In the Matter of Hon. Knapp

In the Matter of the Honorable Marc Knapp, Judge of the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County, JD No. 1, September Term, 2025, Opinion by Booth, J. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – REMOVAL – The Supreme Court of Maryland removed from office a judge serving on the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County who engaged in egregious misconduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Court concluded that the judge violated numerous provisions of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct (“MCJC”)—18-101.1 (Compliance with the Law); 18-101.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary); 18-102.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment); 18- 102.5 (Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation); 18-102.8(b) (Decorum, Demeanor, and Communications); and 18-102.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities). These violations arose from the judge’s interference with the operations of the Orphans’ Court, including his: (1) recording judicial deliberations without his colleagues’ consent; (2) knowingly and willfully attempting to destroy evidence in the presence of law enforcement officers; (3) repeatedly failing to maintain patient, dignified, and courteous conduct toward judicial colleagues and court staff in and outside of the courtroom; (4) engaging in conduct that created a perception of bias against women and persons of color; (5) repeatedly making disparaging comments about the Judiciary, Orphans’ Court and a judicial colleague to the public and the media; and (6) failing to cooperate with the Judicial Disabilities Commission’s investigative process. The Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s egregious conduct in intentionally deleting audio recordings in the presence of law enforcement officers who were called to investigate a complaint that he was recording his colleagues during judicial deliberations was a sufficient basis to warrant his removal from office. Such conduct is fundamentally incompatible with judicial office and erodes the public confidence and in trust in the Judiciary. In addition to this blatant violation, the Court also considered the conduct upon which it found violations of the MCJC, as well as mitigating factors, and concluded that removal was the only disposition sufficient to preserve the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the Judiciary and assure the public that the Judiciary does not condone such judicial misconduct. Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities Case Nos.: CJD 2024-033, CJD 2024-034, CJD 2024-035, CJD 2024-040, CJD 2024-0046 CJD 2024-047, CJD 2024-052, CJD 2024-068 Argued: June 4, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND JD No. 1 September Term, 2025 IN THE MATTER OF THE HONORABLE MARC KNAPP, JUDGE OF THE ORPHANS’ COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Harrell, Glenn T. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned) McDonald, Robert N. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned) JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Filed: July 17, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.17 '00'04- 13:05:13 Gregory Hilton, Clerk  “In Maryland, judges are expected to abide by certain ethical standards, set forth in the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct [], to ensure they conduct themselves in a manner consistent with preserving the integrity of the judiciary.” In re Nickerson, 473 Md. 509, 512 (2021) (footnote omitted). When a judge’s conduct falls short of those standards, the Maryland Constitution vests the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities (the “Commission”) with authority to investigate alleged instances of judicial misconduct and, where appropriate, recommend that this Court take appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including removal from office. Md. Const. art. IV, § 4B; In re Ademiluyi, 488 Md. 45 (2024). This case concerns Marc Knapp, a judge of the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County, who was elected to that position by the qualified voters of Anne Arundel County in November 2022.1 On February 24, 2025, Investigative Counsel charged Judge Knapp with having engaged in sanctionable conduct that violated multiple provisions of the Maryland 1 Maryland’s Orphans’ Courts are courts of record established by Article IV, Section 1 of the Maryland Constitution. These courts exercise jurisdiction over the administration of estates, certain guardianship and protective proceedings, and related matters. Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts (“ET”) §§ 2-102, 13-105. The Maryland Constitution requires only that Orphans’ Court judges be Maryland citizens and residents of their jurisdiction for at least twelve months before their election. Md. Const. art. IV, § 40. By statute, different jurisdictions have different requirements for serving on the Orphans’ Court for that jurisdiction. For example, in Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Prince George’s County, Orphans’ Court judges are required to be members of the Maryland bar, and a single judge may preside over and decide matters alone. By contrast, in Anne Arundel County, as relevant to this proceeding, the judges are not required to be Maryland attorneys. The judges make decisions as a three-judge panel, requiring that at least two judges concur for the court to take any official action, thus constituting a collegial decision-making process. ET § 2-106(a)(3). Code of Judicial Conduct (“MCJC”).2 Investigative Counsel amended the charges on May 1, 2025, and alleged that Judge Knapp committed sanctionable conduct in violation of Maryland Rules 18-101.1 (Compliance with the Law); 18-101.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary); 18-101.3 (Avoiding Lending the Prestige of Judicial Office); 18-102.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment); 18-102.5 (Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation); 18-102.8 (Decorum, Demeanor, and Communications with Jurors); 18-102.10 (Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases); 18-102.16(b) (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities); and 18-103.1(d) & (e) (Extra-Official Activities in General). On June 5, 2025, Judge Knapp, through counsel, filed a response to the amended charges. The Commission held a public hearing over the course of three days in October 2025. At the hearing, Investigative Counsel called 12 witnesses and entered 27 exhibits. Judge Knapp testified on his own behalf, called two character witnesses, and entered three exhibits.3 2 The Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct (“MCJC”) is codified in Chapter 100 of Title 18 of the Maryland Rules. “The substantive provisions and much of the MCJC are based in large part on the 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct proposed by the American Bar Association (ABA Model Code).” Md. Rule 18-100.1(a) (citation modified). The MCJC is divided into five parts: introductory material, judicial integrity and the avoidance of impropriety, the performance of judicial duties, extrajudicial activities, and political activity. See Committee Note to Md. Rule 18-100.1(a). This structure “conforms generally” to the ABA Model Code. Id. Likewise, the Rules are numbered in parallel to the ABA Model Code. “Thus, for example, ABA Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law) is Maryland Rule 18-101.1, which is also captioned ‘Compliance with the Law.’” Id. 3 At the Commission hearing, Investigative Counsel called the following witnesses: Deborah Cheek (Auditor and Assistant Court Administrator for the Anne Arundel County Register of Wills); the Honorable David Duba (former Orphans’ Court judge for Anne Arundel County); Corporal Juan Fuentes (Anne Arundel County Police Department); Cody Henson (security guard for the Watkins Security Agency stationed at the Anne Arundel County Orphans’ Court); Georges-Phillip Hetherington (former law clerk for the Anne 2  On March 9, 2025, the Commission issued a unanimous decision in which it made extensive findings of fact, and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Judge Knapp committed sanctionable conduct as defined by Maryland Rule 18-402(m)(1).4 In total, the Commission concluded that Judge Knapp violated the following Maryland Rules: 18- 101.1; 18-101.2; 18-102.3; 18-102.5; 18-102.8(b); and 18-102.16. The Commission found insufficient evidence to sustain charges under Rules 18-101.3, 18-102.10, and 18- 103.1. By unanimous vote, the Commission recommended that Judge Knapp be removed from office. In accordance with Maryland Rule 18-435(c), the Commission referred the matter to this Court for final disposition. Judge Knapp filed 24 exceptions to the Commission’s findings of fact, and five exceptions (including multiple subparts) to its legal conclusions, and urged this Court to adopt a lesser sanction. The Commission filed a response to Judge Knapp’s exceptions. Arundel County Orphans’ Court); Officer Brenden King (Anne Arundel County Police Department); Detective Michael Krok (forensic digital examiner for the Anne Arundel County Police Department); Corporal Joseph Mastros (Anne Arundel County Police Department); Eunice Owns (County Administrator for the Anne Arundel County Register of Wills); Tameka Smith (Chief Deputy for the Anne Arundel County Register of Wills); and Sergeant Heather Whittaker (Anne Arundel County Police Department). In addition to testifying, Judge Knapp called two character witnesses: Trevor Kiessling, Esquire and Audrey McFarlane, Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law. “‘Sanctionable conduct’ means misconduct while in office, the persistent failure 4 by a judge to perform the duties of the judge’s office, or conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. A judge’s violation of the provisions of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by Title 18, Chapter 100 may constitute sanctionable conduct.” Md. Rule 18-402(m)(1). 