Placeholder name
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket377350
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2026
10:35 AM
In re B. TATE, Minor.
Nos. 377350 and 377353
Alpena Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 23-007738-NA
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and CAMERON and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 respondents appeal by right the trial court’s order
terminating their parental rights to their minor child, BT, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
(conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions),
(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned
to parent). We affirm the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction and its determination that statutory
grounds for termination existed. However, we vacate the trial court’s best-interest findings and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2023, petitioner, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS),
petitioned to remove BT from respondents’ care, alleging multiple instances of domestic violence
that resulted in criminal charges against both parties and the entry of a no-contact order. The
petition also raised concerns about substance abuse. BT was removed from respondents’ care and
ultimately placed with her maternal aunt. At the adjudication hearing, respondents entered pleas
admitting to the allegations in the petition.
1
In re Tate Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 9, 2025 (Docket
Nos. 377350 and 377353).
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During the proceedings, respondents repeatedly violated the no-contact order. Their last
contact occurred in June 2024 and resulted in respondent-mother being charged with domestic
violence against respondent-father. Despite DHHS offering respondents various services, their
caseworker testified that their participation was inconsistent and tended to occur only shortly
before hearings.
After the case had been pending for approximately two years, DHHS petitioned to
terminate respondents’ parental rights, citing respondents’ failure to consistently participate in
services and repeated positive drug screens. At the termination hearing, respondents’ caseworker
acknowledged that respondents had participated in some services but testified that they had derived
little benefit from these services. The trial court ultimately found that statutory grounds existed to
terminate respondents’ parental rights and that termination was in BT’s best interests. These
appeals followed.
II. PRESERVATION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Respondents’ challenge to the trial court’s acceptance of their pleas is unpreserved for
appellate review because they did not move to withdraw their pleas or otherwise object to the
advice of rights provided. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 462-463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020).
We therefore review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re MJC,
349 Mich App 42, 47; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,
3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 48 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In general, “an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of
the proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The party asserting error has the
burden of proving prejudice. Id.
Respondents’ challenges to the trial court’s statutory-grounds and best-interest
determinations are preserved. We review for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and
ultimate determinations of statutory grounds and whether termination is in the child’s best
interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “The trial court’s factual
findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence supports them, but we are definitely and firmly
convinced that it made a mistake.” Id. at 709-710.
III. ADJUDICATION
Respondents first argue that the trial court erred by accepting their pleas at the adjudication
hearing without properly advising them of their rights as required by MCR 3.971(B). We agree
that the trial court did not provide the required advice concerning all the rights respondents
relinquished by entering their pleas, but we conclude that respondents have not established they
are entitled to relief.
Michigan child protective proceedings consist of two phases: the adjudicative phase and
the dispositional phase. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App at 463. During the adjudicative phase, the
trial court determines whether to exercise jurisdiction over the child. Id. at 464. “The fact-finding
adjudication of an authorized petition to determine if the minor comes within the jurisdiction of
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the court is called a trial.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Parents may waive their right
to this trial by entering a plea of admission or no contest to allegations in the petition. Id.
A waiver of constitutional rights must be voluntary and must constitute knowing,
intelligent acts undertaken with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. Id. Reflecting this due-process requirement, MCR 3.971(B) requires trial courts to
advise respondents in child-protective proceedings of specified rights before accepting a plea at
the adjudication stage. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 21; 934 NW2d 610 (2019).
Here, the trial court did not adequately advise respondents of: (1) their right to have adverse
witnesses appear and testify, MCR 3.971(B)(3)(c); (2) their right to subpoena witnesses,
MCR 3.971(B)(3)(e); and (3) that they could still be liable for child support if their rights were
terminated, MCR 3.971(B)(5). The trial court also overlooked MCR 3.971(B)(6) through (8)
because it did not mention these rights before it accepted the pleas. Because respondents did not
preserve this issue, however, they must establish that the error affected their substantial rights. In
re MJC, 349 Mich App at 47. On appeal, both respondents contend that the trial court’s error
deprived them of the opportunity to withdraw their pleas. Neither respondent, however, asserts
that they would have declined to enter their pleas had the trial court provided the required advice.
Thus, although the trial court failed to comply fully with MCR 3.971(B), respondents have not
demonstrated the prejudice necessary to obtain relief under the plain error standard.
IV. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondents next argue that the trial court clearly erred by finding that statutory grounds
for termination existed. We disagree.
