People v Madison

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v MADISON Docket No. 167120. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 9, 2025. Decided July 31, 2026. Cinecca D. Madison, who was 19 years old when he allegedly shot two people, was charged with open murder, MCL 750.316, assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and two counts of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. Defendant moved for a competency evaluation and an evaluation of his criminal responsibility in the Ottawa Circuit Court; the court entered orders referring defendant to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, where he was evaluated by Dr. Michele Hill, who concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Hill noted that, while defendant had not been medicated at the time of the shooting, he had since been taking a prescribed antipsychotic administered by the jail. With regard to criminal responsibility, Dr. Hill initially was not sure whether defendant suffered from any mental illness, but she later learned that, approximately 10 months before the shooting, defendant had been the subject of mental-illness proceedings. The Ottawa Probate Court had issued a mental-health pick-up order for defendant shortly after he received treatment for paranoia and hallucinations, and Community Mental Health of Ottawa County had diagnosed defendant with schizophreniform disorder, a precursor diagnosis to schizophrenia. Nevertheless, Dr. Hill concluded that defendant was not legally insane at the time of the alleged crime. One of defendant’s psychological experts opined that defendant was not legally insane at the time of the alleged crime but that defendant’s mental illness affected his behavior and actions. Defendant moved to present evidence and submit jury instructions regarding his diminished capacity, arguing that his diminished capacity negated the specific-intent element of the charged crimes. The court, Karen J. Miedema, J., denied defendant’s motion on the basis that People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223 (2001), held that evidence of mental incapacity short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent. Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals, REDFORD, P.J., and CAVANAGH and YATES, JJ., denied leave to appeal. Defendant sought interlocutory leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, challenging the continued viability of Carpenter and seeking to present evidence of his alleged diminished capacity at trial. The Supreme Court stayed the trial court proceedings and ordered and heard oral argument on the application. 515 Mich 1016 (2024).  In an opinion by Justice BERNSTEIN, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices WELCH, BOLDEN, THOMAS, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 1. The Carpenter Court erred by ruling that the legal-insanity statute, MCL 768.21a, foreclosed the presentation of diminished-capacity evidence to contest the mens rea element of a charged specific-intent crime. The Carpenter Court expended little effort on interpreting the language of MCL 768.21a, which on its face addresses only the affirmative defense available to a legally insane defendant. There is no language in the statute directed at the concept of diminished capacity. A diminished-capacity argument is distinct from the insanity defense. The insanity defense is an affirmative defense that admits guilt but seeks to excuse it without reference to any individual elements of the crime. In contrast, the purpose of diminished-capacity evidence is aimed at negating specific intent; this approach does not admit the crime and seek to then excuse or justify it but instead challenges the prosecution’s case by questioning whether a defendant had the requisite mens rea at the time of the crime. Because diminished capacity is necessarily distinct from the affirmative defense of legal insanity, the Legislature’s codification of the legal-insanity defense has no bearing on the admissibility of diminished-capacity evidence. The statement in MCL 768.21a(1) that “[m]ental illness or having an intellectual disability does not otherwise constitute a defense of legal insanity” means precisely what it says; although evidence of a defendant’s diminished capacity because of mental illness or intellectual disability cannot constitute an affirmative defense of legal insanity, the statute simply does not state or imply anything about the availability of diminished-capacity evidence to negate a specific element of a crime. The Carpenter Court’s erroneous conclusion that the Legislature had created a comprehensive statutory scheme governing any defense rooted in mental illness or intellectual disability was contrary to the plain language of MCL 768.21a and the statute allowing a defendant to be found guilty but mentally ill, MCL 768.36; further, it improperly used the Legislature’s silence on the use of evidence of diminished capacity outside of legal insanity to overturn decades of common law. 2. Principles of stare decisis weigh in favor of overruling Carpenter. Whether a case was wrongly decided is not, in itself, determinative of whether it should be overruled. In determining whether the decision should be overruled, a court reviews whether the decision defies practical workability, whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship were the decision to be overruled, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision. The court may also consider whether the prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from precedent and whether upholding the rule is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. Regarding practical workability, while Carpenter’s all-or-nothing approach is straightforward