3  We held a hearing on June 4, 2026, and thereafter, we entered a per curiam order in which we concluded that Judge Knapp committed one or more of the violations determined by the Commission. In accordance with Article IV, § 4B(b)(1) of the Constitution of Maryland, and based upon the egregious nature of the misconduct in this case, the most appropriate disposition was to remove Marc Knapp from office as a judge of the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County. We now explain the basis for our order. I Judge Knapp’s Threshold Allegations of Error In addition to his exceptions to the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Knapp raises two threshold legal issues related to prehearing rulings by the Commission. First, he asserts that the Commission erred in denying his request to consolidate his hearing with a hearing on his colleague, Chief Judge Vickie Gipson’s pending disciplinary charges.5 Second, he contends that the Commission should have excluded from the evidence, and therefore should not have considered, a recording extracted from his cell phone, based upon his contention that the cell phone was unlawfully seized by law enforcement officers. We address each issue before turning to Judge Knapp’s exceptions. A. Commission’s Denial of Judge Knapp’s Motion to Consolidate Before the Commission, Judge Knapp filed a “Motion for Appropriate Relief (Consolidation)” in which he asserted that a fair reading of the charges against both Judge Knapp and Chief Judge Gipson involve “interpersonal conflict[s] with each other.” Although 5 See In Re The Honorable Vickie Gipson, Supreme Court of Maryland, JD No. 2, September Term, 2025. 4 Judge Knapp acknowledged that there was “no specific rule concerning joinder in the procedural rules that govern hearings before the Commission[,]” he cited to the joinder rules that govern criminal and civil actions generally, Maryland Rules 4-253 and 2-503, as offering “significant guidance.” Judge Knapp posited that because much of the alleged misconduct arose from the “same act or transaction” or “the same series of acts or transactions” with Chief Judge Gipson and other court-related personnel, and “a common question of law or fact or a common subject matter[,]” the cases should be consolidated for purposes of the Commission’s hearing. Judge Knapp also asserted that considerations of “judicial economy” also favored consolidation. Investigative Counsel opposed the request for joinder. On April 28, 2025, the Commission Chair, the Honorable Anne K. Albright, of the Appellate Court of Maryland, entered an order denying Judge Knapp’s motion to consolidate. In the order, the Chair concluded that, even if the Commission’s charges against multiple judges could be consolidated (an issue that the Chair concluded the Commission did not need to decide) and there was some factual overlap between the allegations against the two judges such that there might be some efficiency gained by having a consolidated hearing, she was not persuaded that “efficiency (if any) outweighs the danger of confusion” or a danger to Chief Judge Gipson’s rights, “among other challenges that may arise from a consolidated hearing[.]” We review the Chair’s decision to deny the motion to consolidate for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 556 (1997) (explaining that, in the criminal context, the balancing test for joinder is a discretionary function and a reviewing court will only reverse a trial judge’s decision if it was a clear abuse of discretion). We 5 conclude that there was no abuse of discretion, and therefore, overrule Judge Knapp’s exception arising from the Chair’s decision on the motion to consolidate. As Judge Knapp acknowledges, there is no rule that speaks to consolidation in the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings. The Chair determined, among other things, that any potential judicial economy was outweighed by the potential for confusion, and the right of confidentiality. In undertaking a balancing analysis, the Chair gave a reasoned and thoughtful explanation for her denial of the motion, and we overrule Judge Knapp’s exception. B. Commission’s Decision To Admit Audio Recording Recovered by Law Enforcement Prior to the Commission’s hearing, Judge Knapp filed a motion in limine, in which he sought to exclude admission of both an audio recording that he made of judicial deliberations among himself and his colleagues on June 4, 2024,6 and testimony from law enforcement about that recording and its subsequent seizure. On October 8, 2025, the Commission denied Judge Knapp’s motion to exclude the recording and the officers’ testimony regarding Judge Knapp’s attempt to destroy evidence in their presence. As we will discuss in more detail below, some of the charges against Judge Knapp related to allegations that he was recording conversations and discussions among himself 6 In his motion in limine, Judge Knapp sought to exclude a recording that he referenced as being made on June 11, 2024. As the Commission points out in a legal memorandum responding to Judge Knapp’s arguments on this issue, the June 11 recording was not admitted into evidence against Judge Knapp. For purposes of considering Judge Knapp’s exception, we will assume that his motion in limine sought to exclude the audio recording of the judicial deliberations among the judges on June 4, 2024—the audio recording that was, in fact, admitted into evidence. 