Ernest v Brown

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong ERNEST v BROWN Docket No. 168462. Argued on application for leave to appeal April 9, 2026. Decided July 29, 2026. Keran Ernest, as personal representative of the estate of Maurice Ernest, brought a medical malpractice action in the Genesee Circuit Court, alleging that defendants failed to properly diagnose and treat Maurice when he presented to the emergency department at McLaren Regional Medical Center on July 16, 2020, with chest pain; Maurice died the following day. Plaintiff received letters of authority on June 7, 2021, which authorized her to act on behalf of Maurice’s estate. Plaintiff sent defendants a notice of intent to sue (NOI) as required by MCL 600.2912b on February 10, 2023, and plaintiff filed her complaint on August 14, 2023. Defendants sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred because, under MCL 600.5805(8), the general two-year statutory limitations period to bring a medical malpractice claim had expired on July 16, 2022. Plaintiff argued that her complaint was timely filed under the wrongful-death saving provision of MCL 600.5852, which permits an appointed personal representative to file suit within two years of the date the letters of authority were issued; plaintiff contended that under MCL 600.5856(c), the limitations period was tolled for the 182-day notice period required by MCL 600.2912b(1) when, before expiration of the two-year period under the saving provision, she sent her NOI to defendants. Defendants argued that plaintiff’s complaint was not timely because, under Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004), the wrongful-death saving provision is not subject to tolling for the NOI and the statutory limitations period had therefore expired before plaintiff filed the cause of action. The trial court, Celeste D. Bell, J., granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, holding that plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under Waltz. Plaintiff filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals and a bypass application in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the bypass application. 513 Mich 1047 (2024). In an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued March 20, 2025 (Docket No. 368566), the Court of Appeals, CAMERON, P.J., and GARRETT and MARIANI, JJ., affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that it was bound by Waltz. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on the application, asking the parties to address whether Waltz correctly held that MCL 600.5856(c) does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions in MCL 600.5852 and, if Waltz was incorrectly decided, whether Waltz should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis. ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 673 (2025). In an opinion by Justice BERNSTEIN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 1. Waltz erred by concluding that MCL 600.5856 does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions in MCL 600.5852. MCL 600.5852 incorporates a period of limitations, such that MCL 600.5856 operates to toll MCL 600.5852; accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed. MCL 600.2912b(1) generally provides that a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must provide an NOI to the defendants at least 182 days prior to filing a complaint. Under MCL 600.5856(c), the running of the two-year statutory limitations period for malpractice actions in MCL 600.5805(8) is tolled during the 182-day notice period required by MCL 600.2912b(1) if the statutory limitations period would otherwise expire during the notice period; in such cases, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given. Importantly, MCL 600.5856 tolls only “statutes of limitations or repose.” MCL 600.5852 provides that when a decedent dies before the statutory limitations period has run, or within 30 days after it has run, the personal representative has an additional two years to commence a lawsuit from the date the letters of authority are issued, so long as the action is commenced no later than three years after the limitations period has run. Prior to Waltz, MCL 600.5852 had been characterized as a saving provision that extends the period of limitations for a personal representative to file an action. Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196 (2002), then complicated matters when it held that MCL 600.5852 is a saving statute, not a statute of limitations. Two years later, Waltz held that MCL 600.5856 did not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions under MCL 600.5852 and that MCL 600.5852, by its own terms, is operational only within the context of the separate period of limitations that would otherwise bar an action; accordingly, Waltz held that MCL 600.5852 functions as only an exception to the limitations period. Jurists have criticized Waltz since its inception. The fundamental flaw in the Waltz decision is that it characterized MCL 600.5852 as solely a saving provision and rejected a statutory reading consistent with existing caselaw that characterized MCL 600.5852 as incorporating a limitations period as well. MCL 600.5852 “saves” the cause of action from a statute-of-limitations defense for some additional period of time; in doing so, it necessarily incorporates a new limitations period, which is subject to the tolling mechanism of MCL 600.5856. Furthermore, Waltz’s holding implied that the Legislature did not intend MCL 600.5852 to fall within the ambit of MCL 600.5856, but the legislative history demonstrates that this conclusion is incorrect. There is no principled reason, and no demonstrated legislative intent, to conclude that personal representatives who must comply with the notice requirements of MCL 600.2912b cannot receive the accompanying tolling benefits of MCL 600.5856. Waltz was wrongly decided. 2. Stare decisis considerations weigh in favor of overruling Waltz. If a court determines that a case was wrongly decided, the court examines several factors in considering whether the decision ought to be retained or overturned. One of these factors—whether the law or relevant facts have changed such that the prior decision should be overruled—does not favor overruling Waltz. However, other factors—whether the decision defies practical workability and whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship were the decision to be overruled—weigh in favor of overruling Waltz. Regarding workability, while Waltz is not difficult to apply, it has been subject to widespread, consistent criticism. Further, Waltz impermissibly shortened the time provided by the Legislature for people to file medical malpractice claims, and it did so with little basis in the statutory language. And in considering reliance interests, that Waltz erroneously read the statutory text is significant because where a judicial decision disrupts legitimate citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest. Only a small set of litigants is affected by Waltz—those alleging a wrongful death who also attempt to benefit from the tolling of the limitations period. And no defendant has provided a persuasive explanation as to how medical malpractice defendants have altered their behavior because of reliance on Waltz. Court of Appeals’ judgment reversed; case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would have held that the plain language of MCL 600.5852 cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean that MCL 600.5852 is a statutory limitations period that may be tolled. The plainest indicator that MCL 600.5852 is not “a” period of limitations is that the statute refers to “the” separate period of limitations. MCL 600.5852 provides additional time to file an action after “the period of limitations has run”; this means that MCL 600.5852 cannot itself be characterized as a period of limitations. Waltz was barely mentioned in Michigan caselaw after 2006, and the Legislature did not act to correct Waltz or address jurists’ concerns with Waltz’s holding when it amended MCL 600.5852 in 2012. Justice ZAHRA additionally joined Justice THOMAS’s dissenting opinion disagreeing with the majority’s stare decisis analysis. Justice THOMAS, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, saw no compelling reason to discard Waltz’s holding where (1) it creates an administrable procedural rule that has been the governing law for more than 20 years and has not been shown to cause substantial real-world harm given the avenues available to avoid dismissal of a claim by filing a timely medical malpractice action notwithstanding its holding, (2) it has not been applied outside of its specific context, (3) it interpreted statutory language that did not unambiguously address the issue and used distinct legal terms of art, (4) it did not depart from then-existing precedent, as no court had previously resolved this issue, and (5) there have been no changes in the facts or law since Waltz was issued that undermine its holding. The majority gives almost dispositive weight to the view that Waltz was wrongly decided by using that conclusion to buttress multiple parts of its stare decisis analysis, and its analysis effectively operates under the presumption that Waltz should be overruled unless doing so would cause substantial harm. For stare decisis to do meaningful work, it carries with it a presumption in favor of retaining precedent. It is important to apply stare decisis in a principled manner out of respect for the Supreme Court and to ensure legitimacy and public respect for its decisions. Justice THOMAS discerned no strong or compelling reason to overrule Waltz that went beyond her skepticism of its conclusion.