In Re C Wilson Minor
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket379912
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2026
8:55 AM
In re C. WILSON, Minor.
No. 379912
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 23-005052-NA
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and CAMERON and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child, CW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions that led to
adjudication), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody when financially
able to do so), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). We affirm.
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In May 2023, Children’s Protective Services (CPS) received allegations that CW had
witnessed a physical altercation between respondent and CW’s legal father.1 During the
investigation that followed, respondent and the father admitted that CW had witnessed several
assaults by respondent against the father and that, on one occasion, respondent became upset and
bit CW. After CPS became involved, numerous other acts of aggression occurred in June, August,
and September. In early October, respondent called a CPS supervisor and left a vulgar, threatening
voice mail. A few days later, respondent became angry with the father for not answering his phone
and asked police to perform a welfare check on CW. On the same day, respondent went to the
father’s home when he and CW were out and turned off a security system, which father had
installed because of respondent’s behavior. Following a team meeting held three days later,
respondent left another vulgar, threatening voice mail for CPS. The next day, the Department filed
a petition asking the trial court to remove CW from respondent’s care, place her with the father,
authorize supervised parenting time, and prohibit respondent from going onto the father’s property.
1
The father was not a respondent in the child protective proceeding.
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The trial court ordered CW to be taken into protective custody and scheduled a preliminary hearing
for the next day. Ultimately, the trial court authorized the petition, placed CW in the father’s care
under the Department’s supervision, appointed a lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) for CW, and
allowed respondent parenting time, supervised or unsupervised at the Department’s discretion.
In November 2023, respondent pleaded to an amended petition, admitting past domestic
violence between her and the father in CW’s presence; that respondent struggled with her mental
health and anger management, which sometimes affected her ability to parent CW; that she was
unemployed and found it financially difficult to provide the necessary care to CW; and that she
could benefit from services to improve her parenting skills, maintain healthy relationships, and
help her emotional and mental stability. At the initial disposition, the Department recommended
services to address these issues, including a psychological evaluation, anger-management classes,
individual counseling, and parenting classes. The Department also recommended that respondent
obtain and maintain employment. The Department noted that respondent was already attending
individual counseling, that in-home family services had already begun and respondent was “very
compliant and engaged,” and that she had just started a full-time job. Respondent began
unsupervised parenting time in November and overnight parenting time in January, all without
incident.
However, on April 18, 2024, respondent became upset during a discussion of CW’s
counseling, threw her purse and phone at the caseworker, and tried to climb across the table to
attack the caseworker. Respondent was arrested and initially charged with felony assault, but the
charge was later amended to a one-year misdemeanor attempted assault. Respondent pleaded to
the misdemeanor and was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay a $600 fine. The Department
had already issued respondent a “zero-tolerance” letter because of other threatening behavior
toward her caseworker. Thus, after the attempted assault, the Department suspended respondent’s
parenting time and determined that there was no reasonable service or supervision that it could put
in place to ensure the safety of CW during parenting time. Respondent agreed to the temporary
suspension of her parenting time, explaining that she was “triggered,” “lost her temper,” and
“overreacted.” Approximately two months later, the trial court ordered that respondent have
telephone parenting time at the Department’s request.
Respondent’s progress was minimal over the next two years. CPS caseworker Kimberly
Lewis testified at the termination hearing that respondent worked with an in-home domestic-
violence program through Catholic Charities from June 2023 to July 14, 2023, when respondent
“dropped out” of the program. Respondent did not complete any domestic-violence services
thereafter, and domestic violence was not included in respondent’s counseling. As to counseling,
respondent had five different mental-health counselors during the pendency of the case. She
appeared open and engaged during sessions, but she discontinued counseling whenever she wanted
to, sometimes after only a few appointments. Some of her counselors testified at the termination
hearing that respondent made some progress toward her therapeutic goals, but none testified that
she had made appreciable progress. Respondent had five jobs during the pendency of the case,
including some seasonal work, but she was unemployed at the time of the termination hearing, and
there was no evidence that respondent could support CW financially without employment. As to
parenting skills, respondent completed a Nurturing Parenting class and an online parenting class,
she attended an in-home family services program for 10 of 12 weeks, and she exercised her
telephonic parenting time. Despite the services provided, respondent continued to have angry
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outbursts and to act impulsively, particularly with respect to going to CW’s home and school in
violation of the trial court’s orders and without regard to CW’s emotional well-being.
