Blackman's Point Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Call
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketAC 25-P-1078
StatusPublished
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25-P-1078 Appeals Court
BLACKMAN'S POINT HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., & others1 vs.
NANCY BLACKMAN CALL, trustee,2 & others.3
No. 25-P-1078.
Bristol. March 9, 2026. - November 18, 2026.
Present: Desmond, Tan, & Wood, JJ.
Manufactured Housing Community. Contract, Settlement agreement.
Real Property, Restraint on alienation, Right of first
refusal. Consumer Protection Act, Unfair or deceptive act.
Practice, Civil, Consumer protection case.
Civil action commenced in the Southeast Division of the
Housing Court Department on March 23, 2020.
Following review by this court, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 711
(2024), the case was heard by Anne Kenney Chaplin, J., on
motions for summary judgment and entry of judgment was ordered
by her.
Donald M. Solomon for the plaintiffs.
1 John Flanagan and Thomas Oram.
2 Of the Blackman Realty Trust.
3 Dana Lewis Blackman and Roger Bradford Blackman, as
trustees of the Blackman Realty Trust, and Blackman's Point R.V.
& Camping, LLC.
2
Steven S. Broadley for the defendants.
Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, & Daniel A. Less,
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.
WOOD, J. This matter is before us for a second time. See
Blackman's Point Homeowners' Ass'n v. Call, 103 Mass. App. Ct.
711 (2024). The defendants (collectively, Blackmans) own and
operate a manufactured housing community (park).4 The plaintiffs
are the homeowners' association for the park and two individual
tenants and association members. The Blackmans seek to
discontinue the park, remove the manufactured homes, and then
sell the underlying land, which they believe will command a
higher price without the park on it. The plaintiffs, however,
contend that both the Manufactured Housing Act (act), G. L.
c. 140, §§ 32A-32S, and a settlement agreement between the
parties require the Blackmans, if they intend to sell the land
to a third party who wants to use the land for a different
purpose, to continue operating the park until they receive a
4 Manufactured housing communities were previously known as
mobile home parks. See Mac's Homeowners Ass'n v. Gebo, 92 Mass.
App. Ct. 453, 454 (2017). The trustees of the Blackman Realty
Trust are the record owners of the property where the park is
located, and Blackman's Point R.V. & Camping, LLC, is the
licensed operator of the park. As we discuss infra, various
members of the Blackman family have owned and operated the park
for decades. Where the difference between the current owners
and operators and their predecessors-in-interest is immaterial
to our discussion, we refer to them all interchangeably as the
Blackmans.
3
bona fide offer to purchase the land. Then, they must permit
the homeowners' association an opportunity to exercise its
statutory and contractual rights of first refusal. We agree
with the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we vacate so much of the
judgment that entered for the Blackmans and remand for further
proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.5,6
Background. Many of the following facts were described in
this court's prior decision. See Blackman's Point Homeowners'
Ass'n, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 713-716. We recite them here for
context.
1. The park. The park is on oceanfront land in Marshfield
and, for decades, has been owned and operated by various members
of the Blackman family as a manufactured housing community. The
park is open on a seasonal basis only, between May 1 and
September 30. During the months that the park is closed,
tenants have the option to store their manufactured homes there.
5 The judgment was substantially in the Blackmans' favor but
included a declaration for the plaintiffs on one point, which
then became binding on the homeowners' association and all unit
owners: a prior settlement agreement between the parties did
not violate the rule against perpetuities. The Blackmans have
not cross-appealed from those aspects of the judgment, and they
are not before us.
6 We recognize the amicus brief filed by the Attorney
General.
4
2. The underlying lawsuits. In many respects, the current
dispute between the Blackmans and the park's tenants goes back
to the 1980s, when the Blackmans began to express an interest in
discontinuing the park or selling the land. In 1987, the
homeowners' association and several individual tenants and
association members brought an action claiming that the
Blackmans were violating the act. The plaintiffs in the 1987
lawsuit claimed that they had various statutory rights,
including a right of first refusal in the event of a sale, that
the Blackmans were not honoring. The parties resolved the 1987
lawsuit through a settlement agreement dated March 22, 1988.
