Bob’s Asphalt. In Count I, Bowerman alleged that Red Oak breached its covenant under MCL 554.139(1) to keep the premises and all common areas fit for the use intended by the parties and in a reasonable state of repair. In Count II, Bowerman alleged that Westveld negligently failed to correct the trench or install adequate safeguards and warnings so as to negate the tripping hazard it posed. And in Count III, Bowerman similarly alleged that Bob’s Asphalt negligently failed to correct the trench or install adequate safeguards and warnings to mitigate the tripping hazard it posed. Red Oak, Westveld, and Bob’s Asphalt each successfully moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 2 The trial court held, as a matter of law, that Red Oak did not breach its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because the trash-disposal area 2 Bowerman does not challenge the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of Bob’s Asphalt. Although the trial court did not explain its reasoning in a written order, Bob’s Asphalt argued in its motion that its personnel did not create the trench and were unaware of its existence until they were asked to fill it on November 10, 2021. That argument was supported by an affidavit executed by Michael Radford, the co-owner of Bob’s Asphalt, who stated that Koch requested on November 10, 2021, that Bob’s Asphalt personnel fill the trench at issue. The material statements in the affidavit were uncontroverted. 5 remained reasonably accessible and was therefore fit for the use intended by the parties. The trial court further held that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounded in premises liability and, as a matter of law, Westveld did not owe Bowerman any duty of care because the trench was an open and obvious hazard that lacked special aspects rendering it unreasonably dangerous. 3 Bowerman appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split, unpublished per curiam opinion. Bowerman v Red Oak Mgt Co, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 12, 2024 (Docket No. 366338). The majority held, as a matter of law, that Red Oak did not breach its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep the common areas fit for the use intended by the parties because tenants retained reasonable access to the trash-disposal area, notwithstanding the presence of the trench. Id. at 4-5. Namely, the tenants had means of access to the trash-disposal area that did not require them to encounter the trench. Id. at 5. And because Bowerman was able to successfully walk around the trench on several other occasions, the majority characterized it as a “mere inconvenience” that did not negate the area’s fitness for the use intended by the parties. Id. The majority further held that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounded in negligence rather than premises liability, such that Westveld had a duty to perform its work with ordinary care so as not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. Id. at 7. The majority concluded, as a matter of law, that Westveld did not breach its common-law duty. Id. It 3 The trial court entered its summary-disposition order just months before this Court held in Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95; 1 NW3d 44 (2023), that the open and obvious nature of a condition on a premises is relevant to breach and the parties’ comparative fault rather than a land possessor’s duty. 6 reasoned that the newly poured concrete platform was visible even in darkness. Id. And although Bowerman was aware of the trench’s location and could have avoided it, she chose the path that led to her injury. Id. Judge MARIANI dissented. In his view, summary disposition was unwarranted because there exist genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Red Oak breached its covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(a) and whether Westveld breached its common-law duty to perform its work with ordinary care so as not to create an unreasonable risk of harm. Bowerman (MARIANI, J., dissenting), unpub op at 1. Bowerman sought leave to appeal before this Court, and we ordered oral argument on the application. We directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Westveld breached any duty owed to Bowerman and whether Red Oak violated MCL 554.139(1)(a). Bowerman v Red Oak Mgt Co, Inc, ___ Mich ___; 21 NW3d 186 (2025). II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a complaint.” Kandil- Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 109; 1 NW3d 44 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of material 7 fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). At bottom, “[a] court’s role at the summary disposition stage is narrow[.]” Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 109. We likewise review de novo matters of statutory interpretation. Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 424; 751 NW2d 8 (2008). “The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language.” American Civil Liberties Union of Mich v Calhoun Co Sheriff’s Office, 509 Mich 1, 8; 983 NW2d 300 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When statutory language is unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or permitted because the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed by the words it chose.” Id. III. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. NEGLIGENCE We begin with Bowerman’s negligence claim against Westveld. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bowerman, reasonable persons could conclude that Westveld personnel created an unreasonable risk of harm by digging the trench and leaving it uncovered and unmarked upon their departure from the Stanton Park Apartments. It follows, then, that there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding Westveld’s breach of its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others. Michigan law distinguishes between claims based upon theories of ordinary negligence and those based upon premises liability. See, e.g., Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc, 336 Mich App 616, 624-626; 971 NW2d 716 (2021). To identify the true nature of a claim, we must read the complaint as a whole and 8 look beyond procedural labels. See Altobelli v Hartmann, 499 Mich 284, 299; 884 NW2d 537 (2016). Premises-liability claims arise from the condition of the land at issue, see Jeffrey-Moise, 336 Mich App at 625, and they are predicated upon the defendant’s possession and control of such land, see Kubczak v Chem Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 660; 575 NW2d 745 (1998). A plaintiff, therefore, may assert a premises-liability claim only against a defendant with possession and control over the land at issue at the time the plaintiff’s injury occurred. See id. Ordinary negligence claims, on the other hand, are “based on the underlying premise that a person has a duty to conform [their] conduct to an applicable standard of care when undertaking an activity.” Jeffrey-Moise, 336 Mich App at 624. The Court of Appeals majority correctly held that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounds in ordinary negligence rather than premises liability. The record reflects that Westveld personnel completed their work and departed the Stanton Park Apartments on October 21, 2021. Westveld lacked possession and control of the trash-disposal area when Bowerman’s injury occurred on October 30, 2021. Bowerman’s claim is correspondingly premised upon the alleged failure of Westveld’s personnel to conform their conduct to the applicable standard of care associated with replacing the concrete platform underneath the dumpster. Such a claim sounds in ordinary negligence rather than premises liability. See Kubczak, 456 Mich at 660; Jeffrey-Moise, 336 Mich App at 625. 4 4 Justice BOLDEN views the issue through an alternative lens in her dissent. She concludes that Bowerman’s claim sounds in premises liability alone because her alleged injury was caused by a condition on the land. But this issue does not hinge solely on the condition that caused Bowerman’s alleged injury. It also concerns the alleged failure of Westveld’s personnel to conform their conduct to the applicable standard of care. See Laier v Kitchen, 9  Ordinary negligence has four essential parts: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages. See Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich 651, 660; 822 NW2d 190 (2012). “[T]he threshold question in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.” Id. at 660 n 19. “Duty is essentially a question of whether the relationship between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor’s part for the benefit of the injured person.” Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 438-439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977) (citations omitted). The common law “imposes on every person engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use due care, or to so govern [their] actions as not to unreasonably endanger the person or property of others.” Clark v Dalman, 379 Mich 251, 261; 150 NW2d 755 (1967). “Generally, unless the court can conclude that all reasonable persons would agree the defendant did not create an unreasonable risk of harm, whether a defendant’s conduct in the particular case breached this general standard of care is a question of fact for the jury to decide.” Finazzo v Fire Equip Co, 323 Mich App 620, 634; 918 NW2d 200 (2018) (emphasis added). 266 Mich App 482, 493; 702 NW2d 199 (2005) (opinion by NEFF, J.) (“Defendant’s conduct was . . . an alleged basis of liability, independent of premises liability.”); cf. Boylan v Fifty Eight, Ltd Liability Co, 289 Mich App 709, 721; 808 NW2d 277 (2010) (“[A] party to a contract breaches a duty separate and distinct from the contract when it creates a new hazard that it should have anticipated would pose a dangerous condition to third persons.”). Looking at the substance of the complaint, Bowerman alleges that Westveld breached its duties to correct the trench and install adequate safeguards or warnings so that it would not constitute a tripping hazard. Because Bowerman does more than merely allege that Westveld personnel created a condition on the land—i.e., she alleges that Westveld personnel breached their “obligation to use due care, or to so govern [their] actions as not to unreasonably endanger the person or property of others,” Clark v Dalman, 379 Mich 251, 261; 150 NW2d 755 (1967)—we conclude that Bowerman’s claim against Westveld sounds in ordinary negligence rather than premises liability. 10  The Court of Appeals majority erred by holding that there exists no genuine issue of material fact regarding Westveld’s breach of its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others. The record reflects that Westveld personnel created the trench when they replaced the concrete platform underneath the Stanton Park Apartments’ dumpster. When they finished their work, Westveld personnel left the site. But they also left the trench at issue uncovered and unmarked, which is how it remained for several weeks. According to Westveld’s owner, who acknowledged that the trench could pose a tripping hazard, Westveld personnel typically marked conditions such as the trench with cones or caution tape, but he could not specifically recall whether they did so in anticipation of departing the Stanton Park Apartments. And although Westveld personnel filled another smaller trench with sand so that a wheelchair-bound tenant could access the apartment building—an act that could be construed as a tacit acknowledgment that such a condition posed an obstacle to the tenants—they did not fill the trench at issue. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bowerman, see El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160, reasonable persons could conclude that Westveld personnel created an unreasonable risk of harm by digging the trench and leaving it uncovered and unmarked upon their departure from the Stanton Park Apartments. It follows, then, that there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding Westveld’s breach of its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others. See Finazzo, 323 Mich App at 634. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Court of Appeals majority relied on evidence regarding Bowerman’s own actions as well as her knowledge of the trench’s existence and location. Bowerman, unpub op at 7. But as we explained in Kandil-Elsayed, “Michigan is a comparative-fault jurisdiction, meaning that it is the policy of our state that 11 when a plaintiff is at fault, it does not bar recovery, but rather reduces the amount of damages they can recover by their percentage of fault.” Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 133, citing MCL 600.2959. Under Michigan’s comparative-fault framework, “[i]n an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, . . . the liability of each person shall be allocated . . . by the trier of fact and . . . in direct proportion to the person’s percentage of fault.” MCL 600.2957(1). Bowerman’s acts and omissions are relevant to her degree of comparative fault but do not establish, as a matter of law, that Westveld personnel acted in accordance with their common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others. The Court of Appeals majority thus erred by relying on evidence regarding Bowerman’s acts and omissions as the basis for its conclusion that Westveld was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). B. MCL 554.139 We likewise conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Red Oak breached its statutory covenant under MCL 554.139. MCL 554.139 provides, in part: (1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor covenants: (a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties. (b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or license, and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and of the local unit of government where the premises are located, except when the disrepair or violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the tenant[’]s wilful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct. 12 “MCL 554.139 provides a specific protection to lessees and licensees of residential property in addition to any protection provided by the common law.” Allison, 481 Mich at 425 (emphasis omitted). “The statutory protection under MCL 554.139(1) arises from the existence of a residential lease and consequently becomes a statutorily mandated term of such lease.” Id. The plain language of the statute further provides that MCL 554.139 “shall be liberally construed” in favor of lessees, who are entitled to “have the benefit of the covenants established [t]herein.” MCL 554.139(3). Liberal construction requires a court to give the statutory text “the largest, the fullest, and most extensive meaning” of which it is susceptible. Birznieks v Cooper, 405 Mich 319, 331 n 12; 275 NW2d 221 (1979) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The seminal case addressing these statutory covenants is Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP—a different sort of parking-lot case. In Allison, 481 Mich at 427, we recognized that MCL 554.139 does not define the term “common areas,” and we concluded that, “in the context of leased residential property, ‘common areas’ describes those areas of the property over which the lessor retains control that are shared by two or more, or all, of the tenants.” Using that definition, we concluded that the parking lot within the leased residential property at issue was a common area such that the lessor had a statutory duty to keep it fit (i.e., adapted, suited, or appropriate) for the parking of vehicles. Id. at 429. To do so, at least in relation to the accumulation of snow and ice, the lessor was required “to ensure that the entrance to, and the exit from, the lot [was] clear, that vehicles [could] access parking spaces, and that tenants [had] reasonable access to their parked vehicles.” Id. We elaborated that MCL 554.139(1)(a) “does not require a lessor to maintain a lot in an ideal condition or in the most accessible condition possible, but merely requires the 13 lessor to maintain it in a condition that renders it fit for use as a parking lot.” Allison, 481 Mich at 430. And we stated that “[m]ere inconvenience of access . . . will not defeat the characterization of a lot as being fit for its intended purposes.” Id. On these bases, we held, as a matter of law, that the one to two inches of accumulated snow and underlying layer of ice on which the plaintiff slipped and fell did not render the parking lot at issue unfit for the use intended by the parties. Id. at 423, 431. We reasoned as follows: In this case, in construing the meaning of these terms in the contract, neither of the parties has indicated that the intended use of the parking lot was anything other than basic parking and reasonable access to such parking. Plaintiff’s allegation of unfitness was supported only by two facts: that the lot was covered with one to two inches of snow and that plaintiff fell. Under the facts presented in this record, we believe that there could not be reasonable differences of opinion regarding the fact that tenants were able to enter and exit the parking lot, to park their vehicles therein, and to access those vehicles. Accordingly, plaintiff has not established that tenants were unable to use the parking lot for its intended purpose, and his claim fails as a matter of law. [Id. at 429-430.] Central to the Allison Court’s analysis was fitness in the context of using a parking lot to park and to enter, exit, and access parked vehicles. Id. There was no discussion of the area’s fitness for other uses, such as reaching a dumpster. Here, the parties do not dispute that the Stanton Park Apartments’ trash-disposal area was a “common area” as provid