People v Eads

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v EADS Docket No. 168205. Argued April 8, 2026 (Calendar No. 2). Decided July 30, 2026. James G. Eads was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of second- degree murder, MCL 750.317, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was 16 years old when he shot and killed a 17-year-old in an apparently gang-related incident in 1992. Defendant had been riding in the backseat of a car when he noticed the 17-year-old wearing a T-shirt representing a rival street gang. Defendant exited the car, drew a pistol, and shot the victim five times. While defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, the jury convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The advisory judicial sentencing guidelines in effect at the time recommended a minimum sentence between 12 and 25 years’ imprisonment or parolable life imprisonment. The trial court, John H. Hausner, J., sentenced defendant as an adult and imposed a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment, which was to be served consecutively to a term of two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm. In his direct appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was disproportionate under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 (1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued November 9, 1994 (Docket No. 160735). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 450 Mich 865 (1995). In January 2021, defendant moved for relief from judgment under MCR Subchapter 6.500, challenging his sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment as unconstitutional and disproportionate in light of Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and its progeny. Defendant argued that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment and his due-process rights by imposing a disproportionate sentence that failed to properly consider his youth as a mitigating factor under Miller and that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated because he was being treated more harshly than a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a. The trial court, Mark T. Slavens, J., denied defendant’s motion. The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal in an unpublished order, entered July 19, 2021 (Docket No. 357332). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. While defendant’s application remained pending, the Supreme Court issued opinions in People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022), which held that a parolable life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder violates Michigan’s constitutional prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, and People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022), which held that a court resentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder to a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a must consider the distinctive attributes of youth as mitigating factors but need not articulate on the record how the defendant’s youth affected the sentence imposed. After those opinions were issued, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted, directing the Court of Appeals to consider whether defendant is entitled to relief under Boykin or Stovall. 512 Mich 918 (2023). On remand, the Court of Appeals, BORRELLO and MARIANI, JJ. (MURRAY, P.J., dissenting), held that defendant was entitled to resentencing. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that defendant’s motion satisfied the procedural requirements in MCR 6.508(D) because defendant’s direct appeal was completed long before Miller and its progeny were issued. On the merits, the majority analyzed defendant’s sentence under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and the four-factor test from People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15 (1992). The majority concluded that the sentence was cruel or unusual punishment under these factors for reasons similar to those articulated in Stovall when holding that a parolable life sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment, and the majority held that defendant’s sentence was also disproportionate under the related, but distinct, nonconstitutional proportionality requirement in Milbourn and Boykin. The prosecution sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted the application. ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 118 (2025). In an opinion by Justice THOMAS, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN, WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court held: A sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender violates the prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. This holding applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 1. Defendant demonstrated good cause for failing to raise a constitutional challenge to his sentence on direct appeal. While defendant challenged his sentence on nonconstitutional Milbourn proportionality grounds in his direct appeal, he did not argue in that appeal that his sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and (b), to obtain relief on the basis of grounds that could have been raised in a prior proceeding but were not, a defendant must demonstrate good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal as well as actual prejudice. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized as good cause an intervening retroactive constitutional decision relevant to the defendant’s claims, and defendant’s direct appeal in this case was exhausted in 1995, long before Miller, Stovall, and other retroactive changes in constitutional law regarding youth sentencing were decided. Additionally, defendant could show actual prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv) because his sentence, which constituted cruel or unusual punishment under Michigan’s Constitution, was invalid. 2. Defendant’s discretionary term-of-years sentence was appropriately assessed under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and the Bullock factors. While both Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and Milbourn require that sentences be proportionate, they do so under different frameworks that reflect different focuses and rationales. Milbourn proportionality review is a product of the legislative intent for proportionality in sentencing by granting a trial court discretion to impose a sentence within a particular range; thus, the focus of the Milbourn inquiry is whether a sentence imposed is proportionate under this framework. And because the statutory scheme provides a trial court with the discretion to select a sentence within a particular range, appellate review is under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. In contrast, Const 1963, art 1, § 16 provides a check on the Legislature’s authority to authorize punishment. This necessarily requires an exercise of independent judicial judgment that is informed by considerations outside of legislative intent. Moreover, it is axiomatic that a sentencing judge lacks discretion to impose an unconstitutional sentence. Thus, unlike Milbourn proportionality review, appellate courts review de novo whether a sentence violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Finally, while Milbourn proportionality is a highly fact-specific inquiry that is based on the particular circumstances of an offense and offender, the cruel-or-unusual-punishment clause is often applied to an entire class of offenders subject to a particular punishment. A sentence might be considered reasonable when viewed in the context of the Michigan legislative scheme yet be considered disproportionate under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. It is also possible that a punishment is categorically cruel or unusual as a matter of law when applied to a particular class of offenders such that it is unnecessary to engage in a more fact-specific Milbourn proportionality review. It would be inappropriate to interpret a doctrine premised on legislative intent as cutting off an independent constitutional analysis that, by its nature, serves as a limitation on the Legislature’s authority. 3. A sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender violates the prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. In assessing whether a punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16, a court considers the following factors articulated in Bullock: (1) the severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the goal of rehabilitation. In this case, every Bullock factor supports the conclusion that defendant’s sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. With regard to the first two factors, a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment, like the parolable life sentence analyzed in Stovall, exceeds what is presumptively imposed on a youthful offender for the more serious offense of first-degree murder, without the benefit of the procedural protections that are provided to a youthful offender convicted of first- degree murder. Such a sentence means that the initial review by the parole board does not occur until after a defendant has served 50 years in prison, after which an individual’s opportunity for release is contingent on the parole board’s discretion for the remainder of their lifetime. As to the third factor, a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender is out of step with national trends regarding youth sentencing and with the types of sentences other jurisdictions typically impose on anyone convicted of second-degree murder. Finally, this sentence does not meaningfully advance the penological goal of rehabilitation. 4. Because defendant’s sentence is categorically unconstitutional as applied to a youthful offender convicted of second-degree murder, it was unnecessary to address whether, under the specific facts of this case, defendant would also be entitled to relief under Milbourn and Boykin; accordingly, Part VI of the Court of Appeals opinion, which addressed whether defendant was entitled to resentencing under Milbourn and Boykin, is vacated, and Part III of the Court of Appeals opinion is vacated to the extent that it addresses whether defendant was procedurally barred by MCR 6.508(D)(2) from raising challenges to his sentence under Milbourn and Boykin.  5. The holding in this case—that a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for a second- degree murder committed by a youthful offender violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16—applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Court of Appeals’ judgment affirmed to the extent that it reverses the Wayne Circuit Court’s order denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, vacates defendant’s sentence for second-degree murder, and remands this case to the Wayne Circuit Court for resentencing; Part III of the Court of Appeals opinion vacated to the extent it addresses whether defendant was procedurally barred by MCR 6.508(D)(2) from raising challenges to his sentence under Milbourn and Boykin; and Part VI of the Court of Appeals opinion vacated. Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would have held that defendant’s case is procedurally barred and that defendant’s term-of-years sentence is not unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Defendant did not argue in his motion for relief from judgment that his sentence is categorically unconstitutional; defendant argued that his sentence violates the principles of equal protection and that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating characteristics of youth. Defendant’s argument that his sentence is cruel or unusual under the Michigan Constitution is procedurally barred by MCR 6.508 because he cannot establish good cause for failing to raise that argument in a prior proceeding. Additionally, no retroactive change in the law justifies defendant’s failure to raise a challenge under the Michigan Constitution in his direct appeal, because neither Miller nor Stovall addressed the constitutionality of individualized term-of-years