Full Opinion

The Methodist Church of Cape St. Claire, et al. v. The Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., et al., No. 1812, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Nazarian, J. ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY Resolving Local Churches’ claims that Annual Conference of United Methodist Church (UMC) had committed fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by failing to act in accordance with Church doctrine, custom, and practices, in good faith, and in the Local Churches’ best interests would have required circuit court to consider the sanctity of religious doctrine in violation of church autonomy doctrine. ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – FINANCIAL MISMANGEMENT Church autonomy doctrine prevents court from resolving Local Churches’ claim that Annual Conference had mismanaged clergy pension funds because circuit court would have to examine UMC’s view regarding the role of clergy and church leaders, their authority and compensation, and internal church management, a function that falls within the purview of a separate governing body within the church. ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – BREACH OF CONTRACT Circuit court did not err when it declined to determine whether Annual Conference’s imposition of a payment requirement before Local Churches could disaffiliate from UMC was otherwise consistent with the UMC’s governing instrument, the Book of Discipline, because such determination would have required the circuit court to interpret UMC doctrine and interfere with church governance. ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – QUIET TITLE TO PROPERTY Claim that circuit court had failed to address whether Local Churches’ holding of property in trust for the UMC had been terminated after trust purposes had become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve would have required circuit court to determine fundamental purpose of a trust formed with a particular religious purpose in mind and whether subsequent doctrinal changes had frustrated that purpose. Such consideration would have infringed on the protections bestowed under the First Amendment. LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE – MULTIPLE CIRCUIT COURT RULINGS Circuit court decision not to dismiss claims at motion to dismiss stage of litigation was interlocutory and did not bind it from disposing of the claims in later summary judgment ruling. RECUSAL Circuit court judge’s affiliation as a parishioner with local UMC church that was not a party to the dispute, without more, had no apparent impact on Local Churches’ ability to receive a fair trial and was insufficient, on its own, to overcome presumption of judicial impartiality. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C-02-CV-23-000500 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 1812 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ THE METHODIST CHURCH OF CAPE ST. CLAIRE, ET AL. v. THE BALTIMORE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, INC. ET AL. ______________________________________ Nazarian, Albright, Beachley, Donald E.* (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Opinion by Nazarian, J. Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State ______________________________________ Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.10.05 Filed: October 5, 2026 15:49:00 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk * Beachley, J., now a Senior Judge, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court. He participated in the adoption of this opinion after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A. Thirty-seven Maryland Methodist churches (the “Local Churches”), all part of the Baltimore Washington Conference (the “BW Conference”) of the United Methodist Church (“UMC”), sought to disaffiliate from the UMC and to retain the real properties each has held in trust for the UMC since becoming part of the national church. Citing the national church’s governing documents, the BW Conference conditioned disaffiliation and property retention on the Local Churches’ payment of fifty percent of the assessed value of the real property they wished to retain (the “payment requirement”) in addition to other payment terms established by the UMC for disaffiliating churches. The Local Churches objected to the payment requirement and sued the BW Conference, its Board of Trustees (the “Board”), and its presiding bishop, LaTrelle Easterling (the “Bishop”) (collectively, the “Conference”) in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In two phases, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Conference on the grounds that the Local Churches hadn’t generated a genuine dispute of material fact and that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred secular courts from deciding their claims. The Local Churches appeal the court’s application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and we affirm. I. BACKGROUND In 1968, the Methodist Church and the Evangelical United Brethren Church merged to form the UMC. The UMC’s Book of Discipline is “the instrument for setting forth the laws, plan, polity, and process by which United Methodists govern themselves” as written and amended over time by UMC General Conferences of denominations. It details the UMC’s constitution, doctrine and general rules, organizational structure, and policies relative to church property and judicial administration. The UMC operates under a hierarchical structure set forth in the Book of Discipline. At the top of the hierarchy is the General Conference, which is vested with “full legislative power over all matters distinctively” related to the UMC’s theology of Connectionalism, including matters of church governance. The General Conference meets once every four years and is comprised of both clergy and lay delegates elected by the Annual Conferences. The Annual Conferences have the right to vote on amendments to the UMC’s constitution, to elect delegates to the General Conference, and to “discharge such duties and