Frownfelter v Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong FROWNFELTER v ESURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY Docket Nos. 168356 and 168357. Argued on application for leave to appeal April 9, 2026. Decided July 22, 2026. Plaintiff, McKenna Frownfelter, brought an action against Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company in the Oakland Circuit Court under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits after she was injured in a car crash as a passenger in a vehicle owned by her father, Corey Frownfelter (Frownfelter). Esurance, Frownfelter’s insurer, filed a third-party complaint against Frownfelter’s other insurers, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company and Farmers Insurance Company, and against Auto- Owners Insurance Company, which insured plaintiff’s mother, Stephanie Lawrence, contending that they were higher priority insurers and that it was entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiff also filed complaints against Progressive, Farmers, and Auto-Owners seeking outstanding PIP benefits. Esurance moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s case under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff was domiciled with her mother at the time of the accident because she spent 75% of her time there, making Lawrence’s insurance provider, Auto-Owners, the highest priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(1). Auto-Owners countered that because the parents’ 2011 divorce judgment provided for a 50/50 joint custody split and plaintiff was staying at Frownfelter’s home at the time of the crash, plaintiff was domiciled with Frownfelter under Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 (2013), which held that when a family court has entered an order relating to custody, the child’s domicile is established by operation of law for all purposes, including the no-fault act. Grange also noted that if a custody order granted the parents an equal division of physical custody, the child’s domicile would be the same as that of the parent with whom the child is living at the time. The trial court, Kwamé L. Rowe, J., entered an order denying Esurance’s motion for summary disposition and granting Auto-Owners’ request for judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). The remaining parties to the first-party complaint entered into a stipulated judgment that preserved plaintiff’s ability to appeal the trial court’s ruling on Esurance’s motion for summary disposition. In the meantime, plaintiff filed a tort action seeking noneconomic damages pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(b) from Frownfelter, as the owner of the involved vehicle, and requesting a declaratory judgment that the “step-down” provision in the Esurance policy, which lowered bodily injury liability coverage from $250,000 to $20,000 for residents of Frownfelter’s household, did not apply. Plaintiff also moved for summary disposition as to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage Esurance was to provide to Frownfelter, arguing that because she was not a “resident” of his home at the time of the accident, Frownfelter was entitled to $250,000. Following oral arguments, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion on the ground that she was a resident of Frownfelter’s home at the time of the accident, and it also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The parties then entered into a stipulated judgment for $250,000, which preserved plaintiff’s right to appeal the trial court’s orders denying her motions for summary disposition and for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed by right, challenging the trial court’s decisions denying Esurance’s motion for summary disposition against Auto-Owners, denying her motion for summary disposition against Esurance, and denying her motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, FEENEY, J. (LETICA, P.J., concurring, and GARRETT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued February 24, 2025 (Docket Nos. 366118 and 366120), holding that plaintiff was domiciled with Frownfelter at the time of the accident pursuant to the divorce judgment and Grange and that she was a “resident” of Frownfelter’s home for purposes of the step-down provision in his Esurance policy. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 25 NW3d 671 (2025). In an opinion by Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices BERNSTEIN, WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held: A custody order does not determine a child’s domicile for purposes of the no-fault act. The domicile rule set forth in Grange is overruled. While a custody order serves as a starting point in ascertaining a child’s domicile, where the facts of the child’s living arrangements are clearly inconsistent with the family court’s orders, those orders should not be considered representative of the child’s domicile. Instead, courts should look to the traditional factors for determining domicile for purposes of no-fault insurance articulated in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477 (1979), and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675 (1983). When the child’s parents share joint custody, courts should also consider where the child actually spends the majority of their time and where the child actually sleeps most nights of the week. These factors are not exhaustive, and no one factor is dispositive. The Court of Appeals judgment was vacated with respect to both the holding that plaintiff was domiciled with Frownfelter at the time of the accident and the holding that plaintiff was a resident of Frownfelter’s home at that time for purposes of the step-down provision in his Esurance policy, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 1. Determining a person’s domicile is