People v Haupt

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v HAUPT Docket No. 167315. Argued on application for leave to appeal March 10, 2026. Decided July 30, 2026. Defendant, Alexander J. Haupt, was arrested on a misdemeanor stalking charge in September 2017 in relation to 17-year-old AM. The police obtained a warrant to search defendant’s cell phone for evidence related to the stalking allegations, and, after finding naked photos of AM, they obtained a second warrant to search the phone for evidence of child sexually abusive material (CSAM). In that search, police found images of AM naked or performing sexual acts, as well as text messages and e-mails indicating that defendant had sold the images to a third party and an audio file in which defendant tried to coerce AM into withdrawing a pending criminal complaint. Defendant was subsequently charged in the Clare Circuit Court with producing CSAM, distributing CSAM, possessing CSAM, using a computer to commit a crime, and obstructing justice. Defendant had troubled relationships with both the attorney he had retained and the attorney he was later appointed, and, as a result of their motions to withdraw, defendant either was entirely without counsel or had only advisory counsel during some of the pretrial proceedings, including a hearing on June 25, 2019, at which the court considered whether to allow the admission of AM’s preliminary-examination testimony, and a hearing on July 2, 2019, at which the court considered his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the original search of his cell phone and his motion to dismiss. The trial court, Roy G. Mienk, J., conducted the latter hearing without advising defendant of his continuing right to the assistance of counsel. The trial court later held a hearing on the prosecution’s motion to compel and strike defense witnesses and exhibits at which neither defendant nor his advisory counsel was present, and the court later granted the motion. On the day that trial was scheduled to begin, defendant stated on the record that he planned to stand mute, alleging that the trial court had violated MCR 6.005 by failing to provide an attorney except in an advisory capacity. The trial court responded by reappointing the attorney who had been serving in an advisory capacity only and adjourning trial until the following day. After a two-day trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. Defendant appealed as of right, arguing that the trial court had deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing his attorney to withdraw without appointing substitute counsel. The Court of Appeals, MURRAY, C.J., and M. J. KELLY and O’BRIEN, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued September 23, 2021 (Docket No. 351593) (Haupt I), holding that even though defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel and the trial court had not complied with People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361 (1976), and MCR 6.005(D) in allowing defendant to proceed in propria persona, defendant could not show entitlement to relief under the standard for plain-error review in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750 (1999). The panel also suggested that defendant might have forfeited his right to counsel through his own conduct. Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which held the case in abeyance for People v Posey, 512 Mich 317 (2023), People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472 (2023), and People v King, 512 Mich 1 (2023). 973 NW2d 147 (2022). After those cases were decided, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision in Haupt I to the extent it was inconsistent with King (regarding deprivation of trial counsel) and Posey (regarding review of within-the-guidelines sentences), remanded defendant’s case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of those decisions, and otherwise denied leave. 513 Mich 912 (2023) (Haupt II). On remand, the same Court of Appeals panel again affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued April 25, 2024 (Docket No. 351593) (Haupt III), concluding that defendant had not been deprived of counsel during any critical stage of the proceedings. Defendant again applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to address whether (1) defendant had validly waived his right to counsel following defense counsels’ motions to withdraw on October 23, 2018, and June 10, 2019; (2) defendant forfeited his right to counsel through his conduct and remarks as in People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98 (2014); and (3) the periods for which defendant was without counsel constituted critical stages of the proceedings. ___ Mich ___; 21 NW3d 587 (2025). In an opinion by Justice BOLDEN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices WELCH, THOMAS, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: Defendant was deprived of counsel at a critical stage of his criminal proceedings, and he did not validly waive his right to counsel or forfeit his right to counsel through his conduct. Accordingly, reversal was required. 1. The Haupt I panel correctly held that the trial court failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D). Defendant did not make a request for self- representation, let alone an unequivocal request, and because the trial court failed to advise defendant of the charges, the risk of self-representation, and the opportunity to consult with another attorney, any alleged waiver was not knowing and intelligent. The trial court also did not consider whether the self-representation would disrupt the court. Accordingly, automatic reversal is appropriate if defendant was unrepresented at any critical stage. 