In Re stauffer/howard Minors
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket380252
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2026
2:26 PM
In re STAUFFER/HOWARD, Minors.
No. 380252
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2024-001270-NA
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and RIORDAN and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent1 appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
two minor children, MS and MH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). For the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
These child-protective proceedings began in April 2024, when petitioner, the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), petitioned to remove the children from respondent’s care.
The petition alleged that respondent and her children were living in a tent under a bridge and that
respondent was unwilling to give up her dogs to move herself and the children into a shelter. A
Children’s Protective Services investigator reported that respondent had no source of income and
that she and the children had been urinating into a bucket in the tent and defecating into plastic
bags. The investigator also learned that MS had not been in school for eight or nine months and
that MH had never been enrolled in school. MH’s front teeth were decaying, and he had not
received dental treatment. The trial court granted an ex parte motion to remove the children.
After adjudication and initial disposition, several permanency-planning hearings were held
from September 2024 to October 2025. During that time, respondent regularly participated in
supervised parenting-time visits with the children. However, respondent did not make progress
1
Although the children’s fathers were named respondents in these child-protective proceedings,
MH’s father was deceased at the time the petition was filed, and MS’s father is not party to this
appeal. Therefore, we use the term “respondent” to refer only to respondent-mother.
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finding housing or employment, and she delayed completing a psychological evaluation until
June 2025. Respondent’s case workers provided respondent with a digital watch, a cellular phone,
cellular phone battery packs to charge the phone, and assorted paper products. However, on the
basis of respondent’s lack of progress addressing her barriers to reunification, the trial court
ordered the DHHS to seek termination of respondent’s parental rights following an October 2025
hearing.
At the termination hearing, the trial court heard the testimonies of Family and Children’s
Services Caseworker Sarah Carpita and respondent. Their testimonies showed that respondent had
been offered the following services: monthly bus passes, random drug screenings, referrals for
housing services, referrals for employment services, parenting education, supervised parenting
time, and referrals for mental-health services at Integrated Services of Kalamazoo and “Summit
Point.”
Respondent regularly attended supervised parenting time. However, her relationship with
MS had deteriorated significantly and their interpersonal conflict at parenting time was negatively
affecting MH. Respondent completed a supportive-visitation parenting-skills program as well, but
her assessment after the program showed that her score for appropriate discipline had become
worse rather than better. Respondent testified that she had been trying to acquire housing and
employment without success, and she generally testified that the DHHS’s efforts to assist her had
been inadequate given the difficulties that she faced because of her homelessness and lack of
transportation.
Although the trial court was not dismissive of respondent’s difficulties, the court
nevertheless found that the DHHS had made reasonable efforts, that statutory grounds existed to
terminate respondent’s parental rights to the children, and that termination was in the children’s
best interests. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights. This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights to her
children because DHHS did not make reasonable efforts for reunification, the statutory grounds
for termination were not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and termination of her parental
rights was not in the children’s best interests. We disagree.
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Because respondent did not object or otherwise argue that the services provided to her were
inadequate when the case service plan was adopted or shortly thereafter, this issue is not preserved
for appellate review. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 336-337; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). We
review unpreserved issues in child-protective proceedings for plain error affecting substantial
rights. In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 47; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). “To avoid forfeiture under the
plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was
plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 48 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Generally, an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice,
i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Absent the presence of aggravated circumstances, the DHHS has an affirmative duty to
make reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the respondent-parent before seeking termination
of parental rights. In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707; 987 NW2d 919 (2022). This requires
the creation of a case service plan identifying the steps that the DHHS and the respondent will take
to rectify the barriers to reunification. Id. Reasonable efforts “typically include drug treatment,
psychological evaluation and support, and housing assistance.” Id. “[T]here exists a commensurate
responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey,
297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
The record shows that the DHHS referred respondent to Neighborhoods, Inc., the SHARE
Center, The Haven, and Women’s Co-op for housing and employment assistance to help her with
her homelessness, which was the primary barrier to reunification in this case. The DHHS also gave
respondent bus passes, occasionally drove her places, facilitated supervised parenting-time visits,
provided respondent with a watch and cellular phone, and met with respondent to discuss her
service plan and identify her needs.
Unfortunately, respondent testified that the challenges in everyday life to meet her basic
needs were too substantial to overcome and comply with services. Respondent explained that she
was reliant on the SHARE Center for meals and showers. Respondent also testified that walking
was painful for her, and bus service was inadequate for transportation because it required walking.
At trial, there was a great deal of testimony and argument regarding respondent’s ability to
go to a kiosk operated by Summit Point to complete a three-hour appointment which was required
for respondent to begin counseling services there. One of respondent’s caseworkers drove
respondent to Summit Point once, but respondent left without completing the intake and instead
went to get a meal. Respondent did not appear at Summit Point a second time her caseworker
offered to drive her there. Respondent did testify below that she asked to be driven to Summit
Point repeatedly thereafter.