6 and other individuals without their consent, and to his subsequent deletion of evidence pertaining to those recordings in the presence of law enforcement officers, who had responded to a 911 call to investigate the allegations. In criminal proceedings against Judge Knapp that are not relevant to the charges in this proceeding, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted Judge Knapp’s motion to suppress the cell phone. Thereafter, Judge Knapp filed a motion in limine to exclude the same evidence from the Commission’s hearing, arguing that the suppression ruling in the criminal court resolved the issue in his favor. The Commission denied Judge Knapp’s motion, explaining that the court’s acceptance of Judge Knapp’s argument in his criminal case and its resultant application of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule did not extend to the introduction of the same evidence in a Commission hearing. Judge Knapp believes this ruling was in error. We review the Commission’s denial of Judge Knapp’s motion to suppress based on the facts in the record and in the light most favorable to Investigative Counsel as the prevailing party on the motion. See Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 14 (2016). Where relevant, we review legal questions de novo; however, we do not disturb the Commission’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 14–15. “Where evidence is obtained in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, the exclusionary rule provides that the evidence will be inadmissible at trial.” In re Russell, 464 Md. 390, 407 n.10 (2019) (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976)). The “prime purpose of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” Janis, 428 U.S. at 446 (citation omitted). “As with any remedial 7 device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” In re Russell, 464 Md. at 407 n.10 (quoting Janis, 428 U.S. at 447). The U.S. Supreme Court explained in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), that outside the criminal context, the application of the exclusionary rule depends upon a balancing of the rule’s likely deterrent effect against the societal costs of excluding reliable evidence. See id. at 447–54 (declining to extend the exclusionary rule to civil proceeding). We adopted the Janis balancing test when we addressed the applicability of the exclusionary rule in public discharge hearings—a matter of administrative procedure. See Sheetz v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208 (1989). In Sheetz, we explained that the deterrent benefits of the exclusionary rule are “minimal” in the context of discharge proceedings and therefore the exclusionary rule “does not generally apply” in such cases. Id. at 215. However, “as a matter of Maryland administrative law,” we noted that we were “unwilling to hold that such evidence is always admissible.” Id. We held that, in the context of a civil administrative discharge proceeding, such evidence is inadmissible “where the defendant establishes that the police were improperly motivated to illegally seize evidence to benefit civil proceedings.” Id. at 216. We set forth a nonexclusive list of factors that a court should consider in determining the motivation behind an improper search and seizure: (1) whether, at the time of the illegal search, the police were aware of the potential effect of using such evidence in civil proceedings; (2) whether the severity of the consequences of civil proceedings roughly paralleled or exceeded that of the criminal proceedings; (3) whether a reasonable officer 8 would have believed the search to be a proper one; (4) whether there was an agreement between the police and another party to pursue the investigations which led to the improperly obtained evidence; and (5) whether the police had a special interest in the case. Id. at 216. Applying the factors outlined in Sheetz, the Chair found that there was no evidence in the record that the police were aware of a potential judicial disabilities case or any civil matter in which the seized evidence might be introduced. The Chair recognized that any potential sanctions it may recommend be levied against Judge Knapp were far less severe than the consequences he faced in the criminal case. With respect to any suppression ruling made by the circuit court, the Chair determined that “a reasonable officer would have believed the search to be a proper one,” and concluded that “collateral estoppel [did] not prevent the Commission from considering” the lawfulness of the search “anew.” The Chair found no evidence of an agreement between the police and any other party to pursue the investigation that led to the seized recording. Finally, the Chair determined that there was no evidence indicating that law enforcement had a special interest in the Commission’s case against Judge Knapp. Considering these factors, the Chair concluded that Judge Knapp “failed to establish that the police were improperly motivated to illegally seize evidence to benefit [these] civil proceedings.” We determine that the Chair’s application of the Sheetz factors to the evidence in this case was not clearly erroneous and ascribe no error to her denial of Judge Knapp’s motion. We overrule Judge Knapp’s exception to the Chair’s decision to deny his motion in limine. 