People v Black

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v BLACK Docket No. 168159. Argued April 8, 2026 (Calendar No. 1). Decided July 30, 2026. Donyelle M. Black was convicted in 1988 following a bench trial of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); armed robbery, MCL 750.529; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for felony murder. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), concluding that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles are cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII, and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), holding that the Miller holding is retroactive, the prosecution moved, pursuant to MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, to reimpose defendant’s LWOP sentence. At his Miller hearing, defendant presented a forensic psychologist as an expert witness who testified that defendant had manifested developmental attributes as a teenager that were not typically found in adolescents, such as a lack of empathy and remorse, along with typical attributes of a 15-year- old, like impulsivity and immaturity. She opined that these traits were no longer present in defendant as an adult, which suggested rehabilitation. The prosecution did not present any witnesses at the hearing, and the trial court entered an order stating that the prosecution did not bear the burden of proof at the hearing and concluding that life without parole was not a disproportionate sentence. The court then entered an amended judgment of sentence reimposing defendant’s LWOP sentence. Defendant appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Michigan Supreme Court held in People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112 (2022), that the prosecution bears the burden of proof at a Miller hearing. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s amended judgment of sentence in light of Taylor and the parties’ stipulations and remanded to the trial court for a second Miller hearing. The prosecution moved on remand for the trial court to compel defendant to submit to a psychological examination by a prosecution expert or, alternatively, to strike the psychological testimony of defendant’s expert from the first Miller hearing and any reports by defense experts. The trial court, Cheryl A. Matthews, J., granted the motion. Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals, O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ., affirmed. ___ Mich App ___ (December 19, 2024) (Docket No. 367831). Defendant’s application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court was granted. ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 330 (2025).  In a unanimous opinion by Justice HOOD, the Supreme Court held: If a defendant indicates an intent to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing, a trial court may compel the defendant to undergo a similar examination by a prosecution expert, consistent with the defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights against self- incrimination, US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. If the defendant chooses to undergo a psychological examination by a prosecution expert, any evidence obtained during the examination is admissible only as rebuttal and may not be used by the prosecution as part of its case-in-chief. 1. Defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination were not violated when the trial court required him to submit to a psychological evaluation conducted by an expert chosen by the prosecution as a precondition to offering his own psychological evidence at his Miller hearing. It is well established that if a defendant does not place their mental status at issue at a trial or a sentencing proceeding, the prosecution’s use of a court-ordered psychological evaluation against the defendant violates the defendant’s constitutional right against self- incrimination. But if a defendant presents expert psychological evidence, the prosecution is permitted to offer evidence obtained during a court-ordered psychological evaluation for the limited purpose of rebuttal. From this principle, it naturally follows that, if a defendant indicates their intent to introduce expert psychological evidence at a proceeding, the trial court may compel the defendant to submit to a psychological evaluation conducted by an expert chosen by the prosecution. Michigan trial courts generally have the authority to order postconviction psychological and psychiatric evaluations for use at sentencing. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination attaches at a court-ordered psychiatric examination used for sentencing purposes, but that right does not preclude courts from ordering these evaluations under the parameters set forth here. If compelled psychological evaluations were never permissible for purposes of Miller hearings, as defendant argues, prosecutors would effectively be prohibited from presenting psychological evidence to challenge the defendant’s psychological evidence, which would undermine the adversarial process. 2. If a defendant indicates an intent to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing, the trial court is permitted under the Fifth Amendment to compel the defendant to submit to a court-ordered psychological examination to rebut the defendant’s evidence in kind. A defendant’s mental status is relevant in the Miller context. Resentencing pursuant to Miller requires an assessment of a defendant’s rehabilitative potential, which has an individualized mental component. A defendant’s mental state may also be relevant when assessing other Miller factors, such as the defendant’s immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, as well as the defendant’s family and home environment. Further, defendants may wish to introduce expert evidence of their mental status to refute claims that they lack the capacity for rehabilitation or to show that the attributes of their youth that led to the commission of the sentencing offense are no longer present. 