State v. Fields

State of Maryland v. Terrell Henry Fields, No. 784, September Term, 2022. Opinion by Graeff J. SECOND AMENDMENT – AGE-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON FIREARM POSSESSION – SEVERABILITY The circuit erred in dismissing the charges against appellant on the ground that the statutes involved violated the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. To assess a challenge to a gun regulation, we look to the two-part test set forth in New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 10 (2022). First, we determine whether the Second Amendment covers appellee’s conduct. Second, if that is the case, we determine if the statute is consistent with this Nation’s historical traditions of firearm regulation. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (“PS”) § 5-133(d) (2022 Repl. Vol.) prohibits possession of a regulated firearm by those under 21 years of age. With regard to the first step of the analysis, we assume, without deciding, that individuals under the age of 21 are part of “the people” that the Second Amendment protects. With respect to the second step, we hold that the statute is constitutional as applied to individuals who are 18-to-20-years of age because it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 4-203 (2021 Repl. Vol.) prohibits a person from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun without a permit. Appellant contends that this statute was unconstitutional because it hinged on an unconstitutional licensing scheme that was in effect at the time of his arrest in 2019. Appellant is correct that the language in PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) in effect in 2019 required an applicant for a permit to have a “good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun,” and this requirement was found to be unconstitutional in Bruen. Nevertheless, that language was severable from the rest of the permitting scheme, leaving in place a scheme that made appellee’s conduct criminal. Appellee failed to show that CR § 4-203, with the offending portion severed, was unconstitutional. The circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the counts charging violations of CR § 4-203. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CT191003X REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 784 September Term, 2022 ______________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND v. TERRELL HENRY FIELDS ______________________________________ Graeff, Tang, Beachley, Donald E. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Graeff, J. ______________________________________ Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Filed: July 2, 2026 Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.02 15:11:14 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  Terrell Henry Fields, appellee, was charged with multiple offenses, three of which related to a loaded .40 caliber handgun the police found in appellee’s vehicle. At the time, appellee was 20 years old, and he did not possess, nor had he ever applied for, a permit to carry a handgun. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted the motion and dismissed the charges against appellee. On appeal, the State presents the following question for this Court’s review: Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellee’s charges on Second Amendment grounds? For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 29, 2019, detectives from the Prince George’s County Police Department executed a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by appellee. They observed him “reach with both hands and recover an item from his waistband area,” which he then placed underneath the driver’s seat. The officers then saw, in plain view in the center console, a bag containing what the officers suspected to be marijuana. During a subsequent search of the vehicle, the officers found a .40 caliber semi-automatic Smith and Wesson handgun with an extended magazine. The handgun was loaded with one round in the chamber and nineteen rounds in the magazine. At the time of his arrest, appellee was 20 years old. He did not have a permit for the handgun, nor had he attempted to apply for one. On October 3, 2019, a Grand Jury indicted appellee on six counts, including: (1) possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime in violation of Md. Code. Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 5-621(b)(1) (2021 Repl. Vol.); (2) transportation of a firearm in connection to a drug trafficking crime in violation of CR § 5-621(b)(2); (3) knowing transportation of a loaded handgun in a vehicle in violation of CR § 4- 203(a)(1)(v); (4) knowing transportation of a handgun in a vehicle in violation of CR § 4- 203; (5) unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to distribute in violation of CR § 5-602; and (6) possession of a regulated firearm while under the age of 21 in violation of Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (“PS”) § 5- 133(d) (2022 Repl. Vol.). The State ultimately nolle prossed the three drug-related counts from the indictment and proceeded only on the three remaining firearms violations. 1 0F Between December 13, 2019, and June 6, 2022, the court continued the case several times. There were various reasons for the continuances, including the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 24, 2022, appellee filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, which was decided one day earlier, invalidated Maryland’s firearm permitting scheme, which required, pursuant to PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii), that an applicant have “good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun.” Appellee’s motion to dismiss noted that Bruen invalidated this type of “may issue” permitting scheme, which required the applicant to demonstrate a “special need for self-defense.” Appellee argued, therefore, 1 A nolle prosequi is “an official declaration by the State, announcing that it will not pursue the charges in a particular charging document.” State v. Simms, 456 Md. 551, 557 (2017) (quoting Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 659 n.2 (2005)). The Supreme Court of Maryland has described it as “[t]he abandonment of the prosecution.” Id. (quoting Barrett v. State, 155 Md. 636, 638 (1928)). 