2. Assuming without deciding that the forfeiture-by-conduct doctrine exists in Michigan, defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel by conduct. At no point did defendant refuse to remain in the courtroom, refuse to participate in the proceedings, insist that the court could not proceed at all, or engage in the kind of purposeful and defiant obstruction and disruption of the court’s proceedings that were present in People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98 (2014).  3. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the July 2, 2019 hearing on the motion to suppress evidence did not constitute a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has not adopted a formal test for determining what constitutes a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, and no binding authorities have established whether suppression hearings are critical stages for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Van v Jones, 475 F3d 292, 312 (CA 6, 2007), noted that its decisions and those of the United States Supreme Court have offered several possibilities for what could constitute a critical stage, each of which required consideration of the likelihood that significant consequences have resulted from the absence of counsel. Van also noted that the proper assessment of such likelihood for weighty criminal matters of constitutional dimension is made by applying the reasonable-probability standard. Further, Van opined that the best way to make this assessment is by asking whether the defendant had an opportunity subsequent to the hearing in question to recover or exercise any privilege that may have been lost at that hearing. In concluding on remand that defendant’s suppression hearing was not a critical stage under the circumstances, the Court of Appeals panel erred by distinguishing Henderson v Frank, 155 F3d 159 (CA 3, 1998), and United States v Hamilton, 391 F3d 1066 (CA 9, 2004), both of which determined that suppression hearings are critical stages of criminal proceedings. Although the panel differentiated Henderson and Hamilton because defendant had no witnesses and the defendants in those cases did, whether witnesses were called is but one factor that trial courts may consider when determining whether a stage is critical to a defendant’s criminal proceedings. In this case, defendant’s entire pretrial attempt to suppress cell phone evidence was under the conditions of the trial court demanding that defendant proceed unrepresented by counsel. Under these circumstances, he was wholly deprived of the right to counsel to argue the admissibility of evidence that would speak directly to his ultimate guilt or innocence at trial, and he could not wholly recover the privilege he lost during the hearing. Although defendant’s appointed counsel did move to suppress evidence obtained during the second search of defendant’s cell phone, defendant was deprived of counsel when seeking to suppress different evidence, namely, data and images extracted during the first search of the phone that were directly correlated to his ultimate guilt. A subsequent opportunity to object at trial does not necessarily recreate the lost opportunity to litigate suppression with counsel before trial. Once the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, the parties’ trial posture changed. The later reappointment of counsel on the morning of trial did not cure the earlier uncounseled rulings because counsel was not given a meaningful opportunity to prepare the case with those evidentiary questions still open. Accordingly, the July 2, 2019 hearing on the motion to suppress constituted a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. Court of Appeals judgment reversed; defendant’s convictions and sentences vacated; and case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Justice HOOD, concurring, joined the majority opinion in full. He wrote separately because, while he agreed that the hearing on the suppression motion represented a critical stage of the proceedings, he would have gone further and concluded that the six weeks immediately preceding the trial constituted its own critical stage. Rather than looking at the motion hearings individually, as the Court of Appeals panel did, Justice HOOD would have considered defendant’s six weeks of self-representation in the aggregate, explaining that what happens in the preparation period immediately preceding trial can have a significant effect on the outcome of trial, as the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Michigan appellate courts have acknowledged. In this case, defendant’s lack of counsel hindered his ability to conduct pretrial investigation and otherwise prepare for trial, as demonstrated by the fact that the motions he filed were disorganized, legally underdeveloped, and lacking in legal sophistication, whereas the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing the possible suppression of the evidence against him was complicated and nuanced. In addition to the pretrial hearing, status conference, and motion hearings that occurred during this time frame, the six weeks before trial were a vital time for trial preparation outside the courtroom. In sum, because defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, Justice HOOD agreed fully with the majority opinion, but he would have gone further on the basis of the specific facts of this case. Justice ZAHRA, joined by Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring, agreed that defendant was deprived of counsel during a critical stage and is therefore entitled to a new trial, but wrote separately to make clear that his agreement was grounded in the facts of the case. He would have declined to analyze the merits of defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to comply with MCR 6.005(D) and that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Because Haupt I was vacated only to the extent that it was inconsistent with King, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there had been a violation of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) was left intact, which should have ended the analysis as to whether defendant had been impermissibly deprived of counsel and left only the question whether this error entitled defendant to relief. He also clarified that, while he agreed that the July 2, 2019 suppression hearing constituted a critical stage given the facts of this case, it did not follow that all motions to suppress constitute critical stages, and it was unnecessary in this case to consider more broadly whether suppression hearings with different factual circumstances would also constitute a critical stage. In all other respects, he concurred with the majority opinion.