Attorney General v Eli Lilly and Company

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong ATTORNEY GENERAL v ELI LILLY AND COMPANY Docket No. 165961. Argued November 5, 2025 (Calendar No. 1). Decided July 31, 2026. The Attorney General filed a petition in the Ingham Circuit Court, requesting authorization to issue subpoenas related to a civil investigation into the practices of Eli Lilly and Company under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq., alleging that there was probable cause to believe that Eli Lilly had artificially increased the list prices of its insulin medications in violation of MCL 445.903(1)(z), given the disparity in pricing between its insulin products sold in Michigan and its products sold in other countries and the disparity in pricing between Eli Lilly’s branded drug, Humalog, and its generic version, Lispro. The Attorney General also argued that there was probable cause to believe that Eli Lilly had violated MCL 445.903(1)(i) by making false representations in its promotion of Lispro. Simultaneously, the Attorney General filed a complaint for declaratory relief under MCR 2.605, seeking a declaration that the civil investigation, and any resultant lawsuit, was not foreclosed by MCL 445.904(1)(a), which provides an exemption from the MCPA for “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” The Attorney General argued that Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446 (1999), and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203 (2007)—which both held that this exemption broadly encompasses general transactions authorized by law, even where the specific alleged misconduct is prohibited—were wrongly decided. The circuit court issued an order concluding that probable cause existed to believe that Eli Lilly violated the MCPA and authorizing the Attorney General to issue civil investigative subpoenas. Eli Lilly moved to stay the proceedings, including the issuance of subpoenas, pending resolution of the Attorney General’s complaint for declaratory relief. Eli Lilly also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that the sale of pharmaceuticals was a regulated activity and thus exempt from the MCPA under MCL 445.904(1)(a) under Smith and Liss. In a stipulated order, Eli Lilly agreed to withdraw its pending motion to stay without prejudice, and the Attorney General agreed to refrain from issuing subpoenas until the declaratory- judgment action resulted in a decision permitting the Attorney General to proceed with her investigation or another event took place making issuance of subpoenas appropriate. The Attorney General filed a cross-motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1) and MCR 2.116(C)(9), arguing that Smith and Liss were wrongly decided and that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption should be narrowly construed. The circuit court, Wanda M. Stokes, J., granted summary disposition in favor of Eli Lilly and dismissed the Attorney General’s complaint, ruling that the Attorney General’s MCPA claims were foreclosed by Smith and Liss. The Court of Appeals, RIORDAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and BOONSTRA, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued June 22, 2023 (Docket No. 362272). The Attorney General sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which directed and heard oral argument on the application. 513 Mich 1003 (2024). Following oral argument, the Supreme Court granted the application, directing the parties to address (1) whether the Attorney General adequately pleaded a claim that Eli Lilly violated the MCPA, (2) whether it was necessary for the Attorney General to adequately plead a violation of the MCPA for a court to determine whether MCL 445.904(1)(a) applies, (3) whether Smith and Liss correctly interpreted MCL 445.904(1)(a), and (4) if Smith and Liss were incorrectly decided, whether they should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis. ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 513 (2025). In an opinion by Justice HOOD, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices WELCH and THOMAS, the Supreme Court held: When determining whether an MCPA claim falls under the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption, courts should consider whether the specific transaction or conduct at issue, rather than the general transaction, is authorized by law. Because Smith and Liss were wrongly decided and unsupported by stare decisis principles, they were overruled. The Court of Appeals decision was reversed, the circuit court’s order was vacated, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 1. The Attorney General adequately pleaded a request for declaratory relief. Under MCL 445.907(1), the Attorney General can petition the circuit court to authorize an investigation into an alleged MCPA violation, and the circuit court, if it finds probable cause to believe a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in a method, act, or practice that is unlawful