necessary to ascertain which insurer is liable to pay PIP benefits under MCL 500.3114(1), which limits PIP coverage for relatives of policyholders to those who are domiciled in the same household. The no-fault act does not define the term “domiciled,” but it has acquired a precise, technical meaning in Michigan’s common law. Domicile determinations for purposes of assessing insurer liability in the no-fault context are generally made by considering the factual circumstances surrounding the party’s living situation and by balancing and weighing several factors, none of which is determinative on its own. A nonexhaustive list of such factors was provided in Workman: (1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place they contend is their “domicile” or “household,” (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household, (3) whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises, and (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. Additional relevant factors were set forth in Dairyland for determining whether a child of majority age is domiciled with their parents: (1) whether the child continues to use their parents’ home as their mailing address, (2) whether they maintain some possessions with their parents, (3) whether they use their parents’ address on their driver’s license or other documents, (4) whether a room is maintained for them at the parents’ home, and (5) whether they are dependent on the parents for support. 2. In Grange, the Court considered whether a child of divorced parents who has a legal residence in both parents’ homes can be domiciled in more than one household for purposes of MCL 500.3114(1). The Grange Court correctly held that a child of divorced parents has only one domicile at any given point in time. However, the Grange majority went on to hold that courts presiding over no-fault disputes must treat a custody order as conclusive evidence of the child’s domicile. Grange also noted that if a custody order were to grant an equal division of physical custody, the child’s domicile would alternate between the parents so as to be the same as that of the parent with whom they are living at the time. The underpinning of the Grange majority decision—that a custody order is capable of definitively establishing a child’s domicile by operation of law—is legally unsupported and creates the very type of “dual domicile” that the Grange majority itself rejected. Physical custody orders under the Child Custody Act, which are governed by a court’s determination of the child’s best interests, are not equivalent to domicile determinations, which focus on where a person has fixed their abode, and a family court does not have the authority under the Child Custody Act to set a child’s domicile by order. Further, the Grange rule is not easily applied to custody orders that are not clearly drafted, that provide discretion to the parties as to how to structure their parenting time, or that grant each parent joint physical custody under MCL 722.26a(7), and it disregards the practical reality that circumstances might change for divorced parents and their children over time as a matter of amicable agreement without an updated court order. The rule also unduly impinges on the ability of an insurer to accurately assess its risks when entering into insurance agreements by placing PIP liability on the insurer of the parent who has been ordered to have physical custody, even when the child is not primarily living with that parent. The rule is also inconsistent with the no-fault act, which provides PIP protection for accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household. For these reasons, Grange was incorrectly decided. Because the Grange domicile rule was only superficially workable, was unlikely to be relied on, would result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, and constituted a departure from the traditional common-law approach to ascertaining domicile, it was overruled. 3. Determining the domicile of a child with two legal residences for purposes of the no- fault act requires a review of all the facts and circumstances to ascertain whether the evidence that the child is domiciled in one legal residence outweighs the evidence that the child is domiciled in another legal residence. This inquiry necessarily involves some consideration of the family court’s orders relating to the custody of a child and a child’s legal residence, which can serve as the starting point for determining a child’s domicile. But because custody arrangements between parties often informally change without court awareness or recognition, an initial custody order might not accurately reflect the child’s present living situation. Consequently, courts should also consider the nonexhaustive factors articulated in Workman and Dairyland, where the child spends the majority of their time and sleeps most nights of the week, and other relevant considerations within the fact-finder’s discretion. Court of Appeals judgment vacated in part; case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Justice THOMAS, concurring, agreed with the majority’s resolution of the case, its reasoning in critiquing the ruling in Grange, and its holding that a divorce judgment or other custody orders are only a starting point in determining a minor child’s domicile for purposes of no-fault insurance, though she would have preferred to decide the case more narrowly and leave the question of whether to overrule Grange until it was necessary. She wrote separately primarily to highlight the implications of this case for family courts, which are not tasked with making domicile determinations and do not write their orders with future no-fault implications in mind. She noted that choices made in the family court during or after a divorce involving minor children may have a significant impact years later in a completely different area of law for the litigants, who are focused on the many required aspects of a legal divorce and often lack the guidance of counsel. She concluded that the decision in this case, which provides a consistent determination regarding domicile across all cases, helps mitigate, but does not eliminate, that impact.  Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood FILED July 22, 2026 STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT MCKENNA FROWNFELTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 168356 ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, and PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY, FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Defendants- Appellees.  MCKENNA FROWNFELTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 168357 COREY FROWNFELTER, AUTO- OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH ZAHRA, J. In this case brought under the no-fault act, 1 plaintiff, McKenna Frownfelter, aged 15 at the time, was severely injured in a car accident on her way to school from her father’s house. Pursuant to her parents’ 2011 divorce judgment, her father and mother had joint physical custody of her, and the custody order provided that she was to reside with each parent 50% of the time. In reality, however, plaintiff spent closer to 75% of her time at her mother’s house and 25% of her time at her father’s house. This case requires the Court to determine in which household plaintiff was domiciled at the time of her accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114, the provision of the no-fault act that governs which insurer is liable to provide personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. In Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, this Court held that, “in the event that the child’s parents are divorced and a family court has entered an order relating to 1 MCL 500.3101 et seq. 2 custody, . . . the child’s domicile is established by operation of law” and “the custody order is thus determinative of the child’s domicile for all purposes, including the no-fault act.” 2 The Court noted that in cases where a custody order grants the parents an equal division of physical custody, “the child’s domicile would alternate between the parents so as to be the same as that of the parent with whom he is living at the time.” 3 Applying Grange, the trial court ruled that plaintiff was domiciled with her father, because the applicable custody order granted plaintiff’s parents joint physical custody and an equal amount of parenting time, and plaintiff had stayed at her father’s home the night before the accident. The trial court thus denied the motion for summary disposition filed by her father’s insurer, Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The trial court also found that plaintiff was a resident of her father’s household for purposes of a “step-down” provision in his insurance policy with Esurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings. We hold that the domicile rule in Grange was incorrectly adopted. We reject the Grange majority’s overly simplistic holding that a custody order is capable of dispositively setting a child’s domicile by operation of law. Instead, a custody order creates the custodial environment from which domicile can be established. Custodial environment and domicile are distinct concepts, and the Child Custody Act 4 nowhere purports to establish domicile for purposes of the no-fault act. The Grange domicile rule unreasonably posits that every custody order functions to conclusively establish the legal domicile of a given child under 2 Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 481; 835 NW2d 363 (2013). 3 Id. at 513 n 78. 4 MCL 722.21 et seq. 3 the no-fault act, regardless of any ambiguities in the custody order or practical changes to the needs and practices of the child and divorced parents that naturally develop over time. The rule also unduly impinges on the ability of an insurer to accurately assess its risks when entering into insurance agreements. The Grange rule is particularly ill-suited for cases in which a custody order grants each parent joint physical custody and creates a 50/50 division of physical custody, as in the instant case. This rule “is a semantic end-run around our traditional rule that a person may only have one domicile and ignores the practical reality that in virtually all cases, a child will have a primary residence that will constitute the child’s domicile.” 5 We conclude that Grange improperly expanded the common-law doctrine of domicile by operation of law beyond its logical and practical bounds and was wrongly decided. Application of a stare decisis analysis compels us to overrule this aspect of Grange. Having overruled the Grange domicile rule, we see no principled reason to treat the domicile determination differently in this context than in all others. The determination of the domicile of a child with two legal residences requires a review of all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the evidence that the child is domiciled in one legal residence outweighs the evidence that the child is domiciled in another legal residence. 6 While we disagree with the Grange majority that the applicable custody order is dispositive in ascertaining a child’s domicile, a family court’s custody and residence determinations serve as the starting point for determining a child’s domicile because “ ‘[a] party must obey 5 Grange, 494 Mich at 517 (ZAHRA, J., concurring). 6 See In re High, 2 Doug 515, 522-523 (Mich, 1847). 4 an order entered by a court with proper jurisdiction.’ ” 7 But custody arrangements between parties often informally change without court awareness or recognition. Thus, an initial custody order may not accurately reflect the present living situation of the minor child at issue. Consequently, while courts should look to the custody order when determining a child’s domicile, this should not be the only consideration, as the order is not always reflective of reality. For purposes of determining, under the no-fault act, the domicile of minor children whose parents share joint custody, where the facts demonstrate that the parties are acting consistently with the pertinent custody order, it is reasonable to conclude that the custody order is reflective of the child’s domicile. But where the facts of the child’s living arrangements are so clearly inconsistent with the family court’s order that it is reasonable to conclude that the child’s parents have reached an agreement regarding the child’s domicile that differs from the domicile set forth in the custody order, the family court’s order should not be considered representative of the child’s domicile. In all cases, courts should make domicile determinations in light of the actual facts of the custodial situation. In making these determinations, courts should look to the traditional factors for determining domicile for purposes of no-fault insurance articulated by this Court in Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch 8 and by the Court of Appeals in Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co. 9 Additionally, other relevant factors that are unique to the context 7 Grange, 494 Mich at 531 (ZAHRA, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 8 Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich 477, 496; 274 NW2d 373 (1979). 9 Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675, 682; 333 NW2d 322 (1983). 5 of minor children whose parents share joint custody include (1) where the child actually spends the majority of their time and (2) where the child actually sleeps the majority of the nights of the week. None of these factors alone is dispositive, but collectively, they are compelling indicators of where a child is domiciled. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to its holding that plaintiff was domiciled with her father at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident. We also vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to its holding that plaintiff was a resident of her father’s home at the time of the accident, as the panel’s residency determination flowed directly from its conclusion that plaintiff was domiciled with her father. We remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff’s mother, Stephanie Lawrence, and father, Corey Frownfelter, divorced in 2011. Pursuant to their divorce judgment, Lawrence and Frownfelter shared joint physical custody of plaintiff and her brother Hunter. Specifically, the custody order stated “that the parties shall have parenting time with the minor children . . . at such times and places as shall be agreed upon by the parties.” The order clarified: “The residence of the minor children . . . shall be with [Lawrence], at her current address . . . 50% of the time and with . . . [Frownfelter], at his current address . . . .” While this might have reflected the custody arrangement that existed in 2011, Lawrence explained in a deposition that, by the time of the accident in 2020, plaintiff spent closer to 75% of her time at her mother’s house and 25% of her time at her father’s house. 6  On January 7, 2020, plaintiff spent the night at her father’s house. On January 8, Hunter was driving himself and plaintiff to school in Frownfelter’s car when he hit a patch of ice, causing the vehicle to crash into a tree. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries and required emergency back surgery as a result. At the time, Lawrence was insured by Auto-Owners Insurance Company, and Frownfelter was insured under policies issued by Esurance, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, and Farmers Insurance Company. On October 16, 2020, plaintiff filed a first-party complaint against Esurance, arguing that Esurance violated the no-fault act and breached the terms of its insurance policy when it delayed payment of plaintiff’s insurance benefits. Esurance then filed a third-party complaint against Progressive, Farmers, and Auto-Owners on May 26, 2021, contending that they were higher priority insurers and that it was entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiff also filed complaints against Progressive, Farmers, and Auto-Owners seeking outstanding PIP benefits. Esurance moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s case under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff was domiciled with Lawrence at the time of the accident, making Lawrence’s insurance provider, Auto-Owners, the highest in priority insurer pursuant to MCL 500.3114(1). Auto-Owners countered that the custody order provided for a 50/50 custody split and that plaintiff was domiciled with her father pursuant to this Court’s decision in Grange. The trial court agreed with Auto-Owners and entered an order denying Esurance’s motion for summary disposition and granting Auto-Owners’ request for judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). The remaining parties to the first-party complaint subsequently entered into a stipulated judgment in the amount of $7,292.82 in favor of plaintiff. The judgment 7 preserved plaintiff’s ability to appeal the trial court’s ruling on Esurance’s motion for summary disposition. In the meantime, on January 25, 2022, plaintiff filed a tort action seeking noneconomic damages pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(b) from Frownfelter, as the owner of the involved vehicle, for injuries sustained in the accident. The complaint included a request for a declaratory judgment that the “step-down” provision in Frownfelter’s Esurance policy, which would lower bodily injury liability coverage from $250,000 to $20,000, did not apply. 