People v Soriano

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong PEOPLE v SORIANO Docket No. 167373. Argued on application for leave to appeal December 10, 2025. Decided July 7, 2026. Zebadiah J. Soriano was convicted following a jury trial in the Grand Traverse Circuit Court of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving penetration, MCL 750.520g(1). Defendant and his friend, AC, took LSD together at the home AC shared with her mother. At some point after ingesting the LSD, defendant removed his pants and underwear, forced himself on top of AC, and began to grope her. AC testified that before the assault, defendant said, “We’re going to do this,” and “we’re going to do this, right?” AC was able to get away from defendant and go to her mother for help. Defendant eventually left the house while still naked from the waist down, and AC’s mother called the police. After officers found defendant, he was arrested and taken to the hospital. The sheriff’s deputy who arrested defendant and was with him at the hospital observed that, when he first encountered him, defendant seemed to be hallucinating, and he was confused at the hospital while “coming down” from the effects of the drug. The deputy read defendant his Miranda 1 rights about an hour after he was found by the police. According to the deputy, defendant waived his rights and agreed to speak to the deputy. During the interrogation, defendant stated, “I am a rapist and I am fucked.” The trial court, Kevin A. Elsenheimer, J., denied defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress the statements elicited following his waiver. Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure an expert witness on intoxication. The trial court denied the motions. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, SWARTZLE, P.J., and SERVITTO, J. (GARRETT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, issued May 30, 2024 (Docket No. 359165). Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave, the Court ordered oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 20 NW3d 594 (2025). In an opinion by Justice THOMAS, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices ZAHRA, WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court held: 1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).  Defendant’s Miranda waiver was not valid because it was not knowing and intelligent. The admission of the statements he made under the invalid waiver was not harmless error because the statements were highly prejudicial in demonstrating defendant’s intent to commit a sexual penetration at the time of the assault. Therefore, defendant was entitled to a new trial. 1. Defendant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the alleged waiver, which requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the suspect’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether the suspect has the capacity to understand the Miranda warnings, their Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Additionally, because of the impact that intoxication may have on a person’s mental state, special care must be taken in assessing a waiver when there is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendant had been hospitalized and displayed erratic and confused behavior before and during the questioning by police. The parties agreed that defendant had taken a large amount of LSD prior to the interrogation and was suffering from severe hallucinations prior to and at the time he was taken into police custody. Although defendant was no longer hallucinating when he was read the Miranda warnings about one hour after being taken into custody, the question was not whether he was hallucinating but whether he had the mental capacity to understand his rights and the import of waiving those rights when he was given the warnings. The short period of time between defendant’s erratic behaviors and being advised of his Miranda rights supports the conclusion that defendant was not able to understand his rights at the time of waiver. The officer who questioned defendant testified that defendant seemed “confused” during the questioning, and defendant testified that he did not know why he was Mirandized and did not understand the interrogating officer’s questions. Although defendant’s admitted statements evidenced that he had some understanding that he was in trouble, this did not equate to an understanding of his Miranda rights and making a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Defendant did not satisfy many of the considerations that would indicate he had the ability to exercise discretion and the competence to understand his rights. Defendant’s age, lack of experience with law enforcement, and lack of sleep contributed to the determination that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Accordingly, the prosecution did not establish that defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent by a preponderance of the evidence, and the alleged waiver was invalid. 2. The prosecution did not demonstrate that the erroneous admission of the challenged statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals concluded that any Miranda error was harmless because AC’s testimony provided more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found defendant guilty, given that a victim’s testimony can be sufficient by itself to support a CSC conviction. However, the Court of Appeals erred in its harmless-error analysis. A preserved error is not harmless simply because the reviewing court concludes that the jury reached the right result. The question is whether an average jury would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the erroneously admitted testimony. That is, the prosecution must prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.  Assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration is a specific intent crime that requires the defendant to possess a particular criminal intent beyond the act. The prosecution was required to prove that defendant committed an assault and that he had an intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration. The evidence supporting the intent element was: (1) defendant’s removal of his pants and underwear, (2) AC’s testimony, and (3) defendant’s declaration, “I am a rapist.” This statement overshadowed the other two pieces of evidence and was tantamount to an admission that he intended to commit a penetration. The statement was highly prejudicial to the defense and the strongest evidence that he intended to commit CSC involving penetration. Given the other evidence concerning defendant’s intent, the average jury would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the erroneously admitted statement. Court of Appeals judgment reversed, conviction vacated, and case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurred with the majority that defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid and that admission of the statements was not harmless, but disagreed that the waiver was invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent. Instead, defendant’s waiver was invalid because it was involuntary. The knowing-and-intelligent inquiry was governed by People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621 (2000), which held that the defendant in that case had made a knowing and intelligent waiver because he had the base intellectual capability of understanding his rights and an intellectual understanding of his rights, despite expert testimony that his delusions had prevented him from understanding how his Miranda rights applied to his situation. The majority did not meaningfully engage with Daoud, and it was difficult to reconcile the majority’s holding with Daoud’s holding that only a baseline understanding of Miranda rights is required. The voluntariness test asks whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of a free and unconstrained choice or whether the accused’s will has been overborne and their capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Unlike the knowing-and- intelligent inquiry, a determination that a confession was involuntary requires that there was coercion. The police conduct here could be characterized as coercive, and an examination of the totality of the circumstances led to the conclusion that this coercion rendered defendant’s waiver involuntary.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 7, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 167373 ZEBADIAH JOSEPH SORIANO, Defendant-Appellant. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH THOMAS, J. A jury convicted defendant, Zebadiah Soriano, of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving sexual penetration. See MCL 750.520g(1). At trial, the prosecution introduced testimony that Soriano declared himself “a rapist” when being questioned by a sheriff’s deputy at the hospital. He claims that the statement should have been excluded because he did not provide a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his rights before the deputy questioned him as required by Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). In arguing that his waiver was invalid, Soriano relies on his hospitalization, his recent hallucinations and incoherence caused by LSD intoxication, his behavior during the deputy’s questioning, and other circumstances as discussed herein. We agree that Soriano’s waiver was invalid. Voluntary intoxication does not make a Miranda waiver per se invalid. It is one factor within the totality of the circumstances courts should consider in assessing whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 634; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). However, the totality of the circumstances here undermined Soriano’s ability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Moreover, the prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement at issue was harmless; the statement was the most significant evidence toward proving the intent requirement of MCL 750.520g(1). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate Soriano’s conviction, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY In the early morning hours of November 21, 2020, Soriano, who was 18 years old at the time, was with his platonic friend, AC, at her home, where he allegedly assaulted her. AC and Soriano had spent the day together on November 20, 2020, and Soriano returned with AC to the home she shared with her mother that night. AC and her mother had agreed to let Soriano stay with them to quarantine for two weeks after Soriano and AC were both exposed to COVID-19. AC’s mother eventually went to sleep. Around midnight, AC and Soriano decided to take LSD. AC took one tab of LSD, and Soriano 2 took six tabs. Soriano testified that his dose was the most he had ever taken and more than double his normal dose. Some time after the two had taken the LSD, Soriano took off his socks, pants, and underwear. AC testified that Soriano stated, “We’re going to do this,” and “[W]e’re going to do this, right?” before forcing himself on top of her and groping her. AC testified that she resisted and was able to get away, but Soriano chased her to the stairs and began choking her with his arm. She got away again and ran up the stairs. AC’s mother testified that she woke up and observed Soriano running up the stairs yelling, “I’m dead,” and “We’re all dead.” AC’s mother “reassured him that he