to apply, this factor is of little weight in comparison to the import of safeguarding the ability of criminal defendants to present a defense that should be available and that was otherwise available for at least 30 years before Carpenter. Next, reliance interests do not weigh in favor of retaining Carpenter. Overruling Carpenter will lead to a change in evidence that some defendants seek to raise in the context of their own individual trials, but this will not create a dislocation of the trial process. Fact-finders and trial court judges are well equipped to adjust to the renewed availability of the diminished-capacity defense, and evidentiary rules will guide the admission of mental-health evidence in this context as they would in any other. The most serious concern regarding reliance interests is how overruling Carpenter will impact court operations in the aggregate, but even if this reliance factor weighs in favor of maintaining Carpenter, it is not, in itself, dispositive. Finally, while it is difficult to say whether there were changes in the law or facts since Carpenter, Carpenter’s all-or-nothing approach has increasingly appeared inconsistent with the state of the medical and psychiatric fields as the scientific understanding of mental health and intellectual disability has evolved. Although overruling Carpenter might require the justice system to adjust or adopt new procedures, the other factors weigh in favor of overruling Carpenter. Trial court’s order vacated; case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Chief Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justice WELCH, concurring, fully agreed with the majority but wrote separately to comment on the broader impact of the decision and to provide further explanation as to how trial courts should examine diminished-capacity evidence moving forward. Chief Justice CAVANAGH questioned whether People v Mangiapane, 85 Mich App 379 (1978), and other decisions like it remain good law. Moreover, she wrote to caution that the majority opinion’s decision should not be interpreted as a free-for-all in regard to the introduction of evidence of mental illness or intellectual disability; all pertinent rules of evidence, including MRE 401, MRE 403, and MRE 701, continue to apply. Justice WELCH, concurring, fully agreed with the majority opinion, and she also agreed with Justice HOOD that lower courts will face postconviction motions from defendants seeking to apply the majority’s decision retroactively; accordingly, she wrote to highlight helpful aspects of state and federal retroactivity jurisprudence and to point courts toward pertinent caselaw discussing the process for determining retroactivity. Justice HOOD, concurring, agreed with the majority opinion but was cautious in reaching the decision to overturn Carpenter because of his grave concerns about the ripple effects that overturning Carpenter will have on every level of Michigan’s court system. The focus of his disagreement with the majority’s stare decisis analysis relates to whether overturning Carpenter would work an undue hardship because of reliance on that case. Overturning Carpenter may have impacts on legislative and administrative frameworks that have developed around not-guilty-by- reason-of-insanity adjudications and on the judicial system’s ability to efficiently manage criminal proceedings, particularly with regard to requests or referrals for diminished-capacity evaluations. The Center for Forensic Psychiatry is already overwhelmed and backlogged, and the current demand of competency and criminal-responsibility referrals already impacts the timeliness of cases; the majority’s decision adds—and potentially substantially adds—to them. Additionally, overturning Carpenter will likely dramatically increase postconviction motions and appeals that will necessarily seek to define the scope of the majority’s decision. Justice HOOD supports administrative review of the Michigan Court Rules to assist courts in addressing the challenges that the majority’s decision will pose, and he encourages the Legislature to monitor this issue. Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would have upheld Carpenter because it was faithful to the applicable statutory scheme and rightly decided. The majority’s decision to overrule Carpenter plainly controverts the clear intent of the Legislature by undermining the comprehensive statutory scheme set forth by the Legislature, and its revival of the diminished-capacity defense conflicts with multiple provisions of the statute. Specifically, permitting the diminished-capacity defense allows intellectually disabled defendants to circumvent the Legislature’s policy choice that intellectually disabled criminals receive some form of state-enforced psychiatric attention. The majority opinion substitutes its own results-driven interpretation of the statute, ignoring obvious indications of statutory intent. The majority opinion also relies on inapposite caselaw and the arguments of criminal defendants to erroneously conclude that Carpenter has been widely criticized. Furthermore, the majority opinion’s holding raises new and thorny questions that courts and litigants will have to face, including the applicable notice and evidentiary requirements and which party bears the burden of proof. Further, the majority ignores the dictates of stare decisis. The majority improperly decides that the practical-workability factor is of little weight, and the majority improperly asserts that it is the duty of the Supreme Court to safeguard defenses that should be available to defendants. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that criminal defendants do not have a due- process right to present a diminished-capacity defense, and whether defendants ought to be able to assert the diminished-capacity defense is a question for the Legislature. Regarding reliance interests, the majority’s decision reshapes strategy incentives for criminal defendants and creates significant procedural and evidentiary questions. Additionally, the majority opinion’s attack on Carpenter’s reasonableness in light of unchanged facts is irrelevant to a proper stare decisis analysis and more properly constitutes a merits-based argument against Carpenter. Regarding whether upholding the rule is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to present diminished-capacity evidence to negate the element of mens rea, so there is no public interest at stake. Carpenter was not an abrupt departure from precedent; even on collateral review, the Supreme Court of the United States in Metrish v Lancaster, 569 US 351, 368 (2013), unanimously accepted the Carpenter Court’s “reasonable interpretation of the language of a controlling statute,” i.e., MCL 768.21a, as barring evidence of mental illness on criminal culpability unless presented under the defense of legal insanity. Justice ZAHRA would conclude that Carpenter should be retained.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 31, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167120 CINECCA DAQUAN MADISON, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH BERNSTEIN, J. Since this Court decided People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223; 627 NW2d 276 (2001), its holding that nothing short of legal insanity—including evidence of mental incapacity less than legal insanity to negate the mens rea requirement of specific-intent crimes—can be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility has been subject to questions and criticism. Today, we conclude that Carpenter was wrongly decided and that the principles of stare decisis weigh in favor of overruling it. We therefore overturn Carpenter and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In June 2022, defendant, then 19 years old, was riding his bike with Antory Burrell and Demontae Knight. While the three were riding through a park, defendant allegedly shot his two companions. Burrell sustained four gunshot wounds and Knight sustained five. Defendant was uninjured and fled the scene. Burrell and Knight were taken to the hospital, where Burrell died of his injuries. Knight survived, but he underwent four surgeries and was hospitalized for 10 days. According to Knight, defendant shot both men from behind, and while Knight was “playing dead” after being shot, he saw defendant walk up to Burrell as he lay motionless on the ground and shoot him again. Defendant was charged with open murder in violation of MCL 750.316, assault with intent to commit murder in violation of MCL 750.83, and two counts of carrying or possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony in violation of MCL 750.227b. In the trial court, defendant moved for a competency evaluation and an evaluation of his criminal responsibility. The court entered orders referring defendant to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, where he was evaluated by Dr. Michele Hill, who concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Hill noted that, while defendant had not been medicated at the time of the shooting, he had since been taking a prescribed antipsychotic administered by the jail. With regard to criminal responsibility, Dr. Hill initially was not sure whether defendant suffered from any mental illness, but she later learned that, approximately 10 months before the shooting, defendant had been the subject of mental- 2 illness proceedings in Ottawa County. The Ottawa Probate Court had issued a mental- health pick-up order for defendant shortly after he received treatment for paranoia and hallucinations at Holland Hospital. Although defendant presented as agitated, psychotic, and disorganized, he was initially denied follow-up treatment due to uncertainty over whether his symptoms were caused by a history of drug use. After several months of clean urine screens, Community Mental Health of Ottawa County diagnosed defendant with schizophreniform disorder—the precursor diagnosis to schizophrenia. 1 Accordingly, Dr. Hill opined that defendant “was experiencing a substantial disorder of thought that at times significantly impaired his capacity to recognize reality during the months leading up to the alleged offense and was mentally ill.” Nevertheless, she continued to conclude that defendant was not legally insane at the time the alleged crime took place. Defendant retained psychological experts of his own. Defense expert Dr. Jeffery Kieliszewski agreed with Dr. Hill that defendant was not legally insane at the time the shooting occurred but opined that defendant’s mental illness affected his behavior and actions. Defense expert Dr. Michael Wolff did not directly opine on defendant’s criminal responsibility but indicated that defendant’s mental illness and intellectual disability affected his perception of the events surrounding his alleged criminal activity. Defendant thereafter moved to present evidence and submit jury instructions regarding his diminished capacity, arguing that his diminished capacity negated the specific-intent element of the charged crimes. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. 