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 29, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT KERAN ERNEST, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF MAURICE ERNEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 168462 PAUL W. BROWN, JR., M.D., ELMAHDI M. SAEED, M.D., CYPRESS CARDIOLOGY, PLLC, and MCLAREN HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees, and FAROUK M. BELAL, M.D., Defendant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH BERNSTEIN, J.  This case asks us to consider whether the medical malpractice tolling provision of MCL 600.5856(c) can toll the wrongful-death saving provision of MCL 600.5852. We hold that it can. Under a plain reading of the relevant statutes, MCL 600.5852 is itself a statute of limitations that is subject to the tolling mechanism of MCL 600.5856. Because Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642; 677 NW2d 813 (2004), held otherwise, we hold that Waltz was incorrectly decided and overturn that decision. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On July 16, 2020, Maurice Ernest experienced chest pain and discomfort, and he presented to the emergency department at McLaren Regional Medical Center in Flint. After an initial exam, Dr. Paul Brown transferred Maurice to the cardiac unit for observation. Dr. Elmahdi M. Saeed was the attending physician in the cardiac unit at that time. Dr. Farouk M. Belal examined Maurice and noted a provisional diagnosis of acute coronary syndrome and hypokalemia. The next day, Maurice died from a bilateral pulmonary embolism. Plaintiff, Keran Ernest, as personal representative of Maurice’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action against defendants, Brown, Saeed, Belal, Cypress Cardiology, PLLC, and McLaren Health Care Corporation, alleging that they failed to properly diagnose and treat Maurice. At issue here is the timeliness of plaintiff’s complaint. The alleged malpractice occurred on July 16, 2020. Plaintiff received letters of authority on June 7, 2021, which authorized her to act on behalf of Maurice’s estate. Plaintiff sent defendants a notice of 2 intent to sue (NOI), as required by MCL 600.2912b, on February 10, 2023, and plaintiff filed her complaint on August 14, 2023. However, under MCL 600.5805(8), the general two-year statutory limitations period to bring a medical malpractice claim expired on July 16, 2022. Plaintiff argued that her complaint was timely filed under the wrongful-death saving provision of MCL 600.5852, which permits an appointed personal representative to file suit within two years of the date the letters of authority were issued. However, this provision alone could not render plaintiff’s action timely because the August 14, 2023 complaint was filed more than two years after the June 7, 2021 letters of authority were issued. In other words, even applying the wrongful-death saving provision, the statutory limitations period would have expired on June 7, 2023, several months before plaintiff filed her complaint. But plaintiff argued that the limitations period was tolled for 182 days under MCL 600.5856(c) when she sent her NOI to defendants. Because the NOI was sent before the statutory limitations period would have expired if the wrongful-death saving provision applied, plaintiff argued that the NOI tolled the statutory limitations period such that the August 14, 2023 complaint would be considered timely. Defendants sought summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred by the statute of limitations because, under Waltz, 469 Mich at 650-651, the wrongful-death saving provision is not subject to tolling for the NOI and thus the statutory limitations period had expired before plaintiff filed the cause of action. Plaintiff indicated her intent to challenge the Waltz decision. The trial court held that plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under Waltz. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants’ motions and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. 3  Plaintiff then filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals and a bypass application in this Court. We denied the bypass application. Ernest v Brown, 513 Mich 1047 (2024). The Court of Appeals, noting that it was bound by this Court’s decision in Waltz, affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Ernest v Brown, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2025 (Docket No. 368566). Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in this Court, and in lieu of granting leave, we ordered oral argument on the application, asking the parties to address: (1) whether Waltz v Wyse, 469 Mich 642 (2004), correctly held that MCL 600.5856(c) does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful- death actions provided in MCL 600.5852; and (2) if Waltz was incorrectly decided, whether it should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-468[; 613 NW2d 307] (2000). [Ernest v Brown, ___ Mich ___, ___; 25 NW3d 673, 673 (2025).] II. WHETHER WALTZ WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is reviewed de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118-119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate when the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiff’s claim is barred under the applicable statute of limitations.” Kincaid v Cardwell, 300 Mich App 513, 522; 834 NW2d 122 (2013). Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Wyandotte Electric Supply Co v Electrical Technology Sys, Inc, 499 Mich 127, 137; 881 NW2d 95 (2016). In interpreting a statute, our principal rule of construction is to determine and give effect to 4 the Legislature’s intent, and the most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain language of the statute. Id. B. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE The Legislature has set out a comprehensive scheme governing the timeliness of medical malpractice claims involving alleged wrongful deaths. First and foremost, a medical malpractice cause of action is subject to a general two-year statutory limitations period. MCL 600.5805(8). However, after an alleged act of medical malpractice has occurred, a plaintiff is not entitled to immediately file a complaint. Instead, MCL 600.2912b(1) requires that a plaintiff first provide an NOI to the defendants at least 182 days prior to filing a complaint. Under MCL 600.5856(c), however, the running of the two-year statutory limitations period is tolled during this 182-day notice period if the statutory limitations period would otherwise expire during the notice period. In such cases, “the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given.” Id. Importantly, MCL 600.5856 tolls only “statutes of limitations or repose.” “A statute of limitation . . . prescribes the time limits in which a party may bring an action that has already accrued.” Sills v Oakland Gen Hosp, 220 Mich App 303, 308; 559 NW2d 348 (1996). 1 1 While MCL 600.5856 explicitly contemplates that both statutes of limitations and repose are subject to tolling, there is no contention that MCL 600.5852 ought to be characterized as a statute of repose. “A statute of repose prevents a cause of action from ever accruing when the injury is sustained after the designated statutory period has elapsed.” Sills, 220 Mich App at 308. In this way, a statute of repose “may bar a claim before an injury or damage occurs.” Ostroth v Warren Regency, GP, LLC, 474 Mich 36, 42 n 7; 709 NW2d 589 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, a statute of repose does 5  In wrongful-death actions, MCL 600.5852 provides a different, extended time line for personal representatives who proceed on behalf of a decedent’s estate: (1) If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action that survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run. (2) If the action that survives by law is an action alleging medical malpractice, the 2-year period under subsection (1) runs from the date letters of authority are issued to the first personal representative of an estate. Except as provided in subsection (3), the issuance of subsequent letters of authority does not enlarge the time within which the action may be commenced. (3) If a personal representative dies or is adjudged by a court to be legally incapacitated within 2 years after his or her letters are issued, the successor personal representative may commence an action alleging medical malpractice that survives by law within 1 year after the personal representative died or was adjudged by a court to be legally incapacitated. (4) Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (3), an action shall not be commenced under this section later than 3 years after the period of limitations has run. In short, MCL 600.5852 provides that when a decedent dies before the statutory limitations period has run, or within 30 days after it has run, the personal representative has an additional two years to commence a lawsuit from the date the letters of authority are issued, so long as the action is commenced no later than three years after the limitations period has run. not consider when a claim accrued but instead prevents a claim from ever accruing if the claim is not brought within a specific time frame. Here, all parties agree that the cause of action accrued when the medical malpractice occurred. Therefore, we limit our analysis to whether MCL 600.5852 is a statute of limitations. 