Full Opinion

Prince George’s County v. Joseph Watts, No. 56, September Term, 2025, Opinion by Fader, C.J. LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT CLAIMS ACT – “TORTIOUS ACT OR OMISSION” – STATE STATUTORY CLAIMS The Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) caps the amount of damages that can be awarded against a local government entity in a lawsuit arising from the “tortious acts or omissions” of local government employees committed within the scope of their employment and without malice. That cap does not apply generally to all State statutory claims. However, the damages cap may apply to State statutory claims that sound in tort if the statutory scheme does not reflect that the General Assembly has made a determination concerning the extent and scope of liability of local governments under that particular statutory scheme. MARYLAND FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ACT – DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION – RETALIATION – LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY Claims brought for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“MFEPA”) are not subject to the LGTCA damages cap. MFEPA is a comprehensive statutory scheme in which the General Assembly expressly contemplates claims against local governments, provides that those claims be treated the same as claims against other entities, and establishes a separate set of damages caps unique to that statutory scheme. The specific provisions for liability of local governments in MFEPA take precedence over the general provisions in the LGTCA. STATE GOVERNMENT § 20-1202 – PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY CODE § 2-222 – DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION – LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY Claims brought for disability discrimination under § 20-1202 of the State Government Article for violation of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Prince George’s County Code are subject to the LGTCA damages cap. Section 20-1202 does not reflect that the General Assembly contemplated claims against local governments or made any determination concerning the treatment of such claims. Accordingly, the LGTCA general damages cap applies. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAL20-17893 Argued: May 4, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 56 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY v. JOSEPH WATTS ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Getty, Joseph M., (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned) JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Fader, C.J. Watts, J., concurs and dissents. ______________________________________ Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Filed: July 13, 2026 Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.13 '00'04- 09:57:40 Gregory Hilton, Clerk The Local Government Tort Claims Act, or LGTCA, makes local governments responsible for the “tortious acts or omissions” of their employees committed within the scope of their employment. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-301 – 5-304 (2020 Repl.; 2025 Supp.). It also limits the liability of local governments by capping the amount of damages that can be awarded against them and immunizes local government employees from liability for such claims if they acted without malice. Id. In this case, we examine whether the LGTCA damages cap applies to claims brought under two state statutes: (1) the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, or MFEPA, Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 20-601 – 20-611 (2021 Repl.; 2025 Supp.); and (2) § 20-1202 of the State Government Article, which establishes a state cause of action for violating anti-discrimination provisions in the county codes of Howard, Montgomery, and Prince George’s Counties. The respondent, Joseph Watts, sued the petitioner, Prince George’s County (the “County”), alleging employment discrimination based on disability and retaliation. He alleged that the County had unlawfully discriminated against him under both MFEPA and § 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, and that it had unlawfully retaliated against him under MFEPA. A jury found the County liable for both disability discrimination and retaliation, and awarded Mr. Watts $1,700,000 in damages, including $1,098,104.50 for disability discrimination and $601,895.50 for retaliation. The trial court applied the LGTCA damages cap and entered judgment for a total of $400,000, plus costs and attorney’s fees. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the LGTCA liability cap did not apply to Mr. Watts’s claims because Mr. Watts’s injuries arose from statutory violations, not “tortious acts or omissions.” We agree with the Appellate Court that MFEPA claims are not subject to the LGTCA damages cap. MFEPA is a comprehensive statutory scheme, and it expressly contemplates claims against local governments and requires that they be treated the same as claims against other defendants. Accordingly, such claims are subject to the specific limitations on damages in MFEPA, not the separate, general limitation in the LGTCA. However, we disagree with the Appellate Court concerning Mr. Watts’s claim arising under § 20-1202 of the State Government Article, which is not a comprehensive statutory scheme and does not reflect any specific legislative intent with respect to claims against local governments. That claim is therefore subject to the LGTCA damages cap. Consequently, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the Appellate Court’s judgment. On remand, the circuit court should enter judgment in favor of Mr. Watts based on the higher of: (1) Mr. Watts’s MFEPA claims, after application of the MFEPA damages cap; or (2) his § 20-1202 claim, after application of the LGTCA damages cap. BACKGROUND A. Legal Framework We begin with an overview of the statutes and ordinances most relevant to this case. 2 1. The Local Government Tort Claims Act The LGTCA governs the liability of covered local government entities and their employees for “tortious acts or omissions[.]” See Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-301 – 5-304. Specifically, the LGTCA makes a local government responsible “for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with the local government.” Id. § 5-303(b)(1). In turn, the employee is protected from the execution of a judgment based on such conduct unless the employee acted with actual malice. Id. § 5-302(b). The local government’s liability generally “may not exceed $400,000 per an individual claim, and $800,000 per total claims that arise from the same occurrence for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions[.]” 