1 Defendant asserts that this diagnosis was based on, among other things, his statements that the television was whispering evil things to him, that his teddy bear was shooting him funny looks, and that he felt like another person was scratching at the walls of his home to get to him. 3 It recognized that this Court in Carpenter, 464 Mich at 237, held that “the Legislature has created an all or nothing insanity defense” and, therefore, “evidence of mental incapacity short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent.” Accordingly, the trial court concluded, “[b]ecause defendant does not meet the definition of legal insanity, he is prohibited from presenting evidence of his mental illness to negate the specific intent elements of the charged crimes or reduce his criminal responsibility.” The trial court further granted defendant’s motion to present a theory of self-defense and added that, because defendant’s primary intended defense theory was self- defense, it was “premature to determine whether other evidence will support an instruction for voluntary manslaughter.” Defendant sought to challenge this determination on an emergency basis in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted immediate consideration but denied leave to appeal for failure to persuade the Court of the need for interlocutory review. People v Madison, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 10, 2024 (Docket No. 369559). Defendant next sought interlocutory leave to appeal in this Court, challenging the continued viability of Carpenter and seeking to present evidence of his alleged diminished capacity at trial. This Court stayed the trial court proceedings and ordered oral argument on the application. People v Madison, 515 Mich 1016 (2024). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Denson, 500 Mich 385, 396; 902 NW2d 306 (2017). We review de 4 novo questions of law, including whether a statute precludes the admission of any particular evidence. Denson, 500 Mich at 396. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Wyandotte Electric Supply Co v Electrical Technology Sys, Inc, 499 Mich 127, 137; 881 NW2d 95 (2016). Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent, the foremost indicator of which is the statutory language. ACLU of Mich v Calhoun Co Sheriff’s Office, 509 Mich 1, 8; 983 NW2d 300 (2022). “Therefore, we start by examining the words of the statute, which ‘should be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute.’ ” People v Harris, 499 Mich 332, 345; 885 NW2d 832 (2016), quoting People v Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich 6, 13; 825 NW2d 554 (2012). III. LEGAL BACKGROUND A. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY At least as far back as Roberts v People, 19 Mich 401, 421-423 (1870), this Court has observed that insanity may have some bearing on whether a person may be capable of forming the intent necessary to be held culpable for a crime. In People v Durfee, 62 Mich 487, 494; 29 NW 109 (1886), this Court set forth the common-law understanding of legal insanity, which the circuit court in that case described as follows: “You have heard the evidence in the case, you know what the circumstances are, and you can judge from all the evidence in the case— including the transaction itself, and his conduct at the time—whether or not he exhibited evidences which leave a reasonable doubt in your minds of the soundness of his mind in that transaction. Did he know what he was doing,— whether it was right or wrong? and if he did, then did he know or did he have the power, the will power, to resist the impulse occasioned? You are not to draw the inference because a man acts frantically mad and angry, very angry, that he does not resist the impulse,—that that is unsoundness of mind. 5  [This unsoundness must be the result of a disease, and not the result of his having allowed his passions to run until they have become uncontrollable. We frequently meet men in courts of justice who claim that they have committed a crime because they were drunk. The law holds them responsible, because they should not have got drunk; they should not have formed the habit. So the law requires of a man that he will curb his passions and restrain himself, and, if he does not do it, holds him accountable, unless it is by reason of disease which renders him unable to do it.]” [Brackets in original.] This Court identified the salient points of the Durfee test as “1) whether defendant knew what he was doing was right or wrong; and 2) if he did, did he have the power, the will power, to resist doing the wrongful act?” People v Martin, 386 Mich 407, 418; 192 NW2d 215 (1971). The Legislature created a notice requirement for the insanity defense in 1927 but did not define insanity. 1927 PA 175. In People v Lynch, 47 Mich App 8, 15; 208 NW2d 656 (1973), the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who did not raise an insanity defense should have been permitted to offer expert testimony regarding her “mentality and state of mind as bearing upon her intent” in her trial for the murder of her newborn daughter. Considering whether such evidence would subvert the insanity-defense standard set forth in Durfee, the Lynch Court reasoned: There are some states that . . . hold[] that mental capacity is an all or nothing matter and that only insanity, by whatever definition thereof might prevail therein, negates criminal intent. The majority, and we think the sounder, view, however, permits such medical proof, sometimes called proof of diminished or partial responsibility, as bearing on intent generally or at least on those special states of mind where a specific intent is required or where the state of mind by definition determines the degree of the offense as here. [Id. at 20.] The Lynch Court therefore found “nothing novel in admitting testimony bearing on intent” and observed that developments in behavioral science did not change the rules surrounding 6 admission of evidence. Id. at 21. “It must be borne in mind that insanity as a defense is one thing and that proof of the existence or nonexistence of the specific essential mental state, disjoined from any question of legal sanity, is quite another thing.