under the MCPA, may issue a subpoena compelling a person to appear before the Attorney General and answer under oath questions relating to the alleged violation. In this case, the Attorney General filed a petition requesting that the circuit court authorize civil investigative subpoenas on the basis of suspected violations of MCL 445.903(1)(z) and MCL 445.903(1)(i). The circuit court found probable cause, which authorized the Attorney General to serve investigative subpoenas on Eli Lilly or others, and this finding is not being challenged on appeal. Both parties have agreed to a stay of proceedings, effectively pausing the issuance of subpoenas and any challenge to them. Petitions for civil investigative subpoenas are not pleadings, are not required to state a claim under MCR 2.111(B)(1), and are not subject to attack for failure to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Instead, the purpose of the investigative stage is to explore and provide context for subsequent claims when probable cause exists. The circuit court found probable cause and authorized investigatory subpoenas based on allegations that Eli Lilly had possibly violated the MCPA through its insulin pricing practices, but the Attorney General’s request for subpoenas is not, in and of itself, an MCPA enforcement action. The only pleading filed in this case was the Attorney General’s complaint for declaratory relief. 2. Under the circumstances of this case, the Attorney General did not have to first bring a separate claim alleging an MCPA violation for the applicability of MCL 445.904(1)(a) to be litigated. Generally, a circuit court may grant declaratory relief when there is an actual case or controversy. Here, a justiciable case or controversy exists with regard to the Attorney General’s complaint, which solely sought declaratory relief, because the parties agreed to stay the proceedings and the Attorney General chose not to serve the subpoenas that the circuit court had already authorized. The posture of this case, which was created by the stipulated stay of proceedings, does not change the fact that a live controversy exists with respect to whether MCL 445.904(1)(a) applies. Accordingly, declaratory relief was available under MCR 2.605(A)(1). 3. Smith and Liss were wrongly decided. Their broad interpretation of the exemption in MCL 445.904(1)(a) was at odds with the plain language of the statute and essentially nullified all MCPA claims against swathes of industry sectors that would otherwise be subject to consumer- protection claims, contrary to the intent of the MCPA. The exemption in MCL 445.904(1)(a) states that the MCPA does not apply to “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” This language is unambiguous and plainly indicates that MCL 445.904(1)(a) was intended to be a narrow exemption. Smith incorrectly characterized it as a “broad exemption” and improperly inserted the word “general” into the statute by holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the specific misconduct alleged is specifically authorized by law but rather whether the “general transaction” is specifically authorized, regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited. Liss reinforced Smith’s holding, stating that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption requires a “general” transaction that is explicitly sanctioned, despite the fact that the word “general” does not appear anywhere in the text of MCL 445.904(1)(a), thereby broadening the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption in a manner that was contrary to legislative intent. Further, Smith’s and Liss’s interpretation of MCL 445.904(1)(a) wrote the phrase “specifically authorized” out of the statutory language, which allowed the exemption to apply broadly to nearly all claims against regulated businesses and licensed entities and judicially immunized those entities from MCPA claims without consideration of whether the conduct or transaction alleged was related to the licensure or regulation. Neither the text nor the purpose of the MCPA supported such a result. Moreover, the interpretation in Smith and Liss was inconsistent with some provisions of the MCPA and rendered other sections of the MCPA completely nugatory. 4. Stare decisis principles did not prevent Smith and Liss from being overruled. Smith and Liss rendered much of the MCPA completely unworkable by transforming MCL 445.904(1)(a) into an exemption so broad that it precludes most MCPA claims. By misconstruing this narrow exemption and ignoring the statute’s plain language and purpose, these decisions disrupted the reliance interest for consumer protections. To the extent that Michigan businesses are relying on Smith and Liss to engage in unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive business practices otherwise prohibited by the MCPA without the fear of repercussion, their interest is not valid. Further, public-policy interests weigh in favor of overruling Smith and Liss because those decisions severely limit