exercise such powers as the General Conference . . . may determine.” Each Annual Conference is supervised by a bishop and oversees all local churches, or “Charge Conferences,” within its boundaries. The UMC also has a Judicial Council, which serves as its highest judicial authority. The Judicial Council is the sole body charged with interpreting the Book of Discipline and with determining if acts of the General Conference and decisions of law made by the bishops of the Annual Conferences adhere to the provisions of that instrument. Paragraph 2501 of the Book of Discipline provides that “[a]ll properties of the United Methodist local churches . . . are held, in trust, for the benefit of the entire denomination” and that “ownership and usage of church property is subject” to the Book of Discipline. The trust requirement, it says, “reflects the connectional structure” of the UMC “by ensuring that the property will be used solely for purposes consonant with the mission of the entire denomination as set forth in” the Book of Discipline. Paragraph 2503 requires written instruments of conveyance by which real property is held or acquired by local churches for use by the UMC to contain a “trust clause” stating that the premises shall be kept and maintained for the UMC’s benefit. That paragraph provides as well, however, 2 that the absence of a trust clause in such an instrument doesn’t exclude the property held or conveyed from the trust requirement. And the Book of Discipline’s trust requirement is codified in section 5-326 of the Corporations & Associations Article (“CA”) of the Maryland Code, which reads: All assets owned by any Methodist Church . . . whether incorporated, unincorporated, or abandoned: (1) Shall be held by the trustees of the church in trust for the United Methodist Church; and (2) Are subject to the discipline, usage, and ministerial appointments of the United Methodist Church, as from time to time authorized and declared by the General Conference of that church. CA § 5-326. In 2019, the General Conference amended the Book of Discipline and added Paragraph 2553, titled the “Disaffiliation of a Local Church Over Issues Related to Human Sexuality.” Paragraph 2553 recognized a “current deep conflict within The [UMC] around issues of human sexuality” arising from recent changes by the General Conference to the Book of Discipline’s requirements and provisions regarding “the practice of homosexuality” and the ordination and marriage of “self-avowed practicing homosexuals.” Paragraph 2553 created a new disaffiliation path: it granted a local church that wished to disaffiliate from the denomination “for reasons of conscience” related to those changes a limited right to do so by a specified date and on certain conditions without forfeiting any real property held by that church in trust for the UMC. According to Paragraph 2553, the General Conference was to develop a standard form for Disaffiliation Agreements that recognized “the validity and applicability of the [trust requirement], notwithstanding 3 [Paragraph 2553’s] release of property therefrom.” If a two-thirds majority of a local church’s professing members voted to disaffiliate, the board of trustees of the applicable Annual Conference would then establish terms and conditions for the disaffiliation to be “memorialized in a binding Disaffiliation Agreement.” But Paragraph 2553 provided as well, and specifically, that Annual Conferences “may develop additional standard terms” for disaffiliation “not inconsistent with the standard form” of the Disaffiliation Agreement developed by the General Conference. And under Paragraph 2553, the BW Conference imposed the payment requirement at issue in this case as a standard term of disaffiliation for the local churches under its oversight. On March 13, 2023, the Local Churches sued the Conference in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The original complaint set forth nine counts. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that the trust had terminated, or alternatively that it is revocable, and a declaration of the Local Churches’ entitlement to quiet and exclusive possession of their “respective properties.” Count II asked the circuit court to terminate the trust under the Estates & Trusts Article (“ET”) of the Maryland Code or, alternatively, “to have themselves clearly established as the trustee of each respective trust with all power to revoke the trust and/or dispose of the property as Maryland law allows.” Under Counts III and IV, the Local Churches alleged that the Board and the Bishop had constructively defrauded and breached their fiduciary duty both to them and to the BW Conference by misusing and mismanaging the Local Churches’ financial apportionments and real and personal property held in trust; by concealing from the Local Churches material facts about the use of discretionary funds, including management of the conference pension fund; and 4 by making false statements about the pension fund or, alternatively, grossly mismanaging the fund. The Local Churches demanded a court-ordered accounting of the Board and Bishop’s management of the pension fund (Count V), and they asserted claims for quantum meruit (Count VI) and unjust enrichment (Count VII) based on years of having provided apportionments, ministerial services and the use of their real and personal property to the Conference. Count VIII alleged promissory estoppel based on claims that the Local Churches relied reasonably on the understanding that other options for disaffiliation had been and would continue to be available customarily. On May 19, 2023, the Local Churches filed a First Amended Complaint that added a breach of contract claim, Count IX, based on alleged promises in the Book of Discipline and mismanagement of the pension fund. And under (now) Count X of the complaint, they sought quiet title on behalf of the Methodist Church of Cape St. Claire (“St. Claire”), which had purchased its land before the UMC’s formation. On June 21, 2023, the Conference moved to dismiss the Local Churches’ complaint and the