2 that the charges against him should be dismissed. He argued that he had standing to challenge PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii), even though he failed to apply for a carry permit, because the statute itself violated the Second Amendment under the Bruen test, and therefore, he was being prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute. On June 27, 2022, the court held a hearing on appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellee’s counsel argued that CR § 4-203 “incorporates the permitting regime of [PS 5- 306(a)(6)(ii)],” which Bruen identified as an impermissible “may issue” permitting scheme. Counsel acknowledged that Bruen was not a criminal case, but he stated that it did not matter because “the State cannot enforce a prohibition that violates the Second Amendment.” Counsel argued that appellee had “standing to challenge the constitutionality of a regulation he’s being prosecuted for violating.” Counsel then addressed the constitutionality of PS § 5-133(d), prohibiting the possession of a regulated firearm by a person under the age of 21. 2 He argued that PS § 5- 1F 133(d) is unconstitutional under Bruen and the Second Amendment, asserting that persons who are under the age of 21 “are part of the people whom the Second Amendment protects.” Counsel stated that, at the time of the founding, people as young as 16 were part of the militia, and the State would have to show a historical tradition for a ban on firearm possession for individuals between 18 and 20. 2 Counsel stated that he had not challenged count six, which charged appellee with possession of a regulated firearm while under 21 years of age in violation of Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety (“PS”) § 5-133(d) (2022 Repl. Vol.), in his written motion because he believed that the State had nolle prossed that charge. 3  The State argued that, although Bruen invalidated “may issue” permit schemes, the Court did not hold that gun permitting schemes in general were unconstitutional, and only one line, the good and substantial cause language, needed to be stricken with regard to Maryland handgun permits. The rest of the statutory scheme, including the age restriction, was constitutional. The State also argued that appellee lacked standing to challenge the scheme because there was no evidence that he attempted to apply for a gun license. The court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the charges. It characterized the Bruen opinion as “fairly Draconian and myopic,” stating that “[w]hat was contemplated during colonial times simply could not be envisioned to encompass the breadth and depth of society 300 years later.” Nevertheless, based on the court’s interpretation of Bruen, it granted the motion to dismiss. On June 30, 2022, the State filed its Notice of Appeal. 3 On January 9, 2023, the 2F parties filed a joint motion to stay briefing, stating that the Maryland Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Fooks v. State, 490 Md. 458 (2025), cert. denied, 2026 WL 490722 (U.S. 2026), would “provide guidance for the appropriate decision in” the case sub judice. This Court granted the motion. 3 The State appealed the court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss in accordance with Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJ”) § 12-302 (2025 Supp.), which provides that the State may appeal from a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss in a criminal case. 4  On June 6, 2025, the Supreme Court of Maryland issued its decision in Fooks, and on July 2, 2025, this Court lifted the stay. The parties subsequently filed their briefs, and this Court heard argument on February 6, 2026. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review dismissal rulings based on the interpretation of constitutional, statutory, or case law de novo. Jackson v. State, 485 Md. 1, 28 (2023). Moreover, “[t]he proper scope of a constitutional right, and its application to a particular set of facts, are issues of law” which we review de novo. Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor of Balt., 470 Md. 308, 339 (2020). DISCUSSION The State contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing the charges against appellee. It argues that the court’s analysis of the Second Amendment, which protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” was wrong for several reasons. With respect to the dismissal of the count charging a violation of PS § 5-133(d), which generally bars those under age 21 from possessing regulated firearms, the State contends that the statute does not violate the Second Amendment for two reasons. First, it argues that “[t]he founding generation did not understand those under 21 to be part of ‘the people’ having the right ‘to keep and bear arms,’” and therefore, the plain text of the Second Amendment did not apply to appellee’s handgun possession. Second, the State asserts that “restrictions on firearm possession by those under 21 are consistent with a historical tradition of age-related restrictions on firearms access.” 