People v Armogeda

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v ARMOGEDA Docket No. 167760. Argued on application for leave to appeal November 6, 2025. Decided July 29, 2026. Defendant, Evan Taylor Armogeda, was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226; and third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3)(b). At sentencing, defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range was calculated at 270 to 450 months for AWIM, and the trial court, David L. Jordon, J., imposed a within-guidelines controlling sentence of 360 to 600 months’ imprisonment. Defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that Prior Record Variable (PRV) 2 and Offense Variable (OV) 12 were erroneously scored and that the proper guidelines range was 171 to 285 months. The prosecution conceded that the trial court erroneously scored PRV 2 and incorrectly calculated the applicable guidelines range but asserted that the proper guidelines range would be 225 to 375 months. Instead of resolving the scoring issue and determining the appropriate guidelines range, the trial court denied the motion, holding that 360 months was the lowest minimum sentence it found to be appropriate and that it would impose the same minimum sentence regardless of the applicable guidelines range. The Court of Appeals, BORRELLO, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ., affirmed defendant’s sentence in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on October 4, 2024 (Docket No. 365184), holding that the trial court did not err when it acknowledged two possible corrected guidelines ranges but clearly stated that it intended to impose the same minimum sentence regardless, such that resentencing was unnecessary; however, the panel remanded for adjustment of the guidelines range to reflect the correct scoring of PRV 2 and OV 12 and for correction of the presentence investigation report (PSIR) to reflect those determinations. On remand, the parties stipulated that PRV 2 and OV 12 should each be scored at zero points and that the proper guidelines range was 171 to 285 months. The PSIR was amended to reflect these corrections, but no other substantive adjustments were made and defendant’s controlling AWIM sentence remained the same. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address whether resentencing is required when the trial court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of a scoring error but the sentence does not fall within the appropriate guidelines range as amended. ___ Mich ___; 19 NW3d 385 (2025).  In an opinion by Chief Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justices WELCH, BOLDEN, THOMAS, and HOOD, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held: When a defendant’s sentence is based on inaccurate information and falls outside the corrected guidelines range, the defendant is entitled to resentencing, even if the trial court has indicated that it would impose the same sentence on remand. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82 (2006), which held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing if the trial court relied on incorrectly scored guidelines even when the defendant’s initial sentence falls within the corrected guidelines range, does not conflict with People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015), which held that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are advisory. Because the trial court in this case relied on an incorrectly calculated guidelines range and refused to reconsider the sentence in light of the corrected scoring guidelines as Francisco requires, defendant is entitled to resentencing. 1. The holding in Francisco does not conflict with Michigan’s post-Lockridge sentencing scheme and remains relevant today. Nothing in Lockridge sanctions sentencing on the basis of inaccurate information or authorizes sentencing courts to disregard the applicable guidelines range. Lockridge expressly held that a judge must consult the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence. Although the mandatory statutory guidelines were in place when Francisco was decided, defendants are still entitled to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information under the advisory guidelines. Lockridge cannot reasonably be read to deny a defendant whose sentence was based on inaccurate information and falls outside the corrected guidelines range the opportunity to be resentenced. Further, while Francisco relied in part on the portion of MCL 769.34(10) that required appellate affirmation of within-guidelines sentences absent error—which was subsequently severed by People v Posey, 512 Mich ___ (2023) (opinion by BOLDEN, J.), as inconsistent with Lockridge—the Francisco Court was concerned only with the permissive aspect of this provision, which authorized resentencing when the trial court relied on inaccurate information; this is not in tension with Lockridge. And although Francisco articulated an exception to its holding by declining to require resentencing where the trial court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error and the sentence falls within the appropriate guidelines range, if the trial court makes no such indication or if—as in this case—the original sentence exceeds the corrected guidelines range, a defendant is entitled to resentencing. 