3. To the extent that the trial court sua sponte incorporated the record of the first Miller hearing into the record of the second Miller hearing, the order was improper. If defendant chooses to introduce his own expert psychological evidence and, by extension, chooses to submit to a compelled psychological examination, the results of such an examination would not be admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Rather, the prosecution would be permitted to introduce such evidence only for rebuttal purposes. The second Miller hearing is a distinct proceeding at which the burden is on the prosecution to prove facts and circumstances that rebut the presumption against LWOP by clear and convincing evidence. Proceedings will begin anew at the second hearing to ensure that the proper standard of review is applied. 4. A defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not violated when a trial court orders the defendant to decide whether to submit to a compelled psychological examination before the prosecution rests its case-in-chief at a Miller hearing. The Fifth Amendment generally protects against the use of a compelled psychological examination at a trial or sentencing proceeding. Therefore, the focus of the Fifth Amendment inquiry is on the use of the compelled statements. Here, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the trial court from requiring defendant to decide whether to sit for a psychological examination by the prosecution’s expert before the commencement of the Miller hearing. Defendant’s decision about whether to partake in such an examination does not lock him into a defense strategy at the Miller hearing. Even if defendant decides to sit for this examination, the prosecution may use the fruits of it only to rebut evidence presented by defendant at the Miller hearing. If defendant decides not to introduce expert psychological evidence after the prosecution rests at the Miller hearing, the prosecution would be precluded from introducing evidence from its own psychological evaluation. Moreover, the scope of the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence must be limited to the scope of evidence presented by the defendant, even if that scope is narrower than the initial referral question. Court of Appeals decision affirmed; trial court orders vacated to the extent that the court incorporated the record from the first Miller hearing into the second hearing’s record and to the extent that the court relied on defendant’s indication of intent to introduce psychological evidence during the first Miller hearing; case remanded to the trial court. Justice THOMAS, concurring, agreed with the majority’s conclusions and wrote separately to highlight that the relevant federal and state caselaw permits, but guards, the scope of compelled examinations and any resulting testimony. Tailoring the scope of an examination ensures that rights against self-incrimination and related Sixth Amendment rights are respected. Additionally, Justice THOMAS noted that issues not before the Court but that may subsequently arise in Miller hearings when a defendant seeks to offer testimony regarding an expert psychological examination of the defendant include, first, the identity of the expert and process for appointment. In other contexts in Michigan where compelled examinations are conducted, statutory law stipulates that the trial court appoint the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, another qualified examiner, or a facility licensed by the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct such examinations. Second, new practices and procedures for Miller hearings may need to be developed by the trial courts in response to the majority opinion.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 30, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 168159 DONYELLE MICHAEL BLACK, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH HOOD, J. This case involves whether a trial court may compel a defendant to submit to a psychological evaluation conducted by a prosecution expert as a precondition to the admission of the defendant’s own psychological evidence at a hearing conducted pursuant to MCL 769.25a and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). Defendant, Donyelle Michael Black, was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a crime he committed when he was 15 years old. He is currently awaiting resentencing at a Miller hearing. Ahead of Black’s Miller hearing, the trial court entered an order, giving Black the choice to either submit to a psychological examination conducted by an expert chosen by the prosecution or forgo the ability to introduce his own expert psychological evidence at the hearing. We hold that if a defendant indicates an intent to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller hearing, a trial court may compel the defendant to undergo a similar examination by a prosecution expert, consistent with the defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination. See US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. However, we clarify that any evidence gathered during the prosecution expert’s examination, or derived from such an examination, is admissible solely as rebuttal evidence and may not be admitted during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. We remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This case started with a murder in 1987 when Black was 15 years old. He and a juvenile accomplice waited outside a Dairy Queen to find a person to rob. They approached Wanda Sutherland, pointed a gun at her, and robbed her of her money. Black then instructed Sutherland to go into the woods, where he beat, raped, and fatally shot her. In 1988, following a bench trial, Black was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); armed robbery, MCL 750.529; and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. 