5  The State also alleges error by the court in dismissing the counts charging violations of CR § 4-203, which prohibits the transportation of a loaded handgun in a vehicle on public roads, subject to exceptions, which included possession with a permit. The State acknowledges that in 2019, when appellee was arrested, an applicant had to show a “good and substantial reason” (“GSR”) to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, and that Bruen held this requirement unconstitutional. It argues, however, that dismissal of the charges was erroneous because: (1) appellee lacked standing to challenge the permit scheme because he offered no evidence that he applied for a permit or that an application would have been futile, and (2) the GSR requirement could be severed, leaving a constitutional permitting scheme in Maryland. Appellee contends that the court correctly granted his motion to dismiss the gun charges. He argues that PS § 5-133(d)(1) is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him, asserting that individuals under the age of 21 are part of “the people” who enjoy protections under the First and Fourth Amendments, and that same analysis applies to the Second Amendment. Appellee argues that the law restricting individuals under 21 from possessing handguns is inconsistent with the “nation’s tradition of firearm regulation,” and therefore, PS § 5-133(d)(1) is unconstitutional. With respect to CR § 4- 203, appellee contends that, at the time of his arrest, CR § 4-203 was facially unconstitutional because it contained the “may-issue” licensing scheme that Bruen determined was unconstitutional. 6  Before addressing the issues raised by the parties, we address the substantial change in the law regarding gun possession that has occurred during the course of the last 20 years. I. Second Amendment Legal Background The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), the Supreme Court of the United States stated that it was engaging in the “first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,” and it concluded that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and possess arms in the home for self-defense. The Court clarified, however, that the right provided by the Second Amendment was not unlimited, and it was “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. at 626. The Court made clear that its ruling did not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626–27. This list did “not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 627 n. 26. Two years later, the Court held “that the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the states” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). The Court stated that the Second 7 Amendment “guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.” Id. at 785. In 2022, the Supreme Court issued another groundbreaking decision. In Bruen, 597 U.S. at 10, the Court held “that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” This Court recently summarized the holding in Bruen, as follows: The case arose from a challenge to the constitutionality of New York’s licensing regime, which made it a crime to possess any firearm without a license, and provided that, to obtain a license to carry a concealed gun, the applicant must show “proper cause.” Id. at 11. The “proper cause” requirement had been interpreted to require an applicant to “demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the community.” [Bruen, 597 U.S. at 12]. The Court stated that, if “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 24. The Court held that the plain text of the Second Amendment, which provides that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” protects an individual’s right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense. Id. at 32–33. Based on that plain language, the government had the burden to justify any regulation on handguns by showing that it was “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 33–34. The Court acknowledged that “the right to keep and bear arms in public has traditionally been subject to well-defined restrictions governing the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms.” Id. at 38. It concluded, however, that the “historical record compiled by respondents does not demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-defense” or “limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens who 8  demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. at 38. Accordingly, the Court held that New York’s proper cause licensing requirement was unconstitutional. Id. Hicks v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1601794, at *6 (2026). The Court distinguished “may issue” permitting schemes from “shall issue” schemes, explaining that a “shall issue” regime required authorities to issue concealed- carry licenses “whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 13. States with “shall issue” schemes did not grant “licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability.” Id. at 13. “May issue” regimes, by contrast, which in 2022 included six states, including Maryland and New York, required an applicant to make a special showing of need to carry a firearm in public and gave authorities “discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license.” Id. at 13–15. As indicated, the Court held that New York’s “may-issue” permitting scheme requiring a showing of proper cause was unconstitutional. Id. at 38–39. In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito stated that Bruen “decide[d] nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm,” and it did not “expand the categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun.” Id. at 73 (Alito, J. concurring). Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate opinion for himself and Chief Justice Roberts, noting that the Bruen opinion did “not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self- 9 defense,” and he stated that the “Second Amendment allows a ‘variety’ of gun regulations.” Id. at 79–80 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring). Prior to Bruen, Maryland had a “may-issue” licensing regime that required applicants for a permit to demonstrate a “good and substantial reason” to possess a handgun, interpreted to mean that an applicant “must demonstrate having received actual threats or assaults” to qualify for a permit. In re Rounds, 255 Md. App. 205, 210–11 (2022) (quoting PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii)). After Bruen, this Court held that the “good and substantial reason” requirement of PS § 5-306(a)(6)(ii) was unconstitutional. Id. at 212. Accord Engage Armament LLC v. Montgomery Cnty., ___ Md. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1144313, at *14 (2026). The legislature responded to these decisions as follows: In 2023, the General Assembly amended PS § 5-306 to remove the “good and substantial reason” requirement, effective October 1, 2023. 2023 Md. Laws Ch. 651. Maryland is now a “shall issue” state, and its citizens are authorized to obtain a concealed carry permit provided that they are 21 years of age or a member of the uniformed services, do not have any disqualifying offenses or mental disorders, do not have a substance abuse disorder, have successfully completed a firearms training course, and “based on an investigation . . . ha[ve] not exhibited a propensity for violence or instability that may reasonably render the person’s possession of a handgun a danger to the person or to another.” PS § 5-306(a). Applicants must also show that they are “not otherwise prohibited by State or federal law from purchasing or possessing a handgun.” Id. § 5-306(a)(10)(ii). Hicks, ___ Md. App. at ___, 2026 WL 1601794, at *7 (footnotes omitted). In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court clarified Bruen’s analysis, “which lower courts had struggled to apply.” Fooks, 490 Md. at 463. In that case, 10 the Court rejected a facial challenge to a federal statute barring a person “subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm if that order includes a finding that [the person] ‘represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,’ or a child of the partner or individual.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 684 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)). The Court explained that Bruen’s “analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692. The law need not, however, be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.” Id. The reviewing “court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, ‘applying faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). Rahimi, therefore, clarified that the “Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” Id. at 691–92. The Second Amendment does not prohibit “the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.” Id. at 698. In Fooks, 490 Md. at 465, the Supreme Court of Maryland applied Bruen and Rahimi to PS § 5-133(b)(2), which prohibits the possession of regulated firearms by those who have “been convicted of a violation classified as a common law crime and received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years.” The Court held that PS § 5-133(b)(2) was the equivalent of a prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons, which the United States 11 Supreme Court had repeatedly identified as a permissible limitation on the Second Amendment right and presumptively constitutional. Id. at 489–98. The Court additionally held that “felon dispossession laws like § 5-133(b)(2) are consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 498. The Court noted that, when the Second Amendment was ratified, “the right to keep and bear arms was not viewed as inconsistent with the prohibition on the possession of firearms by categories of individuals thought to present a special danger unrelated to whether they had previously engaged in or demonstrated a propensity for violence.” Id. at 499. The Court also considered evidence that English and early American legislatures disarmed distrusted groups “for reasons other than demonstrated dangerousness.” Id. at 499-501. The Court agreed with other courts that found a historical tradition of prohibiting firearm ownership by categories of individuals who were perceived to present “an unacceptable risk of danger if armed.” Id. at 504-05 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1128 (8th Cir. 2024)). The Court found that PS § 5-133(b)(2) satisfied the Second Amendment and was constitutional on its face and as applied to Fooks. Id. at 510. In United States v. Hemani, ___, U.S. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1751710 at *12 (June 18, 2026), the Supreme Court of the United Stated held that the prosecution of Mr. Hemani for possession of a firearm while he was an unlawful user of a controlled dangerous substance i.e., use of marijuana a few times a week, was not consistent with the Second Amendment. The Court stated that “[t]he Second Amendment protects the right of ‘all Americans’ to keep and bear firearms for self-defense.” Id. at *4 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 581). In 12 assessing whether the law banning possession of a gun by an unlawful user of a controlled substance was consistent with the Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation, the government relied on historical habitual drunkard laws, which the government asserted restricted the liberties of individuals to protect the public from dangerous people. Id. at *5–6. The Court rejected this argument, stating that those laws “targeted different kinds of people and did so for different reasons, and operated in different ways.” Id. at 12. For example, habitual drunkard laws focused on those whose “drinking rendered them practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs,” and not, as the statute at issue did, on those who merely used controlled dangerous substances. Id. at *7. Moreover, those historical laws “usually provided some form of process before an individual lost any of his liberties,” whereas the statute at issue “automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user . . . without any pre-deprivation process” Id. at *2. Accordingly, the Court held that the government had not carried its “burden of showing its prosecution of Mr. Hemani complies with the Second Amendment.” Id. at *12. 