parties appeared before the circuit court on September 18 for a motions hearing. On September 18, 2023, the court granted the Conference’s motion to dismiss Count II (seeking judicial modification of the trust) and Counts VI–VIII (quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel). The court didn’t dismiss Count I (declaratory relief) after concluding that neutral principles of law could resolve disputes about the operability of trust provisions on the property of a disaffiliating church. The court determined that the Local Churches’ allegations of gross mismanagement of pension funds under Counts III and IV (constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty) could fall under the fraud or 5 collusion exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and that relief under Count V (demand for accounting) called for court enforcement of obligations under Maryland law and did not interfere with church government or interpretation of church doctrine. The circuit court decided it wasn’t necessary to dismiss Count IX (breach of contract) at the motion-to-dismiss stage of the case, but the court recognized that even though “the issues of implied duties and financial liabilities are clearly secular, eventually the Court would likely need to interpret [the Book of Discipline] to determine whether there was a breach.” Lastly, the court denied the Conference’s motion to dismiss Count X (quiet title) because, it reasoned, property disputes are an exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. After discovery closed, the Conference moved for summary judgment. The Conference argued that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction, that disaffiliation was no longer an available remedy because Paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline had expired on December 31, 2023, and that even if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction and could award a remedy, the Local Churches had failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact. The court held a summary judgment hearing on July 1, 2024. The Local Churches indicated that the financial documents produced by the Conference during discovery may have addressed Count V of their complaint (demand for accounting) and the parties agreed to dismiss that claim after the hearing. At that point, their claims for declaratory judgment, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and quiet title remained. With regard to the Local Churches’ request for a declaratory judgment, the circuit court concluded that there was “no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the 6 [Book of Discipline] created an irrevocable trust.” The court reasoned that the text of the Book of Discipline states expressly that the trust is irrevocable, that its trust clauses don’t reserve for local churches the right to revoke, and that Maryland case law presumes that trusts are irrevocable unless the power of revocation has been reserved. Because there was no dispute that the Local Churches held their property in trust for the UMC and had consented to the trust provisions in the Book of Discipline, the court found the Conference entitled to summary judgment. For these same reasons, the court awarded summary judgment to the Conference on their quiet title claim. The circuit court also found that the Local Churches’ constructive fraud claim fell outside the fraud or collusion exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the court from examining how the UMC governs and manages the Conference’s pension fund. The court determined further that summary judgment was appropriate because the Local Churches hadn’t generated a genuine dispute of material fact in support of their allegations that the Conference had made false statements and mismanaged pension funds, allegations that the Conference had refuted with admissible evidence. The court found that their breach of fiduciary duty claim lacked a factual basis. And the court concluded that adjudicating this claim would require it to analyze how the Conference had decided to establish the 50% payment requirement, a matter that the UMC’s judicial council can resolve and to which the court should defer under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Finally, the circuit court found that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the court from adjudicating the Local Churches’ breach of contract claim. Determining 7 whether the Conference had breached the Book of Discipline, the court reasoned, would require it to interpret the governing law of the UMC and to reference or analyze the Book of Discipline, church polity, and church doctrine. The court determined that it would be improper for it to resolve whether different provisions of the Book of Discipline are consistent for purposes of Paragraph 2553. The court concluded that there was no neutral principle by which it could resolve the Local Churches’ breach of contract claim and entered summary judgment in favor of the Conference. The Local Churches noted a timely appeal. II. DISCUSSION The Local Churches raise five questions1 on appeal. The Conference objects on 1 The Local Churches phrased their Questions Presented as follows: 1. Did the trial court err by applying the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine to preclude judicial review of secular and property-related provisions of the Book of Discipline, thereby denying Appellants their right to a jury trial on disputed factual issues? 2. Did the trial court improperly dismiss Appellants’ claims for declaratory judgment and quiet title under the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine? 3. Did the trial court err by failing to adhere to the law of the case doctrine in reconsidering prior rulings that the Book of Discipline could be interpreted using neutral principles of law? 4. Did the trial court’s denial of judicial review violate Appellants’ constitutional rights? 5. Did [the trial judge’s] refusal to recuse himself constitute an abuse of discretion? The BW Conference stated seven Questions Presented: Continued . . . 