10 Plaintiff moved for summary disposition as to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage Esurance was to provide to Frownfelter, arguing that she 10 Frownfelter’s Esurance insurance policy contained the following provision: To the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the “minimum limits” of liability required by the financial responsibility law of the state in which a “covered auto” is principally garaged, “we” do not provide Liability Coverage for any “insured”: A. For “bodily injury” to “you” or any “family member” for any damages in excess of the “minimum limits”. The policy defined “family member” as: “Any person related to ‘you’ by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of ‘your’ ‘household’[.]” Under the section titled “Driver and Resident Information,” the insurance application asked Frownfelter to identify all members of his household aged 14 or older. Frownfelter identified himself and his son Hunter, but he did not identify plaintiff, even though she was 15 years old at that time. If plaintiff was a “resident” of Frownfelter’s household, then this “step-down” provision would apply and defendant Esurance was not required to provide coverage to her “for any damages in excess of the ‘minimum limits.’ ” The term “minimum limits” was defined to “refer[] to the minimum amounts of liability insurance required to be provided under the automobile financial responsibility and insurance laws of Michigan,” which, at the time, was “$20,000.00 for [plaintiff’s] bodily injury” under MCL 500.3009(1)(a). But if plaintiff was not a resident of Frownfelter’s household, the policy entitled plaintiff to as much as $250,000. 8 was not a “resident” of his home at the time of the accident, and therefore, Frownfelter was entitled to be paid $250,000 per person in bodily injury liability coverage. Following oral arguments, the trial court issued an order denying plaintiff’s motion, finding that plaintiff was a “resident” of Frownfelter’s home at the time of the accident, meaning that the step-down provision in the Esurance policy applied. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The parties then entered into a stipulated judgment for $250,000, which preserved plaintiff’s right to appeal the trial court’s orders denying her motions for summary disposition and for reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed by right from both the stipulated judgments, challenging the trial court’s decisions denying Esurance’s motion for summary disposition against Auto- Owners, denying her motion for summary disposition against Esurance, and denying her motion for reconsideration. She contended that the trial court erred in finding that she was domiciled with Frownfelter and a resident of his household. In an unpublished opinion issued on February 24, 2025, a split panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that plaintiff was domiciled with Frownfelter at the time of the accident pursuant to the divorce judgment and this Court’s decision in Grange. 11 The Court of Appeals majority also held that plaintiff was a “resident” of her father’s home at the time of the accident for purposes of application of the step-down provision in his Esurance policy. In a partial dissent, Judge GARRETT agreed with the majority’s analysis of the domicile issue but disagreed with the majority’s determination that this analysis also 11 Frownfelter v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 24, 2025 (Docket Nos. 366118 and 366120). 9 controls plaintiff’s residency. In her view, the question of whether plaintiff was a resident of her father’s household should have been resolved by interpreting the plain language of the insurance policy. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in this Court, and, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing “whether the lower courts erred in concluding that: (1) the appellant was domiciled with her father, Corey Frownfelter, at the time of the January 8, 2020 motor vehicle accident, and (2) whether the lower courts erred in concluding that appellant was a resident of Frownfelter’s household at the time of the accident.” 12 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. 13 Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriately granted where no genuine issue of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 14 Domicile is a common-law doctrine, 15 the interpretation and applicability of which is reviewed de novo. 16 A domicile determination in a particular case is generally a question 12 Frownfelter v Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___; 25 NW3d 671 (2025) (citations omitted). 13 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 14 Id. at 120. 15 Grange, 494 Mich at 481. 16 See Tkachik v Mandeville, 487 Mich 38, 45; 790 NW2d 260 (2010). 10 of fact. 17 A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. 18 However, where the underlying material facts are not in dispute, the determination of domicile is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. 19 This Court likewise reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. 20 III. ANALYSIS This case requires the Court to reconsider the rule set forth in Grange, which states that where a child’s parents are divorced and a family court has entered an order relating to custody, the custody order is solely determinative of a child’s domicile for purposes of the no-fault act. 21 After an examination of our common-law understanding of domicile, we hold that Grange was incorrectly decided. We then engage in a stare decisis analysis, which compels us to overrule the Grange domicile rule. Finally, we set forth and apply the applicable domicile framework. A. DOMICILE GENERALLY The concept of domicile has deep roots in Michigan law. 22 Michigan courts have defined “domicile” as “ ‘that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for 17 Hartzler v Radeka, 265 Mich 451, 452; 251 NW 554 (1933). 