1 1 Black was also found guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b. However, these counts were later vacated and merged with his felony-murder conviction. 2 Relevant to this appeal, the trial court sentenced Black to LWOP for his felony-murder conviction. Over 20 years later, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller, 567 US at 479; see US Const, Am VIII; see also Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190, 206; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016) (holding that Miller has retroactive effect). But it also held that discretionary LWOP does not offend the Eighth Amendment so long as the sentencing court has “the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Miller, 567 US at 489. In light of Miller and Montgomery, the prosecution moved to reimpose Black’s LWOP sentence. See MCL 769.25; MCL 769.25a. 2 Before Black’s Miller hearing, he retained expert witness Dr. Carol Holden, a licensed forensic psychologist. Dr. Holden conducted a four-hour interview with Black over Zoom. She prepared a psychological evaluation and expert report, based on her interview with Black, as well as other documents and records. At the Miller hearing, the trial court admitted Dr. Holden’s report, and Dr. Holden testified. During her testimony, 2 The Michigan Legislature enacted a sentencing scheme in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller eliminating mandatory LWOP as a permissible punishment for individuals who were convicted of crimes committed while they were juveniles. See People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 179-180; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). That is codified in MCL 769.25. Id. At the same time, the Legislature codified a sentencing procedure in the event that Miller was found to have retroactive applicability. Id. The conditional pathway is codified in MCL 769.25a. Id. at 179-180 & n 2. After the United States Supreme Court eventually confirmed that Miller applies retroactively, see Montgomery, 577 US at 206, hearings began under these statutes, which are colloquially referred to as Miller hearings. See, e.g., People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 122; 987 NW2d 132 (2022) (describing a Miller hearing that was conducted under MCL 769.25). 3 Dr. Holden explained that when Black was 15 years old, he manifested developmental attributes of a typical 15-year-old, such as impulsivity and immaturity, as well as attributes not typically found in adolescents, such as lack of empathy and remorse. She explained that it is not typical for a 15-year-old to commit a crime of this magnitude, but there were elements of adolescent reasoning and decision-making involved in the execution of the crime. Dr. Holden also discussed Black’s difficult upbringing, explaining that he experienced abuse and neglect during his childhood and was exposed to community violence from a young age. Dr. Holden explained that, at the time she examined Black, he struggled to explain why the robbery escalated into a rape and murder. He expressed remorse for his crimes. He described himself as a “horrible kid” who did not think about the impact his crimes would have on the victim, her family, and the community. Dr. Holden opined that Black spoke about the impact of the crimes with empathy and compassion. Dr. Holden believed that Black demonstrated potential for rehabilitation. She explained that Black’s misconduct in prison had decreased as he aged. She added that he participated in self-help programs, treatment programs, and counseling, and he pursued educational opportunities while incarcerated. Dr. Holden concluded that Black’s traits of impulsivity, aggressiveness, irritability, recklessness, and remorselessness were no longer present. She testified that Black’s maturation and growth suggested rehabilitation. Black called five additional witnesses at the Miller hearing, who discussed Black’s difficult childhood as well as his maturation and rehabilitative efforts. The prosecution did not call any witnesses. At the conclusion of the Miller hearing, the trial court reimposed Black’s LWOP sentence, stating that “the Court does not find that these factors mitigate 4 against a sentence of mandatory life without parole.” The trial court’s order stated that the prosecution did not bear the burden of proof at the hearing. Black appealed. During the pendency of Black’s appeal, this Court issued our opinion in People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 138; 987 NW2d 132 (2022), holding that the prosecution bears the burden of proof at a Miller hearing. In light of Taylor, and by stipulation of the parties, the Court of Appeals vacated Black’s amended judgment of sentence and remanded to the trial court for a second Miller hearing. People v Black, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 1, 2023 (Docket No. 362394). On remand, during a status conference, the trial court apparently sua sponte orally ordered that all evidence from the first Miller hearing would be incorporated into the record of the second Miller hearing. 