8 preservation grounds to the fourth issue—whether the circuit court violated the Local Churches’ constitutional rights when it granted summary judgment. On this issue, the Local Churches highlight that the authority of the Book of Discipline and the holding of UMC property in trust have been codified into Maryland law, and they assert that foreclosing judicial review of church actions in either respect amounts to a deprivation of due process and potential violations of the establishment and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. They argue further that denying judicial review of disputes arising under the Book of Discipline burdens their religious freedom and amounts to an 1. Did the trial court err in dismissing claims challenging the consistency of Conference disaffiliation procedures with the UMC’s central governing document for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction? 2. Did the trial court err in dismissing claims based on the Conference’s alleged mismanagement of clergy pension funds for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction? 3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to Appellees on Appellants’ claims for constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based [on] a lack of evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact on refuted allegations that Appellees made false statements regarding clergy pension fund liabilities, or had mismanaged clergy pension funds or otherwise mismanaged the Conference’s finances? 4. Did the trial court err in finding a lack of genuine factual dispute and entering summary judgment for Appellees on claims that sought to terminate or modify the irrevocable trust over local church property? 5. Did the law of the case doctrine require the trial court to adhere to its previous rulings on subject-matter jurisdiction? 6. Did the trial judge err in declining to recuse himself based on his and his family’s membership in non-party local churches affiliated with the UMC? 7. Should the Appellate Court exercise its discretion to hear several arguments raised by Appellants for the first time on appeal whose resolution would not facilitate adjudication of Appellants’ claims on remand? 9 unconstitutional judicial taking by nullifying their property rights without just compensation. The Conference objects to these constitutional arguments on preservation grounds, arguing that allowing the Local Churches to raise them for the first time on appeal would be substantially prejudicial because the “claims were not raised or developed at all” before the circuit court. The Conference urges us not to hear these constitutional concerns because they don’t change the circuit court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction, offer useful guidance to the trial court, or promote judicial economy. We agree with the Conference. The Local Churches didn’t preserve their constitutional arguments for appellate review. Ordinarily, appellate courts will not decide non-jurisdictional issues “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . . .” Md. Rule 8-131(a). “The question in determining whether an issue [has been] preserved . . . is not simply whether it was raised in some fashion, but whether it was raised with sufficient precision, clarity, and emphasis to give the [adjudicator] a fair opportunity to address it.” Concerned Citizens of Cloverly v. Montgomery Cnty. Plan. Bd., 254 Md. App. 575, 602 (2022) (quoting Ctr. for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 688, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). The party must make the substance behind their assertion clear to the court, and a “passing reference” is not enough. Id. at 603. And, most of all, the trial court must have had an opportunity to answer the question or solve the problem. We have the discretion to hear new arguments on appeal when the circumstances compel it, but there needs to be a really good reason to depart from the normal requirement that parties raise issues in trial courts first. 10 The Local Churches didn’t raise their constitutional objections sufficiently to preserve them for our review, and the record reveals no rulings on the constitutional claims. Their original complaint asserted that the payment requirement infringed on their “fundamental rights to property and freedom of religion.” The complaint claimed also that court intervention was necessary to enabling “the free exercise of [their] constitutional religious and property rights” and alleged that judicial abstention would impede their freedom of religion under the state and federal constitution. These allegations endured through to their First Amended Complaint. In their opposition to the Conference’s motion to dismiss, the Local Churches claimed that being forced to either comply with the payment requirement, abandon their land, or remain affiliated with the UMC in conflict with their religious beliefs, if approved by the court, would amount to a “judicially approved private taking or a violation of their First Amendment rights.” But they embodied these asserted constitutional violations in the declaratory, corporate governance, real estate, and contract claims that followed. They didn’t assert independent violations of their free exercise rights, judicial takings, or violations of due process or the establishment or equal protection clauses. Nor did the Local Churches build on these assertions in their opposition to the Conference’s motion for summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, they referenced their “valuable property rights” and how not allowing them to sue the Conference would create “a number of constitutional concerns,” but then said they weren’t at the hearing to argue those concerns. Later in the hearing, their counsel suggested that a legal system that would keep them from suing while allowing the Conference to sue them 11 if they disaffiliated might violate due process and the establishment and equal protection clauses, but left the discussion there. Nor did the Local Churches present a developed legal