Anaplan Parent, LP v. Brennan
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketSJC 13917
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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SJC-13917
ANAPLAN PARENT, LP, & another1 vs. TIMOTHY BRENNAN.
Suffolk. September 9, 2026. – November 17, 2026.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges,
Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.
Contract, Agreement not to compete. Injunction. Practice,
Civil, Preliminary injunction. Statute, Construction.
Corporation, Corporate entity, Subsidiary. Words,
"Employer."
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
August 21, 2025.
A motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction was heard by Debra A. Squires-Lee, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Leigh Ann Buziak, of Pennsylvania (Russell Beck also
present) for the plaintiffs.
Patrick J. Hannon (Hampton M. Watson also present) for the
defendant.
Michaela C. May, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
1 Anaplan, Inc.
2
Samuel Larson, Stephanie Swanson, Mark C. Fleming, & Adam
Ellis Harper, for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
WENDLANDT, J. The Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement
Act, G. L. c. 149, § 24L (MNAA or act), sets forth certain
"minimum requirements" for an agreement that restricts an
employee's postemployment competitive activities to be "valid
and enforceable." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b). Pertinent to this
case, one such requirement is that such an agreement be "in
writing and signed by both the employer and employee." G. L.
c. 149, § 24L (b) (ii). This case presents the question whether
an agreement that is in writing and is signed by the employee
but bears the signature of the parent company of the employee's
employer satisfies this requirement. We conclude that it does
not. Further concluding that such an agreement does not fall
within an exception to the act's requirements for
"noncompetition agreements outside of an employment
relationship," G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a), we affirm the Superior
Court judge's denial of preliminary injunctive relief to enforce
an agreement between plaintiff Anaplan Parent, LP (parent), and
defendant, Timothy Brennan, who was an employee of the parent's
subsidiary, plaintiff Anaplan, Inc. (subsidiary), purporting to
3
restrict Brennan's postemployment activities competitive with
the subsidiary.2
Background. 1. Facts. The subsidiary, an enterprise
software company, hired Brennan in 2019.3 Three years later,
Brennan entered into an equity incentive agreement with the
parent, a limited partnership with a stated purpose to "invest
in, manage, operate, oversee, structure and control, directly or
indirectly," the subsidiary, the only operating subsidiary of
the parent.4
In connection with the agreement, Brennan received an
equity interest in the parent and became one of its limited
partners. In exchange, he agreed to certain restrictive
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America and Associated
Industries of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Employment
Lawyers Association.
3 At the commencement of his employment with the subsidiary,
Brennan entered into an employment agreement that required
Brennan to assent to a provision purporting to restrict his
postemployment competitive activities. The employment agreement
was signed by both Brennan and the subsidiary; however, the case
at bar does not concern the noncompetition provision of the
employment agreement, and neither the parent nor the subsidiary
contends that it is enforceable under the MNAA. See note 13,
infra.
4 The subsidiary, Anaplan, Inc., is directly owned by
Anaplan Holdings, LLC, which is in turn owned by Anaplan
Intermediate Holdings, Inc., which is in turn owned by Anaplan
Parent, LP. While this renders plaintiff Anaplan Parent, LP,
the corporate "great-grandparent" of plaintiff Anaplan, Inc., we
use the term "parent," as the parties have, for simplicity.
4
covenants, including a covenant that, for the twelve-month
period after his employment with the subsidiary ceased, Brennan
would not render services to a business that competes with the
subsidiary.5 The agreement provided that the equity grant
5 More particularly, the agreement provided:
"During Participant's Continuous Service and for a period
of [twelve] months after the date on which Participant's
Continuous Services ceases, Participant shall not directly
or indirectly participate in any activity . . . that would
qualify as Competition in the Territory . . . ."
"Participant" was defined as Brennan. "Continuous Service"
was defined as "an individual's continuous employment with, or
continuous provision of services to, the Partnership or one of
its Subsidiaries." As discussed infra, Brennan provided no
services to the parent; accordingly, his "Continuous Service"
period ended with his employment with the subsidiary.