3 Subsequently, the prosecution filed a motion requesting that the trial court compel Black to submit to a psychological examination by prosecution expert Dr. Kris Mohandie, or alternatively, strike the psychological testimony and report of Dr. Holden and preclude the admission of additional psychological testimony or reports by defense experts. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion, stating: “The Defendant is ordered to submit to a psychological examination by prosecution expert Kris Mohandie by October 1, 2023. In the alternative, the parties may stipulate to set this order aside and strike the psychological testimony and report of defense expert Carol Holden.” Black filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal and, in a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. People v Black, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (December 19, 3 While both parties agree that such an order was given, the lower court record does not show that the trial court entered the order. 5 2024) (Docket No. 367831). We granted Black’s application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to address: (1) whether the constitutional bar on compelled self-incrimination precludes a sentencing court from requiring the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by the prosecution’s expert as a precondition to admitting testimony from the defendant’s psychological expert at a resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to MCL 769.25a and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), see US Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; (2) if not, whether the sentencing court may require the defendant to make his or her decision on whether to submit to a compelled psychological examination before the prosecution has rested its case-in-chief; and (3) whether the results of a compelled psychological examination are admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief or solely as rebuttal evidence. [People v Black, ___ Mich ___, ___; 25 NW3d 330, 330 (2025).] II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review questions of constitutional law de novo. People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 213; 917 NW2d 355 (2018). We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 614; 790 NW2d 607 (2010). However, when a trial court’s evidentiary decision involves a question of law, we review that question of law de novo. Id. III. LEGAL BACKGROUND This case deals with the intersection of juvenile-lifer proceedings and guarantees against self-incrimination. We briefly discuss the legal backdrop for both against which we consider this case. A. JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 6 inflicted.” US Const, Am VIII (emphasis added). “Michigan’s Constitution has its own punishment provision, but it is broader than the federal Eighth Amendment counterpart.” People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 241; 987 NW2d 161 (2022). The Michigan Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis added). “[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 US at 471. “Juveniles lack maturity, possess an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, are more vulnerable to negative outside influence, have limited control over their own environment, and have transitory personality traits.” Taylor, 510 Mich at 125. “[T]he distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Miller, 567 US at 472. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at 479. “Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at 476. “By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. at 479. Under Miller, before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP, courts are required to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. 7  In Michigan, if a defendant is under 21 years old at the time of their crime and is “convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including first-degree murder, the prosecutor may file a motion seeking to have the juvenile sentenced to LWOP.” 4 Taylor, 510 Mich at 130; see MCL 769.25(2). If the prosecutor moves to sentence a juvenile to LWOP under MCL 769.25(2), the trial court shall conduct a Miller hearing as part of the sentencing process. MCL 769.25(6). At the hearing, the trial court must consider the following “Miller factors,” as well as any other relevant criteria: (1) [T]he juvenile’s chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile’s family and home environment—from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him; (4) the incompetencies of youth, which affect whether the juvenile might have been charged with and convicted of a lesser crime, for example, because the juvenile was unable to deal with law enforcement or prosecutors or because the juvenile did not have the capacity to assist their attorney in their own defense; and (5) the juvenile’s possibility of rehabilitation. [Taylor, 510 Mich at 126, quoting Miller, 567 US at 477-478 (quotation marks omitted).] As the moving party, the prosecution bears “the burden of demonstrating facts that support their extraordinary request to sentence a juvenile defendant to LWOP. In doing so, the prosecutor must prove facts and circumstances that rebut the presumption against LWOP by the well-known standard of clear and convincing evidence.” Taylor, 510 Mich 4 MCL 769.25 “applies to a criminal defendant who was less than 18 years of age at the time he or she committed” certain enumerated offenses. MCL 769.25(1). In Parks, 510 Mich at 268, this Court extended the protections of MCL 769.25 to 18-year-olds, and in People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 10, 2025) (Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654); slip op at 2, 13-14, we extended the protections to 19- and 20-year-olds. 8 at 135-136. When determining whether to impose LWOP, the trial court should “start from the premise that the juvenile defendant before them, like most juveniles, has engaged in criminality because of transient immaturity, not irreparable corruption.” Id. at 135. The trial court “must consider all the evidence before it and determine whether the presumption has been rebutted in order to impose LWOP.” Id. at 136. B. SELF-INCRIMINATION The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both guarantee the right against self-incrimination. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. “The state constitutional right against self-incrimination is interpreted no differently than the federal right.” People v Bassage, 274 Mich App 321, 324; 733 NW2d 398 (2007). Michigan has interpreted this right “to extend beyond the defendant’s conviction and afford[] protection against compelled self-incrimination in the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding.” People v Watkins, 247 Mich App 14, 19; 634 NW2d 370 (2001); see also People v Wright, 431 Mich 282, 295; 430 NW2d 133 (1988) (holding that the right against self-incrimination “attaches at a court-ordered psychiatric examination used for sentencing purposes”). “[T]he availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.” In re Gault, 387 US 1, 49; 87 S Ct 1428; 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967). In Estelle v Smith, 451 US 454; 101 S Ct 1866; 68 L Ed 2d 359 (1981), the Supreme Court held that Fifth Amendment protections extend to statements made by a defendant during a competency evaluation. There, a defendant in Texas faced the death penalty. Id. 9 at 456. Texas’s capital punishment sentencing procedure placed the burden on the prosecution to prove a defendant’s future dangerousness. 5 Id. at 457-458. To meet this burden, the prosecution introduced evidence obtained from the defendant during a pretrial court-ordered competency evaluation. Id. at 458-460, 466. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was implicated. Id. at 466. The Court emphasized that the defendant had “introduced no psychiatric evidence” at the sentencing proceeding, “nor had he indicated that he might do so.” Id. The Court held: “A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 468. Because statements made during the defendant’s court-ordered psychiatric examination were not “given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences,” the statements “could be used as the State did at the penalty phase only if [the defendant] had been 5 Future dangerousness was one of three factors to be assessed during the penalty phase of Texas’s capital punishment proceedings. As the Supreme Court explained in Estelle: In Texas, capital cases require bifurcated proceedings—a guilt phase and a penalty phase. If the defendant is found guilty, a separate proceeding before the same jury is held to fix the punishment. At the penalty phase, if the jury affirmatively answers three questions on which the State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge must impose the death sentence. One of the three critical issues to be resolved by the jury is whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. In other words, the jury must assess the defendant’s future dangerousness. [Estelle, 451 US at 457-458 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] 10 apprised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them.” Id. at 469 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Six years later, in Buchanan v Kentucky, 483 US 402; 107 S Ct 2906; 97 L Ed 2d 336 (1987), the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of the admission of findings from court-ordered psychological examinations. There, the defendant presented evidence of psychological reports to “establish the ‘mental status’ defense of extreme emotional disturbance.” Id. at 423. To rebut this evidence, the prosecution introduced evidence of a court-ordered psychological evaluation, which had been jointly requested by the defense and prosecution to enable the defendant to receive psychiatric treatment while awaiting trial. Id. at 410-411 & n 11, 423. The Court reasoned that the prosecution could not properly respond to the defendant’s mental-health-status defense “unless it presented other psychological evidence.” Id. at 423. The Court therefore held that the “introduction of such a report for this limited rebuttal purpose does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation.” Id. at 423-424. In Kansas v Cheever, 571 US 87; 134 S Ct 596; 187 L Ed 2d 519 (2013), the Court reaffirmed that “where a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state to commit a crime, the prosecution may offer evidence from a court-ordered psychological examination for the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s evidence.” 6 Id. at 98. The Court explained that “[a]ny other rule would undermine the adversarial process, allowing a defendant to provide the jury, through an expert operating as proxy, with a one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental 6 The Court clarified that its holding in Buchanan was not limited to circumstances in which the court-ordered evaluation was jointly requested by the parties. Cheever, 571 US at 93. 