People v Morgan

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v MORGAN Docket No. 167492. Argued October 8, 2025. Decided June 24, 2026. Michael M. Morgan was charged in the 53rd District Court with moving violation causing death, MCL 257.601d(1), as the result of a collision between the car he was driving and a motorcycle driven by Donald D. Arnold, who later died from his injuries. Eyewitness testimony indicated that the decedent had accelerated quickly after a traffic light turned green and that he struck the side of defendant’s vehicle as defendant was attempting a U-turn. Defendant moved to admit evidence that the decedent might have reached a speed exceeding 20 miles per hour over the posted limit before the collision, as well as evidence that the decedent’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of the collision might have been as high as 0.071 to 0.081 g/dL. The district court, Daniel B. Bain, J., ruled that the speed evidence was admissible but the BAC evidence was not, and the Livingston Circuit Court, Matthew J. McGivney, J., denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal that ruling. After granting defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals, RIORDAN and CAMERON, JJ. (MARKEY, P.J., dissenting), affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued August 8, 2024 (Docket No. 367789), on the ground that People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184 (2010), required a preliminary showing of gross negligence before evidence of intoxication was admissible and, because no such showing had been made with respect to the decedent’s conduct, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the BAC evidence. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing (1) whether evidence of the decedent’s BAC is relevant, and (2) whether the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 516 Mich 924 (2024). In an opinion by Justice HOOD, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN, WELCH, BOLDEN, and THOMAS, the Supreme Court held: The district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the decedent’s possible intoxication. Under Feezel, evidence of a victim’s BAC must merely have any tendency to make gross negligence on the part of the victim more or less probable. In this case, the BAC evidence was relevant under MRE 401 because it was probative of proximate causation in light of other admissible conduct, and it was admissible under MRE 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice was low compared to the evidence’s probative value in determining whether the decedent’s intoxication, speed, and acceleration constituted gross negligence or a superseding cause of the collision. The district court abused its discretion by considering the evidence in isolation rather than as part of the comprehensive body of evidence that could inform the jury’s decision on proximate cause and also by excluding, without a clear rationale, evidence of intoxication while admitting evidence of speeding. 1. To convict a defendant of moving violation causing death, MCL 257.601d(1), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused a death by committing a moving violation while operating a motor vehicle on a highway or other place open to the public. The causation element of MCL 257.601d(1) has two parts—factual and proximate— and the prosecution is required to prove both parts. Factual causation exists if a fact-finder determines that but for defendant’s conduct, the result would not have occurred. Proximate causation requires a finding that the victim’s injury was a direct and natural result of the alleged criminal conduct, with no intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct and broke the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury. Whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant’s conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability. Ordinary negligence is reasonably foreseeable, so it cannot be a superseding cause that would sever the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s harm, whereas a victim’s gross negligence or intentional misconduct is sufficient to break the causal chain because it is not reasonably foreseeable. 2. The district court erred by excluding evidence of the decedent’s BAC as irrelevant under MRE 401. The evidence of intoxication was material because the charged crime required the prosecution to prove an element of causation beyond a reasonable doubt. It was also probative because, under Feezel, evidence of the victim’s BAC must merely have any tendency to make gross negligence on the part of the victim more or less probable. While neither intoxication nor speeding, standing alone, might have been relevant under Feezel, in this case, those two pieces of evidence occurred together. As a result, the decedent’s alleged speeding and high rate of acceleration must be considered in light of his possible intoxication, and his possible intoxication must be considered in light of his alleged speeding and high rate of acceleration. Applying Feezel to these facts led to the conclusion that the decedent’s BAC was relevant. The lower courts misapplied principles from Feezel, which held that, generally, the mere fact that a victim was intoxicated when the defendant committed a crime is not sufficient to render evidence of the victim’s intoxication admissible and that being intoxicated, by itself, is not conduct amounting to gross negligence. But Feezel did not set a floor for the level of intoxication that is relevant, it did not set a floor for the type of conduct that opens the door to consideration of intoxication, and it did not strictly analyze intoxication or conduct in isolation. Further, by admitting the evidence of the decedent’s speeding—which appeared to bear on one issue, causation—the district court implicitly determined that gross negligence was in issue. Accordingly, the jury may consider the role intoxication played in the decedent’s possible speeding, his rates of acceleration, and his ability to react to defendant’s allegedly unlawful U-turn. 3. The district court also erred by excluding evidence of the decedent’s BAC under MRE 403. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because the decedent’s possible speeding and rapid acceleration on a motorcycle after possibly drinking went to the heart of whether he was grossly negligent and therefore related directly to the disputed element of proximate causation. Though the conduct was less egregious and the intoxication was less pronounced than that in Feezel, the combination—if a jury believed that evidence—would be not merely marginally probative but potentially critical to the issue of causation. Court of Appeals judgment reversed, district court order vacated, and case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, concluded that, taken together with evidence of the decedent’s speed and operation of his motorcycle, the BAC evidence did not create a jury-submissible question of fact on the issue of gross negligence because it demonstrated, at best, ordinary negligence. He stated that without more evidence bearing on gross negligence, the BAC evidence served a minimal probative purpose but carried a high risk of unfair prejudice and should therefore have been excluded under MRE 403. He noted that even if the Court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion, reversal would not have been warranted absent a finding that the district court had abused its discretion, and in this case the district court’s conclusion did not fall outside the principled range of outcomes. He stated that, in sum, the majority opinion fell short by undermining the spirit of Feezel’s statement that evidence of intoxication alone is not enough to put gross negligence at issue, giving short shrift to caselaw suggesting that defendants must present evidence of gross negligence before a jury-submissible question of fact may exist, incorrectly concluding that defendant made a showing sufficient to clear that bar, and basing its holding in part on an assumed rationale for the trial court’s admission of speeding evidence even though that decision was not before the Court.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED June 24, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167492 MICHAEL MARC MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH HOOD, J. On October 8, 2025, we heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the August 8, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion filed by defendant, Michael Marc Morgan, to admit evidence regarding the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of the decedent, Donald Douglas Arnold. We again consider that application. See MCR 7.305(I)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the district court. The critical issue in this appeal is what bearing the proposed BAC evidence has on the issue of proximate cause. In other words: does evidence of the decedent’s possible intoxication make it either more likely or less likely that Morgan was the proximate cause of the crash that led to the decedent’s death? And if it does, is that evidence admissible under MRE 403? Standing alone, evidence of the decedent’s BAC, which may have been as high as 0.081 grams per deciliter (g/dL), would not necessarily be relevant under MRE 401—let alone admissible under MRE 403. See People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 202; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.) (holding that “any level of intoxication on the part of a victim is not automatically relevant”). 1 Similarly, standing alone, evidence of the decedent’s possible speeding—depending on how fast he was going—might not be relevant. See People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 181, 192-193, 195-196; 148 NW 400 (1914) (holding that a violation of the speed limit does not per se establish gross negligence and noting that driving one mile per hour over the speed limit is not gross negligence but acknowledging the possibility that driving 10 miles per hour (mph) over the speed limit might be in some circumstances). See also People v McCoy, 223 Mich App 500, 504; 566 NW2d 667 (1997) (in holding that driving 100 mph in a residential neighborhood is gross 1 Although Justice CAVANAGH’s lead opinion was signed by only two other justices, it was joined by Justice WEAVER in all but footnote 14 and the citations of People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), and thus had majority support but for these exceptions. See Feezel, 486 Mich at 217 (WEAVER, J., concurring). For ease of reading, subsequent citations of the lead opinion will omit the authorial parenthetical unless these exceptions are implicated. 2 negligence, stating, “[T]he appropriate consideration is not whether [the] defendant was exceeding the speed limit, but rather, whether [the] defendant acted with gross negligence under the totality of the circumstances, including [the] defendant’s actual speed and the posted speed limit.”). Here, the district court admitted evidence of the decedent’s possible speeding, which might have been as much as 20 mph over the speed limit, apparently acknowledging some bearing on proximate cause. 