2. In this case, although the trial court concluded that the sentence imposed was proportionate regardless of the applicable guidelines range, the trial court erred by refusing to reconsider the sentence in light of the corrected scoring guidelines as Francisco requires, and the Court of Appeals erred by prematurely affirming defendant’s sentence before remanding to the trial court for the appropriate guidelines range to be determined. Defendant is entitled to resentencing, during which the court must score the applicable sentencing variables only on the basis of accurate information, correctly calculate the recommended minimum guidelines range, and consider the corrected guidelines range when imposing a new sentence. The trial court is not precluded from imposing the same sentence on remand if that sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender; further, the trial court retains discretion to depart from the guidelines range but remains bound by Lockridge’s requirement that any such departure be reasonable.  Court of Appeals judgment reversed in part; case remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand for resentencing but disagreed with the majority’s decision to address whether Francisco conflicts with Lockridge. Justice BERNSTEIN would have held that the trial court erred by refusing to resolve the scoring issues that prevented it from finding what guidelines range was applicable, because that determination had a meaningful impact on how defendant’s sentence could be reviewed on appeal. The need for individualized sentencing based on accurate information alone justified the reversal of the sentence imposed in this case without reliance on Francisco. Further, the majority did not adequately address what impact Lockridge’s holding that the legislative guidelines are merely advisory had on Francisco. Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would have followed the remand procedures set forth in United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005), and adopted in Lockridge rather than require a full resentencing. Reliance on Francisco to require resentencing was misplaced because the sentencing court expressly stated on the record that it would not sentence defendant to less than 30 years’ imprisonment even if defendant’s arguments relating to the guidelines scoring were meritorious and even if this sentence was outside of defendant’s advisory guidelines range. Justice ZAHRA would have permitted the trial court to first address whether it would have imposed the same sentence had it not relied on inaccurate information or scoring, with resentencing required only if the trial court believed that it would have sentenced defendant differently.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 29, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167760 EVAN TAYLOR ARMOGEDA, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CAVANAGH, C.J. This case concerns whether resentencing is required where a defendant’s sentence is based on inaccurate information and exceeds the corrected guidelines range but the trial court indicates it would impose the same sentence on remand. To resolve this question, we consider whether our decision in People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006), which held that resentencing is required in these circumstances, is at odds with People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), where we held that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are discretionary. We hold that these cases are not in conflict and reaffirm Francisco’s conclusion that, when a sentencing court relies on an incorrectly calculated guidelines range, a defendant is entitled to be resentenced. Accordingly, we hold that defendant is entitled to resentencing in this case, and thus the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his sentence. On remand, the trial court must rescore the guidelines and reconsider the sentence in light of the corrected guidelines range but may, in its discretion, impose the same sentence if the court finds it to be reasonable and proportionate. If the sentence imposed after resentencing is not within the guidelines range, the trial court must articulate the reasons for its departure. See MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e). We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and remand to the trial court for resentencing. I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226; and third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3)(b). The trial court imposed a controlling sentence of 360 to 600 months for AWIM. At sentencing, defendant’s guidelines range was calculated at 270 to 450 months for AWIM, thus making defendant’s sentence a within-guidelines sentence. However, following sentencing, defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that both Prior Record Variable (PRV) 2 and Offense Variable (OV) 12 were erroneously scored. At a hearing held on the motion, the prosecution conceded that PRV 2 was erroneously scored and that the proper guidelines range would be 225 to 375 months; however, defendant argued that a further correction to PRV 2 was necessary, such that the 2 proper guidelines range would instead be 171 to 285 months. A change in the scoring of OV 12 would not have affected the guidelines range. At the hearing, the trial court noted the difference between the guidelines ranges as conceded by the prosecution and as argued by defendant. Instead of resolving the issue of the proper scoring of PRV 2 and OV 12 and deciding which guidelines range applied, the trial court held that 360 months was the lowest minimum sentence it found to be appropriate and that it would impose the same minimum sentence regardless of the applicable guidelines range. The trial court explained its rationale: It’s nothing scientific, honestly. It’s just not a scientific thing. It’s because there was a—there was a video that probably got played several times in the car. And—but for just the confluence of a lot of fortuitous circumstances, the victim wouldn’t have been at the trial to testify, because he would have been dead. And he lost a great percentage of blood in his body. I can’t remember, for the record, what it was, but it was a big number. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentence in an unpublished per curiam opinion, holding that the trial court did not err when it “acknowledged two possible corrected guideline ranges but clearly stated that it intended to impose the same minimum sentence regardless so that resentencing was unnecessary.” People v Armogeda, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 4, 2024 (Docket No. 365184), pp 8-9. However, the Court of Appeals did “remand for a hearing to clarify the correct assessment of PRV 2, and adjustment of the guidelines sentencing range to consider the correct scoring of PRV 2 and OV 12, and correction of the [presentence investigation report (PSIR)] to reflect these determinations.” Id. at 9. On remand, the parties submitted a stipulated order, which the trial court entered. The stipulated order 3 noted that PRV 2 and OV 12 should each be scored at zero points and that the proper guidelines range was thus 171 to 285 months. The PSIR was amended to reflect these corrections. No other substantive adjustments were made, and defendant’s controlling AWIM sentence remains the same. Defendant then sought leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address “whether resentencing is required where the trial court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error, but the sentence does not fall within the appropriate guidelines range as amended. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8 (2006); see also People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015).” People v Armogeda, ___ Mich ___, ___; 19 NW3d 385, 385 (2025). II. SENTENCING PRINCIPLES In 1902, voters passed an amendment to the Michigan Constitution of 1850 authorizing indeterminate sentencing, which has since been continuously enshrined in our state Constitution. See Const 1850, art 4, § 47; Const 1908, art 5, § 28; Const 1963, art 4, § 45. In an indeterminate sentencing system, the sentencing judge does not determine the exact amount of time a defendant will serve, as illustrated by the controlling sentence of 360 to 600 months in this case. See Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) (defining “indeterminate sentencing” as “[t]he practice of not imposing a definite term of confinement, but instead prescribing a range for the minimum and maximum term”). A certain amount of judicial discretion is inherent in such a system. In 1983, in an attempt to remedy disparities in sentencing, Michigan first employed advisory sentencing guidelines, 4 which were promulgated by an administrative order of this Court. See Administrative Order No. 1983-3, 417 Mich cxxi (1983). Because these guidelines were merely advisory, sentencing disparities continued, and the Legislature enacted mandatory sentencing guidelines in 1998. See 1998 PA 317; MCL 777.1 et seq. Except where permitted by statute, MCL 769.34(3), as amended by 1998 PA 317, trial courts were required to impose minimum sentences within the guidelines range, MCL 769.34(2), as amended by 1998 PA 317. Two decades ago, this Court made clear that it would be “fundamentally unfair to deny a defendant . . . the opportunity to be resentenced on the basis of accurate information” if the sentencing court’s error altered the appropriate guidelines range. Francisco, 474 Mich at 89-90 (comma omitted). While the applicable sentencing principles have evolved in the intervening years, trial courts are still required to “consult the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. This requirement serves multiple purposes. Not only does it assist in creating a record “to facilitate appellate review” of the sentence, id., it also provides a “meaningful benchmark” that contributes to the fairness of the sentencing process, Rosales-Mireles v United States, 585 US 129, 133; 138 S Ct 1897; 201 L Ed 2d 376 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 141 (“[T]he public legitimacy of our justice system relies on procedures that are neutral, accurate, consistent, trustworthy, and fair, and that provide opportunities for error correction.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); 1 Francisco, 474 Mich at 89-90. 1 We note as persuasive the United States Supreme Court’s continued construction of the federal sentencing guidelines. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 391. Despite making those guidelines advisory in United States v Booker, 543 US 220; 125 S Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 5  In Francisco, 474 Mich at 88-92, this Court held that a defendant is entitled to resentencing if the trial court relied on incorrectly scored guidelines—even when the defendant’s initial sentence falls within the corrected guidelines range. The defendant in that case appealed his sentence of 102 to 480 months. Id. at 88. Under the sentencing guidelines, as scored by the trial court, the defendant’s sentence fell within the minimum sentence range of 87 to 217 months. Id. However, the trial court had improperly scored OV 13 at 25 points. Id. The correctly scored guidelines “actually set forth a minimum range of 78 to 195 months.” Id. Because “the scoring error altered the appropriate guidelines range,” id. at 89, this Court remanded for resentencing, explaining that “[a] defendant is entitled to be sentenced by a trial court on the basis of accurate information,” id. at 88, 92. 