CW’s counselor since June 2023, Nicole Brummel, testified at the termination hearing that
the father sought counseling for CW because she was feeling stressed by the fighting between
respondent and the father and sometimes displayed emotional dysregulation through angry
outbursts and lashing out. Brummel diagnosed CW with “unspecified trauma disorder,” which
meant that CW was traumatized, but not to the degree required for a diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder. Brummel’s testimony indicated that CW was deeply affected by respondent’s
angry behavior. She talked to Brummel about nightmares and fears that were attributable to
respondent’s yelling, about running and hiding from scary things, about her concerns for her father,
and her fears about what might happen if respondent became too angry. CW did not want
respondent to be part of her therapy sessions.
The trial court repeatedly ordered respondent not to go to CW’s home or school because
these were the child’s “safe” places. However, respondent continued to violate these orders,
causing the trial court to opine that respondent had no respect for the court system, the father, or
CW, and that her pattern of behavior was to do what she wanted to do when she wanted to do it.
For example, the Department reported that CW sent respondent a photograph of the family at a
campground and respondent then went to the campground and “caused a scene” because she did
not like that CW’s grandparents were there. CW hid in (or behind) a boat so that respondent would
not see her, and she told the caseworker that she was afraid of respondent. On another occasion,
respondent showed up unannounced at the father’s house more than a year after she had moved
out to purportedly “get her things,” and was “trespassed from” the property. Nevertheless,
respondent then showed up and was trespassed again. Even after being barred from the property,
she showed up at CW’s home, banging on the doors and trying to yell through the windows at CW
while CW hid in her room. During a parenting-time phone call at about the same time, respondent
yelled and swore at CW and told her that she was not supposed to tell the LGAL about things that
happened. CW’s counselor testified that CW went back and forth on wanting to see respondent.
She ultimately indicated that she wanted to see respondent, but only as long as respondent was not
angry.
Efforts were made to move respondent toward supervised parenting time. At a dispositional
review/permanency-planning hearing in September 2024, the LGAL suggested in-person
parenting time in a therapeutic setting. The trial court instructed caseworker Lewis to contact CW’s
counselor to see if she might be willing to supervise parenting time. If not, then the caseworker
was to explore other options for supervised parenting time. The court adjourned the matter for 30
days and challenged respondent to continue counseling and other services and not to contact or go
to CW’s school, initiate contact with CW’s counselor, or go anywhere near CW during that period.
The court framed this as a “test” to see if supervised parenting time could go forward. Respondent
did not pass the test. When the hearing resumed, the Department reported that in response to the
Kent County Friend of the Court recommending that the father be given sole physical and legal
custody and respondent supervised parenting time, respondent harassed CW’s counselor,
demanding to know why the counselor told the Friend of the Court that CW was afraid of her.
When respondent was asked to stop her angry and aggressive phone calls and e-mails, she
responded by threatening to report the counselor and press charges against her and by trying to
discontinue CW’s counseling services.
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A few months later, the LGAL suggested that the trial court order the Department to
supervise parenting time in accordance with the Kent Circuit Court’s interim custody order.
Although concerned about adding more parenting time when it was clear that respondent did not
follow the trial court’s orders, the LGAL recommended that the Department’s caseworker
supervise parenting time before handing off supervision to a third party who was not familiar with
the case. However, during a discussion with the trial court, respondent indicated that it did not
matter what the Muskegon Circuit Court wanted because the custody order would be the governing
order. The LGAL then withdrew her suggestion for parenting time, concerned that respondent
would rely on the custody order to further ignore the orders of the court in the child protective
proceeding. In any event, the Department reported that CW’s counselor had declined to facilitate
family sessions with CW and respondent because the counselor wanted to keep CW’s sessions a
safe place for the child.
In May 2025, the Department recommended adding supervised parenting time that
accorded with the Kent Circuit Court’s custody order, which allowed YWCA supervision of
parenting time through the Safe Connections Program. Observing that it could not keep the case
open indefinitely and that it needed either to close the case or pursue termination, the Department
recommended closing the case because it did not believe that terminating respondent’s parental
rights was in CW’s best interests. Respondent’s attorney agreed that the case should be closed.