argument or analysis of how the Conference violated these constitutional provisions to the circuit court at the summary judgment motion hearing. The Local Churches articulated the impact on their religious freedom and other constitutional rights in the form of the secular state law counts they alleged in their complaints—presumably in an understandable effort to keep their arguments and their injuries as grounded as possible in secular state law rather than more ephemeral and ecclesiastical principles. That makes sense, and the Local Churches left things there—they didn’t give the circuit court broader or more abstract constitutional arguments to consider and address. Sage Title Group LLC v. Roman, 455 Md. 188, 211–12 (2017) (in deciding whether an issue has been preserved sufficiently, appellate courts consider “whether the trial judge ‘could identify . . . the argument that was being made in support of the motion.’” (quoting Nelson v. Carroll, 350 Md. 247, 250 (1998))); see also Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC, 446 Md. 397, 417–18 (2016) (issue preserved where both parties disputed it before the court); Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167, 183 (2007) (issue preserved sufficiently based on the substance of appellant’s arguments). As a result, they didn’t raise these independent constitutional theories for purposes of Maryland Rule 8-131(a) and preserve them for appellate review. From there, we rephrase the Local Churches’ four issues: first, whether the circuit court applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine properly in granting summary judgment on their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims; second 12 whether the court erred when it dismissed their declaratory judgment and quiet title claims; third, whether the circuit court contravened the law of the case doctrine when it resolved their claims; and fourth, whether the court abused its discretion when it declined to recuse in response to their motion for disqualification. We review a circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 1, 14 (2004) (citation omitted), and we review the record independently to determine if there is a genuine dispute of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Similarly, “we review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss.” Reiner v. Ehrlich, 212 Md. App. 142, 151 (2013) (cleaned up) (quoting Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 (2012)). “Whether the law of the case doctrine should be applied” in a particular case is likewise “a legal question” that we review without deference. Baltimore Cnty. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Balt. Cnty. Lodge No. 4, 449 Md. 713, 731 (2016) (citations omitted). Finally, “[t]he decision of whether to recuse is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of discretion.” In re Colin R., 63 Md. App. 684, 701 (1985) (citation omitted). A. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine 1. Application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to dismiss the constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims. The Local Churches argue first that the circuit court ignored viable exceptions to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and dismissed their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims incorrectly. Citing case law from other 13 jurisdictions, they contend that the court could have applied neutral principles of law and could have recognized the fraud exception to the doctrine to resolve those claims. The Conference responds that the court concluded rightly that neutral principles of law couldn’t resolve the Local Churches’ claims because they would have required the court to interpret the Book of Discipline and assess the Conference’s compliance with its own ecclesiastical law. The Conference argues that the cases cited by the Local Churches are distinguishable, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to scrutinize the UMC’s financial operations and internal governance, and that the fraud exception is narrow and doesn’t apply here. Ecclesiastical abstention, also known as the church autonomy doctrine, prohibits civil courts from resolving religious questions, as proscribed by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Vaughn v. Faith Bible Church of Sudlersville, 248 Md. App. 477, 485 (2020) (citing Lang v. Levi, 198 Md. App. 154, 169 (2011)); Bourne v. Ctr. on Children, Inc., 154 Md. App. 42, 52–53 (2003) (“religious organizations require ‘an independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine’” (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))); Marjorie Shields, Annotation, Construction and Application of Church Autonomy Doctrine, 123 A.L.R. 5th 385 (2004) (“the ‘church autonomy doctrine’ deals with a church’s First Amendment right to autonomy in making decisions regarding its own internal affairs, including matters of faith, 14 doctrine, and internal governance.”).2 In particular, secular courts must avoid adjudicating disputes “‘on the basis of religious doctrine and practice,’” resolving matters of “‘church doctrine or governance,’” or deciding secular matters in ways that entangle the court in “‘questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.’” Nouri v. Dadgar, 245 Md. App. 324, 345 (2020) (first quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); then quoting Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt., 111 Md. App. 616, 622 (1996); and then quoting From the Heart Church Ministries v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 370 Md. 152, 179 (2002)). If the core of a dispute concerns “‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of [church members] to the standard of morals required by them,’” we are constrained constitutionally from getting involved. Downs, 111 Md. App. at 622 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1872)). And even if the dispute before us is one that would otherwise be justiciable if presented by secular litigants, it falls outside our authority if resolving it “would