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Lynch Court conceived of diminished capacity as an evidentiary issue. The proposed testimony of the defendant’s mental-health experts was deemed “material and relevant” to the question of specific intent, so the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in precluding the admission of the evidence. Id. at 22. In contrast to insanity, diminished capacity was not considered an affirmative defense because “the question is simply whether there shall be excluded evidence which merely denies the existence of facts which the State must prove to establish that the murder was in the first degree.” Id. at 19 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Diminished capacity was not explicitly defined in the opinion but was referred to as a “mental condition less than insanity . . . .” Id. The Lynch Court further recognized that a defendant who successfully put forth evidence of diminished capacity could still be found guilty of a crime that lacked a specific-intent requirement. Id. at 20-22. In contrast, the insanity defense was understood as an affirmative defense to all offenses. People v Finley, 38 Mich 482, 483-485 (1878). And while the insanity defense required notice to the prosecution, defendants were not required to provide notice to the prosecution before presenting evidence of diminished capacity. Lynch, 47 Mich App at 20. Shortly after Lynch was decided, the Legislature enacted the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1001 et seq. See 1974 PA 258, effective August 6, 1975. Alongside this 7 legislation, the Legislature also enacted 1975 PA 180, which codified the insanity defense at MCL 768.21a. MCL 768.21a, as originally enacted by 1975 PA 180, provided: (1) A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness as defined in [MCL 330.1400a], or as a result of mental retardation as defined in section [MCL 330.1500(g)] of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol or controlled substances at the time of his alleged offense shall not thereby be deemed to have been legally insane. As amended by 1994 PA 56 and 2014 PA 76, 2 MCL 768.21a currently provides: (1) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a criminal offense that the defendant was legally insane when he or she committed the acts constituting the offense. An individual is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness as defined in section 400 of the mental health code, 1974 PA 258, MCL 330.1400, or as a result of having an intellectual disability as defined in section 100b of the mental health code, 1974 PA 258, MCL 330.1100b, that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law. Mental illness or having an intellectual disability does not otherwise constitute a defense of legal insanity. (2) An individual who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol or controlled substances at the time of his or her alleged offense is not considered to have been legally insane solely because of being under the influence of the alcohol or controlled substances. (3) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 The 2014 amendments to the statute did not substantively alter MCL 768.21a from the version that existed at the time Carpenter was decided. These amendments included stylistic edits and inserted the term “intellectual disability” in place of outdated language. 8 As recognized by the statute, the insanity defense is an affirmative defense. “An affirmative defense admits the crime but seeks to excuse or justify its commission. It does not negate specific elements of the crime.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 704 n 11; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). Also in 1975 PA 180, the Legislature adopted MCL 768.36, allowing a defendant who asserts an insanity defense to be found “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI). MCL 768.36(1) currently provides: (1) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a of this chapter, the defendant may be found [GBMI] if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following: (a) The defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an offense. (b) The defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense. (c) The defendant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacked the substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law. Neither the insanity-defense statute nor the GBMI statute mentions diminished capacity. In the wake of the codification of the insanity defense, the Court of Appeals continued to allow defendants to raise the diminished-capacity defense but procedurally treated diminished capacity as a subset of legal insanity. See People v Mangiapane, 85 Mich App 379, 395; 271 NW2d 240 (1978) (“We find that the defense known as diminished capacity comes within this codified definition of legal insanity. We further find that psychiatric testimony on the issue of defendant’s capacity to form the specific intent comes within the codified definition of legal insanity. By thus categorizing 9 defendant’s defense we do not preclude the admission of evidence supporting defendant’s claim that, although not legally insane, he lacks mental capacity to entertain the specific intent that is a necessary element of assault with intent to commit murder. But, we hold that defendant must give the notice required by the statute of intention to assert that defense.”); People v Denton, 138 Mich App 568, 570-572; 360 NW2d 245 (1984) (citing Mangiapane and applying the procedural requirements to assert legal insanity to a diminished-capacity defense); People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 464; 421 NW2d 200 (1988) (“There is no statutory definition of diminished