Counsel argued that the custody order provided protections for CW and that there was no credible
expectation that respondent’s attempts to change the custody order would be successful. However,
the LGAL advocated for termination. The trial court expressed concern about the harm that would
befall CW if the court closed the child protective proceeding case. The court viewed its options as
abandoning CW or having the Department petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The
court believed that respondent’s repeated violations of the court’s orders left the court with no
choice but to change the permanency-planning goal and order the Department to file a termination
petition. After the Department moved unsuccessfully to rescind the order to file a termination
petition, and its efforts to arrange an evaluation to assist in determining CW’s best interests failed,
the Department filed a supplemental petition seeking the termination of respondent’s parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), (3)(g), and (3)(j).
Following a termination hearing, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established the grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j). The court
also found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in CW’s best interests. The
court found that returning CW to respondent in any capacity was contrary to the child’s best
interests because respondent did not comply with her service plan and made clear that she would
not comply with the court’s orders. The trial court concluded that the parent-child relationship
favored termination because, although a bond existed, it was “not a strong bond.” Further, CW’s
need for permanency, stability, and finality also favored termination because respondent would
keep moving to change the order and harass the father until she got what she wanted, and this
constant action would harm CW. The court found that the length of time that the case had been
open and respondent’s lack of improvement in her parenting ability also favored termination.
Although the trial court acknowledged that relative placement weighed in favor of termination, it
found that relative placement did not preclude termination in this case because of the domestic
violence against the father and the potential harm to CW if respondent’s rights were not
termination. The court found that there were advantages to CW staying in the father’s home, as he
was employed and provided an appropriate home for the child. The trial court determined that
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respondent’s history of domestic violence toward the father also favored termination, noting that
the case began because of domestic violence and that respondent had continued to perpetrate acts
of domestic violence throughout the case. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order terminating
respondent’s parental rights and closing the case. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION
Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated her due-process
rights when it ordered the Department to file a supplemental petition over the Department’s
objection. We disagree.
Respondent failed to preserve these issues by raising them in the trial court. See In re
Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8-9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). Therefore, our review is for plain error
affecting substantial rights. In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 47; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). “To avoid
forfeiture under the plain-error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred,
2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id.
at 48 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it
caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Utrera, 281 Mich App at 9.
“The party asserting plain error bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” MJC,
349 Mich App at 48.
MCL 712A.19a(8) governs when a trial court may order the initiation of termination
proceedings. Relevant to the instant appeal, section 19a(8) provides that if a court “determines at
a permanency-planning hearing that a child should not be returned to his or her parent, the court
may order the agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights.” A trial court is not
required to order the initiation of termination proceedings under certain circumstances, one of
which is when “[t]he child is being cared for by relatives.” MCL 712A.19a(8)(a). However,
MCL 712A.19a(8) gives the trial court discretion and does not require agreement by the
Department.
The trial court impliedly found that respondent’s repeated efforts to contact CW in blatant
disregard of the trial court’s orders and at the expense of CW’s emotional well-being compelled
the court to conclude that CW could not be returned to respondent’s care. Considering this finding,
MCL 712A.19a(8) permitted the trial court to order the Department to initiate termination
proceedings. The court could have exercised its discretion differently because CW was placed with
her father and a custody dispute was ongoing. See MCL 712A.19a(8)(a). However, the court
rejected this option, believing that CW would still be at risk of harm if matters proceeded under
the custody case because respondent was no more likely to comply with the custody order than she
had been with the court’s orders in the child protective proceeding. Adoption was never at issue,
see MCL 712A.19a(8)(b)(i), and respondent’s failure to benefit from her case service plan
indicated that statutory grounds existed to file the petition, see MCL 712A.19a(8)(b)(ii).
Considering the information available to the court at the time, the court’s decision to order
the Department to file a termination petition was an appropriate use of the trial court’s discretion
and fell within the statutory framework provided by MCL 712A.19a(8), despite the Department’s
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opposition. Therefore, respondent has not established that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering the Department to file a termination petition.
Respondent next argues that ordering the Department to file a termination petition violated
her due-process rights. We disagree.