"Partnership" was defined as the parent "and/or its direct
and indirect Subsidiaries and/or controlled Affiliates,"
including the subsidiary. "Competition" was defined to mean
"to directly or indirectly . . . render services to or for
. . . any . . . business or enterprise (including any
division, group or franchise of a larger organization),
whether as a . . . director, officer, employee, . . . or
other participant, that conducts, participates in or
constitutes a business or business line that the
Partnership is conducting or that the Partnership conducted
during the one-year period immediately preceding the date
that Participant is no longer employed or engaged by the
Partnership or any Subsidiary or Affiliate of the
Partnership."
"Territory" was defined as
"all of the United States . . . and all of each other
country in which the Partnership generates sales, markets
products or provides services during Participant's
employment or engagement or, upon termination of
Participant's employment or engagement, generated sales,
5
"serve[d] as fair and reasonable consideration" supporting the
restrictive covenants, including the restriction on Brennan's
postemployment activities in competition with the subsidiary.6
The agreement was signed by the parent's interim chief financial
officer on behalf of the parent and was also signed by Brennan.
It was not signed by, or on behalf of, the subsidiary. However,
the agreement expressly identified the subsidiary as a third-
party beneficiary, providing that "[c]ertain provisions of [the
agreement] are entered into for the benefit of and shall be
enforceable by . . . [the subsidiary] as provided herein."7
marketed products or provided services at any time during
the one-year period prior to the termination of
Participant's employment or engagement."
6 Annex C to the equity incentive agreement tailored the
general terms of the agreement apparently to conform to certain
State requirements for the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements, including certain requirements under the MNAA.
Thus, Brennan agreed and acknowledged that he "had ten business
days from receipt of [the agreement] to review and accept [the
agreement], prior to it becoming effective." See G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b) (i). Annex C also provided that the covenant not to
compete "shall not apply if the [subsidiary] terminates
[Brennan's] employment without Cause." See G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (c) (iii).
7 In addition to the covenant not to compete at issue in
this appeal, the equity incentive agreement between the parent
and Brennan also contained a nonsolicitation provision,
prohibiting Brennan from soliciting any of the parent or the
subsidiary's other participants, associates, consultants,
agents, or representatives. The agreement also barred Brennan
from soliciting the parent or the subsidiary's customers,
suppliers, vendors, licensees, distributors, contractors, or
other business relations. And the agreement further prohibited
Brennan from making "any derogatory or negative statement or
6
Over the next two years, Brennan entered into two
additional equity incentive agreements with the parent; each
contained materially the same terms. Both granted Brennan
equity interests in the parent in exchange for, inter alia,
nearly identical noncompetition covenants. As with the original
equity incentive agreement, Brennan and the parent signed, but
the subsidiary did not. The subsidiary was also identified as a
third-party beneficiary to these agreements.
The record details the services Brennan rendered to the
subsidiary as its employee. By contrast, the record does not
show that Brennan provided any services to the parent, and
Brennan expressly denied doing so. On July 25, 2025, Brennan
notified the subsidiary that he had accepted an offer to join
Pigment, another enterprise software company that competes with
the subsidiary.
2. Procedural history. In August 2025, the parent and the
subsidiary commenced the present suit and filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to
prohibit Brennan from starting his employment at Pigment.8 In a
communication about the [parent] or its Affiliates" or their
"respective businesses, products, services or activities" other
than truthful statements compelled by valid legal order.
8 The parent and the subsidiary first commenced a suit in
Federal District Court, seeking a temporary restraining order
and injunction, but dismissed the suit before any decision on
the motion. They commenced the present suit the same day.
7
thorough, well-reasoned opinion, the Superior Court judge denied
the motion. The judge determined that the parent and the
subsidiary had not shown a likelihood to succeed on the merits
because the noncompetition covenants were not enforceable under
the MNAA, as the equity incentive agreements were not signed by
Brennan's employer, the subsidiary. The judge also rejected the
alternative argument that the covenants were not governed by the
act, which does not apply to "noncompetition agreements outside
of an employment relationship." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a). The
judge reasoned that the covenants arose "out of an . . .
employment relationship."9 Id. The parent and subsidiary timely
filed a notice of appeal.10 We transferred the appeal sua
sponte.
9 The employment agreement between Brennan and the
subsidiary, see note 3, supra, provided that "all claims
relating to [Brennan's] employment" would be settled by "final
and binding arbitration." The arbitration provision specified
that "[i]njunctive relief and other provisional remedies will be
available in accordance with Section 1281.8 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure," which permits arbitrators to issue
"[p]reliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders,"
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.8(a)(3). In the Superior Court,
Brennan referred to the arbitration provision in his opposition
to the sought preliminary injunctive relief; after the judge
denied the injunctive relief, Brennan filed a motion to compel
arbitration, which the judge allowed.