The 1988 settlement agreement provided that the Blackmans
would continue operating the park as follows:
"In each year succeeding 1988 in which the Blackmans do not
notify the [homeowners'] [a]ssociation by April 1 of each
such year of any bona fide offer to buy the [p]roperty that
the Blackmans intend to accept, the Blackmans hereby agree
to reopen the [p]ark for the period from May 1 through
September 30 of each such year."
In the event that a third party made a bona fide offer to
purchase the land on which the park sits, the Blackmans disputed
that the homeowners' association or any individual tenant had a
statutory right of first refusal but agreed to give the
homeowners' association a contractual right of first refusal.
The settlement agreement also included provisions setting the
5
rental rates for the 1988 season and limiting how much rental
rates could be increased in the future.
The Blackmans continued to own and operate the park and, in
2014, brought suit to determine if they could increase the
rental rates to fair market rates. The 2014 lawsuit ended with
a stipulated judgment that was incorporated in an order for
judgment on June 4, 2018. The stipulated judgment enjoined the
Blackmans from raising the rental rates in excess of what the
1988 settlement agreement permitted and stated that it was
"still in force and ha[d] not been amended, modified, or
terminated by the parties in any respect, whether by this
judgment or otherwise."
Around March 29, 2018, while the 2014 lawsuit was ongoing,
the Blackmans sent letters to park tenants entitled "Notice of
Intent to Sell," stating, "in accord with the requirements of
[ ] G. L. c. 140, § 32R(a), that [the Blackmans] intend to sell
the land . . . and to take steps to begin the process of
discontinuing [their] business as prescribed in [ ] G. L.
c. 140[,] § 32L[,] and the Settlement Agreement." In two
subsequent letters to park tenants entitled "Notice of Intent to
Discontinue Use," dated June 12, 2018, and August 7, 2018, the
Blackmans stated, "in accord with the requirements of [ ] G. L.
c. 140, § 32L, that [the Blackmans] intend to discontinue the
use of the [p]ark and discontinue the [p]ark's business, as
6
prescribed in [ ] G. L. c. 140, § 32L," to "pursue other
objectives." These later two notices made no mention of the
Blackmans' intent to sell the land in accord with the
requirements of G. L. c. 140, § 32R. The Blackmans readily
admit that they seek to discontinue the park, remove the
manufactured homes, and sell the land in the belief that they
will obtain a higher price than if the park were intact. As one
of the defendants stated in an e-mail message,
"I'm against selling . . . before we get rid of the
'present clutter', which, in my mind lessens the possible
asking price of the property. Of course, the [homeowners'
association] would not want to have to move any of their
things! I, of course, do not want to make this easy for
them!"
The defendant who wrote the message explicitly testified that
the "clutter" to which she was referring included the
manufactured homes.
On March 23, 2020, the plaintiffs brought the instant
lawsuit in the Housing Court. The plaintiffs claimed that the
Blackmans could not discontinue the park under the 1988
settlement agreement and that, regardless, the Blackmans were
not following the procedures for discontinuance to use the land
for a different purpose set forth in the act, see G. L. c. 140,
§ 32L (7A)-(9), or the procedures to sell the land to a third
party set forth in the act, see G. L. c. 140, § 32R. The
plaintiffs also claimed that the Blackmans' actions were unfair
7
or deceptive in violation of G. L. c. 93A. The complaint
sought, inter alia, declaratory relief and damages under c. 93A.7
A judgment entered for the Blackmans, and the plaintiffs filed
their first appeal.
The focus of the first appeal was whether the Blackmans
violated the terms of the 1988 settlement agreement. We
concluded that the terms of the settlement agreement prohibited
the Blackmans from discontinuing the park for as long as they
own the land but that we needed to remand for the Housing Court
to address in the first instance the parties' arguments
regarding the enforceability of that agreement. See Blackman's
Point Homeowners' Ass'n, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 716-718. We also
remanded for reconsideration of the plaintiffs' claim for
violation of G. L. c. 93A, as the judgment for the Blackmans on
that count was premised on the idea that they had not violated
the settlement agreement. See id. at 720. In light of the open
question regarding whether the settlement agreement was
enforceable, and thus whether the Blackmans could discontinue
the park, we declined to reach the issue whether the Blackmans
7 The complaint also sought damages for violation of G. L.
c. 186, § 18, which prohibits retaliation against tenants. In
the prior appeal, we affirmed the judgment for the Blackmans on
that count, and it is not before us in this appeal. See
Blackman's Point Homeowners' Ass'n, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 719-
720.