2 But it excluded evidence of his possible intoxication. We conclude under the facts of this case that evidence of the decedent’s possible intoxication is admissible. It is relevant because it is probative of proximate cause in light of other admissible conduct. See MRE 401. And it is admissible under MRE 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice is low compared to the evidence’s probative value; namely, its effect on the jury’s ability to assess whether the decedent’s intoxication, speed, and acceleration constituted gross negligence or a superseding cause. By excluding this evidence, the district court abused its discretion in two ways. First, it considered the evidence in a silo rather than as part of the comprehensive body of evidence that could inform the jury’s decision on proximate cause. Second, without a clear rationale, it excluded evidence of 2 The district court’s decision to admit evidence of the decedent’s possible speeding was not at issue before the Court of Appeals and is not at issue before us. As elsewhere described in further detail, the Court of Appeals nonetheless addressed this issue. See People v Morgan, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 8, 2024 (Docket No. 367789), p 3. And considering that the operative test demands consideration of the totality of the circumstances, see McCoy, 223 Mich App at 504, evidence of the decedent’s possible speeding—and the district court’s decision with respect to the admission of that evidence—remains relevant to the admissibility of the intoxication evidence. 3 intoxication while admitting evidence of speeding. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS This case concerns a motorcycle-car collision that resulted in the decedent’s death. Morgan was driving in his car southbound on Kensington Road in Brighton Township, Michigan, at approximately 5:15 p.m. The decedent was traveling northbound on the same road, on his motorcycle. Shortly before the collision, the decedent was stopped at a red light south of the collision site. When the light turned green, he allegedly accelerated quickly. According to one witness, it looked like the decedent’s motorcycle “took off like a bat,” accelerating “heavily” when the light changed. His exact speed remains in dispute. 3 Around that time, Morgan—who was approximately 750 feet away from the intersection—began to make a U-turn and entered the northbound lane in which the decedent was traveling. While Morgan was turning, and before the turn was completed, the decedent’s motorcycle struck the side of Morgan’s vehicle. The decedent died from his injuries approximately 75 minutes later. According to an eyewitness, the decedent moved rightward within his lane just before his motorcycle struck Morgan’s turning vehicle. Morgan claimed to neither see nor 3 Morgan’s proposed accident reconstructionist calculated that the decedent could have reached 75 mph within 400 feet of the intersection. He further opined that the decedent would have taken 8 to 10 seconds to travel from the intersection to the site of the collision and that Morgan would have had seven additional seconds to complete his U-turn had the decedent gone no faster than the posted speed limit of 55 mph. In contrast, however, the prosecution’s accident reconstructionist opined that the decedent was traveling between 35 mph and 38 mph when the collision occurred. 4 hear the motorcycle approaching, stating after the collision that he was hit “out of nowhere.” The prosecution later charged Morgan with a moving violation causing death under MCL 257.601d(1). The alleged underlying moving violation was an unlawful U- turn. At a pretrial hearing, Morgan moved to admit evidence of the decedent’s speed and BAC. The BAC evidence included a post-mortem toxicology report that showed the decedent’s BAC was .059 g/dL at the time of his death, approximately 75 minutes after the collision. Morgan also sought to admit expert testimony that the decedent may have been impaired at the time of the collision, along with an explanation of the effects alcohol may have had on his operation of the motorcycle. 4 The district court concluded that evidence of the decedent’s speed was admissible at trial but excluded evidence regarding the decedent’s BAC. Morgan sought leave to appeal before the circuit court, which denied his application. Morgan successfully applied for leave to appeal before the Court of Appeals. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order, rejecting Morgan’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to admit evidence regarding the decedent’s BAC. See People v Morgan, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 8, 2024 (Docket No. 367789), p 1. The 4 Morgan’s proposed expert testimony on toxicology included a “retrograde extrapolation”—essentially a method used to estimate a person’s BAC at a certain point in time. See People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 124; 594 NW2d 487 (1999). Although the decedent’s BAC when tested 75 minutes after the collision was 0.059 g/dL, Morgan’s proposed expert opined that the decedent’s BAC at the time of the collision could have been as high as 0.071 to 0.081 g/dL. The prosecution contests the reliability of this figure. 5 Court of Appeals noted that the prosecution is required to prove proximate cause in a moving-violation-causing-death case. Id. at 2, citing MCL 257.601d(1). It further noted that establishing proximate cause requires a showing that the victim’s injury was a direct and natural consequence of the defendant’s actions. Morgan, unpub op at 2, citing People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 436; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). But a victim’s gross negligence may create a superseding cause that breaks the causal chain. Morgan, unpub op at 2, citing Feezel, 486 Mich at 195. Relying on Feezel, the Court of Appeals noted that a victim’s intoxication is not automatically relevant or probative of gross negligence. Morgan, unpub op at 2, citing Feezel, 486 Mich at 202. It read Feezel to require a trial court to first examine a victim’s exhibited conduct and determine whether there has been a preliminary showing of gross negligence. In other words: separate from intoxication, was the victim’s conduct grossly negligent? The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the decedent’s speeding (or other alleged negligence in operating the motorcycle) was not so excessive as to make out that preliminary showing, let alone that his BAC contributed to the collision, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the evidence of his intoxication was inadmissible. 5 Morgan, unpub op at 4-5. The Court of Appeals also 5 We observe that the Court of Appeals concluded without analysis or citation that this act of speeding was not grossly negligent. See Morgan, unpub op at 3 (“Although the victim’s speeding would have shortened both drivers’ reaction time, the question here is whether the act of exceeding the speed limit by, at most, 20 [mph] under these conditions provides the necessary showing of gross negligence.”). It also characterized the district court as having concluded that speeding was “foreseeable” and not grossly negligent, when the district court’s actual statements appear to acknowledge that there was testimony that the decedent was going as fast as 75 mph—an admittedly disputed fact—which it described as an issue that was “going to come down to credibility.” This, combined with its admission of evidence regarding possible speeding, suggests that the district court understood that 6 rejected Morgan’s argument that his proposed toxicology expert would have explained the nexus between the decedent’s speeding and alcohol consumption because the expert’s report only outlined the probable pharmacological effects of the decedent’s BAC—it did not state that his BAC caused him to speed. Morgan, unpub op at 4. Judge MARKEY dissented, concluding that the district court had abused its discretion. Id. at 1 (MARKEY, J., dissenting). She rejected the majority’s methodology, noting that the court should not view the evidence of the decedent’s conduct in speeding away from the intersection in a vacuum, separately from its consideration of possible intoxication or some level of impairment because of alcohol consumption. Id. at 6-7. Essentially, she concluded that speeding and possible intoxication are relevant to causation. Id. Therefore, Judge MARKEY would have reversed the district court’s order excluding the BAC evidence. Id. at 8. This appeal followed. We ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing whether the district court abused its discretion; specifically, we directed the parties to address (1) whether evidence of the decedent’s BAC is relevant, and (2) whether the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Morgan, 516 Mich 924, 924 (2024). We address each question in turn. evidence of speeding (particularly if the jury believed the testimony that put the decedent’s speed 20 mph over the speed limit) was relevant. 7  II. LAW AND ANALYSIS We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 192 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Morgan stands charged with a moving violation causing death, in violation of MCL 257.601d(1). The statute provides: A person who commits a moving violation while operating a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public, including, but not limited to, an area designated for the parking of motor vehicles, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both, if the moving violation was the proximate cause of the death of another person. [Id.] This provision translates to four elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant, (2) operation on a highway (or other place open to the public or generally accessible to motor vehicles), (3) commission of a moving violation, and (4) that by committing the moving violation, the defendant caused a death. See MCL 257.601d(1); M Crim JI 15.15. The fourth element, causation, is the only element at issue in this appeal. For crimes arising under the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., “cause,” or causation, has a “ ‘unique, technical meaning.’ ” Feezel, 486 Mich at 194, quoting Schaefer, 473 Mich at 435. Causation has two parts: factual causation and proximate causation. Feezel, 486 Mich at 194. The prosecution is required to prove both parts. Id. at 194-195. See also Schaefer, 473 Mich at 436. “Factual causation exists if a finder of fact determines that ‘but for’ defendant’s conduct the result would not have occurred.” 8 Feezel, 486 Mich at 194-195. But to prove the charge, the prosecution must also show that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the accident or the victim’s death. Id. at 195. Proximate cause, as the name suggests, means that the alleged criminal conduct is directly close to, and consequential to, the alleged harm. Cf. Schaefer, 473 Mich at 436. It requires the victim’s injury to be a “direct and natural result” of the alleged criminal conduct. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We have previously observed that proximate causation “is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.” Id. To make this determination requires an examination of “whether there was an intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken.” Id. at 436-437. “Whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant’s conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 195, citing Schaefer, 473 Mich at 437. Reasonable foreseeability separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence, and courts make this distinction on a case-by-case basis. See Feezel, 486 Mich at 195-201. Ordinary negligence is reasonably foreseeable, so it cannot be a superseding cause that would sever the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and victim’s harm, i.e., proximate causation. Id. at 195. On the other hand, a victim’s “gross negligence” or “intentional misconduct” is sufficient to “break the causal chain between the defendant and the victim because it is not reasonably foreseeable.