require [us] to adjudicate matters of church doctrine or governance, or to second-guess ecclesiastical decisions made by a church body created to make those decisions . . . .” Id. That said, this constitutional constraint applies only to matters “‘strictly and purely ecclesiastical [in] character,’” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America and Can. 2 The Maryland Declaration of Rights protects religious liberty as well. See Md. Const. art. 36; see also Barghout v. Mayor and City Council, 325 Md. 311, 324–28 (1992) (considering a challenge under Article 36). The parties have not briefed whether Article 36 imposes any independent limitation on the role of Maryland courts in resolving ecclesiastical disputes, so we don’t address that question and we resolve this case entirely under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 15 v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733), where “religious doctrine, biblical interpretations, or other ecclesiastical matters” form the basis of the dispute. Vaughn, 248 Md. App. at 491; Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 324. After all, some controversies are “‘simply disputes as to the meaning of agreements on wills, trusts, contracts, and property ownership [that are] . . . questions of civil law and are not predicated on any religious doctrine.’” From the Heart, 370 Md. at 181 (quoting Presbytery of Beaver- Butler of United Presbyterian Church v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317, 1321 (Pa. 1985)). Other disputes involve nondoctrinal questions, such as whether there was an agreement between the parties and, if so, the terms of their agreement. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d at 1321. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether the question can be decided on the basis of neutral principles of law which do not involve the resolution by the court of ecclesiastical issues, or doctrinal proprieties.’” Mt. Olive Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church of Fruitland, Inc. v. Bd. of Incorporators of the Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church Inc., 348 Md. 299, 312 (1997) (quoting Calvary Presbyterian Church of Balt. City v. The Presbytery of Balt. of United Presbyterian Church in U.S., 39 Md. App. 405, 417 (1978)); see Eritrean Orthodox Tweahdo Diocese of USA & Canada v. Sinoda, ___ Md. ___, No. 49, Sept. Term 2025, slip op. at 7 (filed July 23, 2026) (“If a court need not answer an ecclesiastical question to resolve a dispute, and can instead apply neutral principles of law to decide the merits, then the court must do so.”). “Neutral principles of law are principles that are ‘applicable not only to religious bodies, but to public and private lay organizations and to civil governments as well.’” From the Heart, 370 Md. at 180 (quoting Kennedy v. Gray, 807 P.2d 670, 676 (Kan. 1991)). 16 Which neutral principles should apply “will vary with the subject matter of the case.” Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 346. See generally, id. at 346–47 (courts can use neutral principles of law to decide breach of contract); Vaughn, 248 Md. App. at 486 (courts can apply neutral principles of law to resolve a secular dispute between religious organizations that require “interpretation of corporate charters or bylaws.”); From the Heart, 370 Md. at 179–80 (courts can rely on neutral principles of law to resolve church property disputes). “Each set of circumstances must be evaluated on an individual basis by the court to determine whether, under the facts of the particular case, a court would be forced to wander into the ‘theological thicket’ in order to render a decision.” American Union of Baptists, Inc. v. Trustees of Particular Primitive Baptist Church at Black Rock, Inc., 335 Md. 564, 574 (1994). This neutral analysis “may involve examination of some religious instruments, such as a church constitution, [but so long as] the inquiry [is] performed in purely secular terms without relying ‘on religious precepts’” civil courts will have observed the constitutional line. From the Heart, 370 Md. at 180 (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 604). The Local Churches claim that the circuit court applied the church autonomy doctrine improperly to decline review of their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims. We begin with their constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims, see Moon v. Fam. Fed’n for World Peace and Unification Int’l, 281 A.3d 46, 62 (D.C. 2022) (“In determining whether a controversy is justiciable, we . . . consider ‘the actual issues the court has been asked to decide’” (quoting Family Fed'n for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 249 (D.C. 2015)), to which they argue that the court should have applied a fraud or collusion exception to the church 17 autonomy doctrine. See id. at 70 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has “strongly suggested” that an exception exists where courts could decide ecclesiastical disputes “when religious figures act in bad faith for secular purposes.” (cleaned up)). The general idea behind this exception is that although “freedom to believe is absolute . . . freedom to act cannot be [and a] church may not hide behind the first amendment when perpetrating fraud upon the public or its members.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1240 (Miss. 2005). But the tort of intentional misrepresentation, or fraud, is a separate cause of action that the Local Churches didn’t plead in their amended complaint, see generally Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 28 (2005) (stating elements required to prove fraud claim in Maryland); D’Aoust v. Diamond, 197 Md. App. 195, 216 (2010) (unlike constructive fraud, actual fraud is an intentional tort), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 Md. 549 (2012). And even if they had, the record does not reveal a secular purpose that could have motivated the Conference’s adoption of the payment requirement or its management of the pension funds. As