8
complied with the procedures for discontinuance set forth in the
act. See id. at 715 n.10.
On remand, a judgment entered containing the following
declarations, which "shall be binding upon, without exception,
all members of the [homeowners' association] and all owners of
units in the park": (1) the Blackmans complied with the
procedures for discontinuance set forth in the act; and (2) the
1988 settlement agreement was void as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation, and was unenforceable on equitable grounds, but
it did not violate the rule against perpetuities. The judgment
also included a finding for the Blackmans on the plaintiffs'
claim for violation of G. L. c. 93A.
This matter is now here on the plaintiffs' appeal from that
judgment. They argue that the act prohibits the Blackmans from
discontinuing the park to facilitate the sale of the land.8 We
agree. We further conclude that the 1988 settlement agreement
is enforceable and therefore serves as an independent
prohibition on discontinuing the park. Lastly, we conclude that
the plaintiffs' claim for violation of G. L. c. 93A requires
further consideration.
As noted above, the Attorney General has filed an amicus
8
brief in support of the plaintiffs' interpretation of the act.
9
Discussion. 1. Discontinuance. The primary question in
this appeal is whether the Blackmans may discontinue the park
and have the manufactured homes removed to facilitate the sale
of the land. The plaintiffs argue that doing so would violate
the act and the 1988 settlement agreement, which they argue is
enforceable. We review these questions of law de novo. See
Meyer v. Veolia Energy N. Am., 482 Mass. 208, 211 (2019).9
a. Manufactured Housing Act. Turning first to the act, we
are guided by our fundamental approach to statutory
interpretation:
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by
the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered
in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief
or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers
may be effectuated" (citation omitted).
Vita v. New England Baptist Hosp., 494 Mass. 824, 834 (2024).
"[O]ur analysis begins with the principal source of insight into
legislative intent -- the plain language of the statute"
(quotations and citation omitted). Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489
Mass. 356, 362 (2022), S.C., 494 Mass. 562 (2024). "Ordinarily,
9 We note that the primary question before us -- whether the
Blackmans may discontinue the park to facilitate the sale of the
land -- could be resolved under either the act or the settlement
agreement. We nonetheless analyze the question under both
theories to provide clarity to the parties, who are here on a
second appeal following remand, and because the plaintiffs
relied on both theories in seeking damages under G. L. c. 93A.
10
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is
conclusive as to legislative intent" (citation omitted). Vita,
supra. In conducting this analysis, "[w]e do not interpret
words in a statute in isolation; rather, we must look to the
statutory scheme as a whole so as to produce an internal
consistency within the statute" (quotations and citation
omitted). Id.
The act was intended to protect a particularly vulnerable
community of homeowners who own their manufactured homes but not
the land underneath. See Greenfield Country Estates Tenants
Ass'n v. Deep, 423 Mass. 81, 86 (1996). Many owners of
manufactured homes are vulnerable to losing access to the land
on which their homes are located, leading to significant
uncertainty and hardship. See id. While theoretically movable,
manufactured homes are essentially permanently fixed to the land
under their manufactured housing communities. See Yee v.
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992). As a result, it is
typically impossible to sell a manufactured home if it is not on
a lot. "[I]f a tenant is unable to sell his home on the lot,
his investment may be rendered almost worthless." Commonwealth
v. Gustafsson, 370 Mass. 181, 191 (1976). See Commonwealth v.
DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 238 (1974) (market value of manufactured
homes in place on lot significantly greater than its market
value as manufactured home to be moved). These realities place
11
tenants of a manufactured housing community in peril if their
landlord decides to stop operating the community. See
Greenfield Country Estates Tenants Ass'n, supra. To protect
these vulnerable communities, the Legislature enacted the
Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A-32S. "The goal
of the [act] is to avoid discontinuances of manufactured housing
communities and to ensure that tenants of such communities are
not left at the peril of their landlords due to a practical
inability to relocate a manufactured housing unit." Id. Put
another way, the act was intended to protect tenants of
manufactured housing communities from displacement.