“To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). The trial court found grounds existed to
terminate respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), among other subsections,
because “[n]either parent has acknowledged the harm to the minor child as a result of their fighting,
domestic violence, or drug use,” and, “[u]ntil they come to terms with that, which they have not,
they will not be able to provide a safe environment for the child.” The record supports the trial
court’s determination.
Termination is appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if the trial court finds that “[t]here
is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will
be harmed if the child is returned to the home of the parent.” “The harm contemplated under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes emotional harm as well as physical harm.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich
App 252, 279; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
During the termination hearing, respondents acknowledged their history of domestic
violence but maintained that it had not affected BT because, although she was in the home during
the incidents, she was not in the same room while they occurred. Respondents also minimized the
severity of the violence, characterizing it as less serious than alleged. But a caseworker testified
that exposure to domestic violence could still impact BT even if she had not been physically
injured. The record included incidents in which respondent-father gave respondent-mother a black
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eye and respondent-mother stabbed respondent-father with a knife. Given the severity of these
incidents, and BT’s presence in the home, the trial court could reasonably find that respondents’
failure to appreciate this potential emotional harm represented a continuing risk of harm if she
were returned to their care.
Respondents’ participation in services further supports the trial court’s determination. “A
parent’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that
the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. Here,
the caseworker testified that respondents participated inconsistently in services, and derived “little
to no benefit” from them, often reverting back to their previous behavior. Their engagement tended
to increase in the weeks preceding their court hearings, and much of their improvement occurred
only after DHHS petitioned for termination. Considered together, we conclude that the trial court
did not clearly err by finding that termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).2
V. BEST INTERESTS
Finally, respondents argue that the trial court erred when it found that terminating their
parental rights was in BT’s best interests. We agree that the trial court’s findings are inadequate to
permit appellate review of this determination.
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts,
297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “The focus at the best-interest stage has always been
on the child, not the parent.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to
determine the [child’s] best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests,
the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond
to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.
The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the
parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption. [Id. at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]3
2
Because “[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32, we need not address
whether termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (g).
3
We recognize that the trial court focused on the factors provided in the Child Custody Act,
MCL 722.21 et seq., specifically those provided in MCL 722.23, rather than those identified in In
re White. But MCL 722.23 may be considered by trial courts presiding over termination-of-
parental-rights proceedings. In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 238; 894 NW2d 653 (2016).
Moreover, the trial court’s analysis addresses many of the factors in In re White. Specifically, the
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The trial court must also explicitly consider a child’s placement with relatives, which ordinarily
weighs against termination. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347; see also In re Olive/Metts, 297
Mich App at 43. Relative placement does not preclude termination, and a trial court “may terminate
parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best
interests[,]” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347, quoting In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43.
But the trial court must explicitly consider this placement as part of its best-interests determination.
Here, BT was placed with her maternal aunt. Although the trial court briefly referenced
BT’s bond and progress in that placement, it did not explicitly address the significance of the
relative placement in its best-interests analysis or explain how that consideration weighed in
comparison to the other relevant factors. Merely acknowledging BT’s placement and progress does
not demonstrate that the trial court properly considered the placement in deciding whether
termination was in her best interests.
“A trial court’s failure to explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of
the [child’s] placement with relatives renders the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest
determination.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43. Because the trial court did not adequately
address BT’s relative placement, we cannot determine whether it properly weighed that placement
against the other best-interest factors. Thus, reversal is required.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction and its determination that
statutory grounds existed. We vacate the trial court’s best-interests findings and remand to the trial
court to reconsider whether termination of respondents’ parental rights is in BT’s best interests in
light of her placement with a relative. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
trial court considered respondents’ ongoing mental health issues, minimal participation in services,
unsuccessful completion of their treatment plans, and failure to benefit from services. The trial
court also noted that, despite both respondents taking domestic violence courses, they continued
to have domestic violence incidents in violation of a no-contact order and did not follow through
with therapeutic services. Finally, it recognized BT’s need for permanency and stability, opining
that BT likely never knew stability in respondents’ care, but was thriving in her placement. The
court also pointed out that, while BT did have a bond with her parents, that bond had deteriorated
over the two-year proceedings. On this record, although the trial court seemingly overemphasized
the importance of the Child Custody Act factors, its analysis nonetheless covered many of the
factors outlined in In re White.
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