the ability to conduct state-specific consumer-protection enforcement, and they were a stark and inexplicable departure from the interpretation of MCL 445.904(1)(a) in Attorney General v Diamond Mtg Co, 414 Mich 603 (1982), which Smith essentially overruled without conducting a stare decisis analysis. Court of Appeals judgment reversed; circuit court order vacated; case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. Justice BOLDEN, joined by Justices ZAHRA and BERNSTEIN, dissenting, concluded that the Attorney General did not have standing to litigate the questions before the Court because no violation of the MCPA was alleged and, without a case of actual controversy, declaratory relief was unavailable under MCR 2.605(A)(1). She thought that the majority sidestepped the actual- controversy requirement for standing by relying on the fact that plaintiff filed a petition for investigative subpoenas in a secondary case in a separate docket. She further believed that the investigative-subpoena process was an ex parte process that could not meet the requirements of MCR 2.605(A)(1). She stated that even if there had been an actual controversy in this case that gave rise to standing, the majority would have exceeded the permissible scope of declaratory relief, which was not needed to guide the parties’ future conduct in this case in light of their agreement that Smith and Liss are binding precedent that would seemingly bar this lawsuit. She reserved judgment on whether Smith, Liss, or both cases have analytic flaws or whether those cases ought to be preserved by way of stare decisis and would simply have affirmed the longstanding requirement that a party needs to demonstrate standing before a court can address the underlying substantive legal issues presented.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 31, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 165961 ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH HOOD, J. This case is about the scope of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq. Plaintiff, the Michigan Attorney General (the AG), sought and obtained authorization from the Ingham Circuit Court to issue subpoenas while investigating the insulin-pricing practices of defendant, Eli Lilly and Company, for potential violations of the MCPA. Alongside her subpoena request, the AG filed a complaint for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration from the Ingham Circuit Court that her investigation, and any resultant lawsuit, is not foreclosed by MCL 445.904(1)(a), which provides an exemption from the MCPA for “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” In Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446; 597 NW2d 28 (1999), and Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203; 732 NW2d 514 (2007), this Court held that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption broadly encompasses general transactions authorized by law, even where the specific alleged misconduct is prohibited. In this case, the Ingham Circuit Court granted Eli Lilly’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the AG’s complaint for declaratory relief, reasoning that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption applied because Eli Lilly was authorized by law to manufacture and sell insulin products. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the AG has not yet filed a complaint pleading an MCPA violation, this case involves a justiciable controversy because the trial court authorized the AG to issue investigatory subpoenas related to her investigation into Eli Lilly, and the parties dispute the proper interpretation of MCL 445.904(1)(a). Accordingly, declaratory relief is necessary to guide the parties’ future conduct, and the AG was not required to plead an MCPA violation for this Court to address the applicability of the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption. Furthermore, when determining whether an MCPA claim falls under the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption, courts should consider whether the specific transaction or conduct at issue is authorized by law. Smith and Liss were wrongly decided because they inappropriately broadened the scope of the exemption, contrary to the plain language of the statute. Because the doctrine of stare decisis points toward their reversal, we overrule 2 Smith and Liss, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the circuit court’s order, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND A. LEGAL BACKGROUND The MCPA “was enacted to provide an enlarged remedy for consumers who are mulcted”—that is, defrauded—“by deceptive business practices.” Dix v American Bankers Life Assurance Co of Florida, 429 Mich 410, 417; 415 NW2d 206 (1987). At its inception, the MCPA was one of the most powerful consumer-protection statutes in the United States. 