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 30, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167315 ALEXANDER JAMES HAUPT, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH BOLDEN, J. In this case, we consider whether defendant, Alexander J. Haupt, validly waived his right to counsel and, if not, whether he was deprived of counsel during a critical stage of his criminal prosecution in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Initially, defendant validly waived the right to counsel. Later, he reinvoked the right to counsel and counsel was appointed. Appointed counsel later moved to withdraw his representation. In granting the motion, the trial court ordered defendant to proceed to trial without counsel without first demonstrating on the record that defendant was advised of his continuing right to counsel or ensuring that defendant validly waived that right. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that defendant’s waiver was invalid because the trial court did not comply with MCR 6.005(D) but that the error did not warrant reversal. People v Haupt, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 23, 2021 (Docket No. 351593) (Haupt I), p 3. Subsequent to this decision, we held that violations of MCR 6.005(D) are subject to automatic reversal when the result is deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding and that the forfeiture doctrine does not apply to such errors. People v King, 512 Mich 1; 999 NW2d 670 (2023). The Court of Appeals reconsidered its prior holding in light of King and held that the pretrial periods during which defendant lacked counsel were not critical stages of the proceedings. People v Haupt (On Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 25, 2024 (Docket No. 351593) (Haupt III), pp 4-7. We must now determine whether defendant was deprived of counsel at a critical stage. We hold that he was indeed deprived of counsel at a critical stage and that this structural error is subject to automatic reversal. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. UNDERLYING CRIME Defendant was 19 years old when he had a dating relationship with 17-year-old AM. In September 2017, defendant was arrested on a misdemeanor stalking charge related to AM. At the time of his arrest, the police confiscated defendant’s cell phone and obtained a warrant to search the phone for evidence related to the stalking allegations. During the 2 initial search, police observed naked photos of AM, and they obtained a second warrant to search the phone for evidence of child sexually abusive material (CSAM). During the second search of the phone, police found images of AM naked or performing sexual acts on or within 24 hours of December 19, 2016, when AM was 17 years old. They also uncovered text messages and e-mails indicating that defendant had sold the images to a third party. Finally, police discovered an audio file in which defendant tried to coerce AM into withdrawing a pending criminal complaint. As a result, defendant was charged with a host of crimes: producing CSAM, distributing CSAM, possessing CSAM, using a computer to commit a crime, and obstructing justice. 1 B. PRETRIAL Defendant initially retained attorney Scott Grabel as counsel. In April 2018, Grabel moved to withdraw because of a lack of communication with defendant. Defendant objected and indicated he would communicate with Grabel moving forward. The trial court denied the motion. Grabel again moved to withdraw in June 2018, citing a breakdown in the relationship; specifically, Grabel testified that when he strongly encouraged defendant to take a plea deal, defendant said he was “going to get” Grabel’s law license. 2 1 Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor stalking offense for which he was arrested in a separate case that is unrelated to the appeal here. 2 At the hearing, Grabel emphasized that defendant had “always been respectful” when speaking with Grabel and that defendant had “abided by all terms and conditions of bond.” Grabel also assured the court that he felt neither threatened nor assaulted by defendant and was “not worried that his bar license was being threatened,” but said he did not think the relationship could continue given defendant’s comments about his law license. 3  Defendant objected. When the trial court asked defendant whether he was “in agreement that” Grabel should withdraw, defendant asserted, “No. No, I’m not.” When the trial court asked defendant whether he had confidence in Grabel’s representation, defendant stated, “Yes. Yes, I have confidence in him.” Defendant then explained: The relationship we built up over time just, to me, shows that, you know, occasionally, like myself, if he gets worked up, you know, we might spiral a little bit, but at the end of the day we do—you know, the work is really good. I have full confidence in him. The trial court granted Grabel’s motion and adjourned the proceedings to allow defendant to hire a new attorney. On August 1, 2018, defendant appeared for a status conference without counsel. Defendant informed the court that he was having issues “finding adequate representation,” suggesting that it was because of a lack of funds. The trial court said that it was “concerned” that it was “going to be set back on the trial docket.” The court told defendant, “You can represent yourself if you don’t hire somebody.” The trial court also stated: “A trial will be set probably 60 days out. You better be prepared to go. I’m not going to do any more adjournments.” The trial court did not inform defendant that he could be appointed an attorney if he could not afford one. At a pretrial hearing on October 23, 2018, defendant again appeared without counsel. The following exchange between the trial court and defendant occurred: The Court: You do have the ability to hire your own attorney? The Defendant: Not at the moment, Your Honor. The Court: Not at the moment? Well, you are entitled to have an attorney represent you, as the Court told you last time we were in court. 