2 Thus, “when a trial court sentences a defendant in reliance upon an inaccurate guidelines range, it does so in reliance upon inaccurate information,” id. at 89 n 7, even if “the difference between the mistaken and the correct guidelines ranges is relatively small,” id. at 91. The Court carved out one exception to its holding by declining to require resentencing “where the trial court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the scoring error and the sentence falls within the appropriate guidelines range.” Id. at 89 n 8, citing People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50, 51; 658 NW2d 154 (2005), the Court has said that sentencing “[g]uidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” at sentencing. Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 49; 128 S Ct 586; 169 L Ed 2d 445 (2007). “Of course, to consult the applicable Guidelines range, a district court must first determine what that range is.” Rosales-Mireles, 585 US at 133. Accordingly, failure to calculate the correct guidelines range is error. Id. at 134. 2 The Court made clear that, “[w]here a scoring error does not alter the appropriate guidelines range, resentencing is not required.” Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 8, citing People v Davis, 468 Mich 77, 83; 658 NW2d 800 (2003). 6 (2003). But if the trial court makes no such indication or if the original sentence exceeds the corrected guidelines range, a defendant is entitled to resentencing. See Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 8. Nine years later, this Court in Lockridge held that Michigan’s previously mandatory sentencing guidelines are advisory only. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-365. There, the Court ensured that the application of the guidelines did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment, responding to the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), Alleyne v United States, 570 US 99; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013), and United States v Booker, 543 US 220; 125 S Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 (2005). See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-365, 383. The Court also held that sentences that depart from the guidelines must be reviewed for reasonableness. Id. at 391-392. As a result, trial courts no longer need to justify a departure from the guidelines with “substantial and compelling reasons.” Id. at 392. But the Lockridge Court made clear that the guidelines “remain a highly relevant consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.” Id. at 391. This Court has also held that, when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, “the proper inquiry . . . is whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), ‘which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’ ” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (citation omitted). This Court recently clarified that within-guidelines sentences are reviewed for reasonableness as well. People v Posey, 512 Mich ___, ___; 1 NW3d 101, 122-123 (2023) (opinion by BOLDEN, J.). 7 “ ‘Sentencing courts must . . . continue to consult the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence . . . [and] justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review.’ ” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 470, quoting Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392 (alteration and ellipses in Steanhouse); see also Posey, 512 Mich at ___; 1 NW3d at 122-123 (opinion by BOLDEN, J.). III. ANALYSIS The Court’s reasoning in Francisco does not conflict with Michigan’s post- Lockridge sentencing scheme. Nothing in Lockridge sanctions sentencing based on inaccurate information. Nor does Lockridge authorize sentencing courts to disregard the applicable guidelines—quite the opposite. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 391. Instead, Lockridge held expressly that a judge “must . . . consult the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.” Id. at 392 (emphasis added). Following Lockridge, this Court has reiterated that scoring the guidelines remains mandatory. See People v Geddert, 500 Mich 859, 859 (2016) (“Even though the guidelines ranges are now advisory, the scoring of the guidelines themselves is mandatory . . . .”). So although the mandatory statutory guidelines were still in place when this Court decided Francisco, the holding in that case is no less relevant today. “[A]n erroneously calculated guidelines range” results in the same “dilemma” under the advisory guidelines: “the defendant will have been given a sentence which stands differently in relationship to the correct guidelines range than may have been the trial court’s intention.” Francisco, 474 Mich at 91-92. Lockridge cannot reasonably be read to deny such a defendant the “opportunity to be 8 resentenced on the basis of accurate information” in these circumstances. Francisco, 474 Mich at 90. And while Francisco relied in part on a statutory provision that is no longer in effect, the Court was not concerned with the portion of the statute that conflicted with Lockridge. Specifically, Francisco cited MCL 769.34(10), which provided as follows: [I]f a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence. [Francisco, 474 Mich at 88, quoting MCL 769.34(10), as amended by 2002 PA 666 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).] Francisco explained that the statute permitted resentencing only if a within-guidelines sentence was based on inaccurate guidelines scoring or information—the circumstances at issue in that case. See Francisco, 474 Mich at 88. In Posey, 512 Mich at ___; 1 NW3d at 124 (opinion by BOLDEN, J.), this Court severed this provision as inconsistent with Lockridge because it required appellate affirmation of within-guidelines sentences absent error. See also id. at ___; 1 NW3d at 123 (“[T]he portion of MCL 769.34(10) that requires appellate affirmation of within-guidelines sentences that are based on accurate information without scoring errors is unconstitutional because, as we explained in Lockridge, it would necessarily render the guidelines mandatory.”). The Court in Francisco was only concerned with the permissive aspect of the provision—authorizing resentencing when the trial court relied on inaccurate information—which is not in tension with Lockridge. 