capacity. Rather, diminished capacity is part of the law of insanity.”); see also People v Hall, 83 Mich App 632, 638- 639; 269 NW2d 476 (1978) (concluding that the jury was properly permitted to consider testimony on diminished capacity negating specific intent, even though the instruction was not specifically labeled “diminished capacity”). We do not intend to suggest that this line of caselaw is without fault. As the Court of Appeals created procedural rules for diminished capacity, it also conflated key terminology in mental health and mental health law. 3 This Court, which did not directly 3 For example, the Mangiapane panel opined that the statutory definition of what is now referred to as intellectual disability had “striking similarities” to diminished capacity and that in many cases a person claiming diminished capacity would fall within the definition of intellectual disability. Mangiapane, 85 Mich App at 392. But despite this conclusion, the Mangiapane Court nevertheless continued to allow admission of evidence showing a lack of “mental capacity to entertain the specific intent that is a necessary element of assault with intent to commit murder.” Id. at 395. In People v Linzey, 112 Mich App 374, 378-379; 315 NW2d 550 (1981), the Court of Appeals seemed to substitute the concept of diminished capacity for the “lacks substantial capacity” language in the insanity statute, MCL 768.21a(1), when it stated, “It does not follow that being mentally ill as defined by the Mental Health Code necessarily means that the person has diminished capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” See also People v Smith, 10 address the validity of the diminished-capacity defense until Carpenter, failed to clarify that diminished capacity and insanity are distinct legal concepts even as we implicitly recognized that defendants could still introduce evidence of diminished capacity in addition to presenting the affirmative defense of insanity. See, e.g., People v Griffin, 433 Mich 860 (1989) (ordering a hearing on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for failure to explore defenses of diminished capacity and insanity). 4 B. PEOPLE v CARPENTER In Carpenter, this Court initially granted leave “to consider whether the lower courts properly determined that it was defendant’s burden to establish his diminished capacity defense by a preponderance of the evidence under MCL 768.21a.” Carpenter, 464 Mich at 225-226. Despite this framing, this Court ultimately departed from that inquiry and instead held that, by enacting a comprehensive statutory scheme setting forth the requirements for and the effects of asserting a defense based on either mental illness or mental retardation,[5] the Legislature has signified its intent not to allow a defendant to introduce evidence of mental abnormalities short of legal 119 Mich App 91, 95; 326 NW2d 434 (1982) (stating that “insanity and mental illness are separate defenses with different consequences”). 4 We note that the dissent, too, echoes some of this confusion in terminology by implying that diminished capacity applies only to defendants who are intellectually disabled, without recognizing that defendants with mental illness but not intellectual disability may present evidence of diminished capacity. 5 Although this phrasing was used in the version of MCL 768.21a that existed at the time Carpenter was decided, as explained in note 2 of this opinion, this outdated language has since been replaced in this provision and elsewhere with “intellectual disability.” See 2014 PA 76. 11  insanity to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent. [Id. at 226.] The Carpenter Court, noting that the diminished-capacity defense had “been the subject of much debate” throughout the country, id. at 236, observed that one common criticism had been the difficulty of applying “the subtle gradations” of mental-health diagnoses to the question of criminal responsibility, id. at 236-237. However, the Carpenter Court concluded that our Legislature had sidestepped this confusion by enacting “an all or nothing insanity defense.” Id. at 237. In explaining this conclusion, the Court stated: Central to our holding is the fact that the Legislature has already contemplated and addressed situations involving persons who are mentally ill or retarded yet not legally insane. As noted above, such a person may be found “guilty but mentally ill” and must be sentenced in the same manner as any other defendant committing the same offense and subject to psychiatric evaluation and treatment. MCL 768.36(3). Through this statutory provision, the Legislature has demonstrated its policy choice that evidence of mental incapacity short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent. As a final matter, we note that even persons acquitted of an offense by reason of insanity may be confined and required to undergo evaluation and treatment. MCL 330.2050. . . . * * * . . . Accordingly, we hold that the insanity defense as established by the Legislature is the sole standard for determining criminal responsibility as it relates to mental illness or retardation. [Id. at 237-239.] Justice MARILYN J. KELLY authored a dissent in Carpenter, finding no language in either the insanity statute or the GBMI statute that addressed the use of evidence to negate specific intent. Id. at 251 (KELLY, J., dissenting). Justice KELLY observed that, instead, “both statutes concern affirmative defenses available to a legally insane defendant. These 12 two statutes, by their plain language, apply only if a defendant seeks to introduce evidence of a mental illness to justify or excuse an otherwise criminal act.” Id. The dissent further highlighted that the “Legislature has made it clear that a person may not be punished for a crime