6  Against this backdrop, the question we consider here is whether the wrongful-death saving provision of MCL 600.5852 ought to be characterized as a statutory limitations period such that it may be tolled by application of MCL 600.5856(c) during the 182-day notice period. Because this Court in Waltz held that MCL 600.5852 is not a period of limitations, we must examine the jurisprudential backdrop against which Waltz was decided before turning to the reasoning of Waltz itself. C. PRE-WALTZ CASELAW Prior to the Waltz decision, this Court—and others—characterized MCL 600.5852 as a saving provision that extends the period of limitations for a personal representative to file an action. Hardy v Maxheimer, 429 Mich 422, 429-432, 441; 416 NW2d 299 (1987) (adopting as persuasive the reasoning of Janes v Sackman Bros Co, 177 F2d 928, 932 (CA 2, 1949), and holding that MCL 600.5852 operated to extend the period of limitations applicable to a wrongful-death action brought by a personal representative). See also Hawkins v Regional Med Laboratories, PC, 415 Mich 420, 438; 329 NW2d 729 (1982) (opinion by RYAN, J.) (stating that “MCL 600.5852 operates to extend the time in which to bring” actions for non-instantaneous death resulting from wrongful conduct); McNeil v Quines, 195 Mich App 199, 202; 489 NW2d 180 (1992) (stating that MCL 600.5852 extends the limitations period); Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 61, 65; 564 NW2d 861 (1997) (referring to MCL 600.5852 as “the statute of limitations saving provision” and an “exception to the statute of limitations,” which “operates to suspend the running of the statute until a personal representative is appointed to represent the interests of the estate”); Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 577; 609 NW2d 177 (2000) (referring to 7 MCL 600.5852 as creating a “recalculated limitation period”), overruled in part by Waltz, 469 Mich at 655. This characterization is consistent with how a saving provision is described in secondary sources. 51 Am Jur 2d (May 2026 update), Limitation of Actions, § 279 (“A saving clause in a statute of limitations extends, rather than abridges, the general statute of limitations, so that if the portion of the limitation period remaining after the failure of a prior action is greater than the period allowed by the saving clause, the plaintiff is not restricted to the latter period in bringing a new action.”). Despite this general agreement, our decision in Miller v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196, 202; 644 NW2d 730 (2002), then complicated matters. In Miller, the Court considered whether the six-month discovery provision in MCL 600.5838a(2) is a “period of limitation.” Id. While MCL 600.5838a(2) is not implicated in this case, the reasoning that led the Miller Court to conclude that MCL 600.5838a(2) should be considered a period of limitations should also have led the Miller Court to the same conclusion as to MCL 600.5852. MCL 600.5838a(2) provides, in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, an action involving a claim based on medical malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. We explained that, because MCL 600.5838a(2) requires that a person who has a cause of action “bring suit within a specified time,” the provision is “an alternative to the other periods of limitation” and “is itself a period of limitation.” Id. However, relying on Lindsey, 455 Mich 56, Miller then confusingly concluded that “[MCL 600.5852] is a saving statute, not a statute of limitations.” Miller, 466 Mich at 202. 8  Miller’s holding that MCL 600.5838a(2) is a period of limitations because it would further extend the allotted time for filing reflected the Court’s understanding that a statutory provision that extends the original period of limitations itself creates a new, alternative period of limitations. See id. at 201 n 3 (questioning, but declining to address, whether MCL 600.5838a(2), as applied to a personal representative, further extended the periods in MCL 600.5852). This understanding is consistent with Omelenchuk’s earlier characterization of MCL 600.5852 as creating a recalculated limitations period. Yet Miller’s insistence that MCL 600.5852 should not be considered a statute of limitations is inconsistent with Miller’s holding that the six-month discovery rule of MCL 600.5838a(2) is a period of limitations. No explanation is given in Miller as to why these two provisions, which function similarly, are given such divergent treatment. D. WALTZ Against this convoluted backdrop, this Court in Waltz considered the exact question we consider now—whether MCL 600.5856 tolls the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions under MCL 600.5852. In Waltz, the plaintiff’s son died on April 18, 1994; accordingly, the two-year limitations period for malpractice actions expired on April 18, 1996. Waltz, 469 Mich at 645. The plaintiff sent the defendants an NOI in January 1999, was appointed personal representative of her son’s estate and received her letters of authority on May 27, 1999, and then filed a complaint on June 23, 1999. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely because it was filed more than three years after the limitations period expired on April 18, 1996. Id. The plaintiff argued 9 that the three-year limitations period for a wrongful-death action was tolled under MCL 600.5856 when the plaintiff sent the defendants an NOI in January 1999. Id. Waltz held that MCL 600.5856 did not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions under MCL 600.5852 and that MCL 600.5852, by its own terms, is “operational only within the context of the separate ‘period of limitations’ that would otherwise bar an action.” Id. at 651. Accordingly, Waltz held that MCL 600.5852 functions as only an exception to the limitations period. Id. In so holding, Waltz found support in Miller’s characterization of MCL 600.5852 as “ ‘a saving statute, not a statute of limitations,’ ” Waltz, 469 Mich at 650, quoting Miller, 466 Mich at 202 (emphasis in Waltz), and Lindsey’s characterization of MCL 600.5852 as a saving provision that applies as an “ ‘exception to the statute of limitations,’ ” Waltz, 469 Mich at 650, quoting Lindsey, 455 Mich at 65 (emphasis in Waltz). Waltz acknowledged that Omelenchuk repeatedly referred to MCL 600.5852 as creating a “limitation period” but dismissed Omelenchuk’s characterization as an “imprecise choice of words.” Waltz, 469 Mich at 654. Waltz thus concluded that MCL 600.5852 “is not a statute of limitations, but a saving statute.” Id. Accordingly, this Court held that the tolling provision of MCL 600.5856 did not operate to toll the additional period in MCL 600.5852 for filing wrongful-death actions. Id. at 655. Justice MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH dissented, joined by Justice MARILYN J. KELLY. The dissenting justices believed that the majority failed to provide proper deference to Omelenchuk and that Lindsey and Miller did not support the majority’s holding. Id. at 660, 663-664 (M. F. CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Rather, the dissent opined that Lindsey and Miller confirmed that MCL 600.5852 should itself be considered a limitations period. Accordingly, the dissent disagreed that this Court misspoke when it referred to 10 MCL 600.5852 as a limitations period in Omelenchuk. Id. at 663. In this way, “because [MCL 600.5852] requires a plaintiff to bring suit within a specified time, [MCL 600.5852] must be considered a limitation period.” Id. at 664. E. ANALYSIS We hold that Waltz erred by concluding that MCL 600.5856 does not toll the additional period permitted for filing wrongful-death actions in MCL 600.5852. To begin, Waltz has long been considered suspect by a number of jurists. See Poniewierski v William Beaumont Hosp Royal Oak, 513 Mich 859, 860 (2023) (WELCH, J., dissenting, joined by M. K. CAVANAGH and BOLDEN, JJ.) (questioning whether Waltz was correctly decided); Poniewierski v William Beaumont Hosp Royal Oak, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 1, 2022 (Docket No. 356925) (N. P. HOOD, J., concurring) (noting that he concurred with the Court of Appeals’ decision because the Court of Appeals was bound by Waltz); Mullins v St Joseph Mercy Hosp, 271 Mich App 503, 514; 722 NW2d 666 (2006) (MURPHY, J., dissenting) (stating the belief that Waltz was wrongly decided); Ward v Siano, 272 Mich App 715, 736; 730 NW2d 1 (2006) (O’CONNELL, J., concurring) (noting that Waltz was confusing and set up a trap for prospective plaintiffs); Mazumder v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 270 Mich App 42, 62-63; 715 NW2d 96 (2006) (criticizing Waltz for establishing “a judicial obstacle” that “could not have been intended by the Legislature”), rev’d 480 Mich 1045 (2008); McLean v McElhaney, 269 Mich App 196, 207 n 2; 711 NW2d 775 (2005) (O’CONNELL, P.J., 11 dissenting) (critiquing Waltz’s “disparaging description” of Omelenchuk). 2 It is significant that the Waltz holding has been steadily criticized from its inception until now, over a period of decades. Our holding today is contextualized by this long-spanning criticism of Waltz. The fundamental flaw in the Waltz decision is that it characterized MCL 600.5852 as solely a saving provision and rejected a statutory reading consistent with existing caselaw that characterized MCL 600.5852 as incorporating a limitations period as well. It is true that MCL 600.5852 functions as a saving provision for wrongful-death actions, but to characterize MCL 600.5852 as only a saving provision overlooks how the provision operates in the context of a medical malpractice action and how it was previously characterized in this Court’s opinions. See Waltz, 469 Mich at 663 (M. F. CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (explaining that MCL 600.5852 was long viewed as “a limitation period because it sets forth its own period of limitations”). MCL 600.5852 “saves” the cause of action from a statute-of-limitations defense for some additional period of time; in doing so, it necessarily incorporates a new limitations period. In other words, the saving provision “saves” the cause of action because it extends the limitations period. Our decision in Lindsey illustrates this point. Though Lindsey did not expressly hold that MCL 600.5852 established a statutory limitations period, it held 2 Parties have continually contested Waltz as well. See, e.g., Farley v Advanced Cardiovascular Health Specialists, PC, 266 Mich App 566; 703 NW2d 115 (2005); King v Briggs, 474 Mich 1113 (2006); Wilson v Plyler, 480 Mich 855 (2007); Dallaire Estate v Treatment Works, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 21, 2010 (Docket No. 292971); Mashike Estate v Riverview Med Investors Ltd Partnership, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 21, 2021 (Docket No. 354851); Poniewierski, 513 Mich 859. 