4  The Defendant: I was not informed last time. It was not offered. I have a transcript as well. The Court: All right. Well, you are entitled to have an attorney represent you, and if you’re unable to afford one, the Court will appoint one. Are you asking the Court to appoint you an attorney? The Defendant: Not at the moment, Your Honor. The Court: All right. And you understand that you’re entitled to a lawyer’s assistance? You understand that; is that correct? The Defendant: I do, yep. The Court: All right. And you’re waiving the right to be represented by a court appointed attorney at this time; is that correct? The Defendant: That is correct, your honor. The Court: And you understand the charge and the maximum possible prison sentence if— The Defendant: I do. I do, Your Honor. The Court: And do you understand the risk involved in self- representation? The Defendant: I do, Your Honor. After defendant acknowledged several further warnings, the court determined that defendant had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 3 After the trial court accepted the waiver, defendant requested a remand to the district court for a preliminary examination. Noting that the trial was scheduled to take place the following week, the trial court denied the motion and admonished defendant for not filing 3 Defendant does not claim any error regarding this waiver of counsel. 5 the motion sooner. 4 Three days later, defendant requested a court-appointed attorney, and the trial court appointed Scott Moore and adjourned the trial. Thereafter, Moore filed a motion to remand to the district court for a preliminary examination, which the trial court granted. In early June 2019, Moore moved to withdraw. At the June 10, 2019 status conference, Moore explained that he wanted to withdraw because defendant had questioned Moore’s truthfulness and there had been a complete breakdown of communications. Defendant told the court that he had evidence that Moore was working with the prosecution. In response to this assertion, the trial court stated: This is your second attorney. You hired an attorney and he withdrew, and he filed a motion to withdraw that I denied, and then a few months later again he wanted to withdraw. The Court allowed him. At that time you said you would represent yourself. Several months later you come back in asking for a court appointed attorney. When you asked to represent—when you said you were representing yourself, you said you would do a better job than any court appointed attorney could. So at this point I’m not going to allow Mr. Moore to withdraw totally, but he’s not going to have to represent you. He’s going to be there for advisory purposes. So at this point, you are on your own, and you’re going to have to represent yourself, and if you have any questions regarding the law, Court Rules or anything, Mr. Moore is the person you’re going to have to go to. [Emphasis added.] Notably, defendant did not make a request to represent himself at this time. Further, the court stated that it was not going to adjourn the scheduled July 23, 2019 trial date and that 4 Specifically, the court stated: “[S]ee, this is the problem for you not hiring an attorney or asking for an attorney. . . . Because as an attorney, you can schedule court dates. You could—it was on your responsibility. And this is your risk of self-representation . . . .” Defendant had been self-represented for only a few minutes when the court made these remarks, as no previous waiver had been obtained. 6 if defendant hired another attorney, that attorney would need to be prepared for trial, explaining: “This case is old, and your actions have delayed this case; nobody else’s actions but yours. And the Court is not going to allow you to delay this any longer.” Defendant represented himself at the June 25, 2019 final pretrial hearing. The prosecutor noted then that AM would be away at annual military training from July 12 to 28, 2019. The prosecutor said that while AM’s testimony would be helpful, it was not necessary, but noted that defendant had a right to have her present and needed to advise what he wanted, because if he wanted her present then the trial would need to be rescheduled. The court noted that AM had testified at the preliminary examination. The prosecutor responded that the witness had been subject to cross-examination at the preliminary examination and offered to move to have that testimony read into the record, if the court would like the prosecution to do so. The court said that it would. The court then told defendant that he could draft a subpoena for AM that the court would sign, but that the military might not honor it. Defendant noted that he had motions he wanted to file and was inexperienced, and the court briefly explained the process. Defendant, acting in propria persona, moved to suppress the data and photographic evidence obtained in the original search of his cell phone and also moved to dismiss. At the July 2, 2019 hearing on the motions, defendant argued that the police did not have probable cause to search through the entirety of his cell phone. The trial court conducted the hearing without advising defendant of his continuing right to the assistance of counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and took the motion to suppress under advisement. The prosecution also argued its motion to use AM’s preliminary-examination testimony. Defendant stated that he had never received a copy of the motion but offered a 7 rebuttal argument anyway. 