wasn’t” dead, at which point Soriano fell down the stairs. Soriano got up and fled into the cold fall night completely “naked from the waist down.” AC’s mother described Soriano as “agitated and aggressive” and “making incoherent statements.” She briefly went to look for him, without success, and then called the police. At approximately 4:00 a.m., deputies from the Grand Traverse County Sheriff’s Office responded to a 911 call from the home. The caller relayed that Soriano had taken LSD and was hallucinating. Deputies began searching for him. After Soriano had wandered around outside for about an hour and a half, one of the deputies discovered him on the side of the road at 5:30 a.m. At that point, Deputy Mike Ruggles made his way to Soriano’s location. Soriano was still naked from the waist down when Ruggles arrived. Ruggles testified that Soriano “was definitely experiencing some sort of hallucinations and clearly under the influence of some sort of drug” when Ruggles encountered him. Ruggles arrested Soriano. While in custody, Soriano kept “saying things that didn’t make sense and had 3 very erratic behavior.” Ruggles put Soriano in the back of his car and took him to Munson Medical Center. Ruggles did not conduct an interview with Soriano immediately after the arrest because “[i]t was not possible at that time.” At the hospital, staff placed Soriano in a “restraint chair” for the safety of himself and others. Soriano’s “erratic” behavior continued for a time before he slowly became still and silent. Soriano later testified that he had eventually figured out that he was at the hospital, being treated by doctors and nurses and in the company of a law enforcement officer, but he was not sure why at the time. Soriano recalled that although he was no longer hallucinating, things appeared “wavy” and time was “still moving at a weird pace.” Likewise, Ruggles observed that Soriano was “confused after coming down from [the] euphoria he was experiencing.” About an hour after he had been found by police, Soriano asked Ruggles why he was in the hospital. At that point, Ruggles informed Soriano of the charges against him and read Soriano his rights as required by Miranda, 384 US 436. Ruggles testified that Soriano waived his rights and agreed to speak to him. Ruggles, however, could not recall what Soriano had said to indicate his Miranda waiver. There was no written Miranda waiver. Ruggles did not speak to hospital personnel or consult any medical information to conclude that Soriano was in a state to speak with him, instead relying on his own observations of Soriano’s demeanor and perceptions of Soriano’s understanding. After the alleged waiver, Ruggles proceeded to question Soriano. During the 5- to 10-minute interrogation, Ruggles had to explain more than once why Soriano was at the hospital and asked Soriano “specific questions” because Soriano did not provide “much dialog.” Rather, there were “many long pauses” in Soriano’s 4 statements, and he “responded with a lot of yes-and-no” answers. Early in the questioning, Soriano also stated, “I am a rapist and I am fucked.” Ruggles described this statement as coming “out of the blue.” When asked by Ruggles, Soriano recalled taking six tabs of LSD that night. Soriano also responded to questions about his relationship with AC and answered various other questions posed by the deputy. The interrogation was not recorded on video. Soriano’s stepfather testified that he tried to speak with Soriano two hours after the interrogation and before Soriano was taken to jail, but Ruggles told him that “it wouldn’t do any good” because Soriano was “too out of it.” Ruggles acknowledged the conversation but testified that he did not remember what he told Soriano’s parents. Soriano was discharged from the hospital and taken to jail at 8:37 a.m., shortly after the conversation between Soriano’s parents and Ruggles. The next day, while still at the jail, police attempted to receive a waiver of Miranda and question Soriano again, and Soriano invoked his right to remain silent. Soriano was charged with assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g(1), and assault by strangulation, MCL 750.84(1)(b). Soriano moved to exclude the statements made at the hospital on the grounds that the waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. In addition to the above facts, Soriano testified about his understanding of this questioning. Soriano claimed that at the beginning of the interrogation, he did not understand why Ruggles was giving him the Miranda warning. He “[k]ind of” understood what Ruggles was saying, “but not really.” Rather, he “wasn’t sure about” some of the questions and was “answering [them] randomly.” According to 5 Soriano, he “was kind of in [his] own world” and remembered only portions of the preceding events. However, he agreed that some of the information he told Ruggles was correct, including that he had taken six tabs of LSD. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and the case proceeded to trial. Both Soriano and AC testified at trial, along with AC’s mother and Ruggles. Ruggles’s testimony included a recounting of Soriano’s inculpatory statement from the hospital. The jury convicted Soriano of assault with intent to commit CSC involving penetration but acquitted him of assault by strangulation. Soriano moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Soriano then appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. See People v Soriano, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 30, 2024 (Docket No. 359165), p 1. Soriano then sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave, we heard oral argument on the application, directing the parties to brief: (1) whether the trial court clearly erred when it found that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966); (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, see People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334[; 429 NW2d 781] (1988); and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain an expert to address the defendant’s level of intoxication while in the hospital. [People v Soriano, ___ Mich ___, ___; 20 NW3d 594, 595 (2025).] II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This appeal challenges the trial court’s denial of Soriano’s motion to suppress. We review the trial court’s factual findings on the motion for clear error. People v Attebury, 6 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001). “Clear error exists if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002). We review legal questions and the application of constitutional standards to uncontested facts de novo. Attebury, 463 Mich at 668. III. LEGAL BACKGROUND The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects criminal defendants from coerced self-incrimination. US Const, Am V. 1 In furtherance of this protection, police are required to give suspects notice of their rights prior to a custodial interrogation “to protect against [its] inherently coercive nature.” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 10-11; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (opinion by BOYLE, J.). A suspect’s rights include “the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda, 384 US at 479. These rights are to be “scrupulously honored” by law enforcement. Id. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that people in custody “may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. at 444; see also Daoud, 462 Mich at 633. “[T]he prosecution has the 1 Though Soriano also argues that his waiver was invalid under Article 1, § 17 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, we do not find it necessary to reach the application of our state Constitution as a result of our decision herein. 7 burden of establishing a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” Daoud, 462 Mich at 634. We have framed the waiver inquiry as a two-part analysis: “First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” [Daoud, 462 Mich at 633, quoting Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986).] These are the “voluntary” and “knowing and intelligent” inquiries, respectively. While related, the concepts are analytically distinct in important respects and have different focuses. We note that, for the “voluntary” inquiry, we and other courts have used the same framework for assessing voluntariness in the Miranda waiver context that we use to determine whether a confession was involuntary under a Fourteenth Amendment due- process inquiry. Cheatham, 453 Mich at 17 (opinion by BOYLE, J.). Under both inquiries, a defendant’s “ ‘mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion.’ ” Id., quoting Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 165; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986). 2 We make no ruling regarding whether Soriano’s waiver was voluntary. Rather, the focus of this case is largely on the “knowing and intelligent” inquiry. This component “requires an inquiry into the suspect’s level of understanding, irrespective 2 See also, e.g., Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 398-399; 98 S Ct 2408; 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978) (considering involuntary intoxication, confusion, physical injury, and prior refusals to answer questions); Beecher v Alabama, 408 US 234; 92 S Ct 2282; 33 L Ed 2d 317 (1972) (considering involuntary intoxication, physical condition, and pressure from a medical provider to cooperate). 8 of police behavior.” Daoud, 462 Mich at 636. This inquiry requires us to consider, broadly, “ ‘the state of mind of a criminal defendant . . . divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State.’ ” Id. at 637, quoting Cheatham, 453 Mich at 21-22 (opinion by BOYLE, J.). The question is not whether the defendant’s decision to waive their Miranda rights was a wise one. Daoud, 462 Mich at 636, citing Cheatham, 453 Mich at 28 (opinion by BOYLE, J.). Instead, the focus is on the defendant’s “basic understanding” of their rights. Daoud, 462 Mich at 642. 3 Accordingly, the required analysis focuses on whether the defendant “ ‘has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.’ ” Cheatham, 453 Mich at 27 (opinion by BOYLE, J.), quoting Fare v Michael C, 442 US at 707, 725; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979). In considering whether a Miranda waiver is valid, courts are to consider the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” presented in each case. Daoud, 462 Mich at 633-634, quoting Moran, 475 US at 421. This requires a look at “ ‘all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,’ ” including the suspect’s “ ‘age, experience, education, background, and intelligence,’ ” and consideration of “ ‘whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of 3 See also Cheatham, 453 Mich at 28 (opinion by BOYLE, J.) (“ ‘It is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of “intelligent” waiver but rather in the tenor that the individual must know of his available options before deciding what he thinks best suits his particular situation.’ ”), quoting Collins v Brierly, 492 F2d 735, 738-739 (CA 3, 1974); Fare v Michael C, 442 US 707, 724; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979) (“[T]he question whether the accused waived his rights ‘is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.’ ”), quoting North Carolina v Butler, 441 US 369, 373; 99 S Ct 1755; 60 L Ed 2d 286 (1979). 