9  Having addressed Judge Knapp’s preliminary exceptions, we turn to the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Knapp’s exceptions to the same, and our disposition. II Standard of Review “In reviewing the Commission’s findings of facts, we accept the Commission’s findings as prima facie correct, and will only disturb the Commission’s factual findings to the extent they are clearly erroneous.” In re Ademiluyi, 488 Md. 45, 88 (2024) (quoting In re Nickerson, 473 Md. 509, 518 (2021)). “When reviewing the Commission’s legal conclusions, we independently review the record to determine whether the Commission’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (quoting In re Nickerson, 473 Md. at 527). The Commission’s findings of fact are organized, for the most part, in a general chronological order. After its chronological findings, the Commission makes findings of fact concerning specific categories of misconduct—engaging in conduct that manifests bias, improperly commenting on pending cases, and breaching confidentiality of Commission matters. We summarize the Commission’s findings of fact in the same general format as used by the Commission. III The Commission’s Findings of Fact A. General Background Judge Knapp earned his bachelor’s degree from Brown University in 1966 with a major in history and economics. He subsequently graduated from Columbia University 10 with a master’s degree in business administration, having majored in finance. Judge Knapp worked for almost 40 years in the financial industry, at an executive level, on matters involving financial risk and contracts. After retiring from the finance industry in 2007, Judge Knapp started law school in 2010 at 66 years of age. He passed the Maryland bar examination in 2014 and became a licensed Maryland attorney. Judge Knapp volunteered his time and experience to assist clients with early-stage businesses in the Small Business Administration’s SCORE program.7 B. General Chronology of Events Judge Knapp learned about the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County in 2018 when he received a flyer on Election Day. He decided to run for election and campaigned with another candidate for judge of the Orphans’ Court, David Duba. Judge Vickie Gipson, an incumbent on the Orphans’ Court, was also running. Judge Knapp, Judge Duba, and Judge Gipson were elected to the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County in the November 2022 election. Judge Knapp was the only judge who was licensed to practice law in Maryland. Judge Gipson was licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania. Judge Duba was a full-time high school teacher. After they were sworn in as Orphans’ Court judges, the Governor appointed Judge Gipson to be the Chief Judge of that court. 7 SCORE is the former Service Corps of Retired Executives program. 11  The three judges shared one space for their office chambers, with each judge having their own desk. The desks were arranged in a triangular shape, and the chambers was adjacent to a small kitchenette area. After “going along” with his colleagues for approximately six to eight weeks, tensions arose between Judge Knapp and Chief Judge Gipson over decisions and opinion drafting. Judge Knapp described Chief Judge Gipson’s writing as “us[ing] English words[,]” but not “English sentences.” Judge Knapp decided that it was his responsibility to take what Chief Judge Gipson wrote and “put it into English.” Judge Knapp characterized changes that Chief Judge Gipson made to orders and decisions that he drafted as “plagiarism.” Judge Knapp shared his frustration concerning Chief Judge Gipson’s writing with Judge Duba. In the spring of 2023, clashes over decisions and writing styles morphed into shouting loud enough to be heard outside chambers, which, according to the testimony of Judge Duba, drew “the attention of members of the Register of Wills [office] or the public.” At one point, according to Judge Knapp, staff in the Register of Wills Office came and told them to “cool it.” During his testimony before the Commission, Judge Knapp acknowledged that he and Chief Judge Gipson were told on at least two occasions that they could be heard in the area where the staff of the Register of Wills met with the public. On reflection, Judge Knapp told the Commission that these episodes made him “fe[el] like an asshole[.]” Judge Duba testified that he found Judge Knapp’s conduct and manner of interacting with Chief Judge Gipson during this period to be rude, antagonistic, and adversarial. Judge 12 Duba described an incident in chambers in which Judge Knapp approached Chief Judge Gipson, leaned over her desk while she was seated, and stated that he did not respect her. The Commission found that Judge Knapp was overly argumentative with Chief Judge Gipson in public hearings. By way of example, the Commission pointed to a colloquy between the judges during a status hearing in an estate case, in which Judge Knapp argued with Chief Judge Gipson about whether funds paid to an interested person pursuant to a life insurance policy had to be repaid to the estate.8 8 During the Commission proceeding, recordings of certain estate proceedings were admitted into evidence. In its findings, the