While the trial court did not discount the difficulties that respondent faced to meet her basic
needs, the court believed that there were significant gaps in respondent’s explanations, and the
court did not agree that the DHHS’s efforts had been inadequate. Except for her consistent
engagement in parenting-time visits, respondent largely failed to uphold her responsibility to
comply with services. See id. The trial court was particularly concerned that respondent did not
make use of the services of Women’s Co-op, which the court described as one of the area’s premier
service providers for parenting education, employment services, and support services.
Giving due deference to the trial court’s evaluation of respondent’s credibility, In re
Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 227; 894 NW2d 653 (2016), we conclude that the court did not plainly
err by finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to help respondent reunify with her children
but that those efforts were not successful. See In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 48.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS
The petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more
statutory grounds to terminate a respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3). See In re
Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review for clear error a trial court’s
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finding that one or more statutory grounds have been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A finding is clearly
erroneous when we are “definitely and firmly convinced” that the trial court made a mistake, even
if some evidence supports the finding. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709-710; 846 NW2d 61
(2014).
As stated earlier, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j), which provide as follows:
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
***
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s
jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,
the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received
notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the
conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent.
The trial court did not err with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because termination
occurred in March 2026—645 days after initial disposition in June 2024—and respondent readily
admitted at trial that she had not yet acquired housing and was still living under the same bridge,
which was the primary condition that led to adjudication. Further, given that the services offered
to respondent had not, unfortunately, been successful in resolving her housing situation, it is
unlikely that the situation would be resolved within a reasonable time in the future. For this reason
alone, termination of parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
We also conclude that the trial court did not err with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) or
(j). Regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), the trial court identified respondent’s unresolved issues
with her mental health as another condition justifying jurisdiction, and the court placed much
weight on the findings of the June 2025 psychological evaluation by Dr. Paul Kitchen, which
diagnosed respondent with an “Unspecified Personality Disorder (with immature features).”
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Briefly stated, Dr. Kitchen determined that respondent was emotionally limited and had problems
coping with emotionally stressful situations and dealing with persons in positions of authority. The
record shows that respondent became agitated and sometimes resorted to yelling at caseworkers
and MS when confronted with her failure to address her barriers to reunification. This behavior
significantly damaged respondent’s relationship with MS, and their arguments during parenting
time also had a negative impact on MH. Although respondent was aware that she could benefit
from counseling, she failed to complete the intake process at Summit Point, and the trial court
specifically noted that respondent had failed to provide a credible explanation for that failure.
The trial court explained,
In looking at the totality of the circumstances, there is no doubt in this
Court’s mind that if the children are returned today, it’s not just a housing issue;
there is a severe lack in parenting skills and understanding. [Respondent is] cussing
at [MS] in the middle of parenting time. Even though she is not cussing at [MH],
it’s happening before [MH]. [Respondent] cannot control her behavior. She hasn’t
been able to control her behavior today in the courtroom. She gets upset when she
is asked or redirected by any type of authority. She is acting out towards [MS]. If
[MS] challenges her and asks her why she’s not doing things, and it’s clear that
that’s affecting [MS], [respondent] gets upset and lashes out. Unfortunately, that is
harmful to the mental health of the children.
Respondent’s material situation had not improved since the inception of this case, and the
trial court found that the children’s physical and mental well-being would likely be harmed if
returned to respondent’s care. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Notably, respondent’s failure to comply
with services “is evidence that the child[ren] will be harmed if returned to [respondent’s] home.”
In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. Given these facts, i.e., the lack of housing and mental-health
problems, we are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake by finding
that clear and convincing evidence showed that statutory grounds existed under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii) and (3)(j). See id. at 709-710.
C. BEST INTERESTS
If the trial court finds that the petitioner proved one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, then the court must order termination of the parent’s
parental rights if it also finds that termination is in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5);
In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010). “Best interests are determined on the basis of
the preponderance of the evidence.” In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 733; 858 NW2d
143 (2014). In making a best-interest determination, the focus is on the children, not the parent.
In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. We review for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination
of parental rights is in the children’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40.
“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests,” and it may consider a variety of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent[;] the
parent’s parenting ability[;] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality[;] and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic
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violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. at 714.
In this case, respondent’s failure to comply with services and make progress in securing
housing and employment strongly suggests that respondent was unable to adequately provide for
the children’s material, medical, and educational needs both at the time of termination and for the
foreseeable future. On the basis of respondent’s lack of progress, the trial court found that it was
not in the children’s best interests to “string[] them along” by giving respondent more time or
placing the children under a guardianship. The trial court noted MS’s “acting out and then shutting
down and not wanting any contact with [respondent], physical or otherwise, clearly shows that the
relationship between them is severed.” Although MH was bonded to respondent, MH was having
difficulty with incontinence and night terrors, which the trial court considered an indication that
MH could no longer take the stresses of this case considering his age. MH and MS also were
bonded with one another, and the court found that splitting up the children was not in their best
interests.
Although the children were not in a preadoptive placement, the trial court determined that
it was in their best interests that respondent’s parental rights be terminated so that the court could
place the children in a calm, stable, and permanent situation. While the trial court did not discount
the difficulties that respondent faced during these child-protective proceedings, the record shows
that respondent could not provide the children with a stable or permanent home.
On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. See In re MJC, 349
Mich App at 61.
III. CONCLUSION
There were no errors warranting relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
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