9 waiving those rights.’ ” Cheatham, 453 Mich at 27 (opinion by BOYLE, J.), quoting Fare, 442 US at 725. In considering the voluntariness inquiry, we articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors that courts should consider in Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. 4 Those factors may also be helpful in examining the totality of the circumstances under the “knowing and intelligent” analysis. IV. ANALYSIS As noted, the principal issue here is whether Soriano’s Miranda waiver was “knowing and intelligent,” considering his exhibited confusion and exhaustion related to his LSD consumption, among other relevant factors within the totality of the circumstances. We hold that the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing either 4 These include: (1) “the age of the accused”; (2) “his lack of education or his intelligence level”; (3) “the extent of his previous experience with the police”; (4) “the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning”; (5) “the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question”; (6) “the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights”; (7) “whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession”; (8) “whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement”; (9) “whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention”; (10) “whether the accused was physically abused”; and (11) “whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.” Cipriano, 431 Mich at 334. Justice BERNSTEIN expresses concern that we explicitly reference the Cipriano factors here rather than, presumably, the shorter list of factors from Daoud, 462 Mich at 634. First, we note that the lists in Cipriano and Daoud significantly overlap. Second, Daoud asserts that its list is nonexhaustive and recognizes that we apply a “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach” in evaluating a Miranda waiver. See id. And third, the Cipriano factors would already apply to the voluntariness inquiry. See Cheatham, 453 Mich at 17 (opinion by BOYLE, J.) (noting that the voluntariness standard as applied to a Miranda waiver is identical to that applied to confessions). Accordingly, we see no reason why we would not consider the totality of the relevant circumstances. 10 that Soriano’s waiver was knowing and intelligent or that admission of the statements made under the invalid waiver was harmless error. A. SORIANO’S MIRANDA WAIVER WAS NOT KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT A significant feature of this case is Soriano’s hospitalization and erratic and confused behavior before and during the questioning by Ruggles, both of which stemmed from his known consumption of a large quantity of LSD. The Colorado Supreme Court has provided a helpful, nonexhaustive shorthand for assessing the impact of intoxication on a defendant’s mental state in the context of a Miranda waiver: In considering the intoxication factor, the competence inquiry we have developed in cases involving mental incompetence or language difficulty is pertinent: whether the defendant seemed oriented to his or her surroundings and situation; whether the defendant’s answers were responsive and appeared to be the product of a rational thought process; whether the defendant was able to appreciate the seriousness of his or her predicament, including the possibility of being incarcerated; whether the defendant had the foresight to attempt to deceive the police in hopes of avoiding prosecution; whether the defendant expressed remorse for his or her actions; and whether the defendant expressly stated that he or she understood their rights. [People v Platt, 81 P3d 1060, 1066 (Colo, 2004).] This guidance is consistent with the analysis frequently employed by our Court of Appeals and by courts from other jurisdictions, which often consider whether the defendant appeared coherent and could hold a conversation at the time of waiver. See, e.g., People v 11 Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 265-266; 787 NW2d 126 (2010); 5 United States v Montgomery, 621 F3d 568, 574 (CA 6, 2010). 6 Courts can look to the amount of time between ingestion of intoxicating substances and the alleged waiver and whether the suspect was exhibiting erratic behavior at or around the time of the alleged waiver, information known in this case to the officer. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Eden, 456 Pa 1, 4; 317 A2d 255 (1974). Psychological assessments and other pertinent scientific evidence regarding the effects of intoxication generally or on the specific person at issue are also relevant. See, e.g., id. (considering a psychiatric report on the defendant conducted while he was in police custody and proximate to the questioning). It bears repeating that these factors are necessarily nonexhaustive given that we consider the totality of the circumstances presented in each case when assessing the validity of a Miranda waiver. See Daoud, 462 Mich at 634. The ultimate inquiry is whether the suspect’s waiver of their Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent, i.e., whether the suspect had the mental capacity to understand their rights and the ramifications of waiving those rights when they were given the warning. 5 See also, e.g., People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 710; 703 NW2d 204 (2005); People v Leighty, 161 Mich App 565, 570-571; 411 NW2d 778 (1987); People v Lumley, 154 Mich App 618, 624; 398 NW2d 474 (1986); People v Maliskey, 77 Mich App 444, 450-451; 258 NW2d 512 (1977); cf. People v Prast (On Rehearing), 114 Mich App 469, 483-485; 319 NW2d 627 (1982) (addressing the voluntariness of a confession). 