5 Defendant asserted that the prosecution had not exercised due diligence to produce the complaining witness, had not issued a subpoena, and should have had notice of her military training schedule earlier. 6 The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion. On July 12, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecution’s motion to compel and strike defense witnesses and exhibits. Defendant did not file a response to the prosecution’s motion, and he was not present at the hearing, nor was Moore present as advisory counsel. The court noted that it could rule on the motions without defendant’s being present or making an argument because it “is not considered a critical stage of the proceedings.” After stating that the witnesses and evidence that the prosecution had requested to be struck from the record were not issues relevant to the case, the court granted the motion. C. TRIAL The jury trial was set to begin on July 23, 2019. On that day, the trial court first announced that it was denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The court next noted that 5 The prosecutor indicated that the motion to use AM’s preliminary-examination testimony had been sent to defendant’s father and that defendant’s father responded via e-mail indicating that he had printed it and provided it to defendant. The prosecutor read defendant’s father’s e-mail into the record. 6 The prosecutor stated on the record that a subpoena or notice had been sent, but the complainant advised she was on military orders, and the prosecutor said she could not subpoena someone on active duty. In response, defendant stated that the proper process would be to subpoena the commanding officer. The trial court advised defendant that if he could “somehow subpoena the witness and get her here, and she appears, then we wouldn’t allow the use of the prior record testimony, only in the case that she changes her testimony on the stand.” 8 defendant had filed a response to the motion to strike, which the court had already granted. The court treated the response as a motion to reconsider and denied it. The court noted that both sides had filed motions to compel, but the court did not find that either side was withholding evidence. The parties discussed a July 18, 2019 telephone status conference that defendant had not attended. Moore told the court that since he was made advisory counsel, defendant had not reached out to him for any advice until that morning (July 23, 2019), when defendant asked about the phone conference. The prosecution then requested an order excluding discussion of AM having voluntarily sent any images to defendant, because that was not a defense to the charged offenses. When the court asked defendant for his response to this motion, defendant said, “I’m going to stand mute from this point on, as the Court is in violation of MCR rule 6.005.[7] I did not—I did not say I did not want an attorney. I told you on the record I wanted an attorney. You have not provided one, and an advisory capacity is limited to those who—” The trial court interrupted, stating: “You have an attorney. It’s Mr. Moore. If you want an attorney, he’s ready and he’s here today.” When the court asked defendant directly if he wanted an attorney, he said, “Yes, I do, Your Honor.” The court then reappointed Moore. When the court asked Moore if he had a response to the motion in limine, he said that he was not prepared, but that he relied on the discretion of the court and believed the prosecution would not misstate the law. The court then granted the motion 7 As will be discussed, MCR 6.005 provides various rules concerning when and how the trial court must advise criminal defendants in regard to their constitutional right to counsel. 9 to exclude any argument that AM had consensually sent the photographs. After a brief recess, Moore said that they were “unprepared based almost completely on the defendant’s own actions.” The court, therefore, granted defendant an adjournment. The jury trial was held over the next two days. During trial, Moore verbally moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the cell phone’s hardware that was conducted after the police had searched and seized the photographs and data from within the phone. That motion was denied. Defendant was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to a controlling term of 6 years and 6 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for the convictions of CSAM and using a computer to commit a crime. Defendant was paroled on January 13, 2026. D. APPEAL Defendant appealed as of right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant argued that the trial court had deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by allowing Moore to withdraw without appointing substitute counsel. The panel treated this claim as unpreserved, and it concluded that even though defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel and the trial court had not complied with MCR 6.005(D), defendant could not show entitlement to relief under the standard for plain-error review in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). See Haupt I, unpub op at 2-3. The Court of Appeals also stated that the trial court’s noncompliance with MCR 6.005(D) was not outcome-determinative and suggested that defendant may have forfeited his right to counsel by his own conduct that “delayed the case for over two years[.]” Id. at 4. 