“[P]arents have a significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management
of their children.” In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 109; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). “This interest has been
characterized as an element of ‘liberty’ entitled to due-process protections.” In re Lovitt, 351 Mich
App 237, 244; 34 NW3d 645 (2024). No person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. US Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; Elba Twp v
Gratiot Co Drain Comm’r, 493 Mich 265, 288; 831 NW2d 204 (2013). However, “[d]ue process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews
v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 332, 334; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Courts generally consider three factors to determine what is required by due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. [Id. at 335. See also Brock, 442 Mich at 111 (applying the Eldridge
factors in a termination-of-parental-rights case).]
Respondent contends that consideration of the Eldridge factors shows that her interest in
the care and custody of CW was affected by the trial court’s insistence that the Department file a
termination petition, and that this insistence both heightened and assured the erroneous deprivation
of respondent’s protected liberty interest.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court’s order to file a termination petition
affected respondent’s private interest in the care, custody, and management of CW, her argument
fails to establish that the procedural protections employed in termination cases are inadequate to
prevent the erroneous deprivation of parental rights. These procedural protections included the
right to appointed counsel at public expense, see In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 275-276; 779
NW2d 286 (2009); adequate notice, see In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 693-694; 847 NW2d
514 (2014); and an adjudicative hearing at which respondent could have presented evidence, see
In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 415-418; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). Respondent has not argued that
these protections were not available to her or that they were inadequate.
Additional protections against the erroneous deprivation of parental rights applied at the
termination hearing. Specifically, the “heightened standard of proof of clear and convincing
evidence” is an “error-reducing” procedure used at the statutory-grounds stage to prevent
erroneous deprivation of the natural parent-child relationship. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87;
836 NW2d 182 (2013). See also Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 768; 102 S Ct 1388, 71 L Ed2d
599 (1982). A parent’s interest in the parent-child relationship continues to exist in a lessened form
after statutory grounds have been proven. Accordingly, whether termination is in a child’s best
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interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. All
these procedural protections worked together to safeguard against the erroneous deprivation of
respondent’s fundamental right to a parental relationship with CW. Respondent has not argued—
nor does the record suggest—that any of these protections were lacking or inadequate. Therefore,
respondent has not established that the trial court’s order to the Department to file a termination
petition affected her substantial rights or violated her right to due process.
B. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent also contends that the trial court erred by finding that the Department made
reasonable reunification efforts when the Department did not arrange for respondent to have
parenting time supervised by someone other than the Department. We disagree.
We review for clear error a trial court’s decision regarding reasonable reunification efforts.
See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). “A finding is clearly erroneous
if, although there is evidence to support it,” we are left with a “definite and firm conviction” that
a mistake was made. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be “more than maybe or probably
wrong.” In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Generally, the Department “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify
a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893
NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c), and MCL 712A.19a(2). Respondent
contends that the Department’s reunification efforts were not reasonable because the Department
did not arrange for respondent to have in-person parenting time.
MCL 712A.13a(13) provides that if a child is removed from the parent’s custody, then the
trial court must permit the parent at least weekly parenting time. This requirement, however, is not
absolute. The Department may provide less parenting time if the “court either determines that
exigent circumstances require less frequent parenting time or that parenting time, even if
supervised, may be harmful to the [child’s] life, physical health, or mental well-being.”
MCL 712A.13a(13). Should the court make this determination, then the court “may suspend
parenting time until the risk of harm no longer exists.” MCL 712A.13a(13).
In the present case, the trial court suspended respondent’s parenting time for approximately
two months after her assault on the Department’s caseworker. At the Department’s request, the
trial court reinstated parenting time, allowing respondent supervised phone calls with CW. That
respondent’s parenting time never progressed beyond phone calls was due in large part to
respondent’s conduct. When the trial court reinstated parenting time, it ordered the prosecutor to
work with the Department to address in-person parenting time. At the same time, the trial court
expressed concern that giving respondent in-person parenting time before she addressed her
mental-health and anger-management issues would put “all sorts of people at risk.” Given
respondent’s assault on its employee, it seems reasonable that, not only would the Department be
opposed to putting its employees at risk, but it would also oppose putting others at risk of
respondent’s anger and impulsiveness.