sentences for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder. Further, defendant’s claim of cruel or unusual punishment requires this Court to determine whether defendant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate, but that analysis is precluded by the prior conclusion on direct appeal that defendant’s sentence was proportionate. The majority breaks new ground by applying the Bullock factors to an individualized, discretionary term-of-years sentence. Michigan courts have, until now, typically reviewed only nondiscretionary sentences under Const 1963, art 1, § 16; normally, discretionary term-of-years sentences are subject to proportionality review under Milbourn. The majority also improperly compares defendant’s individualized, discretionary sentence to the sentences at issue in Stovall and the sentences available for juvenile defendants convicted of first-degree murder, who can still be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under MCL 769.25; a term-of- years sentence is necessarily less severe than a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Moreover, the majority employs the unworkable concept of a “de facto life sentence,” creating a host of difficult and unanswerable questions. The majority opinion sets the stage for future constitutional proportionality claims after sentences have been affirmed on direct appeal under nonconstitutional Milbourn proportionality review and generates uncertainty regarding upper and lower limits for sentences imposed on juvenile and young-adult offenders convicted of second-degree murder.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 30, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 168205 JAMES GREGORY EADS, Defendant-Appellee. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH THOMAS, J. In People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 307-308; 987 NW2d 85 (2022), we held that imposing a sentence of life in prison that provides the possibility of parole (a parolable life sentence) on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder constitutes “cruel or unusual punishment” in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. This case involves a question we left open in Stovall: whether a judge who forgoes a parolable life sentence and, instead, imposes a lengthy term-of-years sentence on a juvenile offender convicted of second- degree murder violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16. We conclude that Stovall’s reasoning applies equivalently here such that the term- of-years sentence imposed—a minimum sentence of 50 years in prison and a maximum sentence of 75 years in prison—is similarly grossly disproportionate and violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16 when imposed on a youth 1 convicted of second-degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which reverses the Wayne Circuit Court’s order denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, vacates defendant’s sentence for second-degree murder, 2 and remands to that court for resentencing. Because we conclude that defendant’s sentence is categorically unconstitutional as applied to a youthful offender convicted of second-degree murder, it is unnecessary to address whether, under the specific facts of this case, defendant would also be entitled to relief under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), or People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). Accordingly, we vacate Part VI of the Court of 1 We use “youth” or “youthful offender” in this opinion to refer to those who committed the crime when they were under 21 years old. See People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 10, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654); slip op at 2 (holding that offenders who were 19 and 20 years old at the time of their offense, as a class, share the same mitigating characteristics of youth as their younger counterparts and, thus, are treated equivalently under Const 1963, art 1, § 16). We use the word “juvenile” when referring to statutes or caselaw that address those who committed an offense before they turned 18 years old. 2 Defendant has not argued that he is entitled to resentencing for his conviction of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. See MCL 750.227b(1) and (3) (mandating a two-year sentence for the first such offense that runs “consecutively with and preceding” the sentence imposed for the underlying felony). 2 Appeals opinion, which addresses whether defendant was entitled to resentencing under Milbourn and Boykin, and we vacate Part III of that opinion to the extent it addresses whether defendant was procedurally barred by MCR 6.508(D)(2) from raising challenges to his sentence under these decisions. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1992, defendant, James Gregory Eads, was 16 years old when he shot and killed 17-year-old Eric Kincaid in an apparently gang-related incident. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and of felony- firearm. The advisory judicial sentencing guidelines in effect at the time recommended a minimum sentence between 12 and 25 years’ imprisonment or parolable life. The trial court sentenced defendant as an adult and imposed a sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment, which was to be served consecutively to a term of two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm. Among other things, defendant argued in his direct appeal that his sentence was disproportionate under Milbourn, 435 Mich 630. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed 3 In Milbourn, we held that the “statutory sentencing scheme embodies the ‘principle of proportionality[.]’ ” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 635. Thus, where the Legislature provides the trial court discretion as to what sentence to impose, the court has an obligation to impose a sentence that is “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 636. Appellate courts review the proportionality of a trial court’s sentencing decision under Milbourn for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 660; see also People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471-472; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (readopting Milbourn proportionality review for a sentence that departs from the guidelines range after the 3 defendant’s convictions and sentence. People v Eads, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 9, 1994 (Docket No. 160735). Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, which this Court denied. People v Eads, 450 Mich 865 (1995). Three justices were shown on the order as favoring a remand for resentencing pursuant to Milbourn. Id. In January 2021, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment under MCR Subchapter 6.500 (his first such motion), in which he challenged his sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment as unconstitutional and disproportionate in light of Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), and its progeny. He argued that the sentencing judge violated the Eighth Amendment and his due-process rights by imposing a disproportionate sentence that failed to properly consider his youth as a mitigating factor under Miller, and that his constitutional right to equal protection was violated because he was being treated more harshly than a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder, see MCL 769.25; MCL 769.25a. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal. People v Eads, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 19, 2021 (Docket No. 357332). Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. While this application remained pending, we issued opinions in Stovall, 510 Mich 301, and Boykin, 510 Mich 171. In Stovall, we held that a parolable life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder violates Michigan’s constitutional prohibition on cruel mandatory legislative sentencing guidelines were rendered advisory in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015)). 4 or unusual punishment. Stovall, 510 Mich at 322. In Boykin, we held that a court resentencing a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder to a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a must consider the distinctive attributes of youth as mitigating factors but need not articulate on the record how the defendant’s youth affected the sentence imposed. Boykin, 510 Mich at 177-178. After those opinions were issued, the Court remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. People v Eads, 512 Mich 918 (2023). That order directed the Court of Appeals to consider “whether the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022), or People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022).” Eads, 512 Mich at 918. On remand, the Court of Appeals held, in a split decision, that defendant was entitled to resentencing. People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (January 16, 2025) (Docket No. 357332); slip op at 13. The majority concluded that defendant’s motion satisfied the procedural requirements in MCR 6.508(D) because defendant’s direct appeal was completed long before Miller and its progeny were issued. Id. at ___; slip op at 5. On the merits, the majority first analyzed defendant’s sentence of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and the four-factor test from People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 33-34; 485 NW2d 866 (1992). Eads, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8-13. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that the sentence was cruel or unusual punishment under these factors for reasons similar to those articulated in Stovall when holding that a parolable life sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment. Id. at ___; slip op at 8-13. The panel then held that defendant’s sentence was also disproportionate under the related, but distinct, nonconstitutional proportionality requirement in Milbourn and Boykin. Id. at ___; slip op at 14-15. The majority reasoned that the sentencing judge failed to consider 5 defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor and, instead, used the characteristics of youth that defendant exhibited as aggravating factors to justify a lengthy term-of-years sentence. Id. at ___; slip op at 14-15. In dissent, Judge MURRAY first concluded that the majority erred in analyzing the proportionality of defendant’s sentence under the Bullock factors. Id. at ___ (MURRAY, P.J., dissenting); slip op at 2-4. In his view, this test applies only to a statutory mandatory punishment or a statutory maximum punishment for an offense; a challenge to a discretionary and individualized term-of-years sentence is assessed only under Milbourn and Boykin. Id. at ___; slip op at 2-4. When a trial judge imposes an individualized sentence that complies with Milbourn and Boykin, that sentence is necessarily a proportionate sentence that is not cruel or unusual punishment. Id. at ___; slip op at 4, 6, 10. Finally, Judge MURRAY concluded that the trial court’s sentence here was proportionate under Milbourn and Boykin. Id. at ___; slip op at 4-11. He argued that the sentencing judge was aware of defendant’s youth and, under the totality of the circumstances, did not abuse his discretion when he imposed a sentence of 50 to 75 years in prison. Id. at ___; slip op at 4-11. The prosecution filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted. People v Eads, ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 118 (2025). We directed the parties to “include among the issues to be briefed whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding that: (1) the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301 (2022); and (2) the defendant is entitled to relief under People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171 (2022).” Id. at ___; 25 NW3d at 118. 6  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. People v Christian, 510 Mich 52, 74; 987 NW2d 29 (2022). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law. Id. at 75. Whether a defendant’s sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 is a question of law that we review de novo, meaning that we provide no deference to the lower courts’ decisions. Stovall, 510 Mich at 312. III. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN MCR 6.508(D) A defendant seeking relief from judgment “has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested.” MCR 6.508(D). MCR 6.508(D) imposes different burdens depending on whether the defendant “alleges grounds for relief which were decided against” them in a previous proceeding, MCR 6.508(D)(2) (emphasis added), or “alleges grounds for relief . . . which could have been raised” in a prior proceeding but were not, MCR 6.508(D)(3) (emphasis added). While defendant in this case challenged his sentence on nonconstitutional Milbourn proportionality grounds in his direct appeal, he did not argue in that appeal that his sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See Bullock, 440 Mich at 34 n 17 (explaining that “the constitutional concept of ‘proportionality’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 is distinct from the nonconstitutional ‘principle of proportionality’ discussed in [Milbourn]”). Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that MCR 6.508(D)(3) applies to defendant’s constitutional proportionality challenge under Const 7 1963, art 1, § 16. 4 To obtain relief on this claim, defendant must demonstrate “good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal” and “actual prejudice.” MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and (b). 5 In this context, “actual prejudice” means that a “sentence is invalid.” MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv). We conclude that defendant has demonstrated “good cause” for failing to raise a constitutional challenge to his sentence on direct appeal. This Court has consistently recognized as “good cause” an intervening retroactive constitutional decision relevant to the defendant’s claims. 6 His direct appeal was exhausted in 1995, long before Miller, 4 In arguing that defendant’s constitutional claim is procedurally barred because defendant raised a Milbourn proportionality challenge on direct appeal, Justice ZAHRA overlooks this Court’s discussion in Bullock describing the distinction between nonconstitutional Milbourn proportionality review and constitutional proportionality review under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Instead, he compares the general standard for Milbourn proportionality review with our assertion in a more recent case that “Const 1963, art 1, § 16 requires that criminal sentences be proportional to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender such that excessive imprisonment is prohibited.” Taylor, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 8. There is certainly overlap between the two inquiries. See Bullock, 440 Mich at 34 n 17 (acknowledging that “the concepts share common roots”). But as discussed in greater detail below, this overlap does not mean that defendant raises the same “grounds for relief” that he raised on direct appeal, given the different functions, sources, and frameworks for these proportionality inquiries. 5 Given our holding that defendant is entitled to relief on constitutional grounds, it is unnecessary to address whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that defendant’s nonconstitutional Milbourn proportionality claim satisfied the procedural requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(2). 6 See People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 384-385 & n 8; 535 NW2d 496 (1995) (opinion by BOYLE, J.) (explaining that “good cause” can be shown if “some factor external to the defense precluded counsel from previously raising the issue,” which may include that a legal basis for a claim was not then reasonably available to counsel); see also, e.g., Stovall, 510 Mich at 310-311 (holding that the defendant’s claim overcame the procedural bar on successive motions for relief from judgment in MCR 6.502(G) because the claim was based on Miller, which was a retroactive change in the law, and granting the defendant relief on his claim); People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket 8 Stovall, and other retroactive changes in constitutional law regarding youth sentencing were decided. Moreover, defendant can show that his sentence is “invalid” if it constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Michigan’s Constitution. 7 IV. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution provides that “cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted[.]” We have long recognized that Michigan’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” provides broader protection than the “cruel and unusual punishment” counterpart contained in the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Stovall, 510 Mich at 313-314; Bullock, 440 Mich at 27-35. In recent cases, we have interpreted the Michigan Constitution’s cruel-or-unusual- punishment clause as providing greater protection for youthful offenders than that provided by the federal Constitution’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause. For example, while the Eighth Amendment categorically precludes certain punishments for those who are No. 166813); slip op at 1-2 (holding that People v Parks, 510 Mich 225; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), applies retroactively and granting the defendant relief in a successive motion for relief from judgment). Justice ZAHRA suggests that the “good cause” requirement is not satisfied here because both the Eighth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 16 existed when defendant filed his direct appeal. However, as the above cases also illustrate, new caselaw interpreting a constitutional provision can provide “good cause” for failure to raise a claim in a previous proceeding. See also People v Poole, 349 Mich App 594, 611; 28 NW3d 769 (2024) (holding that the defendant demonstrated good cause for failing to raise a challenge to his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on direct appeal where Miller was issued long after that appeal was completed), affirmed by Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 1-2. 