4 3F With that background in mind, we turn to the issues presented here. 4 Justice Jackson wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Sotomayor, expressing the belief that the Court “veered off course in Bruen” by adopting a “history and tradition” metric to assess the constitutionality of firearm regulations, as opposed to the “means-end scrutiny” approach. United States v. Hemani, ___, U.S. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1751710 at *15-16. Although the parties in that case did not ask the Court to overturn Bruen, Justice Jackson stated that, in a future case, the Court “should consider whether to retire the failed Bruen experiment and return to an explicit assessment of Congress’s ends and means when deciding the constitutionality of firearm restrictions.” Id. at *17. 13  II. Constitutional Challenge Here Appellee argues that PS § 5-133 and CR § 4-203 are facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. We begin by discussing the differences between these challenges. In Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Moore, 116 F.4th 211, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1049 (2025), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that: Plaintiffs contesting the validity of a firearms law under the Second Amendment may bring either an “as-applied” or a “facial” challenge to the law. [United States v.] Moore, 666 F.3d [313,] at 317–20 [(4th Cir, 2012)]. In an as-applied challenge, the court focuses on the circumstances of the particular plaintiffs and whether, in light of those circumstances, the challenged law was unconstitutionally applied to those plaintiffs. Id. at 319. By contrast, in a facial constitutional challenge a plaintiff asks the court to declare that the statute is invalid. As the Supreme Court has explained, “facial challenges are ‘disfavored’ because they ‘often rest on speculation,’ ‘short circuit the democratic process,’ and ‘run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint.’” Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 452 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008)). So to succeed in a facial constitutional challenge, a plaintiff confronts a much more difficult task, namely, to establish that there is “no set of circumstances” under which the law would be valid. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)); see also Moore, 666 F.3d at 318–19 (“[T]he Supreme Court has long declared that a statute cannot be held unconstitutional if it has constitutional application.”). “The stakes are higher in a facial challenge, so the bar goes up as well.” United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2024). 14 Accord Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath, 448 Md. 145, 181 (2016) (“An as-applied challenge is ‘a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or in its application to a particular party.’”) (footnote omitted) (quoting As–Applied Challenge, Black’s Law Dictionary 278 (10th ed. 2014)). Labeling a constitutional challenge as facial or as applied, however, “is not what matters.” Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010). Rather, the important point is whether the challenger’s claim and the following relief would “reach beyond the particular circumstances” of the particular case. Id. In this case, as indicated, appellee challenges two statutes. With respect to PS § 5- 133, appellee presents on appeal an argument regarding all persons under 21, including those under 18. Below, however, the argument was limited to individuals between the ages of 18 and 20. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the claim that the law is unconstitutional as applied only to individuals between ages of 18 and 20. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“[A]n appellate court will not decide any [issue other than subject matter jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.”); see also NRA v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1130 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. pending, No. 24-1185 (U.S. 2025) (rejecting a facial challenge to the law when the challenge was an as applied challenge to individuals between the ages of 18 and 20). With respect to CR § 4-203, we will address appellee’s argument that the statute is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. 15  III. Charge Pursuant to PS § 5-133(a)(1) PS § 5-133 provides that a person may not possess a regulated firearm under certain circumstances. 