People v Sanders

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v SANDERS Docket No. 167899. Argued on application for leave to appeal March 12, 2026. Decided July 30, 2026. In 2013, John H. Sanders was convicted following a jury trial in the Ingham Circuit Court of felony murder and first-degree child abuse. Earlier that year, defendant took his three-month- old daughter to the hospital after she stopped breathing. The examining physician suspected that the child’s injuries were the result of inflicted abuse. While the child remained in the hospital in critical condition, defendant agreed to participate in an interview with detectives from the Lansing Police Department. Defendant repeatedly denied responsibility when the officers either implicitly or directly accused him of harming his daughter. The officers arrested defendant without a warrant and kept him in custody, and the child died that evening. The next day, while defendant remained in detention, a doctor performed an autopsy and concluded that the cause of death was a traumatic brain injury and the manner of death was homicide. Two days later, defendant waived his Miranda 1 rights and agreed to speak with a detective. Defendant initially denied harming his daughter but later gave varying explanations for the cause of her injuries, including that he shook her when she would not stop crying. At the time defendant made these statements, he had been detained for at least 64 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause. A magistrate later that day authorized a criminal complaint against defendant upon a finding of probable cause. In 2019, defendant filed in the trial court a motion for relief from judgment. The court, Rosemarie E. Aquilina, J., granted the motion on the basis that defendant’s trial attorney had been ineffective for failing to seek the assistance of a medical expert regarding the child’s cause of death. During proceedings before the second trial, an evidentiary hearing was held on the prosecution’s motion to admit the statements that defendant had made to the detective; the detective testified that, in 2013, it was his understanding, and the practice of the Lansing Police Department, that a suspect arrested without a warrant had to be brought before a magistrate within 72 hours. The court granted the prosecution’s motion, concluding that although defendant was detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). (1991)—which held that an unconstitutional seizure occurs when the police detain an individual for more than 48 hours following a warrantless arrest without a neutral magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists, unless the prosecution proves the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance—the statements were voluntary under the factors outlined in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315 (1988), and therefore admissible. Defendant sought interlocutory leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which denied the application. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 511 (2025). In an opinion by Justice BOLDEN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN, WELCH, THOMAS, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 1. Statements made by a detained arrestee while seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause must be excluded from evidence unless the prosecution establishes that the statements were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the unconstitutional conduct. Application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate under these circumstances because it would appreciably deter police misconduct. In determining whether suppression is required, a reviewing court should consider whether Miranda rights were read, the temporal proximity between the constitutional violation and the challenged statements, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. The voluntariness of the statements is a separate threshold inquiry guided by the totality of the circumstances and the factors discussed in Cipriano and People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472 (2023). While the Cipriano factors incorporate the length of detention and the delay in bringing a defendant before a magistrate, they do so only through the lens of determining whether a confession was freely and voluntarily made in the context of the Fifth Amendment, not in the context of the Fourth Amendment. People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615 (2000), was overruled to the extent it concluded that Cipriano’s totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness inquiry sufficiently accounts for the Fourth Amendment interests at play when a defendant arrested without a warrant is detained for more than 48 hours without a probable-cause determination. 2. Because the trial court in this case did not consider whether the statements made by defendant were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the McLaughlin violation, the trial court’s order granting the prosecution’s motion to admit the statements was vacated and the case was remanded for the trial court to apply the appropriate standards. It was uncontested that defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated under McLaughlin because he was detained for more than 48 hours following a warrantless arrest without receiving a judicial determination of probable cause, and the delay was unjustified. The detective’s belief that officers had 72 hours to bring a suspect arrested without a warrant before a judge for a probable-cause determination was contrary to McLaughlin’s clear rule, and such a plain legal error is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying delay. An attenuation analysis was appropriate to determine whether the statements made while defendant was wrongfully detained were traceable to the Fourth Amendment violation under McLaughlin, or instead whether the taint of illegality had been purged. Trial court order vacated; case remanded for further proceedings.  Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the exclusionary- rule analysis was required because of the Fourth Amendment McLaughlin violation. Instead, the voluntariness inquiry established in Cipriano would adequately protect the integrity of the process and the statements obtained during the interrogation. The exclusionary rule is a judicial fiction, created to prospectively protect Fourth Amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct, and the United States Supreme Court has refused to apply this judicially created prophylactic rule whenever the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. Far more suitable remedies were available to defendant than suppression of evidence for the violation of his Fourth Amendment right. These alternative remedies—such as threat of civil liability for violating a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights—would deter wrongful police conduct without imposing the high cost on our criminal justice system of excluding evidence critical to the truth-seeking process of a criminal trial. Justice ZAHRA would not have overruled Manning and would have affirmed the trial court’s order to admit defendant’s inculpatory statements under the voluntariness test supplied by Cipriano.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 30, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167899 JOHN HAROLD SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH BOLDEN, J. This appeal concerns the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a judicial probable- cause determination as a prerequisite to the continued detention of a suspect who is arrested without a warrant. Under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56-57; 111 S Ct 1661; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991), an unconstitutional seizure occurs when the police detain an individual for more than 48 hours following such an arrest without a neutral magistrate concluding that probable cause exists, unless the prosecution proves the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. In this case, everyone agrees that defendant, John Sanders, made statements to police while he was detained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under McLaughlin. The questions are whether these statements should be suppressed and what standard applies to resolve that determination. We hold that statements made by a detained arrestee while seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause must be excluded from evidence unless the prosecution establishes that the statements were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the unconstitutional conduct. In making this judgment, a reviewing court should consider whether Miranda 1 rights were read, the temporal proximity between the constitutional violation and the challenged statements, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct. The voluntariness of the statements is a separate threshold inquiry guided by the totality of the circumstances and the factors discussed in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), and People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472, 481-482, 495-496; 999 NW2d 717 (2023). Because the trial court did not consider whether the statements made by Sanders were sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the McLaughlin violation, we vacate the trial court’s order granting the prosecution’s motion to admit the statements at issue and remand to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 2  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND This case arises out of the death of Sanders’s three-month-old daughter on Friday, January 4, 2013. Sanders brought the child to the hospital that morning after she stopped breathing. There, the examining physician identified brain injuries that he suspected were indicative of inflicted abuse. While the child remained in the hospital in critical condition, Sanders agreed to participate in an interview with detectives from the Lansing Police Department. During separate questioning by two detectives at the police station, Sanders repeatedly denied responsibility when the officers either implicitly or directly accused him of harming his daughter. Concluding there was probable cause to believe that Sanders had engaged in criminal conduct, officers formally arrested him without a warrant at the end of the interviews and kept him in custody. The child died around the same time as Sanders’s arrest on Friday evening. The next day, while Sanders remained in detention, a doctor performed an autopsy on the child. The doctor concluded that the cause of death was a traumatic brain injury and the manner of death was homicide. On Monday morning, January 7, Detective Mark Lewandowsky was asked by the lead investigators to speak with Sanders because he had not yet been interviewed after the autopsy was completed. Sanders waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk with Detective Lewandowsky. During the first hour or so of the interrogation, Sanders consistently maintained that he did not harm his daughter. Then, after Detective Lewandowsky confronted Sanders with the autopsy results and insisted there was more to the story, Sanders gave varying explanations for the cause of his daughter’s injuries. These included statements that the child hit her head on the ceiling after he tossed her in 3 the air; that the child fell onto the bed; and that he shook the child when she would not stop crying. At the time Sanders made these