3 3 While the partial dissent claims that Francisco relied on the mandatory nature of MCL 769.34(10), the only mandatory directive in that provision required the Court of Appeals to affirm “a minimum sentence [that] is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range . . . absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.” This directive was not implicated in 9  Despite the shifts in our sentencing law, we have consistently emphasized the need for an individualized sentence based on accurate information: To so tailor the sentence, the judge must gather complete and detailed information about the offender. The judge must assess the reliability of the information received, assure that it is reasonably up-to-date, determine its competency as a sentencing consideration, and resolve challenges to its accuracy. [People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 537; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Milbourn, 435 Mich at 634-636, quoting People v Pulley, 411 Mich 523, 529-530; 309 NW2d 170 (1981) (quotation marks omitted).] This necessarily means that criminal defendants must be afforded “a reasonable opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the information relied on in passing sentence,” People v Eason, 435 Mich 228, 234; 458 NW2d 17 (1990) (considering facts that trigger a statutory sentencing enhancement), including information contained in the PSIR, see, e.g., People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96-97; 559 NW2d 299 (1997) (collecting cases). 4 Moreover, meaningful appellate review requires sentencing based on accurate information. Our current advisory guidelines require the trial court to score the guidelines and consult them at sentencing. Such consultation necessarily requires that the trial court has considered the accurate guidelines and has made a judicial choice about the sentence given with reference to those accurate guidelines. It is impossible for an appellate court to Francisco because the trial court there relied on inaccurate information and incorrectly scored the sentencing guidelines. Instead, Francisco relied on the longstanding principle— which the Legislature enshrined in MCL 769.34(10)—that appellate courts are obligated to correct sentencing errors that alter the sentencing guidelines range. Our conclusion that this obligation survived Lockridge is not a radical proposition; it is consistent with our post- Lockridge jurisprudence, as discussed above. 4 See also People v Owens, 508 Mich 1021, 1023 (2022) (CLEMENT, J., concurring); People v Hernandez, 508 Mich 971, 974 (2021) (VIVIANO, J., concurring). 10 discern whether that judicial choice is reasonable when that choice was not made with accurate information. Accordingly, the trial court must, at a bare minimum, articulate the correct guidelines scores and range to provide a record sufficient “to facilitate appellate review” of the sentence. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. Relatedly, when a sentence departs from the sentencing guidelines range, our court rules require the trial court to “articulate the reasons justifying that specific departure.” MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e). In cases such as this, the trial court could not possibly comply with MCR 6.425(D)(1)(e) without first knowing whether it was departing from the sentencing guidelines range. Finally, the principles of fundamental fairness that guide Francisco’s holding have not been diminished by this Court’s subsequent decisions. This Court has long held that an error in a criminal proceeding that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” warrants reversal, even if that error is unpreserved. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392-393. Fairness in sentencing is necessary to protect not only defendants’ rights but also judicial integrity and public trust in the judiciary. See Francisco, 474 Mich at 92 (“[R]equiring resentencing . . . also respects the trial court’s interest in having defendant serve the sentence that it truly intends.”). See also Rosales- Mireles, 585 US at 140 (“The risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the context of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the [trial] court plays in calculating the range and the relative ease of correcting the error.”). Requiring trial courts to sentence defendants on the basis of accurate information is not a controversial concept but rather is a matter of fundamental fairness and necessary for 11 meaningful appellate review. Therefore, we reaffirm Francisco and hold that when, as here, a sentencing court relies on an incorrect guidelines range, the defendant is entitled to be resentenced. We note that this case does not fall into the exception to resentencing articulated in Francisco because, while the trial court here indicated that it would impose the same sentence on remand, that sentence does not fall within the corrected guidelines range. See Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 8. IV. REMEDY In light of the fact that we remand this case for resentencing, it is necessary for us to clarify what that process requires in these circumstances—that is, where the original sentence falls outside the corrected guidelines range but the trial court has already indicated that it will impose the same sentence on remand. To be clear, a remand for resentencing in this instance is not an inexorable command to the trial court to impose a different sentence. Instead, the sentencing court’s responsibility on remand is to score the applicable sentencing variables based only on accurate information, correctly calculate the recommended minimum guidelines range, and consider the corrected guidelines range when imposing a new sentence. 