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For most of the case, respondent acted angrily and impulsively, repeatedly violating the
trial court’s orders by going unannounced to CW’s home and school. Nevertheless, the record
shows that the LGAL, the Department, and the trial court tried to move toward supervised
parenting time. The LGAL broached the possibility of therapeutic parenting time in
September 2024. The Department made inquiries and reported back in October that CW’s
counselor declined to facilitate therapeutic parenting time because CW had earlier objected to
respondent joining her counseling sessions and the counselor wanted to keep CW’s sessions a safe
place for the child. The trial court then proposed a 30-day test to move parenting time forward. If
respondent continued going to therapy and stayed away from CW’s home and school for 30 days,
then the trial court would give the Department the discretion to facilitate supervised parenting time
if that was what the Kent Circuit Court ordered in the parties’ custody case. Respondent failed the
test.
As the Department points out, respondent’s argument ignores the totality of the
Department’s reunification efforts and focuses on one service that could not be expanded because
of respondent’s own behavior. The record shows that the Department referred respondent to
HealthWest for mental-health services, to Catholic Charities for domestic-violence and parenting-
skills services, and to Services of Hope for anger-management classes.
It is unfortunate that respondent did not have in-person parenting time for nearly two years.
However, the Department provided services to address respondent’s mental-health and anger-
management barriers to reunification, and the trial court put the parenting-time remedy in
respondent’s hands by stating that it would give the Department the discretion to allow parenting
time supervised in accordance with the Kent Circuit Court custody order if respondent could go
30-days without incident—she could not. Given evidence of respondent’s intermittent explosive
anger, her failure to sufficiently benefit from mental-health and anger-management services, and
her repeated disregard of the trial court’s orders, we are not left with a “definite and firm
conviction” that the trial court clearly erred when it found that the Department’s reunification
efforts were reasonable under the particular circumstances of this case. See Mason, 486 Mich
at 152.
C. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding that clear and convincing
evidence established statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
We review for clear error a trial court’s decision that a ground for termination has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-359; 612 NW2d
407 (2000), superseded by statute as observed in In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 83. See also
MCR 3.977(K). “Further, regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817
NW2d 111 (2011). “Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court’s factual findings at
termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73,
90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “If the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory ground
existed, then that one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination of the respondent’s parental
rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
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The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established grounds for
termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(g), and (3)(j).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supports termination when “182 or more days have elapsed since the
issuance of an initial dispositional order” and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable
likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s
age.”
There was no dispute that more than 182 days elapsed since the initial disposition order
that was issued in December 2023 and termination in January 2026. The conditions that led to
respondent’s adjudication were issues with mental health and anger management that affected her
ability to parent, past domestic violence in CW’s presence, current unemployment that made it
difficult to provide financially for CW, and parenting skills. To address these issues, the case
service plan required respondent to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow its
recommendation to engage in individual counseling, to complete an anger-management program,
and to engage in parenting education.
Clear and convincing record evidence supports the trial court’s finding that respondent’s
issues of mental health and anger management continued to exist at the time of the termination
trial. The record shows that respondent saw multiple counselors, some for only a handful of
sessions; went months without any counseling; and she did not sufficiently benefit from the
counseling sessions that she did attend. Respondent continued to display no insight into her
behavior or into CW’s emotional well-being. She insisted that CW was not afraid of her, despite
the child’s contrary disclosures to her counselor, and she failed to understand the effect that her
words and actions had on CW. In fact, respondent dismissed CW’s fear of her yelling and anger
by insisting that someone was “putting things in [CW’s] head.” Although respondent’s counselors
testified that she made some progress, none indicated that respondent had achieved her therapy
goals, and her mental-health counselor at the time of the termination hearing, Valerie Petre,
suggested that it might take respondent six months of weekly counseling to clearly show progress.
Respondent contends that termination based on mental-health issues was clearly erroneous
because there is no record evidence of a formal mental-health diagnosis and no showing that the
“alleged mental health issue impacted [respondent’s] ability to care for [CW].” This argument is
unavailing. Respondent admitted at the adjudication that her mental health affected her parenting.
She received mental-health services in the form of a psychological evaluation and counseling
referrals. Respondent’s participation in counseling was inconsistent and did not show sufficient
benefit to resolve the effect of her mental health on her parenting. Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not clearly err by finding that the mental-health conditions that led to respondent’s
adjudication continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.
The record also shows that respondent did not resolve her employment issue. Respondent
was unemployed at the time of her adjudication and admitted that she lacked the financial resources
to care for CW. Respondent had several jobs during the proceeding, none for very long, and she
was unemployed at the time of the termination hearing. Caseworker Lewis testified that respondent
was having difficulty finding a job because of her criminal history, and that she lacked the
resources to support CW without employment. Accordingly, respondent was in the same position
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at the termination hearing as she was at the adjudication: she was unemployed and lacked the
financial resources to care for CW.