1 Id. § 5-303(a)(1). F The LGTCA was “passed in response to a perceived insurance crisis plaguing counties, municipalities and their employees.” Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311, 328 (2015) (quoting Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285, 291 (1991)); see S. Jud. Proc. Comm., Testimony of Maureen Lamb, Vice President of the Maryland Ass’n of Counties & Anne Arundel County Council Member, S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 1 (Feb. 25, 1987) (explaining that local governments were struggling to purchase liability insurance because 1 The LGTCA provides a higher damages cap for certain claims, including: (1) for “intentional tortious acts or omissions or a violation of a constitutional right committed by a law enforcement officer,” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(a)(3); and (2) for “claims of sexual abuse, as defined in § 5-117 of [the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article], that occurred when the claimant was a minor” and that were filed before June 1, 2025, id. § 5-303(a)(4). 3 insurance companies were “raising prices” and “abandoning the business of insuring governments[]”). A task force created to address the problem proposed what became the LGTCA. Lt. Gov. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Task Force on Liab. Ins., Report of the Governor’s Task Force to Study Liability Insurance, at 13 (Dec. 1985). The task force expressed concern about the costs of lawsuits for local governments without insurance, finding it “obvious” that local governments “must have some form of liability coverage in an era when suits involving civil rights” and other issues were commonplace. Id. at 18. A survey cited by the Governor’s Legislative Office in a briefing paper to the General Assembly identified a 500% increase in lawsuits filed against municipalities between 1980 and 1985, with the lawsuits filed during that span seeking a combined $106 million in damages. Espina, 442 Md. at 329. Soon after, the General Assembly enacted the LGTCA for “the purpose of[,]” among other things, “establishing a limit on the liability of the local governments of the State[.]” 1987 Md. Laws, Ch. 594; see also Bd. of County Comm’rs of St. Mary’s County v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676, 686 (2010) (stating that “[i]t is clear that the limitation on liability provision [of the LGTCA] was enacted ‘for the purpose of limiting the civil liability of local government’” (quoting S. Jud. Proc. Comm., Summary of Comm. Rep., S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 3 (1987))). The Governor’s Legislative Office explained that the limitation on liability “is necessary so that local governments can predict exposure for both insurance and budgetary purposes.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 686 4 (quoting Governor’s Legis. Off. Briefing Paper, H.B. 253/S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 9-10 (1987)). Limiting the liability of local governments was not the sole purpose of the LGTCA, however, as it also sought “‘to provide a remedy for persons who are injured by local government employees, who often have limited resources from which an injured person might collect on a judgment,’ and to ‘ensure that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local government that is ultimately responsible for its employees’ acts.’” Baltimore City Police Dep’t v. Potts¸ 468 Md. 265, 318-19 (2020) (citation modified) (first quoting Beall v. Hollaway-Johnson, 446 Md. 48, 76 (2016); and then quoting Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of Env’t, 446 Md. 254, 279 (2016)). The LGTCA thus prohibits local governments from asserting “governmental or sovereign immunity to avoid the duty to defend or indemnify an employee established” under the LGTCA. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(b)(2). 2. The Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act MFEPA prohibits employment discrimination based on several characteristics including, as relevant to Mr. Watts’s claim, disability. State Gov’t § 20-606(a). The Act also prohibits retaliation against individuals pursuing relief under its provisions. Id. § 20-606(f) (“An employer may not discriminate or retaliate against any of its employees . . . because the individual has: (1) opposed any practice prohibited by this subtitle; or (2) made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the subtitle.”). 