10The parent and the subsidiary unsuccessfully sought an
injunction pending appeal from the Superior Court judge and from
a single justice of the Appeals Court. The single justice
recognized that the case presented "a matter of first
impression."
8
3. Statutory framework. In a "hard fought compromise"
nearly a decade in the making, the Legislature enacted the MNAA
in 2018 to govern the enforceability of noncompetition
agreements in the Commonwealth as part of broader economic
development legislation. Brownsberger, A Study in Persistence
and Compromise (Aug. 13, 2018), https://willbrownsberger.com/a-
study-in-persistence-and-compromise-legislation-regulating-
agreements-not-to-compete [https://perma.cc/VPQ2-SRXW]. See St.
2018, c. 228, § 21 (titled "An Act relative to economic
development in the Commonwealth"). The MNAA defines a
"[n]oncompetition agreement" as an agreement "under which the
employee . . . agrees that he or she will not engage in certain
specified activities competitive with his or her employer after
the employment relationship has ended." G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (a). The agreement must either be "between an employer
and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an . . . employment
relationship." Id. Certain enumerated agreements are excluded
from the statutory definition of "[n]oncompetition agreement,"
including "noncompetition agreements outside of an employment
relationship."11 Id. These excluded agreements are not governed
by the act. Id.
11The other exclusions include provisions not to solicit
the employer's "employees[,] . . . customers, clients, or
vendors," "noncompetition agreements made in connection with the
sale of a business . . . when the party restricted by the
9
The MNAA provides employees with procedural and substantive
protections; a noncompetition agreement must meet these "minimum
requirements" "[t]o be valid and enforceable."12 G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b). Relevant to the case at bar, one minimum requirement
is that "the agreement must be in writing and signed by both the
employer and employee." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (ii). The act
also requires that any noncompetition agreement entered into
after commencement of employment "must be supported by fair and
reasonable consideration independent from the continuation of
employment." Id. Another minimum requirement prescribes that
"notice of the agreement must be provided at least [ten]
business days before the agreement is to be effective," and that
the agreement must "expressly state that the employee has the
right to consult with counsel prior to signing."13 Id.
noncompetition agreement" will "benefit from the sale,"
"forfeiture agreements," "nondisclosure or confidentiality
agreements," "invention assignment agreements," "garden leave
clauses," "noncompetition agreements made in connection with the
cessation of or separation from employment" that "expressly
give[ the employee] seven business days to rescind acceptance,"
and "agreements . . . to not reapply for employment to the same
employer after termination of the employee." G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (a).
12The MNAA prohibits the enforcement of certain
noncompetition agreements entirely, including noncompetition
agreements with minors, students engaged in short-term
employment, most hourly workers, and those who have been fired
or laid off. G. L. c. 149, § 24L (c).
13Where a noncompetition agreement "is entered into in
connection with the commencement of employment," it also "must
10
Additionally, the act requires that the noncompetition
agreement not restrict employees for more than one year after
termination of employment absent employee wrongdoing, and for no
more than two years in that event. G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b) (iv). Noncompetition agreements also "must be no
broader than necessary to protect one or more of the following
legitimate business interests of the employer": its trade
secrets, confidential information, and good will. G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b) (iii).
Further, the act prescribes that noncompetition agreements
"must be reasonable in geographic reach" and "in the scope of
proscribed activities." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (v), (vi). The
act also requires that a noncompetition agreement must "be
supported by a garden leave clause or other mutually-agreed upon
be provided to the employee by the earlier of a formal offer of
employment or [ten] business days before the commencement of the
employee's employment." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (i).
As discussed, see note 3, supra, neither the parent nor the
subsidiary contends that the noncompetition provision in
Brennan's employment agreement with the subsidiary, which stated
that it was governed by California law and which was executed at
the commencement of his employment, is enforceable. Executed in
2019, after the MNAA became effective on October 1, 2018, see
St. 2018, c. 228, § 71, the employment agreement likely did not
comply with at least one of the act's "minimum requirements" for
enforceability of a noncompetition agreement, G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b). At the least, it does not appear to "expressly state
that the employee has the right to consult with counsel prior to
signing." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (i).