There is no dispute that respondent did not complete a domestic-violence course, nor were
domestic-violence issues included in her general counseling. Respondent implies that any issue
with domestic violence was resolved because there was no record evidence that respondent
perpetrated domestic violence against CW during the pendency of the case. However, respondent
did not adequately address her mental-health and anger-management issues, attended only two
sessions of a domestic-violence program, and demonstrated no appreciation of CW’s concerns or
any insight into how witnessing past domestic violence affected CW. Given that respondent
pleaded to the domestic-violence issue and the lack of evidence in the record that demonstrated
that respondent addressed this issue, there is no reason to doubt that this issue continued to exist
at the time of the termination hearing.
As to parenting skills, respondent pleaded that she “could benefit from services to improve
her parenting-skills,” but it is not clear what parenting skills issues existed at the time of
adjudication. If parenting skills include acknowledging a child’s fears and understanding the
parent-child dynamic, then the record demonstrates that respondent did not exhibit these skills. As
already indicated, respondent denied that CW was sometimes afraid of her and fearful for her
father because of respondent’s anger and did not recognize that her behavior negatively impacted
CW. Moreover, respondent’s behavior in ignoring court orders to go to CW’s home and school in
total disregard for how this impacted CW demonstrated a lack of appreciation of CW’s needs.
Although respondent complied partially with her case service plan and counselors testified
that she made some improvement toward her therapy goals, the record evidence is clear and
convincing that the conditions existing at the initial disposition continued to exist at the termination
hearing, especially those pertaining to mental health, anger management, and domestic violence.
Further, there is no reasonable likelihood that these conditions “will be rectified within a
reasonable time consider[ing] [CW’s] age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Petre testified that
respondent would need to attend weekly counseling for at least six months before clear progress
would be noted. And even this depended on respondent’s consistency, commitment, and
application of the skills learned to her daily life. However, respondent denied that she had a mental-
health issue, testified that whether she attended counseling should be up to her, and was ambivalent
about continuing counseling with Petre. Given respondent’s denial of the condition to which she
pleaded at the adjudication and her lack of clear commitment to addressing the condition, there is
no reason to believe that respondent would take steps to resolve the conditions that led to
adjudication within a reasonable time.
We conclude that respondent has not established that the trial court clearly erred by finding
that clear and convincing evidence established statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Accordingly, because “the trial court did not clearly err by
finding one statutory ground existed, then [this] one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination
of the respondent’s parental rights.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 273.
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D. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent lastly contends that the trial court’s best-interest findings were clearly
erroneous. We disagree.
We review “a trial court’s determination regarding best interests for clear error.” In re
Keillor, 325 Mich App 80, 93; 923 NW2d 617 (2018). If the trial court finds “that there are grounds
for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for
reunification of the child with the parent not be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court must
find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best
interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90.
In making its best-interest determination, a trial court may consider “the child’s bond to
the parent[;] the parent’s parenting ability[;] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality[;] and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Gonzales/Martinez,
310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court
may also consider “the parent’s compliance with treatment plans, the child’s well-being in care,
and the possibility of adoption.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 277. “The trial court should
weigh all the evidence available to determine the child’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich
App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Further, a child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the
trial court must consider when making its best-interest determination and a “ ‘child’s placement
with relatives weighs against termination.’ ” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964 NW2d 881
(2020), quoting In re Mason, 486 Mich at 164. “Relative” as defined by MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)
includes a biological parent. In re Boshell/Shelton, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 371973); slip op at 10.
Respondent implies that the trial court’s reasoning with respect to whether CW could be
returned to respondent was faulty because CW could not be returned to her under the terms of the
custody order. Respondent’s implication ignores the central point of the trial court’s analysis under
this factor, which is that returning CW to respondent in any capacity was contrary to the child’s
best interests because respondent did not comply with her service plan and made clear that she
would not comply with the court’s orders.
Respondent argues that the weakness of the parent-child bond is due to the lack of in-
person parenting time for nearly two years. Although it is certainly likely that the lack of in-person
parenting time affected the strength of the parent-child bond, record evidence shows that
respondent’s behavior before and after this period significant