6 See also, e.g., Commonwealth v Walters, 485 Mass 271, 280-281; 149 NE3d 725 (2020); State v Strozier, 834 NW2d 857, 863; 2013 SD 53 (2013); People v Jewell, 175 P3d 103, 105-107 (Colo, 2008); Commonwealth v Silanskas, 433 Mass 678, 685, 686; 746 NE2d 445 (2001); Commonwealth v Eden, 456 Pa 1, 3-4; 317 A2d 255 (1974). 12  Our decision today does not call into question prior cases addressing the more common situation in which our courts have found a knowing and intelligent waiver for a suspect who was questioned in a non-hospital setting when the police had some indication that the suspect had consumed an intoxicant. Our Court of Appeals has said that voluntary “[i]ntoxication from alcohol or other substances can affect the validity of a waiver, but is not dispositive.” Gipson, 287 Mich App at 265. This is consistent with various secondary sources addressing this topic. 7 In this sense, we break no new ground today in holding that there must be an analysis of the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the waiver. We also note that because of the impact intoxication may have on a person’s mental state, “[s]pecial care must be taken in assessing a waiver . . . where there is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Commonwealth v Silanskas, 433 Mass 678, 685; 746 NE2d 445 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v Gagnon, 139 NH 175, 178; 651 A2d 5 (1994) (“A defendant’s mental and physical conditions are crucial in determining whether a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver has occurred.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the parties agree that Soriano had taken a large amount of LSD—a drug that has hallucinogenic effects. They further agree that Soriano was suffering from severe hallucinations prior to and at the time he was taken into police custody. He was taken to 7 See, e.g., 23 CJS (December 2025 update), Criminal Procedure & Rights of the Accused, § 1298 (“A waiver is not invariably invalid merely because the accused is intoxicated.”); 1 Criminal Practice Manual (November 2025 update), § 28.16 (“An otherwise voluntary act is not necessarily rendered involuntary simply because an individual has been drinking or using drugs, and this applies to the ability to waive Miranda rights.”). 13 the hospital because of his drug ingestion and resultant behavior and was placed in a restraint chair at the hospital. Ruggles read Soriano the Miranda warning approximately one hour after Soriano had been taken into custody and while Soriano was still in the restraint chair. The parties agree that Soriano was no longer experiencing hallucinations at that time. But the question is not whether he was still hallucinating. Rather, it is whether Soriano had the mental capacity to understand his rights and the import of waiving those rights when he was given the warning. See Daoud, 462 Mich at 636-637. The short period of time between Soriano’s erratic behaviors and being advised of his Miranda rights supports the conclusion that he was not able to understand his rights at the time of waiver. See Eden, 456 Pa at 3-4. More specifically, Ruggles described Soriano’s affect as both “confused on why he was” at the hospital and, more generally, “confused after coming down from [the] euphoria he was experiencing.” The deputy described their conversation as consisting of “a lot of yes-and-no-type answers” from Soriano without “a whole lot of dialog immediately from him.” As a result, Ruggles had to “ask him specific questions” to elicit information from Soriano. For his part, as noted, Soriano testified that time was “moving at a weird pace” and that he “was kind of in [his] own world.” He further testified that he did not know why he was being Mirandized, did “not really” understand the questions Ruggles was asking, and was answering the questions “randomly.” After the conversation, Ruggles even advised Soriano’s stepfather that Soriano was “too out of it” for a conversation to do any good. This testimony does not support the conclusion that Soriano had the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. 14  To be sure, Soriano’s testimony indicates that he had some baseline understanding of his surroundings and the professional capacities of those in his vicinity. And he had some understanding that he was in trouble, as evidenced by his blurting out, “I am a rapist and I am fucked.” But this does not equate with Soriano’s understanding his Miranda rights and making a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. These circumstances do not satisfy many of the considerations that would indicate that he, as described by one commentator, had the ability to “exercise[] discretion” consistent with competence to understand his rights. Note, “This Has to be Wrong”: Mirandizing the Mentally Challenged, 6 Geo JL & Pub Pol’y 629, 634-635 (2008); 8 see Platt, 81 P3d at 1066. Soriano provided little to the officer in the way of detail, did not attempt to deceive police or provide exculpatory information, and did nothing to show remorse or an appreciation for his situation other than the nonresponsive declaration that he was “a rapist.” Moreover, Ruggles could not remember exactly what Soriano said or did to indicate that he understood 8 “ ‘Exercising discretion,’ in this context, means that the defendant acted in a way that made it clear to the officer that the defendant was capable of assessing his situation and dealing logically with the police—which would indicate that the defendant was mentally capable of taking in new information, making sense of it, and then acting appropriately on that conclusion. . . . Exhibited discretion can arguably be an excellent indication one way or another of a defendant’s real waiver capabilities.” “This Has