To achieve this purpose, the Legislature established
detailed procedures for (1) discontinuances of manufactured
housing communities so the owner may use the land for a
different purpose, see G. L. c. 140, § 32L (7A)-(9), and
(2) sales or leases of land resulting in discontinuances, see
G. L. c. 140, § 32R (b)-(e).10 General Laws c. 140, § 32L (7A)-
(9), prescribes the procedure to be followed when an owner wants
to discontinue a manufactured housing community and use the land
for a different purpose. The owner must "demonstrate[] that
10The act includes a third set of procedures, not pertinent
here, for an owner seeking to sell or lease the community to
someone who plans to continue operating it as such. See G. L.
c. 140, § 32R (a), (f).
12
such change of use or discontinuance is in good faith." G. L.
c. 140, § 32L (8). The owner must also give notice of the
owner's planned alternative use of the land, see id., and "pay
to any tenant who is entitled to receive notice pursuant to
paragraph (8) at the tenant's election, either (a) his actual
relocation costs or (b) the appraised value of the tenant's
manufactured home," G. L. c. 140, § 32L (7A). In contrast,
G. L. c. 140, § 32R (b)-(e), prescribes a different procedure
for an owner seeking to sell the land to a third party who wants
to use the land for a different purpose. The procedures include
notice, see G. L. c. 140, § 32R (b), and a right of first
refusal:
"A group or association of residents representing at least
fifty-one percent of the manufactured home owners residing
in the community which are entitled to notice under
paragraph (b) shall have the right to purchase, in the case
of a third party bona fide offer to purchase that the owner
intends to accept, or to lease in the case of a third party
bona fide offer to lease that the owner intends to accept,
the said community for purposes of continuing such use
thereof . . . .," G. L. c. 140, § 32R (c).
Read together, these provisions establish separate and
distinct procedures for two different means of ending a
manufactured housing community: (1) a good faith change of use
by the current owner; and (2) a sale or lease of the land to a
third party for a different use. The Legislature's
establishment of separate and distinct procedures for these
different objectives makes plain that an owner cannot invoke the
13
change of use procedures prescribed by G. L. c. 140, § 32L, to
facilitate a sale to a third party who does not plan to continue
operating the manufactured housing community. The latter is
prescribed by procedures in G. L. c. 140, § 32R (b)-(e), and we
interpret statutes to produce internal consistency. See Vita,
494 Mass. at 834.
The Blackmans argue that they should be allowed to
(1) discontinue the park, (2) have the manufactured homes
removed, and then (3) offer the land for sale, at which point
they would follow the procedures set forth in G. L. c. 140,
§ 32R (b)-(e), including giving the homeowners' association a
right of first refusal if and when they receive a "bona fide
offer for such a sale . . . that the owner intends to accept."
G. L. c. 140, § 32R (b). We disagree.
As discussed above, the act was intended to protect
manufactured home owners, who are otherwise "left at the peril
of their landlords due to a practical inability to relocate a
manufactured housing unit." Greenfield Country Estate Tenants
Ass'n, 423 Mass. at 86. The plain language of the statute is
unambiguous.11 The act prohibits the Blackmans from
11If the language of the statute were ambiguous, we would
have to consider whether to defer to the Attorney General's
interpretation of the act, as articulated in her amicus brief.
See DeCosmo v. Blue Tarp Redev., LLC, 487 Mass. 690, 700 (2021).
Because the Attorney General's interpretation is consistent with
14
discontinuing the park, having the manufactured homes removed,
and then offering the land for sale.12 To be clear, the act does
not prohibit the Blackmans from selling the land on which the
park sits to someone who does not want to operate the park. The
act simply prescribes the procedure the Blackmans must follow.
Pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 32R, they must continue to operate
the park as a manufactured housing community until they receive
a bona fide offer from a third party to purchase the land. Then
they must report this offer to the plaintiffs and give them the
opportunity to exercise their statutory right of first refusal.
See G. L. c. 140, § 32R (b), (c); ENI 131 Commerce Way LLC v.
T.L. Edwards, Inc., 103 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 840 (2024) (party
must have realistic opportunity to exercise right of first
refusal). If the plaintiffs choose not to or are unable to
exercise their right of first refusal, then the act authorizes
the Blackmans to sell the land to the third party who wants to
the plain meaning of the statute, we need not consider this
issue further.
12We note that the plaintiffs argue that notices sent by
the Blackmans did not comply with statutory requirements. Given
our broader conclusion that the Blackmans may not discontinue
the park to facilitate the sale of the land, the issue of
whether the Blackmans' notices were sufficient is moot, and we
decline to address it. See Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass.
