Tarasuik v. DeSimone
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Date FiledOctober 20, 2026
DocketSJC 13957
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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SJC-13957
RYAN TARASUIK vs. CHRISTOPHER DeSIMONE, SR., & others.1
October 20, 2026.
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
The petitioner, Ryan Tarasuik, appeals from the judgment of
a single justice of this court denying his petition for
extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.
Tarasuik is a litigant in the Northeast Division of the
Housing Court Department. In his petition to the single
justice, filed on June 1, 2026, Tarasuik broadly challenged a
series of orders of the Housing Court permitting a sale of the
property where he lived as a tenant, allowing work to be
performed on the property, and ordering Tarasuik to make use and
occupancy payments. In particular, Tarasuik's petition
challenged three orders issued in two Housing Court cases
brought by Tarasuik against owners of the property: (1) an
order dated February 3, 2026, denying Tarasuik's request to
enjoin a sale of the property and requiring him to allow the
owner to show, inspect, and repair the property; (2) an order
dated April 28, 2026, allowing the property owner to move for an
order requiring Tarasuik to make use and occupancy payments;2 and
1 162 Washington LLC, and Rock and Sons Property Management
LLC.
That order also required the owner of the property to
2
provide notice to Tarasuik prior to performing certain work,
required the owner to comply with a local ordinance limiting
work hours, and noted that the owner waived service of the
order.
2
(3) an order dated May 28, 2026, requiring Tarasuik to make use
and occupancy payments. In addition to seeking relief from
these orders, Tarasuik also moved the single justice to stay
these orders and all proceedings in the Housing Court.
In her judgment denying Tarasuik's petition, the single
justice concluded that the petition did not demonstrate "the
type of exceptional matter that requires the court's
extraordinary intervention," and further, that adequate
alternative remedies were available to Tarasuik. Commonwealth
v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 25 (2019). See id. at 24-25. As to
Tarasuik's motion, the single justice concluded that a stay was
not necessary to avoid irreparable harm. Tarasuik moved for
reconsideration, and his motion was denied.
Tarasuik appeals from the judgment of the single justice.3
"In cases such as this one, where the single justice exercises
discretion not to reach the merits of a petition" seeking relief
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, "the full court asks only whether
the single justice abused his or her discretion in making that
decision" (quotation and citations omitted). Boone v.
Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 1011, 1012-1013 (2024). "The single
justice is not required to become involved if the petitioner has
an adequate alternative remedy or if the single justice
determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject of the
petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary as to
require general superintendence intervention." Fontanez, 482
Mass. at 24-25.
Here, Tarasuik did not sufficiently explain why review of
the disputed orders could not have been obtained in the ordinary
course of appeal from any final judgments or, to the extent they
were interlocutory orders, by way of review pursuant to G. L.
c. 231, § 118, first par. See Harihar v. Commonwealth, 497
Mass. 1013, 1014 (2026) (discussing direct appeal as adequate
alternative); Greco v. Plymouth Sav. Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-
1020 (1996) (review pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par.,
where available, is adequate alternative to G. L. c. 211, § 3).
3 Tarasuik filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to
S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which
applies where "a single justice denies relief from a challenged
interlocutory ruling in the trial court." S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (1).
We assume without deciding that Tarasuik's appeal is not limited
by the requirements of rule 2:21, but as described herein, we
conclude that Tarasuik was not, in any event, entitled to relief
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.
3
Indeed, in successive petitions to single justices of the
Appeals Court, Tarasuik requested and received review pursuant
to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., of an order denying a
request to enjoin a sale of the property, as well as the order
requiring him to make use and occupancy payments. Although his
requested relief was denied in each instance, the fact that he
"did not receive the relief in that court that he desired . . .
does not render the relief inadequate or entitle him to relief
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3." Harihar, supra.
As Tarasuik has not demonstrated the absence of adequate
alternative relief, the judgment of the single justice is
affirmed.4
Judgment affirmed.
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by
a memorandum of law.
Ryan Tarasuik, pro se.
4 As Tarasuik was not entitled to the relief sought in his
petition, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in
the denial of his motion to stay.