statements, he had been detained for at least 64 hours and had yet to receive a judicial determination of probable cause. Only later that day did a magistrate authorize a criminal complaint against Sanders upon a finding of probable cause. Detective Lewandowsky would eventually testify that in 2013, it was his understanding, and the practice of the Lansing Police Department, that a suspect arrested without a warrant had to be brought before a magistrate within 72 hours. At trial in December 2013, a jury convicted Sanders of felony murder and first- degree child abuse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and this Court denied leave to appeal. People v Sanders, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 21, 2015 (Docket No. 320247); People v Sanders, 498 Mich 907 (2015). Sanders moved for relief from judgment in 2019, and the trial court granted a new trial on the basis that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to seek the assistance of a medical expert. The trial court reached this decision following an evidentiary hearing at which two doctors testified that the child’s death was likely caused by a severe infection rather than inflicted abuse. Pretrial proceedings resumed after the prosecution elected to retry Sanders on the charges of open murder and first-degree child abuse. The prosecution moved to admit the statements that Sanders made to Detective Lewandowsky, and Sanders opposed the motion. An evidentiary hearing was held at which Detective Lewandowsky testified and 4 the interrogation video was played. 2 After the hearing, the trial court issued a lengthy opinion granting the prosecution’s motion, concluding that the statements were voluntary under the factors outlined in Cipriano. 3 The court found that a few Cipriano factors— prolonged questioning, length of detention, and the unnecessary delay in bringing Sanders before a magistrate—weighed in favor of exclusion, but it concluded that the totality of the circumstances otherwise supported a finding of voluntariness. While the court found that Sanders was detained in violation of McLaughlin when he made the challenged statements, it noted that the delay was merely one factor in the voluntariness inquiry. Trial court proceedings were stayed while Sanders pursued an appeal of the decision to admit these statements. The Court of Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal. People v Sanders, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 20, 2024 (Docket No. 371677). Sanders then sought leave to appeal in this Court; we ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to address: (1) the proper analysis for determining whether statements made while detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44 (1991), should be suppressed; (2) whether People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615[; 624 NW2d 746] (2000), was correctly decided; and (3) whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the defendant’s statements were voluntary. See People v Cipriano, 431 2 Commonly known in Michigan as a Walker hearing, this proceeding allows a trial court to receive evidence to determine the voluntariness of incriminating statements made by a defendant. People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). 3 These statements were excluded at the first trial by a since-retired judge, but the successor judge determined that she could reconsider the prior judge’s ruling. Sanders does not challenge this authority, so we do not address it. 5  Mich 315 (1988). [People v Sanders, ___ Mich ___, ___; 18 NW3d 511, 512 (2025).] II. LEGAL BACKGROUND The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” US Const, Am IV; People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558 & n 7; 563 NW2d 208 (1997); see also Const 1963, art 1, § 11. An arrest is a seizure but one that is generally reasonable if justified by probable cause. People v Hammerlund, 504 Mich 442, 451; 939 NW2d 129 (2019). Sometimes a lawful arrest requires a warrant. See, e.g., Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 576; 100 S Ct 1371; 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980) (holding that a warrant is required to make a routine felony arrest inside the home). An arrest warrant is issued when a magistrate is presented with a sworn complaint alleging the commission of an offense and determines that there is “reasonable cause to believe that the individual accused in the complaint committed that offense.” MCL 764.1a(1). Other times, like in a public place, the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless arrest so long as a police officer possesses probable cause. Hammerlund, 504 Mich at 452-453. For persons arrested without a warrant, the Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause “promptly after arrest” as a prerequisite to prolonged detention. Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 114, 125; 95 S Ct 854; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975). While a police officer’s “on-the-scene assessment of probable cause” may justify the initial arrest, it cannot provide the legal basis for sustained pretrial detention. Id. at 113-114. Gerstein’s holding therefore ensures that a warrantless arrest receives the same Fourth Amendment scrutiny that would otherwise precede the 6 issuance of an arrest warrant—that is, judicial review for probable cause. Id. Requiring a neutral magistrate to independently examine the evidence protects the presumptively innocent against “unfounded interference with liberty” and recognizes that “[t]he consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.” Id. at 114. Over time, conflicts arose as to what Gerstein meant by a “prompt” probable-cause determination, so the Supreme Court offered guidance in