11
consideration between the employer and the employee" specified
in the noncompetition agreement.14 G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b) (vii). And a noncompetition agreement otherwise "must
be consonant with public policy." G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (b) (viii). The MNAA provides that a "court may, in its
discretion, reform or otherwise revise a noncompetition
agreement so as to render it valid and enforceable to the extent
necessary to protect the applicable legitimate business
interests." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (d).
Discussion.15 1. Standard of review. When examining the
denial of a preliminary injunction, we "determine whether there
14A garden leave clause is defined as "a provision within a
noncompetition agreement by which an employer agrees to pay the
employee during the restricted period, provided that such
provision shall become effective upon termination of employment
unless the restriction upon post-employment activities are
waived by the employer or ineffective." G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (a). A garden leave clause itself is not considered to be
a "noncompetition agreement" under the act, see note 11, supra.
15Before turning to the merits, we pause to address
Brennan's request that we dismiss the present appeal in view of
the judge's allowance of Brennan's motion to compel arbitration.
See note 9, supra. In the circumstances here, where the motion
to compel arbitration was filed and allowed after the judge
denied the sought preliminary injunctive relief, we decline
Brennan's request. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v.
Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 640, 649
(1987) ("an order compelling arbitration does not preclude a
court from awarding necessary pre-judgment relief"). Indeed,
none of the cases upon which Brennan relies resulted in the
dismissal of an appeal from an order of preliminary relief, in
view of arbitration. See Cybulski v. Vaiani, 75 Mass. App. Ct.
382, 384-385 (2009); Cunningham v. Lyft, Inc., 17 F.4th 244, 253
(1st Cir. 2021), quoting Next Step Med. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson
12
was an error of law or whether the judge abused his or her
discretion -- that is, whether the judge applied proper legal
standards and whether there was reasonable support for the
judge's evaluation of factual questions." Massachusetts Port
Auth. v. Turo Inc., 487 Mass. 235, 239 (2021), citing King v.
Town Clerk of Townsend, 480 Mass. 7, 9 (2018).
"We consider the same factors as did the judge: whether
the party seeking the preliminary injunction is likely to
succeed on the merits; whether irreparable harm will result
from a denial of the injunction; and whether, in light of
the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits, the
risk of irreparable harm to the moving party outweighs the
potential harm to the nonmoving party in granting the
injunction."
Turo Inc., supra, citing Garcia v. Department of Hous.
& Community Dev., 480 Mass. 736, 747 (2018), S.C., 495 Mass. 86
(2024).
Where, as here, the judge's analysis of the likelihood of
success on the merits prong rested on a question of statutory
construction, we review that question de novo. See Foster v.
Int'l, 619 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 2010) (reviewing issue of
preliminary relief on merits after ordering arbitration in
recognition that court "may issue 'an interim preliminary
injunction' . . . in the period before 'the arbitrator is set up
and able to offer interim relief itself'").
Moreover, the substantive issues before us are fully
briefed and concern important questions of law regarding the
enforceability of noncompetition agreements in the Commonwealth.
As such we exercise our discretion to reach them. See Automile
Holdings, LLC v. McGovern, 483 Mass. 797, 808 (2020), citing Doe
v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 460 Mass. 342, 343 n.3 (2011).
13
Commissioner of Correction, 488 Mass. 643, 651 (2021), citing
Doe v. Worcester Pub. Sch., 484 Mass. 598, 601 (2020).
2. Statutory construction. "In construing a statute, we
begin with its plain language." Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 494
Mass. 562, 567 (2024), quoting Matter of the Estate of Mason,
493 Mass. 148, 151 (2023).
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by
the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered
in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief
or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers
may be effectuated."
Patel, supra, quoting Matter of the Estate of Mason, supra.
"Because of their remedial nature," we afford an employment
statute, like the MNAA, a liberal construction, Jinks v. Credico
(USA) LLC, 488 Mass. 691, 700 (2021), "to promote the
accomplishment of its beneficent design," Patel, supra at 568,
quoting Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 363 (2022),
S.C., 494 Mass. 562 (2024).