12 that because the plaintiff did not bring her cause of action within two years of being appointed the personal representative of the estate, the cause of action was time-barred by MCL 600.5852. Lindsey, 455 Mich at 67. By holding that MCL 600.5852 time-barred an action, Lindsey necessarily understood that MCL 600.5852 incorporated some new statutory limitations period; in other words, for MCL 600.5852 to be able to time bar an action means that it functioned as a statute of limitations. In this way, this Court did not misspeak in Omelenchuk when it referred to MCL 600.5852 as creating a recalculated period of limitations. See Omelenchuk, 461 Mich at 577. 3 Much of Waltz’s error, however, can be traced to the flaws of Miller. As explained, while the Miller Court classified the six-month discovery rule in MCL 600.5838a(2) as only an alternative statute of limitations, it classified MCL 600.5852 as “a saving statute, not a statute of limitations.” Miller, 466 Mich at 202. Miller did so with little explanation or legal analysis, and Waltz likewise adopted Miller’s view with no additional legal analysis. Indeed, one is left to speculate as to why Waltz chose to adopt Miller’s conclusory statement that MCL 600.5852 was merely a saving statute while dismissing Omelenchuk’s references to MCL 600.5852 as a limitations period itself as an “imprecise choice of words.” Waltz, 469 Mich at 654 (opinion of the Court). We instead believe that Miller’s reasoning as to MCL 600.5838a(2) “supports the conclusion reached in Omelenchuk that 3 The language of the general two-year malpractice statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(8), provides further support for this conclusion. MCL 600.5805(8) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.” (Emphasis added.) The introductory clause of this provision suggests that there are multiple “period[s] of limitations” in the medical malpractice context located within Chapter 58 of the Revised Judicature Act, the chapter in which MCL 600.5852 is housed. 13 the saving provision is a limitation period” because, like the six-month discovery rule, MCL 600.5852 also “requires a plaintiff to bring suit within a specified time.” Waltz, 469 Mich at 663-664 (M. F. CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Further complicating matters, neither Miller nor Waltz discussed the difference in how cases had previously described MCL 600.5852 and whether such a difference is legally meaningful. Similarly, Waltz did not cite any authority for its conclusion that a tolling provision should not apply to the new limitations periods created by saving statutes. Like Justice MICHAEL CAVANAGH, we “question how a claim may be considered time- barred under the saving provision if the saving provision is not a limitation period.” Waltz, 469 Mich at 664 (M. F. CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). While this Court does not resort to legislative history when the statutory scheme is unambiguous, see In re Certified Question, 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003), reference to legislative history provides further support for our holding. Waltz’s holding implied that the Legislature did not intend MCL 600.5852 to fall within the ambit of MCL 600.5856. However, the legislative history demonstrates that such a conclusion is incorrect. In 1993, the Legislature introduced a sea change of tort reform in the medical malpractice context. In particular, these changes included the NOI requirement and its corresponding 182-day notice period, which included the acknowledgment that the statute of limitations is to be tolled during this notice period. 1993 PA 78. The purpose of the NOI requirement, we have explained, is to “promote settlement without the need for formal litigation and reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation while still providing compensation for meritorious medical malpractice claims that might otherwise be 14 precluded from recovery because of litigation costs.” Neal v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 226 Mich App 701, 705; 575 NW2d 68 (1997), citing Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 270 (August 11, 1993), and House Legislative Analysis, HB 4403-4406 (March 22, 1993). At the same time, the tolling provision applies so that a plaintiff is not prejudiced during the notice period. Significantly, when the Legislature passed these amendments, it made no changes to the relevant portions of MCL 600.5852. Nothing in the statutory scheme or its history indicates that the Legislature intended for MCL 600.5856 not to apply to cases that are commenced under MCL 600.5852. Indeed, “[i]t is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes