Vivar v. Dilts

Juan Carlos Vivar v. Samantha Jackson Dilts, M.D., et al., Case No. 82, Sept. Term, 2025, Opinion filed on July 8, 2026, by Berger, J. DEATH – ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH – LIMITATIONS – COMPUTATION OF LIMITATIONS Pursuant to the plain language of Maryland Rule 15-1001(d), to participate in a wrongful death action and share in any subsequent recovery, a use plaintiff typically must file a motion to intervene by the earlier of: (1) three years after the death of the injured person (the statutory deadline) or (2) 30 days after being served with the complaint and requisite notice if the use plaintiff resides in Maryland. Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2) provides that a use plaintiff waives their right to participate in the action or claim recovery by failing to file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline. The plain language of Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2) operates to bar use plaintiffs from joining a wrongful death action as party plaintiffs even when service of the complaint and requisite notice is not effectuated until after the statutory deadline has passed. DEATH – ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH – RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES – CONDITIONS PRECEDENT The requirement that a use plaintiff file a Complaint or motion to intervene within the statutory limitations period is a condition precedent to maintaining suit. Failure to act prior to the statutory deadline extinguishes a use plaintiff’s claim, therefore, the relation back doctrine cannot be applied to render a motion to intervene timely. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. C-16-CV-23-004371 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 82 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ JUAN CARLOS VIVAR v. SAMANTHA JACKSON DILTS, M.D., ET AL. ______________________________________ Berger, Tang, Kenney, James A., III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Berger, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 8, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.08 '00'04- 15:13:02 Gregory Hilton, Clerk  In this case, we must decide whether the relation back doctrine applies in wrongful death actions so as to allow a “use plaintiff” who is served after the statutory deadline to formally join the proceedings as a party plaintiff. 1 Alex Vivar Perez (“Alex”), the son of Appellant Juan Carlos Vivar (“Mr. Vivar”) and Appellee-Plaintiff Cristina Perez (“Ms. Perez”) tragically passed away on August 30, 2020, after a visit to PM Pediatrics Urgent Care in Greenbelt, Maryland. On August 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a statement of claim, including a wrongful death claim, with the Maryland Healthcare Alternative Dispute Resolution Office (“HCADRO”) against the attending physician, Samantha Jackson Dilts, M.D. (“Dr. Dilts”), PM Pediatrics Management Group, LLC, and PM Pediatrics of Maryland, LLC (collectively, “Appellee-Defendants”). That same day, Ms. Perez waived arbitration. Thereafter, and pursuant to the relevant statute, Ms. Perez filed the present action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on September 22, 2023, in which she named Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff. Mr. Vivar was served with the Complaint and requisite notice on September 26, 2023. On June 7, 2024, Mr. Vivar filed the instant Motion to Intervene. The circuit court denied Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene on February 11, 2025. This appeal followed. 1 As explained by the Supreme Court of Maryland, “[a] use plaintiff in common law pleadings is ‘[a] plaintiff for whom an action is brought in another’s name,’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1579 (8th ed. 2004), and ‘who does not join in the action,’ Md. Rule 15- 1001(b).” Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 439 Md. 333, 336 n.1 (2014).  On appeal, Mr. Vivar presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: 2 I. Whether the circuit court erred by denying Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene as untimely under Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(2). II. Whether, provided that the previous question is answered in the affirmative, good cause was shown to excuse Mr. Vivar’s late filing under Maryland Rule 15-1001(e)(3). For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the negative and, therefore, do not reach the second question. We, therefore, affirm. BACKGROUND Alex’s Death and the Initiation of the Instant Action 3 In August 2020, Alex, who had a history of chronic constipation, suffered from an episode of severe abdominal pain and constipation. On August 28, 2020, after Alex’s constipation had continued for approximately two weeks, Ms. Perez took Alex to PM Pediatrics in Greenbelt, Maryland. After an enema was administered, the attending 2 Mr. Vivar phrased the questions as follows: 1. Did the Circuit Court err by denying Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene as untimely pursuant to Md. Rule 15-1001(e)(2)? 2. If the answer to Question Presented #1 is yes, was Mr. Vivar’s late filing excused under Md. Rule 15-1001(e)(3) when the clerk refused to accept his Motion to Intervene, informing him that he was already a plaintiff in the case? 3 The facts of the underlying lawsuit are disputed. To provide context of the underlying claim, we recite here facts from the Complaint. 2 physician, Dr. Dilts, performed an abdominal examination of Alex. Alex was discharged that same evening, despite having not passed a bowel movement. The next morning, Alex began throwing up and having diarrhea. Ms. Perez left Alex in the bathroom to get him a glass of water. When Ms. Perez returned, she found Alex unresponsive on the floor. Ms. Perez called 911 and Alex was transported to the hospital where he was diagnosed as having suffered from cardiac arrest and gastrointestinal bleeding. On August 30, 2020, Alex passed away at the age of nine. According to the autopsy report, Alex’s cause of death was complications of bowel obstruction due to congenital constipation. On August 16, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a medical malpractice claim stemming from Alex’s death against Appellee-Defendants in the HCADRO. That same day, Ms. Perez filed an Election to Waive Arbitration pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2019 Repl. Vol. 2020), § 3-2A-06B of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). 4 On September 22, 2023, Ms. Perez filed a Complaint in the circuit court naming Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff. 5 The Complaint contains three causes of action: negligence, 4 Pursuant to CJP § 3-2A-06B(f)(1), a plaintiff has 60 days after filing an election to waive arbitration to file a complaint “in the appropriate circuit court or the United States District Court.” The operative date for purposes of the statutory deadline with respect to Ms. Perez’s claims, therefore, is the date the statement of claim was filed in the HCADRO. 5 According to Ms. Perez, her original statement of claim filed with the HCADRO named Mr. Vivar as a use plaintiff. Because our forthcoming analysis does not depend on whether Mr. Vivar was in fact named as a use plaintiff in the original statement of claim, we do not address this fact further. 3 wrongful death, and a survival action. Mr. Vivar was served with a copy of the Complaint and the appropriate notice pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-1001(d) on September 26, 2023. 6 Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene According to Mr. Vivar, he attempted to file a formal motion to intervene at the circuit court on October 19, 2023, but the clerk refused his motion. Mr. Vivar claims that the clerk printed out a “Case Summary” showing that Mr. Vivar was already listed as a plaintiff in the action who was represented by counsel, namely the same counsel representing Ms. Perez. Thereafter, Mr. Vivar mailed the draft motion to intervene to Ms. Perez’s counsel. On November 1, 2023, Ms. Perez’s counsel called Mr. Vivar to “allay any confusion” that Mr. Vivar had concerning his rights as a use plaintiff. According to Ms. Perez’s counsel, he informed Mr. Vivar that he did not and would not represent him in the pending matter. Additionally, Ms. Perez’s counsel explained to Mr. Vivar what a use plaintiff is and informed him that he would have to formally intervene if he wished to participate in the action, directing him to the legal options outlined in the notice letter served upon him. 6 In his principal brief, as well as in his motion for reconsideration and at the hearing on his Motion to Intervene, Mr. Vivar contends that he was served on October 6, 2023. In his reply brief and Motion to Intervene, however, Mr. Vivar notes that he was served on September 26, 2023. The affidavit of service by private process similarly provides that Mr. Vivar was served on September 26, 2023. This discrepancy is not addressed by either party. As we shall explain, because the statutory deadline was August 30, 2023, this discrepancy is immaterial. Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, that Mr. Vivar was served on September 26, 2023. 4  After retaining counsel, Mr. Vivar filed the instant Motion to Intervene on June 7, 2024. Ms. Perez and Appellee-Defendants each filed motions in opposition and a hearing regarding the motion was held on January 28, 2025. At the hearing, Mr. Vivar conceded that his motion was untimely under the plain language of both the statutory and served notice deadlines in Maryland Rule 15-1001 (“Rule 15-1001”). 7 To overcome the statutory deadline, Mr. Vivar asked the circuit court to “make new law” by applying the relation back doctrine to relate back the filing of the Motion to Intervene to the date Ms. Perez initiated the action. Mr. Vivar reasoned that the Legislature could not have intended a situation where, because of the competing timelines in the HCDARO statute and wrongful death rule and statute, a plaintiff could serve a use plaintiff after the statute of limitations had passed, thereby nullifying the use plaintiff’s opportunity to participate in the suit. Next, to overcome the served notice deadline, Mr. Vivar argued that the circuit court should find that good cause existed based on the clerk’s alleged refusal to accept his Motion to Intervene and assertion that he was already a party plaintiff. Ms. Perez contended that she complied with Rule 15-1001(d) by serving Mr. Vivar with the Complaint and required notice within 30 days of waiving into circuit court. Further, Ms. Perez argued that, pursuant to Rule 15-1001, because Mr. Vivar filed his Motion to Intervene after the statutory deadline had passed, the circuit court was precluded from finding that good cause excused the late filing. Even if the circuit court were allowed 7 As explained infra, under a plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001, the statutory deadline was August 30, 2023, and the served notice deadline was 30 days after service of the Complaint and requisite notice. 5 to consider good cause, Ms. Perez asserted that no good cause existed because Mr. Vivar did not act with due diligence when confronted with the allegedly contradictory information received from the clerk. Finally, Ms. Perez urged the circuit court to decline Mr. Vivar’s request to apply the relation back doctrine and to, instead, apply a plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001. Appellee-Defendants argued that, irrespective of the served notice deadline, Mr. Vivar was precluded from participating in the suit as a party plaintiff because he failed to file a Complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline, August 30, 2023. Mr. Vivar agreed with Appellee-Defendants that, if a plain language interpretation of Rule 15- 1001 was to be applied, he would be precluded from joining the suit as a party plaintiff. The Circuit Court’s Ruling On February 11, 2025, the circuit court denied Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene. Reading from Rule 15-1001, the circuit court reasoned that to participate in the action, Mr. Vivar would have had to file [with] the clerk of court in which this action is pending a motion to intervene in the action in accordance with the Maryland rules no later than the earlier of one, the applicable deadline stated in 3-904(g), which is the statute of limitations, and section 5-201(a), which is regarding a disability, or 30 days after being served with the complaint and [the Rule 15-1001] notice. The circuit court proceeded to discuss the rule’s waiver by inaction provision, Rule 15- 1001(e)(3), explaining that: If a use plaintiff who is served with the complaint and notice . . . does not file a motion to intervene by the served notice deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the 6  action or claim any recovery unless for good cause shown the Court excuses the late filing. So (e)(3) is really broken up into two sections. One, if the notice of the motion to intervene is not filed by the served notice deadline, then the Court can excuse the late filing if good cause is shown. However, that sentence ends at, the use Plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim any recovery unless for good cause shown the Court excuses the late filing, period. The next sentence is applicable here. The Court may not excuse the late filing if the statutory deadline is not met. Statutory deadline in this particular case is August 30th, 2023. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that, even if it credited Mr. Vivar’s assertion that he had tried to file a motion to intervene on October 19, 2023, the Motion to Intervene must still be denied because it was filed after the statutory deadline of August 30, 2023. Mr. Vivar noted a timely appeal. We shall provide additional facts as necessary in our forthcoming analysis. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to intervene for abuse of discretion. WAMCO, Inc. v. Northeast 400, LLC, 251 Md. App. 196, 205 (2021) (citing Maryland- Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n v. Town of Washington Grove, 408 Md. 37, 64 (2009)). A circuit court abuses its discretion “when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.” WAMCO, Inc., 251 Md. App. at 205 (quoting Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 201 (2020)). Questions of law, such as statutory construction and 7 interpretation are, however, reviewed de novo. Bethesda Afr. Cemetery Coal. v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n of Montgomery Cnty., 489 Md. 1, 42 (2024) (citing Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 482 Md. 159, 178 (2022)). DISCUSSION I. The circuit court did not err in denying Mr. Vivar’s motion to intervene. On appeal -- as he did before the circuit court -- Mr. Vivar concedes that his Motion to Intervene was untimely under Rule 15-1001. Nevertheless, Mr. Vivar contends that the circuit court erred in denying his Motion to Intervene. A. The legal landscape of wrongful death actions in Maryland To begin, we turn briefly to the history of Maryland’s wrongful death statute. As explained in Carter, “[t]he common law not only denied a tort recovery for injury once the tort victim had died, it also refused to recognize any new and independent cause of action in the victim’s dependents or heirs for their own loss at his [or her] death.” Walker v. Essex, 318 Md. 516, 522, 569 A.2d 645, 648 (1990) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)). In 1846, to counter this harsh rule, the English legislature created a cause of action for wrongful death, known as Lord Campbell’s Act, which required a wrongful death suit to be brought by the executor or administrator of the estate for the use of the parties named in the complaint. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23, 569 A.2d at 648. The purpose of Lord Campbell’s Act was “to compensate the families of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another person[,]” and the measure of damages was based on the loss sustained by the parties on whose behalf the action was brought. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 343, 65 A. 49, 53 (1906). Subsequently, every American state adopted its own wrongful death statute, with many states requiring the suit to be brought by the executor, administrator, or personal representative of the 8  deceased person’s estate. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23, 569 A.2d at 648. Carter v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 439 Md. 333, 361 (2014). Maryland adopted its wrongful death statute, bearing close resemblance to Lord Campbell’s Act, in 1852. Walker, 318 Md. at 522-23. Notably, under Maryland’s statute, unlike under the English law, a wrongful death action “is brought in the name of a person entitled to recover, and to the use of all such parties who may have an interest.” Id. at 523. “It follows then, based on the history of the wrongful death cause of action, that a beneficiary (or a personal representative with an interest) would bring the suit for the use of the other parties in interest.” Carter, 439 Md. at 362. Maryland’s wrongful death statute is codified in Sections 3-901 through 3-904 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Critical to our resolution of the present case, CJP § 3-904 and Rule 15-1001 govern the procedures of a wrongful death action. In relevant part, CJP § 3-904 provides: (a)(1) [With exceptions that do not apply here], an action under this subtitle shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased person. ... (c)(1) In an action under this subtitle, damages may be awarded to all beneficiaries proportioned to the injury resulting from the wrongful death. (2) Subject to § 11-108(d)(2) of this article, the amount recovered shall be divided among the beneficiaries in shares directed by the verdict. (d) The damages awarded under subsection (c) of this section are not limited or restricted by the “pecuniary loss” or 9  “pecuniary benefit” rule but may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable for the death of: ... (2) A minor child; ... (f) Only one action under this subtitle lies in respect to the death of a person. (g)(1) [With exceptions that do not apply here], an action under this subtitle shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person. ... The so-called “one action rule” embodied in CJP § 3-904(f) “codifies one of the main policies underlying wrongful death statutes[:] . . . . ‘to protect a defendant from being vexed by several suits instituted by or on behalf of different equitable plaintiffs for the same injury, when all the parties could be joined in one proceeding.’” Carter, 439 Md. at 363 (quoting Walker, 318 Md. at 523). The procedure for providing notice to use plaintiffs and the subsequent joinder of use plaintiffs is delineated in Rule 15-1001. Before we endeavor to interpret the relevant provisions of Rule 15-1001, we address the pertinent evolution of the rule. The Supreme Court of Maryland’s decision in Univ. of Md. Medical Sys. Corp. v. Muti, 426 Md. 358 (2012) (superseded by Rule 15-1001) was “the catalyst of this evolution,” which was subsequently chronicled in Carter. Carter, 439 Md. at 364. 10  The Carter Court was presented with the question of whether use plaintiffs are required to formally join an action prior to the expiration of the three year limitations period in order to participate in subsequent recovery. Id. at 347. At the time of the underlying trial in Carter, Rule 15-1001 provided: (a) Applicability. This Rule applies to an action involving a claim for damages for wrongful death. (b) Plaintiff. If the wrongful act occurred in this State, all persons who are or may be entitled by law to damages by reason of the wrongful death shall be named as plaintiffs whether or not they join in the action. The words “to the use of” shall precede the name of any person named as a plaintiff who does not join in the action. (c) Notice to Use Plaintiffs. The party bringing the action shall mail a copy of the complaint by certified mail to any use plaintiff at the use plaintiff’s last known address. Proof of mailing shall be filed as provided in Rule 2-126. (d) Complaint. In addition to complying with Rules 2-303 through 2-305, the complaint shall state the relationship of each plaintiff to the decedent whose death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act. Id. at 364 (quoting Maryland Rule 15-1001). The Court noted that: The conclusions drawn from the case law interpreting Rule 15- 1001 (prior to Muti) can be summarized in two general propositions: (1) Maryland Rule 15-1001(b) did not require formal joinder; and (2) Maryland Rule 15-1001 was more than just a notice rule because use plaintiffs are real parties in interest whose interests must be acknowledged and protected throughout the litigation. Carter, 439 Md. at 364-65 (citing Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 418 Md. 400, 422 (2011) (superseded by Rule 15-1001) and Williams v. Work, 192 Md. App. 438, 455 (2010) (superseded by Rule 15-1001)). 11  For the duration of the trial in Carter, therefore, there was no clear directive regarding how a use plaintiff could join in a wrongful death action. Indeed, [t]he first affirmative directive to use plaintiffs explaining how to join in a wrongful death action occurred in [the Supreme Court of Maryland’s] 2012 opinion in Muti. In that case, [the] Court undertook the task of clarifying the case law on use plaintiffs. In a section entitled “Some Considered Dicta,” the majority opinion explained the standard for a named use plaintiff to join in the wrongful death action when it stated: Rule 15-1001(b) distinguishes between those beneficiaries who join in the action for damages and those, the use plaintiffs, who do not. Use plaintiffs who wish to assert their respective claims for damages must timely join the action by indicating to the court and to the original parties in some clear fashion that they are claiming their “share.” Ordinarily, this is done by intervening. Carter, 439 Md. at 367 (quoting Muti, 426 Md. at 384). In 2012, the Supreme Court of Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Committee (“Rules Committee”) “closed th[e] door” for “interpretation [of] the precise manner by which a use plaintiff could clearly claim [their] share” by recommending amendment to Rule 15-1001 “to implement holdings of the Court in [Muti].” Carter, 439 Md. at 367-68 (citing Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes of June 21, 2012, at 105). Effective January 1, 2013, “[t]he new version of [] Rule 15-1001 . . . substantially incorporated the old iteration of sections (a) and (b),” while amending other provisions. Carter, 439 Md. at 368. In pertinent part, the amended Rule 15-1001 -- which governs the present case -- provides: 12 (c) Complaint. The complaint shall state (1) the relationship of each plaintiff to the decedent whose death is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act, (2) the last known address of each use plaintiff, and (3) that the party bringing the action conducted a good faith and reasonably diligent effort to identify, locate, and name as use plaintiffs all individuals who might qualify as use plaintiffs. The court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to join all use plaintiffs if the court finds that the party bringing the action made such a good faith and reasonably diligent effort. (d) Notice to Use Plaintiff. The party bringing the action shall serve a copy of the complaint on each use plaintiff pursuant to Rule 2-121. The complaint shall be accompanied by a notice in substantially the following form: [Caption of case] NOTICE TO [Name of Use Plaintiff] You may have a right under Maryland law to claim an award of damages in this action. You should consult Maryland Code, § 3-904 of the Courts Article for eligibility requirements. Only one action on behalf of all individuals entitled to make a claim is permitted. If you decide to make a claim, you must file with the clerk of court in which this action is pending a motion to intervene in the action in accordance with the Maryland Rules no later than the earlier of (1) the applicable deadline stated in § 3-904(g) and § 5-201(a) of the Courts Article [“the statutory deadline”] or (2) 30 days after being served with the complaint and this Notice if you reside in Maryland, 60 days after being served if you reside elsewhere in the United States, or 90 days after being served if you reside outside of the United States [“the served notice deadline”]. You may represent yourself, or you may obtain an attorney to represent you. If the court does not receive your written notice to intervene by the earlier of the applicable deadline, the court may find that you have lost your right to participate in the action and claim any recovery. 