3. Analysis. a. "Employer" under the MNAA. The parent
and the subsidiary first contend that the covenants not to
compete satisfied the act's minimum requirement that
noncompetition agreements be in writing signed by both the
employee and the employer because the term "employer" as used in
the act includes a parent of the direct employer. We disagree.
14
The term "employer" is not defined in the act. However,
the act defines the term "employee," which is instructive as to
the meaning of "employer." See Crown Communities, LLC v.
Austin, 497 Mass. 632, 646 (2026), quoting Garcia v. Steele, 492
Mass. 322, 326 (2023) ("[w]e do not construe terms in isolation;
instead, we consider the specific language of a provision in the
context of the statute as a whole").
Under the act, an employee is "an individual who is
considered an employee under [G. L. c. 149, § 148B (independent
contractor statute)]; provided, however, that the term
'employee' . . . shall also include independent contractors
under [the independent contractor statute]." G. L. c. 149,
§ 24L (a). The independent contractor statute, in turn,
classifies an individual performing any service to an entity
either as "an employee or an independent contractor." Depianti
v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 465 Mass. 607, 621 (2013).
It provides:
"[A]n individual performing any service . . . shall be
considered to be an employee . . . unless:--
"(1) the individual is free from control and direction in
connection with the performance of the service, both under
his contract for the performance of service and in fact;
and
"(2) the service is performed outside the usual course of
the business of the employer; and,
"(3) the individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or
15
business of the same nature as that involved in the service
performed."
G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a).
As set forth supra, the MNAA defines "employee" for
purposes of the act to include both individuals who are
classified as employees and those classified as independent
contractors under the independent contractor statute. Thus,
under the MNAA, an employee is an individual performing any
service for an entity, regardless of whether the individual is
classified as an employee or an independent contractor under the
independent contractor statute. It follows that an "employer"
under the MNAA is, at a minimum, an entity for which an
individual performs any service. Accord Black's Law Dictionary
663 (12th ed. 2024) (defining "employer" as "[a] person,
company, or organization for whom someone works; esp[ecially],
one who controls and directs a worker under an express or
implied contract of hire and who pays the worker's salary or
wages"); G. L. c. 151A, § 1 (j) (unemployment insurance statute
defining "employer" as legal entity with "one or more
individuals performing services for" it); G. L. c. 152, § 1 (5)
(under workers' compensation act, employer is "legal
entity . . . employing employees"). Here, the record shows that
Brennan performed services for the subsidiary; thus, the
subsidiary is Brennan's "employer" for purposes of the MNAA.
16
Nevertheless, the parent asserts that it is Brennan's
"employer" for purposes of the act. In assessing the merits of
this argument, it is instructive that to determine which, as
between two entities, is an individual's employer under both the
wage laws, G. L. c. 151, §§ 1 and 1A, and the independent
contractor statute, G. L. c. 149, § 148B, we are guided by the
principle that "the entity for [which] the individual directly
performs services is ordinarily the individual's employer"
(emphasis added), Jinks, 488 Mass. at 696, citing Depianti, 465
Mass. at 624 n.17, such that generally "one entity is not the
employer of a different entity's employees," Jinks, supra at
698-699. Thus, a parent is not ordinarily the employer of its
subsidiary's employees. See generally Engelhardt v. S.P.
Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006), quoting Lusk v.
FoxMeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1997) ("there
is a 'strong presumption that a parent corporation is not the
employer of its subsidiary's employees'" for purposes of
subjecting parent to liability for acts of subsidiary against
its employees). This general rule admits of at least two
17
exceptions -- corporate disregard16 and joint-employer status17 --
neither of which is contended to apply in the present
circumstances.
Admittedly, the parent notes that two separate, affiliated
entities may be liable for each other's acts under the doctrine
of joint venture liability, contending that the parent's "active
role" in connection with the subsidiary should permit it to
16Corporate disregard, when applicable, sets aside the
principle that "corporations are generally to be regarded as
separate from each other and from their respective
stockholders." Jinks, 488 Mass. at 697-698, quoting My Bread
Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 618 (1968).
It is a narrow exception, applicable only where "necessary to
provide meaningful remedy for injuries and to avoid injustice."
Jinks, supra at 697, quoting Attorney Gen. v. M.C.K., Inc., 432
Mass. 546, 555 (2000). Neither the parent nor the subsidiary
contends that the requirements for corporate disregard are met.