McLaughlin. McLaughlin, 500 US at 50. That case arose from a class action challenging a California county’s policy for providing probable-cause determinations to individuals arrested without a warrant. Id. at 47. The Court held that a judicial determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of arrest will generally satisfy Gerstein’s promptness requirement. Id. at 56. But even a delay of less than 48 hours will not be insulated from constitutional protection if the arrestee can show that the delay was unreasonable. Id. “Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id. After 48 hours without a probable-cause determination, “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance,” and intervening weekends do not qualify as the latter. Id. at 57. In other words, a delay of more than 48 hours presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment. Powell v Nevada, 511 US 79, 83-84; 114 S Ct 1280; 128 L Ed 2d 1 (1994). After Gerstein but before McLaughlin, this Court addressed a related but distinct state-law question in Cipriano. By statute, Michigan requires that an arrestee be brought before a magistrate for arraignment “without unnecessary delay.” MCL 764.26. Cipriano 7 addressed whether a violation of this statute required suppression of a confession obtained during an unnecessary prearraignment delay. Cipriano, 431 Mich at 319. 4 The Court held that unnecessary delay does not mandate exclusion. Id. at 335. Instead, delay is one factor, considered among the totality of the circumstances, for evaluating the voluntariness of a confession. Id. at 333-334. While prolonged prearraignment delay “should be a signal to the trial court that the voluntariness of a confession obtained during this period may have been impaired,” an otherwise voluntary confession should not be excluded solely due to this delay. Id. at 335. Cipriano enumerated a nonexhaustive list of factors that a trial court should consider in a voluntariness inquiry: 4 Sanders asserts that Cipriano’s statement that “the prompt-arraignment requirement was never elevated by the United States Supreme Court to the level of a constitutional right,” Cipriano, 431 Mich at 332, is contrary to Gerstein. It’s clear, however, that Cipriano was drawing a distinction between an arraignment and a probable-cause determination. See id. at 324 n 9 (“The statutory right to prompt arraignment without unnecessary delay should not be confused with the Fourth Amendment requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest without a warrant.”), citing Gerstein, 420 US at 114. While jurisdictions may “combine probable cause determinations with arraignments,” McLaughlin, 500 US at 58—a common practice in Michigan—they are not synonymous proceedings. See MCR 6.104(D) (“If an accused is arrested without a warrant, a complaint . . . must be filed at or before the time of arraignment. On receiving the complaint and on finding probable cause, the court must either issue a warrant or endorse the complaint as provided in MCL 764.1c. Arraignment of the accused may then proceed . . . .”). See also Riney v State, 935 P2d 828, 833 (Alas App, 1997) (“It is important to understand that the hearing required under the Fourth Amendment by Gerstein and McLaughlin is not the same thing as an ‘arraignment’ or an ‘initial appearance’.”). The purpose of a probable-cause determination is to provide a neutral judgment that legal justification exists for an arrest, Gerstein, 420 US at 114, while the purpose of an arraignment is to provide defendants with notice of the charges brought against them and to allow them to enter a plea, People v Nix, 301 Mich App 195, 208; 836 NW2d 224 (2013). Cipriano’s pronouncement is therefore not inconsistent with Gerstein. 8  [T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id. at 334.][5] As noted, Cipriano preceded the decision in McLaughlin. In Manning, 243 Mich App at 626-627, the Court of Appeals considered the interplay between the two cases. Manning observed that Michigan courts had yet to address the legal impact of a Fourth Amendment violation under McLaughlin on statements made during the unreasonable delay. Id. at 638. The McLaughlin decision, Manning opined, “does not supplant” Cipriano; rather, the two opinions “dovetail.” Id. at 617. The Manning Court held that a McLaughlin violation does not automatically require suppression of a confession obtained during the delay. Id. at 642. Such a rule, Manning reasoned, “would not further the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Id. Instead, the McLaughlin violation—and hence, the unreasonable delay—is one factor in evaluating the voluntariness of the statement under 5 We have also since identified “any other factual circumstances, psychological effects, and coercive tactics employed by the officers” during interrogation as relevant to a determination of voluntariness. People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472, 495; 999 NW2d 717 (2023). Such additional factors include promises of leniency and other interrogation strategies that “tend to undermine a defendant’s free will . . . .” Id. at 495-496. 9 Cipriano. And, of course, “[t]he longer the delay, the greater the probability that the confession will be held involuntary.” Id. at 643. 6 III. ANALYSIS Sanders contends that the statements he made during the January 7 interrogation must be suppressed because they were the product of an unconstitutional detention. When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence arising out of an allegedly unconstitutional search or seizure, two separate questions generally must be asked: Did the police conduct violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and if so, is the remedy of the exclusionary rule appropriate? Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 223; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983). We review the answer to these questions de novo, People v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001), meaning independently and without deference to the lower courts, People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 618; 939 NW2d 213 (2019). A. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION The first answer is uncontested here. Sanders’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated, as held in McLaughlin. He was detained for more than 48 hours following a warrantless arrest without receiving a judicial determination of probable cause, and the prosecution conceded in the trial court that this delay was unjustified. Indeed, Detective Lewandowsky admitted that he thought police officers had 72 hours to bring a suspect arrested without a warrant before a judge for a probable-cause determination. That 6 Manning also hinted that, under a different set of facts, “the length of the delay alone may be a sufficient ground to suppress a defendant’s statement, particularly where the delay is so inexplicably long that it raises an inference of police misconduct.” Id. at 645. 10 belief was contrary to McLaughlin’s clear rule, and such a plain legal error is not an extraordinary circumstance justifying delay. B. REMEDY Having established a Fourth Amendment violation, the disputed issue is whether the exclusionary rule—which bars evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from admission as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings, People v Lucynski, 514 Mich 888, 889 (2024)—applies to the statements made by Sanders while he was unlawfully detained. When applicable, the exclusionary rule covers evidence discovered directly from an illegal search or seizure, as well as so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree” evidence that is derivative of the unlawful conduct. Utah v Strieff, 579 US 232, 237; 136 S Ct 2056; 195 L Ed 2d 400 (2016). But “[t]he exclusionary rule does not automatically apply once a court finds a Fourth Amendment violation.” Lucynski, 514 Mich at 889. Instead, as a judicially created remedy, “application of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.” Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 347; 107 S Ct 1160; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987). Because the fundamental purpose of the exclusionary rule is to appreciably deter future Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court has held that the rule only applies when the benefits of deterrence outweigh the costs of exclusion on the justice system. Herring v United States, 555 US 135, 141; 129 S Ct 695; 172 L Ed 2d 496 (2009). The Supreme Court has previously declined to resolve whether the exclusionary rule applies in the context of a McLaughlin violation. Powell, 511 US at 85 n *. Lower federal and state courts have reached differing answers. Some have concluded—like the Court of 11 Appeals in Manning and like the prosecution advocates here—that statements made during a McLaughlin violation must be excluded only if they are involuntarily made, with the delay in presenting a defendant to a magistrate considered as one factor in that determination. See, e.g., People v Willis, 215 Ill 2d 517, 533-535; 831 NE2d 531 (2005); State v Nissen, 252 Neb 51, 68; 560 NW2d 157 (1997); State v Tucker, 137 NJ 259, 270; 645 A2d 111 (1994). Others, however, have rejected the voluntariness-only approach and held that the remedy for a McLaughlin violation is exclusion when the evidence is causally linked to the Fourth Amendment illegality. See, e.g., Anderson v Calderon, 232 F3d 1053, 1071 (CA 9, 2000), overruled on other grounds by Bittaker v Woodford, 331 F3d 715 (CA 9, 2003); Powell v State, 113 Nev 41, 46; 930 P2d 1123 (1997); State v Huddleston, 924 SW2d 666, 673-675 (Tenn, 1996). Sanders argues for the latter approach, insisting that statements must be suppressed if no intervening events broke the causal connection between the unconstitutional detention and the interrogation. To support his position, Sanders discusses the Supreme Court’s application of the exclusionary rule to confessions made following an illegal arrest—that is, an arrest lacking probable cause at its outset. In that context, the Court has long held that verbal evidence must be excluded if it is the “fruit” of an unlawful arrest. Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 485; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963). This inquiry asks whether the statement was obtained by “exploitation” of the Fourth Amendment violation or, instead, whether it was “sufficiently attenuated” from the taint of the illegal arrest to be admissible. Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 592, 600; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975). Described by the Supreme Court as an exception to the exclusionary rule, “[t]he attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery 12 of evidence[.]” Strieff, 579 US at 238. When this link is broken, the statements are admissible because they are unaffected by the Fourth Amendment-violative conduct. Brown, 422 US at 603. But “[w]hen there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession,” exclusion of the evidence is warranted because that remedy is “more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future . . . .” Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200, 218; 99 S Ct 2248; 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979). See also People v Frederick, 500 Mich 228, 242-243; 895 NW2d 541 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure is tainted by that initial illegality unless sufficiently attenuated from it.”). To determine whether inculpatory statements have been purged of the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation, Brown identified several relevant factors, none of which are dispositive: (1) the reading of Miranda warnings, (2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and confession, (3) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. Brown, 422 US at 603-604. See also Dunaway, 442 US at 217-219 (applying the Brown factors to a confession made following an illegal arrest); Taylor v Alabama, 457 US 687, 690-694; 102 S Ct 2664; 73 L Ed 2d 314 (1982) (same). Under this framework, the prosecution has the burden of establishing the admissibility of the statements. Brown, 422 US at 604. Although this case does not involve an illegal arrest, 7 it involves an unconstitutional seizure of a different form—a prolonged detention following a warrantless arrest without a judicial determination of probable cause. We hold that the exclusionary rule applies to 7 Sanders does not challenge the legality of the arrest. 13 statements made during a McLaughlin violation, but suppression is not required if the prosecution demonstrates that those statements are sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the Fourth Amendment infringement. Application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate under these circumstances because it would appreciably deter police misconduct. The rule from McLaughlin is clear, simple, and easy to apply. At most, compliance requires minimal exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials. Violations can be avoided without difficulty because promptly presenting an arrestee to a magistrate is generally within the control of the detaining agency. And to the extent that the ability to meet this obligation is hindered by factors outside the police’s purview, McLaughlin allows the government to show that a “bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” explained the delay. McLaughlin, 500 US at 57. All told, where the Fourth Amendment violation stems from an officer’s own deliberate error, exclusion is likely to deter future misconduct. Cf. United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 921; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”). Contrast a McLaughlin violation with other Fourth Amendment violations where the Supreme Court has concluded that suppression is unwarranted because there is little to no police misconduct to deter. See, e.g., id. at 921- 922 (officer reasonably relied on a later-invalidated search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate); Krull, 480 US at 342, 349-350 (officer reasonably relied on a later-invalidated statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches); Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1, 15- 16; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995) (officer reasonably relied on erroneous information about an outstanding arrest warrant that resulted from an error by a court 14 employee); Herring, 555 US at 136-137 (officer reasonably relied on erroneous information about an outstanding arrest warrant that resulted from a negligent police bookkeeping error). By comparison, applying the exclusionary rule to statements made during a McLaughlin violation is likely to significantly deter unlawful conduct by police officers who arrest and detain an individual without a warrant. The Supreme Court’s decision in New York v Harris, 495 US 14; 110 S Ct 1640; 109 L Ed 2d 13 (1990), does not compel a different result. There, police officers violated the Payton rule—that the Fourth Amendment “prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order to make a routine felony arrest.” Payton, 445 US at 576; Harris, 495 US at 20-21 (applying Payton). At issue in Harris was whether statements made by the defendant at the police station following this unlawful within-the-home arrest should be suppressed. Id. at 17. The Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to such outside-the-home statements, so long as probable cause existed to support the arrest. Id. We believe Harris is distinguishable from this case in several respects. To start, Harris explained that a warrantless arrest of a person in the home but with probable cause does not “somehow render[] unlawful continued custody of the suspect once he is removed from the house.” Id. at 18. Rather, “[b]ecause the officers had probable cause to arrest Harris for a crime, Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was removed to the station house, given Miranda warnings, and allowed to talk.” Id. Similarly, Harris explained that the attenuation analysis from Brown is appropriate only where “ ‘the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.’ ” Id. at 19, quoting United States v Crews, 445 US 463, 471; 100 S Ct 1244; 63 L Ed 2d 537 15 (1980). Because the outside-the-home statement “was not the product of being in unlawful custody,” it was not necessary to consider whether the statement was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the illegal entry into the home. Harris, 495 US at 19. Here, by contrast, continued detention of Sanders, without a timely probable-cause determination from a magistrate, was unlawful. As the Supreme Court has put it, this finding of probable cause is a “condition” or “prerequisite” for prolonged pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest, Gerstein, 420 US at 114, 125; see also McLaughlin, 500 US at 47, and so without that finding, the detention becomes unlawful with the passage of time. See also Manuel v Joliet, 580 US 357, 365; 137 S Ct 911; 197 L Ed 2d 312 (2017) (describing Gerstein as holding that “pretrial restraint on liberty is unlawful unless a judge . . . first makes a reliable finding of probable cause”); Huddleston, 924 SW2d at 675 (“[I]t is not the arrest that is unlawful in a Mc