13  (e) Waiver by Inaction. (1) Definitions. In this section and in section (f) of this Rule, “statutory deadline” means the applicable deadline stated in Code, Courts Article, § 3-904(g) and § 5-201(a), and “served notice deadline” means the additional applicable deadlines stated in the notice given pursuant to section (d) of this Rule. (2) Failure to Satisfy Statutory Time Requirements. An individual who fails to file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline may not participate in the action or claim a recovery. (3) Other Late Filing. If a use plaintiff who is served with a complaint and notice in accordance with section (d) of this Rule does not file a motion to intervene by the served notice deadline, the use plaintiff may not participate in the action or claim any recovery unless, for good cause shown, the court excuses the late filing. The court may not excuse the late filing if the statutory deadline is not met. (f) Subsequently Identified Use Plaintiff. Notwithstanding any time limitations contained in Rule 2-341 or in a scheduling order entered pursuant to Rule 2-504, if, despite conducting a good faith and reasonably diligent effort to identify, locate, and name all use plaintiffs, an individual entitled to be named as a use plaintiff is not identified until after the complaint is filed, but is identified by the statutory deadline, the newly identified use plaintiff shall be added by amendment to the complaint as soon as practicable and served in accordance with section (d) of this Rule and Rule 2- 341(d). Rule 15-1001. After the amendments, therefore, use plaintiffs must “file a motion to intervene to be joined as a party plaintiff in a wrongful death action.” Carter, 439 Md. at 369-70. The sample notice provided in Rule 15-1001(d) provides use plaintiffs with information regarding how to intervene and the applicable deadlines for doing so. 14  The Carter Court went beyond determining whether the use plaintiffs “did enough to join in the action” prior to the expiration of the three year limitations period under the law as it stood during the duration of trial. Carter, 439 Md. at 370. Indeed, the Court analyzed the outcome under three versions of the law: (1) pre-Muti; (2) post-Muti, but before the 2012 amendments to Rule 15-1001; and (3) post-Rule 15-1001 amendment. The trial in Carter occurred before the Court’s decision in Muti and the subsequent revisions to Rule 15-1001 when the relevant use plaintiffs were “real parties in interest that were not required to formally join in the proceeding in order to share in an award for damages.” Id. The Carter Court, therefore, concluded that “the use plaintiffs’ knowing consent to and active participation in the litigation was the functional equivalent of joinder.” Id. Relevant here, the Court went on to explain: [I]f we were evaluating the facts of this case under the state of the law following the 2012 amendments to Rule 15-1001 (effective January 1, 2013), our inquiry would be whether the use plaintiffs “file[d] a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline.” Rule 15-1001(e)(2). This would be a very brief inquiry because it is clear by all accounts that the use plaintiffs did not ever formally join in the present action. Therefore, if the trial in the case at bar took place on or after January 1, 2013, the use plaintiffs would all be barred from recovery because the statute of limitations would have run long before any formal joinder occurred. Id. at 376. B. A plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001 is proper We now turn to interpreting the pertinent provisions in Rule 15-1001. According to Mr. Vivar, the circuit court erred in denying his Motion to Intervene because a plain language interpretation of Rule 15-1001 is improper here. Such a reading, Mr. Vivar 15 suggests, would thwart legislative intent where the competing deadlines of Rule 15- 1001(e), CJP § 3-904(g)(1), and CJP § 3-2A-06B(f)(1) are in tension. That is, Mr. Vivar contends that, because CJP § 3-2A-06B(f)(1) gives a claimant who waives arbitration with the HCADRO 60 days to file their complaint in the appropriate circuit court or