See Jinks, supra, quoting Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc.,
471 Mass. 321, 328 (2015) (listing considerations).
17An entity other than the entity for which the individual
directly performs services can be considered a "joint employer"
where it "has retained for itself sufficient control over the
terms and conditions of the second entity's employees." Jinks,
488 Mass. at 701, citing Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores,
Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997). The parent does
not contend that it qualifies as Brennan's joint employer. The
parent did not hire Brennan, did not have the power to fire him,
did not supervise him, did not dictate or pay his salary, and
did not maintain his employment records. See generally Jinks,
supra at 703, quoting Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc. v.
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998) (setting forth
nonexclusive factors for determination of joint employer status
under minimum wage and overtime statutes, G. L. c. 151, §§ 1,
1A). The record shows that the parent's only payments to
Brennan were in the form of equity, which the equity incentive
agreements make clear "are not part of normal or expected
compensation."
18
enforce the noncompetition agreement with its subsidiary's
employee. But the record does not support that the parent
entered into a joint venture with the subsidiary as pertains to
Brennan. Instead, the parent and the subsidiary have maintained
their separate corporate forms. See note 4, supra. Having
taken advantage of the benefits of this separateness, they may
not disavow that form when it is to their advantage. See
Spaneas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 423 Mass. 352, 354 (1996),
citing Berger v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 416 Mass. 652, 658 (1993),
S.C., 424 Mass. 144 (1997).
Application of the general rule -- that the entity for
which the individual directly performs services is ordinarily
the individual's employer -- demonstrates that the parent was
not Brennan's employer. In fact, the record does not support
that Brennan performed any services whatsoever for the parent,
let alone that he performed any services directly for the
parent. The record evidences only that Brennan provided
services directly to the subsidiary; Brennan's sole relationship
with the parent appears to be that he and the parent entered
into the equity incentive agreements pursuant to which Brennan
received equity in the parent, becoming a limited partner,18 in
18A limited partner of a partnership is not, by virtue of
that status, the partnership's employee. See G. L. c. 109,
§ 19 (b) (1) (limited partner need not be limited partnership's
employee).
19
exchange for certain restrictive covenants, including the
noncompetition provisions in dispute, to benefit the subsidiary.
The parent and the subsidiary invite us to adopt the
definition of "employer" from G. L. c. 149, § 1, which defines
"employer" to include "any person acting in the interest of an
employer directly or indirectly," on the basis that the
Legislature's placement of the MNAA within c. 149 demonstrates
its intent to adopt that definition of the term. See Care
& Protection of Jaylen, 493 Mass. 798, 802 (2024), quoting
Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 582-583 (1994)
("We strive to construe a statute 'in harmony with prior
enactments to give rise to a consistent body of law' wherever
possible, assuming as we must that the 'Legislature was aware of
the existing statutes'"). But the definition of "employer" set
forth in G. L. c. 149, § 1, expressly is limited to application
in connection with G. L. c. 149, §§ 105A to 105C, 105E, and
105F. Contrary to the parent's and the subsidiary's suggestion,
the definition set forth in G. L. c. 149, § 1, shows that where
the Legislature intended to adopt this definition of "employer,"
it knew how to do so, and with regard to the MNAA, codified at
§ 24L, it chose not to do so.19
19The parent and the subsidiary also argue that the term
"employer" should be "narrowed to the facts of this case," to
include a parent "acting solely and exclusively in the interests
of" its subsidiary. Not surprisingly, we do not construe a
20
The equity incentive agreements failed to satisfy the act's
minimum requirement that the employer sign the noncompetition
agreement because the subsidiary, Brennan's employer, did not
sign them.20 See G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (ii). Accordingly,
unless the noncompetition covenants fall outside the act's
reach, discussed infra, they are not valid and enforceable.
b. Noncompetition agreements outside an employment
relationship. In the alternative, the parent and the subsidiary
contend that the noncompetition covenants are not governed by
the act because the covenants fall within an exclusion for
"noncompetition agreements outside of an employment
relationship." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a). In particular, the
parent and the subsidiary contend that "a noncompetition
agreement must either be 'inside' the employment relationship or
statute of general application to conform to the unique facts
presented by a particular corporate relationship in any one
case. See Haggerty v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17, 20 (1869) ("[A]
statute cannot be construed so as to meet the hardships of
individual cases").