5 The trial court is 5 Despite conceding that, at least in some instances, resentencing may be warranted when a defendant is sentenced based on incorrect guidelines scoring, the dissent rejects our uniform approach in favor of “a Crosby-type remand.” Yet the dissent’s principal objection appears to be with the framing of our remedy as a resentencing. The dissent’s preferred approach resembles our holding in many respects. It would likewise require the trial court to recalculate the applicable guidelines range based only on accurate information. And it would similarly allow the trial court to impose the original sentence on remand. The only real distinction is that the dissent would “permit the trial court to first address whether it would have imposed the same sentence had it not relied on inaccurate information or scoring,” and “[i]f the trial court believes that it would have sentenced defendant differently, resentencing is required.” The key difference with our holding is that we require the trial court to make that decision on the basis of accurate information, 12 not precluded from imposing the same sentence on remand if that sentence is “proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 474 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, the trial court retains discretion to depart from the guidelines range but remains bound by Lockridge’s requirement that any such departure be reasonable. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 391-392. Justice ZAHRA complains of our decision to order “a full-blown resentencing” in this case. To be sure, our decision in Francisco did recognize instances in which resentencing may not be required. Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 8. 6 A footnote in Francisco is not, however, a permission slip for trial courts to ignore the proper scoring of our sentencing guidelines. Francisco’s statement recognized that, for example, “[t]he record might reveal a fortuitous comment” indicating that the trial court “based the after first rescoring the guidelines. We disagree that judicial resource considerations justify allowing that decision to be made on the basis of inaccurate or limited information. 6 Federal authority likewise supports the existence of harmless sentencing errors and corrective hearings less than full resentencing, see, e.g., Molina-Martinez v United States, 578 US 189, 203-204; 136 S Ct 1338; 194 L Ed 2d 444 (2016), and the federal courts apply a presumption of harm to errors in calculating or applying the sentencing guidelines, see, e.g., United States v Gates, 48 F4th 463, 471 (CA 6, 2022) (“The burden is on the government to prove ‘with certainty’ that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had the Guidelines had [sic] been properly calculated.”) (citation omitted); United States v Sabillon-Umana, 772 F3d 1328, 1333 (CA 10, 2014) (“Both before and after United States v. Booker, . . . this court has recognized that an obvious misapplication of the sentencing guidelines will usually satisfy the third and fourth elements of the plain error test.”); United States v Raia, 993 F3d 185, 195 (CA 3, 2021) (“In the context of a Guidelines calculation error, harmless error means that the record must demonstrate that there is a high probability that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence under a correct Guidelines range, that is, that the sentencing Guidelines range did not affect the sentence actually imposed.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 13 sentence . . . on factors independent of the Guidelines,” rendering a scoring error harmless. United States v Archuleta, 865 F3d 1280, 1291 (CA 10, 2017) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Here, we simply require the trial court to reconsider the appropriate sentence with the corrected guidelines in mind. V. CONCLUSION Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that the sentence imposed was proportionate to defendant and his conviction regardless of the applicable guidelines range, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to reconsider the sentence in light of the corrected scoring guidelines as Francisco requires. The Court of Appeals thus also erred in prematurely affirming defendant’s sentence before remanding to the trial court for the appropriate guidelines range to be determined. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and remand to the trial court for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction. Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood 14  STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167760 EVAN TAYLOR ARMOGEDA, Defendant-Appellant. BERNSTEIN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I concur with the majority’s result, I write to explain my disagreement on a fundamental point—the necessity of addressing whether People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006), conflicts with People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). I would decline to reach this question, as I believe the error presented in this case is much simpler in nature and does not require us to apply Francisco. In People v Posey, 512 Mich ___, ___; 1 NW3d 101, 109 (2023) (opinion by BOLDEN, J.), this Court considered whether substantive appellate review is available for a within-guidelines sentence. This Court held that “defendants may challenge the proportionality of any sentence on appeal and that the sentence is to be reviewed for reasonableness.” Id. at ___; 1 NW3d at 127 (emphasis added). However, “[w]hen a trial court sentences a defendant