11 state at the time of the alleged crime.” Id. at 94. “When a defendant presents evidence through a psychological expert who has examined him, the government likewise is permitted to use the only effective means of challenging that evidence: testimony from an expert who has also examined him.” Id. IV. ANALYSIS Black argues that the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination by requiring him to submit to a psychological evaluation conducted by the prosecution’s expert as a precondition to offering his own psychological evidence at his Miller hearing. We disagree. It is well established that if a defendant does not place their mental status at issue at a trial or a sentencing proceeding, the prosecution’s use of a court-ordered psychological evaluation against the defendant violates the defendant’s constitutional right against self- incrimination. Estelle, 451 US at 468. But if a defendant presents expert psychological evidence, the prosecution is permitted to offer evidence obtained during a court-ordered psychological evaluation for the limited purpose of rebuttal. Buchanan, 483 US at 423- 424; Cheever, 571 US at 98. From this principle, it naturally follows that if a defendant indicates their intent to introduce evidence at a proceeding from an expert psychologist who has evaluated the defendant, the trial court may compel the defendant to submit to a similar psychological evaluation by a prosecution expert. See Bilal v United States, 240 A3d 20, 28 (DC, 2020). “[C]ourts have relied on Cheever as a basis for rejecting arguments that a trial court violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by refusing to let a defense mental health expert 12 testify about the defendant’s mental condition unless the defendant submits to an examination by a government mental health expert.” Id.; see also State v Madison, 160 Ohio St 3d 232, 254; 155 NE3d 867 (2020); Hernandez v Davis, 750 F Appx 378, 383 (CA 5, 2018). Black contends that compelled psychological evaluations are never permissible for purposes of Miller hearings. We disagree. Michigan trial courts generally have the authority to order postconviction psychological and psychiatric evaluations for use at sentencing. Wright, 431 Mich at 287 (explaining that postconviction presentence evaluations may be “court-ordered or requested as part of the presentence investigative process to determine the defendant’s character traits for purposes of sentencing”). The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination “attaches at a court-ordered psychiatric examination used for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 295. But that right does not preclude courts from ordering these evaluations, under the parameters that we set forth here. Miller hearings differ from ordinary sentencing hearings because at typical sentencing hearings, “neither the prosecutor nor the defendant generally bears any particular burden,” whereas at a Miller hearing, the burden is on the prosecution. 7 Taylor, 510 Mich at 133, 135-136. At Miller hearings, the prosecution bears the burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption “that the particular juvenile defendant 7 As we explained in Taylor, a Miller hearing also has “unique constitutional implications beyond those present at other sentencing hearings because it necessarily involves defendants who commit crimes when they are juveniles—individuals who are constitutionally different from their adult counterparts for purposes of sentencing.” Taylor, 510 Mich at 133 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, “unlike a typical sentencing, a Miller hearing is not a natural progression of a criminal proceeding because the prosecutor must file a motion to change the status quo posttrial.” Id. 13 is not deserving of LWOP.” Id. at 138. Defendants may subsequently introduce evidence in mitigation, including expert psychological evidence on relevant topics. 8 If a defendant introduces such evidence, consistent with Buchanan and Cheever, prosecutors are permitted to introduce evidence to challenge it. 9 To adopt Black’s position would be to effectively prohibit prosecutors from presenting psychological evidence to challenge the defendant’s psychological evidence, which would “undermine the adversarial process.” Cheever, 571 US at 94. 8 Miller hearings are, in some ways, analogous to the capital punishment proceedings involved in Estelle, 451 US at 457-458. Both are postconviction procedures that place the burden on the prosecution to prove that the defendant poses a continuing threat to society. In Estelle, the Supreme Court reasoned that a Fifth Amendment violation occurred when the prosecution offered evidence of a court-ordered competency exam where the defendant “introduced no psychiatric evidence, nor had he indicated that he might do so.” Id. at 466. This holding logically leads to the conclusion that, if the defendant had introduced psychiatric evidence, the prosecution would have been permitted to offer its own psychiatric evidence as rebuttal, regardless of the defendant’s lack of burden at these proceedings. 9 Some Michigan statutes require trial courts to compel a psychiatric exam in certain situations, and they require these compelled evaluations to be conducted by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry or other qualified examiner. See MCL 768.20a(2) (stating that after a defendant provides notice of intent to assert an insanity defense, the “court shall order the defendant to undergo an examination relating to his or her claim of insanity by personnel of the center for forensic psychiatry or by other qualified personnel, as applicable, for a period not to exceed 60 days from the date of the order”); MCL 330.2026(1) (“Upon a showing that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to undergo an examination by personnel of either the center for forensic psychiatry or other facility officially certified by the department of mental health to perform examinations relating to the