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). This is the issue at the center of this case. 9  Gross negligence means “wantonness and disregard of the consequences” of an action. Id. at 195 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We have defined “wantonness” as “ ‘[c]onduct indicating that the actor is aware of the risks but indifferent to the results,’ ” which “usually ‘suggests a greater degree of culpability than recklessness . . . .’ ” Feezel, 486 Mich at 196, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed). In sum, a victim’s ordinary negligence is not relevant to proximate causation, but their gross negligence may be, so it is important for the trier of fact to consider gross negligence when determining whether the prosecution has proved proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt. See Feezel, 486 Mich at 196. Relying on these legal principles, we now consider whether the district court properly excluded evidence of the decedent’s intoxication, either as irrelevant under MRE 401 or as violative of MRE 403. Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of intoxication under either theory. We start with relevance. The Michigan Rules of Evidence provide that evidence is generally admissible if it is relevant, as defined in MRE 401, and not otherwise excludable under MRE 403 or some other authority. Feezel, 486 Mich at 197. See also MRE 402; MRE 401. 6 Evidence is relevant if it has materiality and probative value. Feezel, 486 6 MRE 401 provides: Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. And MRE 402 provides: 10 Mich at 197 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), citing People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998); see also Feezel, 486 Mich at 217 (YOUNG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Materiality is the requirement that the proffered evidence be related to ‘any fact that is of consequence’ to the action.” Crawford, 458 Mich at 388, quoting MRE 401. Because the prosecution must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the offense are always at issue and material. Crawford, 458 Mich at 389. Regarding probative value, “ ‘[t]he threshold is minimal.’ ” Feezel, 486 Mich at 197 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting Crawford, 458 Mich at 390; see also Feezel, 486 Mich at 217 (YOUNG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Any tendency to make a fact of consequence in the case more probable or less probable is sufficient probative force to clear this hurdle. Feezel, 486 Mich at 197. Here, the proposed evidence satisfies the requirements for relevance under MRE 401. The evidence of intoxication is material because “the charge[] at issue require[s] the prosecution to prove an element of causation beyond a reasonable doubt.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 198. It is also probative because “evidence of the victim’s BAC must merely have any tendency to make gross negligence on the part of the victim more or less probable.” Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: • the United States Constitution; • the Michigan Constitution; • these rules; or • other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 11 Id. As we stated in Feezel, intoxication, standing alone, might not be relevant. Likewise, speeding, standing alone, could be foreseeable depending on how fast the decedent was going and, therefore, not relevant to the issue of causation. But here, those two pieces of evidence occur together. We consider the decedent’s alleged speeding and high rate of acceleration in light of his possible intoxication. And we consider his possible intoxication in light of his alleged speeding and high rate of acceleration. Both are relevant under the specific facts of this case. The lower courts misapplied principles from Feezel to reach a different conclusion. In Feezel, we concluded that evidence of the victim’s BAC was relevant and admissible. Id. at 198-202. There, a driver struck and killed a pedestrian who was heavily intoxicated, walking in the middle of the road, with his back to traffic, at night, during a rainstorm. Id. at 199. 7 We held that the “victim’s extreme intoxication was highly probative of the issue of gross negligence” because the intoxication would have affected his ability to perceive the risks posed by his conduct and diminished his ability to react. Id. In reaching this conclusion, we relied on the basic definition of “probative,” acknowledged that there would be situations in which a victim’s BAC was inadmissible, and focused the critical inquiry on conduct, rather than the level of intoxication. Id. at 199- 200, 202. We stated the general principle: “[U]nder the broad definition of ‘probative,’ evidence of the victim’s BAC must merely have any tendency to make gross negligence on the part of the victim more or less probable.” Id. at 198 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), citing Crawford, 458 Mich at 389-390; see also Feezel, 486 Mich at 217 (YOUNG, J., 7 We observe that, in certain locations—like a lively nightlife district—a drunk person in the middle of the street may be foreseeable. Nonetheless, those were not the facts of Feezel. 12 concurring in part and dissenting in part). We then acknowledged that “[d]epending on the facts of a particular case, there may be instances in which a victim’s intoxication is not sufficiently probative,” specifically, when the facts do not create a question “about whether the victim was conducting himself or herself in a grossly negligent manner.