7 See People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997) (explaining that a sentence is invalid “when it is based upon constitutionally impermissible grounds”); see also, e.g., Stovall, 510 Mich at 307-308 (holding that a sentence was unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and granting relief on a successive motion for relief from judgment); Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 1-2 (same). 9 under 18 years old when they commit an offense, 8 we have recognized that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 extends similar protections to those who are under 21 years old. 9 Most relevant here, we have relied on the distinguishing characteristics of youth—such as diminished culpability and greater ability for reform—and related caselaw to conclude that it is categorically cruel or unusual to impose a parolable life sentence on a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder. See Stovall, 510 Mich at 322. In assessing whether a punishment is cruel or unusual in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16, we have consistently considered the following factors: (1) the severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically “rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions.” [People v Kardasz, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (December 19, 2025) (Docket No. 165008); slip op at 33, quoting Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34.] 8 See Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 578; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005) (holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the death penalty on an offender who was under 18 years old at the time of their offense); Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 82; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010) (holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense when the offender was under 18 years old at the time of the offense); Miller, 567 US at 465 (holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to mandatorily sentence any juvenile offender to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole). 9 See Parks, 510 Mich at 232 (holding that, while the United States Supreme Court has drawn the constitutional line for Eighth Amendment purposes at offenders who were under 18 years old at the time of their offense, the principles from Miller also apply to 18-year- old offenders under Const 1963, art 1, § 16); Taylor, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2 (holding that these principles also apply to offenders who were 19 and 20 years old at the time of their offense). 10 These are often referred to as the “Bullock factors.” See, e.g., Stovall, 510 Mich at 314. 10 A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND NONCONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSES As an initial matter, we note that, while both Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and Milbourn require that sentences be proportionate, they do so under different frameworks that reflect different focuses and rationales. As this Court has explained: [T]he constitutional concept of “proportionality” under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 is distinct from the nonconstitutional “principle of proportionality” discussed in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 650; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), although the concepts share common roots. The duty of the appellate courts to review trial court sentences within the applicable statutory ranges for abuse of discretion, as reaffirmed in Milbourn, is rooted not in Const 1963, art 1, § 16, but rather reflects the Legislature’s intent “in setting a range of allowable punishments for a single felony . . . .” [Milbourn,] 435 Mich at 651. Milbourn obviously has no applicability to a legislatively mandated sentence because the trial court, in that case, lacks any discretion to abuse. Milbourn involved the relationship between the trial and appellate courts as they work together to fulfill the Legislature’s intent, under the belief “that judicial sentencing discretion should be exercised, within the legislatively prescribed range, according to the same principle of proportionality that guides the Legislature in its allocation of punishment over the full spectrum of criminal behavior.” Id. By contrast, the issue under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, as raised in these cases and others, concerns whether the punishment concededly chosen or authorized by the Legislature is so grossly disproportionate as to be unconstitutionally “cruel or unusual.” [Bullock, 440 Mich at 34 n 17.] 10 Some opinions refer to these as the “Lorentzen factors” or the “Lorentzen-Bullock factors.” See Parks, 510 Mich at 254-266; Taylor, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 20-34. These factors were originally articulated in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167, 171-181; 194 NW2d 827 (1972), when analyzing a punishment under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution. Bullock recognized that this test applies when assessing a punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 regardless of its continued validity under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Bullock, 440 Mich at 34-35. 11  In other words, Milbourn proportionality review is a product of the legislative intent for proportionality in sentencing by granting a trial court discretion to impose a sentence within a particular range. Thus, the focus of the Milbourn inquiry is whether a sentence imposed is proportionate under this framework. This explains why a statutorily mandated sentence cannot be challenged under Milbourn, as well as why a trial court is required to score and consider the now-advisory legislative sentencing guidelines in every case, 11 with the range guiding both a trial court’s exercise of its senten