1 The MCPA prohibits “[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce,” MCL 445.903(1), and it broadly defines “trade or commerce” as the conduct of a business providing goods, property, or service primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and includes the advertising, solicitation, offering for sale or rent, sale, lease, or distribution of a service or property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, or a business opportunity. [MCL 445.902(1)(g).] The MCPA also provides a long list of “[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices” prohibited under the act. MCL 445.903(1). Relevant to this case, the MCPA prohibits “[m]aking false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions,” MCL 445.903(1)(i), and charging “a 1 See Victor, The Liability of Professionals, Insurance Companies and Other Regulated Industries Under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, 77 Mich B J 69, 69 (1998) (“A comparison of the MCPA with consumer-protection statutes in other states reveals Michigan’s Act to be one of the broadest, all-encompassing consumer-protection statutes in the country.”). 3 price that is grossly in excess of the price at which similar property or services are sold,” MCL 445.903(1)(z). To effectuate these protections, the MCPA provides two main methods of enforcement: private actions by consumers and actions by the AG. See MCL 445.911; MCL 445.905; MCL 445.910. The MCPA grants the AG subpoena power to investigate a potential violation upon a showing of probable cause. See MCL 445.907(1). The AG may pursue injunctive relief, civil fines, and/or a class action on behalf of consumers. See MCL 445.905(1); MCL 445.910(1). Although the MCPA provides broad protections to consumers, those protections are not without limit. The MCPA contains numerous exemptions. See MCL 445.904. At issue in this case is the exemption for “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” MCL 445.904(1)(a). We first discussed the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption in Attorney General v Diamond Mtg Co, 414 Mich 603; 327 NW2d 805 (1982). In Diamond Mortgage, the AG brought an action against a mortgage company, as well as its officers and directors, under the MCPA. See id. at 607. The defendants claimed that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption applied because the mortgage company held a real estate broker’s license, under which it was entitled to perform all acts of a real estate broker, including negotiating mortgages. See id. at 616. We rejected that argument and held that “[w]hile the license generally authorizes [the mortgage company] to engage in the activities of a real estate broker, it does not specifically authorize the conduct that plaintiff alleges is violative of the Michigan 4 Consumer Protection Act, nor transactions that result from that conduct.” Id. at 617. We explained: In so concluding, we disagree that the exemption of [MCL 445.904(1)] becomes meaningless. While defendants are correct in stating that no statute or regulatory agency specifically authorizes misrepresentations or false promises, the exemption will nevertheless apply where a party seeks to attach such labels to “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States”. For this case, we need only decide that a real estate broker’s license is not specific authority for all the conduct and transactions of the licensee’s business. [Id.] We next discussed the scope of the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption in Smith, 460 Mich at 462-467. In Smith, the plaintiff’s deceased father had a life insurance policy, issued by the defendant. Id. at 450. After the plaintiff’s father’s death, the defendant denied coverage, claiming that the policy was void because the decedent had misrepresented his health on his application for insurance. Id. at 451. The plaintiff filed suit, claiming breach of contract and alleging that the defendant violated the MCPA by misrepresenting the advantages, benefits, terms, and conditions of the policy. Id. The defendant argued that because “its application and certificate of insurance forms were submitted to and implicitly approved by the State Commissioner of Insurance,” “the immediate transaction, the sale of credit life insurance, was ‘specifically authorized’ and, therefore, was exempted under” MCL 445.904(1)(a). Id. at 462-463. The plaintiff disagreed, arguing that the alleged fraudulent insurance practices were not specifically authorized by law. Id. at 463. This Court, taking a sharp detour from Diamond Mortgage, held that “the relevant inquiry is not whether the specific misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs is ‘specifically 5 authorized.’ Rather, it is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited.” Id. at 465. We reasoned that MCL 445.904(1)(a) “generally exempts the sale of credit life insurance from the provisions of the MCPA, because such ‘transaction or conduct’ is ‘specifically authorized under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.’ ” Id. Justice MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH dissented, stating that he would have followed Diamond Mortgage and that courts should consider the specific transaction or conduct, as opposed to the general transaction, at issue. Smith, 460 Mich at 481 (M. F. CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Justice CAVANAGH emphasized that “general transactions or conduct subject to licensing are not necessarily exempt from the MCPA” and that being “subject to regulation” is not the same as an action being “specifically authorized.” Id. Justice CAVANAGH noted that the majority’s broad interpretation of the MCPA’s exemption set forth in MCL 445.904(1)(a) would result in all MCPA claims being effectively blocked since most businesses that involve the sale of personal, family, and household goods or services—the practices regulated by the MCPA—have licenses or regulations authorizing their existence and general transactions. Id. at 480-481. This Court again expanded the scope of the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption in Liss. There, the parties contracted for the sale and construction of a residential home. Liss, 478 Mich at 206. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “did not complete construction on time and that the construction that was completed was not done in a workman-like manner.” Id. at 206-207. The plaintiffs sought relief under the MCPA. Id. at 207. This Court explained and clarified Smith, stating: 6  Applying the Smith test, the relevant inquiry is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited. This Court has not construed the meaning of “specifically authorized” under the MCPA. “Specific” means “having a special application, bearing, or reference; explicit or definite.” “Authorize” means “to give authority or formal permission for; sanction.” Thus, the exception requires a general transaction that is “explicitly sanctioned.” [Liss, 478 Mich at 212-213 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] This Court held that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption “applies to residential home builders who engage in the type of activities that define a residential home builder, which activities are permitted by [Michigan’s Occupational Code, MCL 339.101 et seq.,] to be performed only by licensed residential home builders.” Id. at 215. In short, as long as a builder is licensed to act as a residential home builder, any claim related to the “general transaction” of residential home building is exempt from the MCPA. See id. It is against this backdrop that we consider the facts of this case. B. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In January 2022, the AG initiated this case by filing a petition for civil investigative subpoenas in the circuit court, requesting authorization to issue subpoenas related to an investigation into Eli Lilly’s practices in pricing analog insulin products. The AG alleged that Eli Lilly artificially increased the list prices of insulin medications, in violation of the MCPA. Specifically, the AG argued that there was probable cause to believe that Eli Lilly violated MCL 445.903(1)(z) based on the disparity in pricing between its insulin products sold in Michigan and its products sold in other countries, and based on the disparity in pricing between Eli Lilly’s branded drug, Humalog, and its generic version, Lispro. 7 Further, the AG argued that there was probable cause to believe that Eli Lilly violated MCL 445.903(1)(i) by making false representations in its promotion of Lispro. 2 Simultaneously, the AG filed a complaint for declaratory relief under MCR 2.605, seeking a declaration that the MCPA applied to the conduct the AG sought to investigate. The AG argued that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption did not apply in this case and that Smith and Liss were wrongly decided. The AG’s complaint for declaratory relief did not include any separate cause of action under the MCPA. The AG explained that it was preferable to resolve at the inception of the investigation whether the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption applied, rather than to proceed with issuing subpoenas and have Eli Lilly later raise Smith and Liss as a defense. The circuit court issued an order concluding that probable cause existed to believe that Eli Lilly violated the MCPA. The order authorized the AG to issue civil investigative subpoenas. But the AG did not immediately issue the subpoenas. Eli Lilly moved to stay the proceedings, including the issuance of subpoenas, pending resolution of the AG’s 2 To support her petition for investigatory subpoenas, the AG provided a detailed explanation of what her office sought to investigate and why. The AG argued that there was probable cause to believe that Eli Lilly’s established list prices for its insulin medications grossly exceeded the price of the same medications sold in other countries. To support this assertion, the AG provided data from a telephonic survey, conducted by the AG’s office, that compared the costs of insulin medications sold at Michigan pharmacies with