the United States District Court, a plaintiff may -- as was done here -- provide the notice required by Rule 15-1001(d) to a use plaintiff after the statutory deadline has passed, thereby eliminating a use plaintiff’s opportunity to intervene. Such an outcome, according to Mr. Vivar, fails to further the legislative intent to: (1) effectuate the “one action rule to prevent vexation of the defendant by multiple lawsuits;” and (2) apply the “one action rule to compensate the families of the decedent as was conceived in the Lord Campbell Act.” Further, Mr. Vivar asserts that such a result undermines the legislative intent embodied in the served notice deadline, that is, to allow grieving use plaintiffs time to determine whether to participate in a wrongful death action. Rather than offering an alternative construction of Rule 15-1001, Mr. Vivar urges us to conclude that the relation back doctrine applies to render his Motion to Intervene timely. Ms. Perez and Appellee-Defendants (collectively, “Appellees”) counter that a plain reading of Rule 15-1001 is proper because the plain meaning of the rule is unambiguous: a use plaintiff waives their right to participate in a wrongful death action by failing to file a motion to intervene or complaint by the statutory deadline. Accordingly, Appellees contend that the circuit court properly denied Mr. Vivar’s Motion to Intervene as untimely. “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.” Leford v. Jenway 16 Contracting, Inc., 490 Md. 666, 680 (2025) (quoting Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 490 Md. 243, 264 (2025)) (cleaned up). In so doing, “[w]e assume that the General Assembly’s intent is ‘expressed in the statutory language’ and therefore begin our analysis with the plain language of the statute.’” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264 (quoting Spevak v. Montgomery Cnty., 480 Md. 562, 571-72 (2022)). We begin “by looking to the normal, plain meaning of the text, ‘ensur[ing] that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Zukowski v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 490 Md. 243, 264 (2025) (quoting Spevak v. Montgomery Cnty., 480 Md. 562, 572 (2022)). “The same principles which are applied in statutory interpretation apply with equal force to our interpretation of the Maryland Rules.” In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711 (2001) (citing Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264 (2000)). Although we focus our analysis on the plain text, we do not read “statutory language in a vacuum” or confine our interpretation “to the isolated section [at issue] alone.” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010)). Rather, “we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole, considering the ‘purpose, aim or policy of the [General Assembly] reflected in the statute.’” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 264-65 (quoting McClanahan v. Wash. Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 701 (2015)). “If we are satisfied that the statute’s plain language is unambiguous and clearly communicates the General Assembly’s intent, then our inquiry ends, ‘and we apply the plain meaning of the statute.’” Zukowski, 490 Md. at 265 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 448 Md. 648, 655 (2016)). 17  The parties agree that, pursuant to the plain language of Rule 15-1001(d), to participate in the present action Mr. Vivar was required to file a Motion to Intervene with the clerk of the circuit court by the earlier of: (1) the statutory deadline (August 30, 2023) or (2) the served notice deadline (30 days after being served). Mr. Vivar concedes that the Motion to Intervene was untimely under either deadline. What is more, Mr. Vivar acknowledges that, should we apply a strictly plain language review of Rule 15-1001(e)(2), he would be barred from joining as a party plaintiff because he missed the statutory deadline. We agree. To be sure, pursuant to Rule 15-1001(e)(2): “[a]n individual who fails to file a complaint or motion to intervene by the statutory deadline may not participate in the action or claim a recovery.” This language unambiguously sets out a process by which an individual’s failure to act before the statutory deadline constitutes waiver. As noted, it is undisputed that Mr. Vivar did not file either a complaint or a motion to intervene by the statutory deadline, August 30, 2023. Rather, Mr. Vivar did not file the instant Motion to Intervene until June 7, 2024. Accordingly, applying the plain language of Rule 15- 1001(e)(2), we conclude that Mr. Vivar waived his ability to participate in the present action as a party plaintiff. We are unpersuaded by Mr. Vivar’s argument that a plain language interpretation is improper because such a result fails to further the legislative intent underpinning Maryland’s wrongful dea