20The parent and the subsidiary suggest that the judge
"could have . . . adjusted the definition of 'employer'" to
salvage the noncompetition covenants, relying on the provision
of the MNAA permitting courts, as a matter of discretion, to
"reform or otherwise revise a noncompetition agreement so as to
render it valid and enforceable to the extent necessary to
protect the applicable legitimate business interests." G. L.
c. 149, § 24L (d). This argument lacks merit. The referenced
provision concerns the court's discretionary authority to reform
or revise a noncompetition agreement; it is not a rule of
statutory construction.
21
'outside' the employment relationship" such that if (as we
conclude supra) the parent is not Brennan's employer, then the
noncompetition covenants must fall outside the relationship.
Applying this reasoning, the parent and the subsidiary maintain
that the noncompetition covenants are not governed by the
minimum requirements of the act because they constitute
"noncompetition agreements outside of an employment
relationship." Id. We disagree.
An agreement does not fall "outside" the employment
relationship simply because the employer failed to sign the
agreement; instead, we look to the agreement itself to determine
whether it is a "noncompetition agreement" as defined in the act
as either one "between an employer and an employee," or one
"otherwise arising out of an . . . employment relationship."
G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a). As discussed supra, the noncompetition
covenants here were not between Brennan, an employee, and his
employer, the subsidiary; instead, the agreements were between
Brennan and the parent.
We turn to consider whether the covenants constitute
noncompetition agreements "otherwise arising out of an . . .
employment relationship." G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a). As the
parent and subsidiary acknowledge, Brennan entered into the
covenants "[i]n connection with his employment with" the
subsidiary, and the covenants themselves purport to impose
22
postemployment restrictions on competition with the subsidiary
for a period after his employment with the subsidiary ended.
The equity incentive agreements specifically identified the
subsidiary, Brennan's employer, as a third-party beneficiary of,
inter alia, the noncompetition covenants, and provided
consideration (in the form of equity in the parent) to Brennan
in exchange for his promise not to compete with the subsidiary,
his employer, after his employment ended. In these
circumstances, we conclude the noncompetition covenants arose
out of an employment relationship. Accordingly, the covenants
are "noncompetition agreements" as defined by the act.
The parent and the subsidiary next rely on the canon
against surplusage, which directs courts to "give effect to each
word" in a statute. Matter of the Estate of Slavin, 492 Mass.
551, 556 (2023), quoting Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass.
407, 412 (2009). In particular, they maintain that the canon
requires that because the term "noncompetition agreement" is
defined in the act as "an agreement between an employer and an
employee, or otherwise arising out of an . . . employment
relationship," and because the exception refers to
"noncompetition agreements outside of an employment
relationship," the exception contemplates agreements "arising
out of an . . . employment relationship" that are also "outside
of an employment relationship" (emphasis added). G. L. c. 149,
23
§ 24L (a). Because the noncompetition covenants here arose from
Brennan's employment relationship with the subsidiary, and
because, having been executed by the parent rather than by
Brennan's employer, the noncompetition covenants were outside of
the employment relationship, the parent and the subsidiary
continue, the covenants fall within the exception.21
To be sure, "absent contrary context," "statutory terms
used more than once should be given a consistent meaning
throughout." Miele v. Foundation Med., Inc., 496 Mass. 171, 177
(2025), citing Williams v. Board of Appeals of Norwell, 490
Mass. 684, 694 (2022). And where the Legislature has defined a
term expressly in the statute at issue, we generally use that
definition in construing the act. See Arias-Villano v. Chang
& Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 628 (2019), quoting 2A N.J.
Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:7
(7th ed. rev. 2014) ("When a legislature does define statutory
language, its definition usually is binding on courts, even if
the definition varies from a term's ordinary meaning").
21The parent and the subsidiary's reliance on Rooterman,
LLC v. Belegu, 778 F. Supp. 3d 298, 308 n.3 (D. Mass. 2025),
which commented that it "appear[ed] that the [MNAA did] not
apply" to the franchisee-franchisor relationship because it was
"outside of an employment relationship," is misplaced (citation
omitted). Whether a franchisee-franchisor relationship falls
under this exception has no bearing on this case, where nothing
in the record shows that Brennan was a franchisee of either the
parent or the subsidiary.
24
However, "[c]ourts may not be bound by statutory definitions
where they . . . result in unreason