App. Ct. 660, 661 (2020).
15
use the land for a different purpose. See G. L. c. 140,
§ 32R (c).
b. 1988 settlement agreement.13 The 1988 settlement
agreement also, independently, prohibits the Blackmans from
discontinuing the park and having the manufactured homes removed
prior to offering the land for sale. As noted above, the
settlement agreement includes provisions requiring the Blackmans
to reopen the park each year until they decide to sell the
property. In the prior appeal, we interpreted these provisions
as prohibiting the Blackmans from discontinuing the park for as
long as they own the land, but we remanded for consideration of
whether the settlement agreement is enforceable.14 See
Blackman's Point Homeowners' Ass'n, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 716-
718. On remand, in a 2024 decision, the judge concluded that
the settlement agreement was void as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation and unenforceable on equitable grounds. Before
this court, the Blackmans also argue that the settlement
The plaintiffs argue that the Blackmans waived their
13
arguments regarding the enforceability of the settlement
agreement by not raising those arguments in the 2014 lawsuit.
Regardless of whether the issue has been waived, we exercise our
discretion to reach it.
It is undisputed that the Blackmans may sell the land to
14
someone who plans to discontinue the park, and that the
settlement agreement would not restrict a future owner's ability
to discontinue the park.
16
agreement has lapsed by operation of statute, see G. L. c. 184,
§ 23. We disagree on both counts.
First, G. L. c. 184, § 23, provides that "[c]onditions or
restrictions, unlimited as to time, by which the title or use of
real property is affected, shall be limited to the term of
thirty years after the date of the deed or other instrument or
the date of the probate of the will creating them."15 The
Blackmans contend that the terms of the 1988 settlement
agreement requiring them to operate the park until they sell it
are "[c]onditions or restrictions, unlimited as to time, by
which the title or use of real property is affected." Id. The
Blackmans contend that the conditions or restrictions were
therefore limited to a term of thirty years, which ended on
March 22, 2018.
The Blackmans' position founders on the distinction between
a personal contract and a land restriction. A personal contract
imposes an obligation on a particular person or party, such that
the obligation arises from that person's promise rather than the
person's ownership of a particular parcel of land. See, e.g.,
Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 313, 316 (1929) (provision
stating that grantee agreed "to keep the tower clock in its
15The statute includes an exception for certain "gifts or
devises for public, charitable or religious purposes." G. L.
c. 184, § 23. That exception is not applicable here.
17
present position" was "personal obligation" that did not bind
future grantees). In contrast, a land restriction burdens the
land itself and limits use of the land, regardless of who owns
it. See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 485-486 (1935)
(restrictions imposed on several lots as part of common scheme
bound subsequent purchasers).
General Laws c. 184, § 23, applies to land restrictions.
Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 662 (2007). See, e.g., Brear
v. Fagan, 447 Mass. 68, 69, 77-78 (2006) (language in deeds
stated that restrictive covenants would last for thirty years;
otherwise, G. L. c. 184, § 23, would have applied); Stop & Shop
Supermkt. Co. v. Urstadt Biddle Props., Inc., 433 Mass. 285,
287-289 (2001) (statute applied to recorded agreement that
prohibited use of premises for supermarkets, regardless of
owner); Jones v. Murphy, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 2 (2003) (statute
applied to restrictive covenants limiting how lots within
subdivision could be used); Myers v. Salin, 13 Mass. App. Ct.
127, 130, 136 (1982), S.C., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 467 (1984)
(statute applied where, among other things, three separate deeds
each contained "a covenant by the grantor not to build [or to
sell without restricting the rights of future grantees to build]
on a[] [particular] area").
Here, the 1988 settlement agreement is a personal contract
between the Blackmans and the homeowners' association. In that
18
contract, the Blackmans promised that they will use the land for
a specific purpose.16 The Blackmans do not cite any cases, nor
are we aware of any, where G. L. c. 184, § 23, was held to apply
to a personal contract of the sort entered into by the
Blackmans.17 Accordingly, we conclude that the settlement
agreement has not lapsed by operation of G. L. c. 184, § 23.
Second, the settlement agreement does not impose an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. "Reasonable restraints on
alienation may be enforced." Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass.