Commission referenced the following exchange between Chief Judge Gipson and Judge Knapp during a status hearing on April 23, 2023 in the Estate of Cemile Marshall, Estate No. 87055: MS. LATORRE: I guess Jane got a check from the insurance company for my mom. But it was made to her, not to the estate. And that money she used to get the dog. JUDGE GIPSON: So then, that’s not an estate asset. JUDGE KNAPP: Well, was the check payable to Jane as the— JUDGE GIPSON: She just said it was paid to Jane. JUDGE KNAPP: No, she said she got the check. JUDGE GIPSON: She said it came to Jane. JUDGE KNAPP: It came to Jane, that’s correct. But the check was not necessarily payable to Jane. It just could have been sent to Jane but payable to the estate. If the check was payable—if Jane— JUDGE GIPSON: Let’s ask the question. Was the check payable to Jane? 13  In the spring of 2023, Judge Knapp’s demonstrative disrespect for Chief Judge Gipson continued. Judge Duba scheduled an internal meeting in an attempt to see if the judges could develop a better working relationship and establish office norms. According to Judge Duba, Judge Knapp would not agree to “fundamental things” such as listening to each other, not interrupting one another, and being respectful to one another. The session was considered “a flop” as the judges could not agree on a definition of “acting respectful.” Judge Knapp testified that, although he did his “damnedest to deflect,” when pressed, he expressed his honest opinion “that Judge Gipson was not a good attorney[,]” adding that at the time, he “still thought she was an attorney.” He added further that Chief Judge Gipson “wasn’t a good judge,” “her writing was woeful” and “she had absolutely zero leadership skills.” Thereafter, Judge Duba suggested that the judges participate in a mediation session at the Anne Arundel Conflict Mediation Center. After the judges cancelled Orphans’ Court proceedings to attend the mediation, the session was similarly unsuccessful with Judge Knapp having repeated his criticism of Chief Judge Gipson. Judge Knapp then reached out to Chief Justice Fader’s chambers9 and the Anne Arundel County Department of Human Resources. From fall 2023 until May 2024, according to Judge Duba, intermittent “fighting” continued. Judge Knapp refused to agree to respect his fellow judges or to listen to them without interrupting. 9 Chief Justice Matthew Fader, of the Supreme Court of Maryland, came to the Anne Arundel County Orphans’ Court in early 2023 to meet with the judges. According to Judge Knapp, Chief Justice Fader suggested that the judges get in touch with him if they had any problems. 14  Disagreements over opinion drafting continued to the point that they were brought to the attention of the Register of Wills. In late August 2023, the court heard a case and took it under advisement. Judge Knapp drafted a dissent to be filed with Chief Judge Gipson’s majority opinion. In October 2023, following multiple inquiries about the status of the majority opinion, Judge Knapp walked to Chief Judge Gipson’s desk and said, “Vickie, please stop dicking around.” Chief Judge Gipson responded that she was still working on it. Describing Chief Judge Gipson’s response to his “dicking around” statement as a “metaphorical pearl-clutching moment,” Judge Knapp testified that Chief Judge Gipson advised the former Register of Wills that Judge Knapp cursed at her. When Chief Judge Gipson returned to chambers with the former Register of Wills, Judge Knapp repeated the phrase, to which the former Register of Wills “rolled her eyes.” Later that day, Judge Knapp went to the clerk’s office and learned that Chief Judge Gipson and Judge Duba had signed the opinion and order without notifying him. Upon learning this, he grabbed the document to add his dissent for filing. Before the Commission, Judge Knapp explained that he did not consider the phrase “dicking around” as cursing at someone. He acknowledged that he could have said, “[s]top dithering please,” but added that “we’re not in Victorian England.” Fueled by his belief that there was a concerted effort to block his ability to issue dissents and to change the court from a three-judge to a one-judge court, Judge Knapp’s failure to cooperate and lack of courtesy continued. To highlight Judge Knapp’s failure to cooperate and his lack of courtesy, the Commission’s findings refer to several Orphans’ Court proceedings in which Judge Knapp and Chief Judge Gipson quarreled with one 15 another on the bench. We summarize some proceedings as recounted in the Commission’s findings of fact. The case of the Estate of Marion Wierzbowski, Estate No. 110664, came before the Orphans’ Court on January 9, 2024, on a notice of judicial probate. After hearing from the litigants, Judge Knapp and Judge Duba agreed that Mr. Wierzbowski would be appointed personal representative. Chief Judge Gipson advised Mr. Wierzbowski that the first thing that he needed to do was to open a bank account. Thereafter, Judge Knapp returned to a disagreement that he had earlier with Chief Judge Gipson in the hearing about whether the next step in the estate was to open a bank account or wait to open the bank account until there was cash in the estate: JUDGE KNAPP: —let me back up here. I appreciate you [referring to Chief Judge Gipson] like to interrupt, but no, the first thing is not to open up an estate bank account. There’s no cash in the estate. You’re going to have to put money in to have a bank account open. After Judge Knapp continued about possible next steps, Chief Judge Gipson concluded the hearing, indicating that the court was “running ‘very behind’ and that Mr. Wierzbowski would be appointed upon the filing of the necessary paperwork with the Register of Wills.” The court held a hearing in the Estate of Dorothy Bradford, Estate No. 108738, on January 9, 2024, on a notice of judicial probate. One of the issues before the court was whether a copy of the will would be admitted to probate. Judge Knapp asked a series of questions about the will, and Chief Judge Gipson questioned whether the parties could come to an agreement on the issue. The Commission found that Judge Knapp was openly 16 hostile to Chief Judge Gipson and responded rudely after perceiving that Chief Judge Gipson had interrupted his questioning: JUDGE GIPSON: So the problem is, is that the copies are defective, significantly so. MS. LINDA BRADFORD: Okay. JUDGE GIPSON: So, we need to have an original. MS. LINDA BRADFORD: Okay. JUDGE KNAPP: Okay. Excuse me. We have a difference of opinion on the Court as to the admissibility of the copies. MS. LINDA BRADFORD: Okay. JUDGE KNAPP: So, that was one judge’s opinion. It is not this judge’s opinion. * * * JUDGE KNAPP: Okay. And you have no other siblings? MS. LINDA BRADFORD: No. JUDGE KNAPP: Okay. JUDGE GIPSON: Let me ask a question. So, is there any objection to reaching a family agreement similar to what’s in the will? Do you have any objection to that? Is there somehow— JUDGE KNAPP: Before we get there— JUDGE GIPSON: No, I —actually, I asked a question. JUDGE KNAPP: Yeah, I realize you did, but you— JUDGE GIPSON: What is— JUDGE KNAPP: —You jumped in before I finished my questioning. Thank you, Judge Gipson. 17  * * * JUDGE GIPSON: So, what I heard you say was that it was a copy of a copy, and I heard the other Ms. Bradford say the same thing, which is significant. So, it’s not really a copy of the will, it is a copy of a copy. Mr. BERMAN [Attorney]: That is correct, your honor. JUDGE GIPSON: Okay. So, on that basis, I would say it’s inadmissible. JUDGE KNAPP: Okay, again, one judge’s opinion. * * * JUDGE GIPSON: … So, I kind of would like for you guys to have some— to take a second and see if you can’t have some discussion among yourselves to see if you can reach a conclusion as to how you’d like to handle it. Because I’d rather come up with a conclusion that you can live with rather than us dominating and imposing our decision on you. Would that— JUDGE KNAPP: Okay—go ahead. JUDGE GIPSON: Would that be something that you would consider doing? MS. LINDA BRADFORD: I will take it under consideration. JUDGE GIPSON: Okay. JUDGE KNAPP: Okay. I would also just like to point out that, like it or not, I believe my colleague essentially put some pressure on you to come up with an agreement with your sister. And I would urge you to ignore any feelings that you might have that you’re doing that for the benefit of the Court because you are not. I understand that you do not care for your sister. That’s fine. MS. LINDA BRADFORD: It’s not that I don’t care for her. It’s just— JUDGE KNAPP: Whatever it is. Okay. You don’t want to have to—you don’t want to have to deal with her on that issue. That’s fine. MS. LINDA BRADFORD: Financially, we don’t see eye to eye— JUDGE KNAPP: That’s cool. 18  MS. LINDA BRADFORD: —financial responsibilities. I love my sister. She’s my sister, so— JUDGE KNAPP: Okay. But you don’t want to work with her on this. * * * JUDGE KNAPP: And before we leave, again I will kind of reiterate what I said before referencing my colleague’s sort of paternalistic leaning on you to play nice with your sister. If you do not feel comfortable that you can— that it[’]s going to be effective working with your sister, hold your ground. Do not go along with that simply because my colleague would like you to do that, okay. I mean, it would be one thing, again, if, instead of your sister being co-personal representative, if Mr. Berman were. Now, I mean, that is an alternative that you may want to consider. And again, whether he is willing to do that, don’t know. Of course, he has to get paid. But again, simply because my colleague has instructed you to play nice with your sister, that is not a legal position. That is not something you necessarily have to do. And if you do not—and if you feel, for whatever reason, that you’re not going to be comfortable in that role, don’t do it. On April 25, 2024,10 Judge Knapp and Chief Judge Gipson got into an argument while in chambers. The judges intended to discuss a legal issue. Several witnesses who were present for this exchange testified before the Commission: Judge Duba; Georges Hetherington, a law clerk; Cody Henson, a building security guard whom Chief Judge Gipson requested be present in chambers; and Judge Knapp. On hearing the argument from an adjacent room, Mr. Hetherington entered the judges’ chambers and saw Judge Knapp approaching Chief Judge Gipson, who was seat