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 198-199 (emphasis added). We discerned the following rule: Generally, the mere fact that a victim was intoxicated at the time a defendant committed a crime is not sufficient to render evidence of the victim’s intoxication admissible. While intoxication may explain why a person acted in a particular manner, being intoxicated, by itself, is not conduct amounting to gross negligence. [Id. at 199.] When applying that rule to the facts in Feezel, we concluded that the victim’s “extreme intoxication was highly probative of the issue of gross negligence” because it “would have affected his ability to perceive the risks posed by his conduct and diminished his capacity to react to the world around him.” Id. We emphasized, “Indeed, in this case, the proffered superseding cause was the victim’s presence in the middle of the road with his back to traffic at night during a rain storm with a sidewalk nearby.” Id. We concluded that these proofs “were sufficient to create a jury-submissible question about whether the victim was grossly negligent” and noted that the high level of intoxication would aid the jury in determining whether the victim acted with wantonness. Id., citing Barnes, 182 Mich at 198. In other words, evidence of the victim’s intoxication was admissible because of his conduct, but it also informed his conduct. Cf. Feezel, 486 Mich at 199. 8 8 The dissent describes this approach as “undermin[ing] the spirit of Feezel[] . . . .” As stated, we agree that “the mere consumption of alcohol by a victim does not automatically amount to a superseding cause or de facto gross negligence.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 202. But “[t]he court may allow the admission of evidence of the victim’s intoxication to aid the jury in determining whether the victim’s actions were grossly negligent” when the proofs are sufficient to create a fact question. Id. Here, the intoxication evidence informs 13  Three aspects of the conclusion in Feezel on relevance warrant emphasis. First, Feezel did not set a floor for the level of intoxication that is relevant. See Feezel, 486 Mich at 202 (emphasizing that “any level of intoxication” is not automatically relevant). It did not conclude that the victim’s BAC was relevant because it was high; it was relevant in light of the victim’s conduct. Id. Put differently, the victim’s conduct tells us whether the BAC is probative; the BAC (high or low) informs us of the probative value. See id. Second, it did not set a floor for the type of conduct that opens the door to consideration of intoxication. See id. at 202. Third, it did not strictly analyze intoxication or conduct in isolation. See id. at 200-201. One leads to the other, but they are part of a contexture that may bear on proximate cause, subject to the facts of each case. Id. at 202-203. Applying Feezel here, we conclude that evidence of the decedent’s BAC is relevant. Recall, the district court already admitted evidence of his possible speed, which may have been as high as 75 mph (or 20 mph over the speed limit) or as low as 35 mph. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of its ruling, the district court on some level determined that testimony about the decedent’s speed and acceleration, and the expert testimony regarding the specific rate of speed, was admissible. 9 That is to say, it is relevant in that it the alleged quick acceleration to 20 mph over the speed limit near an intersection during rush hour—evidence that the trial court already determined was admissible. Because this evidence creates “a jury-submissible question about whether the [decedent] was grossly negligent,” evidence regarding the decedent’s intoxication will assist the jury “in determining whether the [decedent] acted with ‘wantonness and a disregard of the consequences which may ensue[.]’ ” Feezel, 486 Mich at 199, quoting Barnes, 182 Mich at 198. 9 The dissent takes issue with this conclusion. But one of two things is true: either the district court considered the evidence of speeding and admitted it as bearing on gross negligence or it abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant evidence. 14 is both material and probative. See MRE 401. Again, speeding, i.e., exceeding the speed limit by at least one mile per hour, does not necessarily implicate gross negligence. See Barnes, 182 Mich at 193. But some speeding does. See McCoy, 223 Mich App at 504. It depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the “actual speed and the posted speed limit.” Id., citing Barnes, 182 Mich at 193. And, as the district court seems to have been aware, “[t]his is a question that ordinarily is for the jury.” McCoy, 223 Mich App at 504, citing Barnes, 182 Mich at 199. Regardless of its other commentary, or other conclusions, the district court admitted this evidence. The possibility of the decedent’s speeding appears to bear on one issue: causation. The district court, therefore, implicitly determined that gross negligence is “in issue.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 202 (quotation marks omitted). Against this backdrop, evidence of the decedent’s intoxication may aid the jury’s determination of whether his actions were grossly negligent. See id. at 203. As in Feezel, the decedent’s intoxication—which, though lesser than that of the victim in Feezel, was not negligible—potentially “affected his ability to perceive the risks posed by his conduct and diminished his capacity to react to the world around him.” Id. at 199. In isolation, it is questionable whether either piece of evidence would be sufficient to implicate gross negligence. But every case from Barnes to Feezel—nearly 100 years later—indicates that we do not consider this evidence in a silo. The decedent was possibly moderately intoxicated while possibly speeding on his motorcycle. If Morgan had crashed into the decedent while he sat moderately intoxicated on his motorcycle at a red light, or drove according to the rules of the road, his intoxication might not be relevant. But that is not the case here. Instead, the decedent al