18 See MCR 2.613(C). 19 Hartzler, 265 Mich at 452. 20 Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 57; 860 NW2d 67 (2014). 21 See Grange, 494 Mich at 481. See In re High, 2 Doug at 523 (“It may be laid down as a settled maxim that every man 22 must have . . . a national domicile somewhere.”). 11 a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.’ ” 23 Similarly, a domicile has been understood under the common law as being “ ‘the place where a person has his home, with no present intention of removing, and to which he intends to return after going elsewhere for a longer or shorter time.’ ” 24 Generally, domicile is “a question of fact and intent,” and a determination of domicile involves looking at all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the evidence that a person is domiciled in one location outweighs the evidence that a person is domiciled in another location. 25 “[O]ur common law has recognized that from the time of a person’s birth—from childhood through adulthood—a person can only have a single domicile at any given point in time.” 26 There are three means of acquiring a domicile, which are generally applicable to all persons depending on the factual circumstances: “(1) domicile of origin or of nativity; (2) domicile of choice; and (3) domicile by operation of law.” 27 A domicile of origin or of nativity is established when a person is born, fulfilling the maxim that every person must have a domicile somewhere. 28 A domicile by choice “occurs when a person replaces his 23 Henry v Henry, 362 Mich 85, 101-102; 106 NW2d 570 (1960) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 24 People v Dowdy, 489 Mich 373, 385; 802 NW2d 239 (2011), quoting Hartzler, 265 Mich at 452. 25 In re High, 2 Doug at 523-524. 26 Grange, 494 Mich at 494. 27 8 Mich Civ Jur, Domicile, § 1, p 198. 28 See In re High, 2 Doug at 523-524. 12 current domicile by choosing another, consistent with the proposition that every person must have a domicile until a new domicile is determined.” 29 Finally, a domicile by operation of law occurs when a person with a legal disability lacks the capacity to acquire a domicile of choice, and thus the domicile is established by operation of law. 30 Because a minor child typically cannot form the requisite intent to establish a domicile by choice, a minor child’s domicile is determined, by operation of law, by the domicile of the child’s parents. 31 A person’s domicile of origin is the starting point, and it remains the person’s domicile until that domicile is usurped by a subsequent domicile attained by choice or by operation of law. 32 Accordingly, where a child’s parents have changed their own domicile, the domicile of the child likewise changes by operation of law.33 However, these common-law notions of domicile are not neatly applicable where a child’s parents share, at a minimum, joint legal custody such that the child has two legal residences. 29 Grange, 494 Mich at 502. 30 See 1 Restatement Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 22, p 88 (domicile of minors); 8 Mich Civ Jur, Domicile, § 5, p 204. 31 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30, 48; 109 S Ct 1597; 104 L Ed 2d 29 (1989). See also 8 Mich Civ Jur, Domicile, § 21, p 219 (“Everyone is assigned a domicile of origin at birth by operation of law.”). But note that when a minor child has been emancipated, they may establish a domicile by choice. See MCL 722.4e(1)(d) (“A minor emancipated by operation of law or by court order has the rights and responsibilities of an adult . . . . A minor is considered emancipated for the purposes of, but not limited to, . . . [t]he right to establish a separate domicile.”). 32 Specifically, “[t]he domicil[e] of origin is the domicil[e] which a person has at birth.” 1 Restatement Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 14(1), p 59. The domicile of origin “continues until a new domicil[e] is acquired.” Id., comment a. 33 See Herring v Mosher, 144 Mich 152, 154-155; 107 NW 917 (1906). 13  B. DOMICILE AND THE NO-FAULT ACT Michigan’s no-fault act has largely abolished tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. 34 Instead, insurance companies are required to provide first-party insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, which are commonly referred to as PIP benefits. 35 MCL 500.3114(1) sets forth the general rule for ascertaining which Michigan insurer is liable to provide PIP benefits under the circumstances of a specific case. MCL 500.3114(1) states, in relevant part, as follows: Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5), a personal protection insurance policy described in section 3101(1) applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.[36] Relevant here, the statute limits PIP coverage for relatives of policyholders to those who are “domiciled in the same household[.]” The no-fault act does not define the term “domiciled,” but, as stated earlier, the term “has a precise, technical meaning in Michigan’s common law,” and the term “must be understood according to that particular meaning.” 37 Generally speaking, domicile determinations for purposes of assessing insurer liability in the no-fault context are made by considering the factual circumstances surrounding the party’s living situation and by 34 See MCL 500.3105. 35 MCL 500.3107; MCL 500.3108. 36 Emphasis added. 37 Grange, 494 Mich at 492-493; see also MCL 8.3a. 14 balancing and weighing several factors, none of which is determinative on its own. 38 A nonexhaustive list of factors for determining whether a person is “domiciled in the same household” for purposes of assessing insurer liability in the no-fault context was provided by this Court in Workman: (1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either perman