764, 766 (1983). In determining if a restraint is reasonable,
we look to the following factors, none of which is
determinative, id.:
"1. the one imposing the restraint has some interest in
land which he is seeking to protect by the enforcement of
the restraint; 2. the restraint is limited in duration; 3.
the enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a worthwhile
purpose; 4. the type of conveyances prohibited are ones
not likely to be employed to any substantial degree by the
one restrained; 5. the number of persons to whom
alienation is prohibited is small . . . ." (Citation
omitted.)
16In this appeal, the Blackmans do not dispute that the
settlement agreement is a personal contract.
17The Blackmans cite Patterson, 448 Mass. at 662-663, and
Killorin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 80 Mass. App. Ct.
655, 657-658 (2011), for the proposition that G. L. c. 184,
§ 23, reaches personal contracts. Neither case, however, stands
for that proposition. The court in Patterson, supra at 664,
held that view easements are not restrictions within the meaning
of G. L. c. 184, § 23. In Killorin, supra at 658, we held that
restrictions created under G. L. c. 40A or zoning bylaws are not
restrictions within the meaning of G. L. c. 184, § 23.
19
These factors overwhelmingly support the conclusion that
any restraint on alienation here is reasonable. First, the
homeowners' association has an interest in the land as a duly
incorporated organization that represents the park's tenants and
has a statutory right of first refusal. Second, although the
settlement agreement is not explicitly limited in duration, the
Blackmans may end it by selling the land pursuant to the
procedures prescribed in G. L. c. 140, § 32R. Third, the
enforcement of the settlement agreement accomplishes the same
worthwhile purpose as the act: preventing the displacement of
manufactured housing community tenants. See Greenfield Country
Estates Tenants Ass'n, 423 Mass. at 86. Fourth, the settlement
agreement does not prohibit the Blackmans from using a
particular type of conveyance. Fifth, the settlement agreement
includes no prohibitions on who may buy the land. Rather, it
requires the Blackmans to offer the land for sale with the park
on it. Although that condition might limit the group of
interested buyers, it is not a prohibition on who may buy the
land. Moreover, to the extent the Blackmans rely on the right
of first refusal itself, rights of first refusal have been held
to "work[] a de minimis restraint on the alienation of
20
property." Bortolotti v. Hayden, 449 Mass. 193, 204 (2007).18
We therefore conclude that the settlement agreement is not an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. Accordingly, the
settlement agreement also prohibits the Blackmans from
discontinuing the park in any manner except by selling the land
pursuant to the procedures prescribed in G. L. c. 140, § 32R.
2. Violation of G. L. c. 93A. The plaintiffs argue that
they are entitled to a judgment in their favor on their claim
for violation of G. L. c. 93A. However, we face the same
problem in addressing the c. 93A claim in this appeal as we did
in the last appeal: the judgment for the Blackmans on the
c. 93A claim was based, at least in part, on the erroneous
premise that the Blackmans could discontinue the park to
facilitate sale of the land. Accordingly, we must remand again
for reconsideration of the plaintiffs' c. 93A claim, so that the
claim may be analyzed in the first instance under the legal
framework we have set forth herein. See Fowler v. Labor
18 As we noted in the prior appeal, see Blackman's Point
Homeowners' Ass'n, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 718 n.13, the Supreme
Judicial Court has suggested that a court might impose a thirty-
year limitation on a right of first refusal not otherwise
subject to one when circumstances "demonstrate a good reason not
to enforce the right," Bortolotti, 449 Mass. at 205 n.10. Such
circumstances include "where, because of passage of time, a
reasonable inquiry would not disclose the heirs, assigns, or
others who hold the right of first refusal to real estate." Id.
Those circumstances are not present here.
21
Relations Comm'n, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 97 (2002) (remanding
where decision was based on erroneous view of law).
Conclusion. We vacate so much of the judgment as declared
and made binding on the homeowners' association and all unit
owners that (1) the Blackmans complied with the requirements for
discontinuance set forth in the Manufactured Housing Act, and
(2) the 1988 settlement agreement is void as an unreasonable
restraint on alienation and is unenforceable on equitable
grounds. We also vacate so much of the judgment as found for
the Blackmans on the plaintiffs' claim for violation of G. L.
c. 93A. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The
matter is remanded for entry of declarations consistent with
this opinion, and for further proceedings on the plaintiffs'
claim for violation of G. L. c. 93A.
So ordered.