10  Defendant applied for leave to appeal, raising several issues, including whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that no relief was available for the trial court’s failure to comply with MCR 6.005(D). This Court initially held the case in abeyance for People v Posey, 512 Mich 317; 1 NW3d 101 (2023), People v Stewart, 512 Mich 472; 999 NW2d 717 (2023), and King, 512 Mich 1. People v Haupt, 973 NW2d 147 (2022). After those cases were decided, this Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision in Haupt I to the extent it was inconsistent with King (regarding deprivation of trial counsel) and Posey (regarding review of within-the-guidelines sentences), remanded defendant’s case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of those decisions, and otherwise denied leave. People v Haupt, 513 Mich 912 (2023) (Haupt II). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed, concluding that defendant had not been deprived of counsel during any critical stage of the proceedings. Haupt III, unpub op at 4. 8 Defendant again applied for leave to appeal in our Court. We ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to address whether: (1) the defendant validly waived his right to counsel following defense counsels’ motions to withdraw on October 23, 2018 and June 10, 2019, see People v King, 512 Mich 1, 11-12 (2023); People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368[; 247 NW2d 857] (1976); MCR 6.005(D); (2) the defendant forfeited his right to counsel through his conduct and remarks, see People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98, 130-137[; 858 NW2d 490] (2014); and (3) if the defendant’s waivers of his right to counsel were not valid and he did not forfeit his right to counsel, do the periods for which the defendant was without counsel constitute critical stages of the 8 Posey addressed other issues defendant raised in his direct appeal, but it did not involve the right to counsel or questions about MCR 6.005(D). See Posey, 512 Mich 317. It did not affect the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the issues now before us and is not addressed in this opinion. 11  proceedings, see King, 512 Mich at 15-16; United States v Wade, 388 US 218, 225-227[; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149] (1967); Van v Jones, 475 F3d 292, 312 (CA 6, 2007). [People v Haupt, ___ Mich ___, ___; 21 NW3d 587, 587 (2025).] II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Sixth Amendment and Const 1963, art 1, § 20 guarantee the right to counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. People v Loew, 514 Mich 158, 191; 22 NW3d 323 (2024). This Court reviews de novo whether a defendant was denied this Sixth Amendment right. See People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011). De novo review means that our review is independent and without deference to the lower courts. People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 618; 939 NW2d 213 (2019). Deprivation of counsel at a critical stage is a structural error subject to automatic reversal. King, 512 Mich at 16. The presence of standby counsel does not excuse an invalid waiver or render a Sixth Amendment violation harmless. Id. at 17. III. ANALYSIS A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL A criminal defendant who faces incarceration has a constitutional right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process under the Sixth Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640- 641; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). Representation by counsel “ ‘is the standard, not the exception, in the absence of a proper waiver.’ ” People v Spears, 346 Mich App 494, 504- 505; 13 NW3d 20 (2023), quoting People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 190; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). Accordingly, before allowing a criminal defendant to proceed pro se, the trial court must determine whether the request is unequivocal, whether the defendant is knowingly, 12 intelligently, and voluntarily waiving the right to legal counsel, and whether the defendant’s self-representation will disrupt, unduly inconvenience, or otherwise burden the court and the administration of justice. See Anderson, 398 Mich at 367-368. In addition, the trial court must comply with MCR 6.005(D), which provides “direction concerning the timing and substance of the judicial inquiry to be made when a defendant affirmatively indicates he wishes to proceed pro se.” People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412, 433; 519 NW2d 128 (1994). Specifically, MCR 6.005(D) provides, in part: The court may not permit the defendant to make an initial waiver of the right to be represented by a lawyer without first (1) advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risk involved in self-representation, and (2) offering the defendant the opportunity to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult with an appointed lawyer. “[I]f the trial court fails to substantially comply with the requirements in Anderson and the court rule, then the defendant has not effectively waived his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.” Russell, 471 Mich at 191-192. “Substantial compliance requires that the court discuss the substance of both Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) in a short colloquy with the defendant, and make an express finding that the defendant fully understands, recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.” Russell, 471 Mich at 191 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, defendant originally retained Grabel to represent him, but the trial court granted Grabel’s motion to withdraw in June 2018. After that, Moore was appointed to 13 represent defendant in October 2018. When the trial court ultimately granted Moore’s motion to withdraw in June 2019, the trial court instructed defendant as follows: This is your second attorney. You hired an attorney and h