the cost of the same medications sold at pharmacies in Ontario, Canada. The AG also alleged that probable cause arose through Eli Lilly’s sale and marketing of its authorized generic drug, Lispro. The AG argued that Eli Lilly’s branded drug, Humalog, was sold at a price grossly in excess of the chemically identical Lispro. The AG contended that the availability of Lispro under health insurance plans was determined, in part, through Eli Lilly’s negotiations with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). Through subpoenas, the AG seeks to investigate the extent to which Eli Lilly sought to negotiate the inclusion of Lispro in the plans of PBMs. 8 complaint for declaratory relief. Eli Lilly’s motion to stay essentially served the same purpose as a motion to quash the subpoenas. Eli Lilly argued that it would create an unnecessary burden if the subpoenas were issued before the dispositive question in the case, the applicability of the MCPA, was resolved. 3 Eli Lilly also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted), arguing that the sale of pharmaceuticals was a regulated activity and thus exempt from the MCPA under MCL 445.904(1)(a), citing Smith and Liss. In a stipulated order, Eli Lilly agreed to withdraw its pending motion to stay without prejudice, and the AG agreed to refrain from issuing subpoenas until the declaratory- judgment action resulted in a decision permitting the AG to proceed with her investigation or another event took place making issuance of subpoenas appropriate. 4 The AG filed a cross-motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(1) (requiring the court to “render judgment without delay” if a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law) and MCR 2.116(C)(9) (failure to state a defense), arguing that Smith and Liss were wrongly decided and that the MCL 445.904(1)(a) exemption should be narrowly construed. 3 Specifically, Eli Lilly agreed with the AG that it would be a waste of resources for the AG to proceed with her investigation only to have “the courts confirm that the whole endeavor is ultra vires.” Therefore, Eli Lilly requested that the circuit court “stay proceedings in the matter and allow the parties to litigate the dispositive legal question” already presented in the “declaratory judgment action—just as the Attorney General intended.” 4 Eli Lilly acknowledged in its answer to the AG’s application for leave to appeal that, had the parties not stipulated to stay the proceedings, it most certainly would have moved to quash the subpoenas. 9  The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of Eli Lilly, holding that the AG’s MCPA claims were foreclosed by Smith and Liss. The circuit court dismissed the AG’s complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that “it is not in dispute that [Eli Lilly] manufactures and sells drugs, including insulin, pursuant to licenses issued under Part 177 of the Public Health Code, MCL 333.17701 et seq. Clearly, then, under Smith and Liss, the [MCL 445.904(1)(a)] exemption applies.” Attorney General v Eli Lilly & Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 22, 2023 (Docket No. 362272), p 2. We granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to address: (1) whether the plaintiff adequately pled a claim that the defendant violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq.; (2) whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to adequately plead a violation of the MCPA for a court to determine whether MCL 445.904(1)(a), an exemption to the MCPA, applies; (3) whether this Court’s decisions in [Smith and Liss] correctly interpreted MCL 445.904(1)(a); and (4) if they were incorrectly decided, whether they should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468[; 613 NW2d 307] (2000). [Attorney General v Eli Lilly & Co, ___ Mich ___; 18 NW3d 513 (2025). 5] II. JUSTICIABILITY As a threshold matter, Eli Lilly argues that this Court cannot properly review this case because the AG has not pleaded a legally viable MCPA violation. We disagree. We hold that this case involves an actual, justiciable controversy, triggered by the circuit 5 This Court initially ordered oral argument on the application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to file briefs addressing whether Smith and Liss were wrongly decided and whether stare decisis prevents this Court from overturning Smith and Liss. Following oral argument, this Court granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to brief two additional issues: (1) whether the AG adequately pleaded a claim that Eli Lilly violated the MCPA, and (2) whether it is necessary for the AG to adequately plead a violation of the MCPA for a court to determine whether MCL 445.904(1)(a) applies. 10 court’s authorization of investigatory subpoenas. Although this case is in the investigatory stage of the proceedings, and the AG has not yet pleaded a substantive MCPA violation, this case involves a present legal controversy. A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition in an action for a declaratory judgment.