5 Here, the circumstance at issue restricting possession is age. PS § 5-133(d) 4F provides that, subject to enumerated exceptions, “a person who is under the age of 21 years may not possess a regulated firearm.” Appellee, who was 20 years old at the time of his 5 PS § 5-133(b) prohibits possession of a regulated firearm if the person: (1) has been convicted of a disqualifying crime; (2) has been convicted of a common law crime and received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years; (3) is a fugitive from justice; (4) is an alcoholic; (5) is addicted to or a habitual user of a controlled dangerous substance; (6) suffers from a defined mental disorder and has a history of violence; (7) has been found incompetent to stand trial; (8) has been found not criminally responsible under § 3-110 of the Criminal Procedure Article; (9) has been voluntarily admitted for more than 30 consecutive days to a facility defined by § 10-101 of the Health--General Article; (10) has been involuntarily committed to a facility as defined in § 10-101 of the Health--General Article; (11) is under the protection of a guardian appointed by a court under § 13- 201(c) or § 13-705 of the Estates and Trusts Article, except for cases in which the appointment of a guardian is solely a result of a physical disability; (12) is a respondent against whom a current non ex parte civil protective order has been entered or an order for protection has been issued by a court of another state or a Native American tribe and is in effect; and (13) if under the age of 30 years at the time of possession, has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would be a disqualifying crime if committed by an adult. 16 arrest, does not contend that any of the enumerated exceptions apply to his possession of the gun. 6 5F As indicated, appellee contends that PS § 5-133(d)(1) is unconstitutional. He asserts that “the text of the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals under 21 to bear arms,” and “[t]he Founding Era did not impose a relevantly similar burden on the Second Amendment rights of individuals under 21” as Maryland’s statute. To assess this claim, we look to the two-part test Bruen established for constitutional challenges to gun regulations. First, we must determine whether the Second Amendment covers appellee’s conduct. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. Second, if that is the case, we must determine if the statute is “consistent with this Nation’s historical traditions of firearm regulation.” Id. A. Plain Text of the Second Amendment The first step in the analysis under Bruen is whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers appellee’s conduct. In Bruen, the Court found that the petitioners, “two 6 Exceptions to the prohibition against a person under 21 possessing a handgun include: (1) temporary transfer to a person who is supervised and acting with the permission of a parent or guardian; (2) transfer by inheritance of title, and not of possession; (3) possession by a member of the armed forces or National Guard while performing official duties; (4) temporary transfer to a person participating in marksmanship training of a recognized organization and under the supervision of a qualified instructor; (5) possession by a person required to possess a regulated firearm for employment and who holds a permit; or (6) the possession a firearm for self-defense or the defense of others against a trespasser into the residence of the person in possession or into a residence in which the person in possession is an invited guest. PS § 5-133. 17 ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens,” were “part of ‘the people,’ whom the Second Amendment protects,” and their conduct, carrying handguns publicly for self-defense, was covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. 597 U.S. at 31–32. The question here is whether appellee, who was 20 years old at the time of his arrest, was part of “the people” that the Second Amendment protects. Id. at 24. If so, “the Constitution presumptively protects” his conduct. Id. The parties disagree regarding whether appellee’s challenge satisfies this first step. The State argues that, during the Founding-era, individuals under the age of 21 “were not understood to be part of ‘the people’” protected by the Second Amendment. Rather, it asserts that, at the time of the founding, individuals under the age of 21 were legally minors who were viewed as lacking reason and judgment and “lacked the full rights of adult citizens.” Since minors did not enjoy rights independent of their parents, the State argues that “the founding era would not have understood the Second Amendment right to reach those under 21.” Appellee contends that individuals under 21 are part of “the people” covered by the Second Amendment. He notes that the same term, “the people,” is used in both the First and Fourth Amendments, which apply to individuals under the age of 21, including those under 18. He argues, therefore, that the term “the people” in the Second Amendment must include individuals under 21. Other courts have addressed this issue, and we find those cases instructive. In Lara v. Comm’r. Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 436–39 (3rd Cir.), cert. pending, No. 24-1329 18 (U.S. 2025), the court rejected the argument that 18-to-20-year-olds are not among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. It stated that there was a strong presumption that the Second Amendment applies to “all Americans.” Id. at 435 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 581). Although 18-to-20-year-olds were considered minors at the founding, the court stated that, at step one, in determining whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the court was not “rigidly limited by eighteenth-century conceptual boundaries,” noting that such an approach would result in a finding that “the people” consisted solely of property-owning white males, which “is obviously not the state of the law.” Id. at 437. The court stated that an individual could be included as a member of “the people” and still not be allowed to carry a gun, noting that “[n]either felons nor the mentally ill are categorically excluded from our national community,” but that did not mean that the government canno