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, MEA/NEA v Lansing Bd of Ed (On Remand), 293 Mich App 506, 512-513; 810 NW2d 95 (2011). This Court also reviews de novo questions of law and questions concerning justiciability. See League of Women Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 506 Mich 561, 574; 957 NW2d 731 (2020). B. ADEQUATE PLEADING We first consider whether the AG adequately pleaded a claim that Eli Lilly violated the MCPA. As noted earlier, “[t]he MCPA prohibits the use of unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.” Zine v Chrysler Corp, 236 Mich App 261, 270-271; 600 NW2d 384 (1999). MCL 445.907(1) describes the process by which the AG can petition the circuit court to authorize an investigation into an alleged MCPA violation: Upon the ex parte application of the attorney general to the circuit court in the county where the defendant is established or conducts business or, if the defendant is not established in this state, in Ingham county, the circuit court, if it finds probable cause to believe a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in a method, act, or practice which is unlawful under this act, may, after an ex parte hearing, issue a subpoena compelling a person to appear before the attorney general and answer under oath questions relating to an alleged violation of this act. 11  In January 2022, the AG filed a petition requesting that the circuit court authorize civil investigative subpoenas on the basis of suspected violations of MCL 445.903(1)(z) and MCL 445.903(1)(i). The circuit court found probable cause, which authorized the AG to serve investigative subpoenas on Eli Lilly or others. The circuit court’s probable-cause finding is not being challenged on appeal. Both parties have agreed to a stay of proceedings, effectively pausing the issuance of subpoenas and any challenge to them. On appeal to this Court, the AG concedes, and we agree, that the petition for civil investigative subpoenas is not a “pleading.” “[A] ‘pleading’ means only a complaint, a cross-claim, a counterclaim, a third-party complaint, an answer to one of those four types of pleading, and a reply to an answer.” Bechtold v Morris, 443 Mich 105, 107 n 4; 503 NW2d 654 (1993), citing MCR 2.110(A). “No other form of pleading is allowed.” MCR 2.110(A). Petitions for civil investigative subpoenas are not required to state a claim under MCR 2.111(B)(1), nor are they subject to attack for failure to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Instead, the purpose of the investigative stage is to explore and provide context for subsequent claims when probable cause exists. See Cavalry SPV I, LLC v Morrisey, 232 W Va 325, 335; 752 SE2d 356 (2013) (“[T]he purpose of an investigative subpoena is precisely as its name implies: to investigate. Such an investigation is designed to ascertain whether a violation of [law] has, in fact, occurred so as to permit the filing of an enforcement proceeding against the alleged offender.”). The circuit court found probable cause and authorized investigatory subpoenas, based on allegations that Eli Lilly had possibly violated the MCPA through its insulin pricing practices. But the AG’s request for subpoenas is not, in and of itself, an MCPA enforcement action. The only pleading 12 filed in this case was the AG’s complaint for declaratory relief, filed on the same day as the petition. C. DECLARATORY RELIEF Having concluded that the AG has not yet pleaded an MCPA violation, we turn to the question of whether the AG was required to plead an MCPA violation for the court to determine whether MCL 445.904(1)(a) applies. In other words, did the AG have to file a complaint alleging an MCPA violation for the court to address her request for declaratory relief? Under the facts of this case, we hold that the AG did not have to first bring a separate claim alleging an MCPA violation for the applicability of MCL 445.904(1)(a) to be litigated. In the simplest terms, a circuit court may grant declaratory relief when there is an actual case or controversy. See Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 293 Mich App at 515. So, we ask whether a case or controversy exists with regard to the AG’s complaint that solely seeks declaratory relief. Under the circumstances, it does. The only reason this case presents a question of whether a case or controversy exists is because the parties agreed to stay the proceedings and the AG has chosen not to serve the subpoenas that the circuit court already authorized. Put differently, the posture of this case (i.e., the stipulated stay of proceedings) does not change the fact that a live controversy exists just beneath the surface. “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.” MCR 2.605(A)(1). “The existence of an ‘actual controversy’ is a condition precedent to the invocation of 13 declaratory relief. In the absence of an actual controversy, the trial court lacks subject- matter jurisdiction to enter a d