5 Under MFEPA, an employee who alleges that an employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice may bring a private cause of action against the employer. Id. § 20-1013(a). The Act defines “unlawful employment practice” to include any act prohibited by § 20-606 of the State Government Article, id. § 20-1001, which includes (1) discriminating against any individual with respect to their employment because of, as relevant to Mr. Watts’s claim, “disability unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of the employment[,]” id. § 20-606(a)(1)(i), and (2) “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to make a reasonable accommodation for the known disability of an otherwise qualified employee or an applicant for employment[,]” id. § 20-606(a)(4). If a “court finds that an unlawful employment practice occurred,” it “may provide the remedies specified in § 20-1009(b)” of the State Government Article, id. § 20-1013(d), which “may include”: (i) enjoining the respondent from engaging in the discriminatory act; (ii) ordering appropriate affirmative relief, including the reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay; (iii) awarding compensatory damages; or (iv) ordering any other equitable relief that the . . . judge considers appropriate. Id. § 20-1009(b)(1). The statute specifies that compensatory damages awards “are in addition to” back pay and interest on back pay, as well as any equitable relief awarded. Id. § 20-1009(b)(2). MFEPA caps “the amount of compensatory damages” that may be awarded “for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of 6 enjoyment of life, or nonpecuniary losses,” based on the size of the employer. Id. § 20-1009(b)(3). The highest limit, applicable to employers who, like the County, 2 employ 1F “not fewer than 501 employees,” is $300,000. Id. § 20-1009(b)(3)(iv). That limit does not apply to back pay. 3 Id. § 20-1009(b)(2)(i). 2F Subtitle 9 of MFEPA specifically addresses claims against governmental entities, stating that, with exceptions not relevant here, “a unit, officer, or employee of the State, a county, or a municipal corporation may not engage in a discriminatory act prohibited by[,]” among other provisions, § 20-606 of the State Government Article. Id. § 20-901(a). An employment discrimination claim brought against any such entity or person is subject to the same “rules, procedures, powers, rights, and remedies . . . as those that apply in a discrimination case in which a private person is the respondent.” 4 Id. § 20-902(a). F 2 The County employed 7,691 people in Fiscal Year 2025. Prince George’s County Off. of Fin., Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR) FY2025, at 208 (Feb. 7, 2026), https://www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/sites/default/files/media-document/2025 Annual Comprehensive Financial Report.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2026). 3 The statute has other provisions applicable to back pay awards. For example, if back pay is awarded, “the award shall be reduced by any interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person discriminated against.” State Gov’t § 20-1009(b)(4). And “a complainant may [also] recover back pay for up to 2 years preceding the filing of the complaint, where the unlawful employment practice that has occurred during the complaint filing period is similar or related to an unlawful employment practice with regard to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a complaint.” Id. § 20-1009(b)(5). 4 Section 20-903 of the State Government Article prohibits the State from raising the defense of sovereign immunity in an employment case filed under MFEPA. Section 20-904 provides that if the State lacks sufficient money to pay an award made under MFEPA, the affected governmental unit or officer must report the award to the Comptroller, who must then report the amount of all outstanding awards annually to the 7 3. Prince George’s County Code § 2-222 and State Government § 20-1202 Prince George’s County Code § 2-222 (Supp. 2025) provides: “No employer in the County shall discharge or refuse to hire any person, or act against any person with respect to compensation or other terms and conditions of employment, or limit, segregate, classify, or assign employees because of discrimination.” For purposes of § 2-222, as relevant to Mr. Watts’s claim, “[d]iscrimination” means “acting, or failing to act, or unduly delaying any action regarding any person because of . . . disability . . . in such a way that such person is adversely affected in the area[] of . . . employment . . . .” Prince George’s County, Md., Code § 2-186(a)(6). And the term “[e]mployer includes the Prince George’s County Government.” Id. § 2-186(a)(8). The Prince George’s County Code establishes a Human Rights Commission to investigate discrimination allegations and initiate complaints. Id. §§ 2-187(a), 2-192, 2-193. Upon a finding of discrimination, the Commission may issue a cease-and-desist order that, in addition to injunctive relief, may require an award of back pay and reimbursement of expenses caused by the discriminatory conduct. 5 Id. § 2-195; see Md. 4F Governor, who is required to “include in the State budget sufficient money to pay all awards made against the State under” MFEPA. Id. § 20-904(b), (c). 5 In an employment discrimination case, the Commission may also award damages to compensate for humiliation and embarrassment, subject to a $200,000 limit, Prince George’s County, Md., Code § 2-195.01(a)(3); impose a fine of up to $10,000, id. § 2-195.01(b); issue a civil fine of $5,000 per violation, id. § 2-195.01(c)(1); file a lien for unpaid wages, id. § 2-195.01(c)(2); and recommend disqualification or debarment, id. § 2- 195.01(c)(3). 8 Code Ann., Local Gov’t § 10-202(d) (2013 Repl.) (allowing counties to fine violators of local employment discrimination laws); Code of Maryland Regulations 09.12.39.02 (explaining how to file liens for unpaid wages). In addition to administrative enforcement, the Prince George’s County Code also purports to authorize a private right of action in § 2-200, which provides, in relevant part: “Any person who is aggrieved by any act prohibited in this Division may bring an appropriate action in law or equity in the Circuit Court to seek damages, redress of injury, or injunctive relief arising out of any such prohibited act[.]” In McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, this Court struck down as unconstitutional a Montgomery County Code provision that, like § 2-200, purported to authorize a private cause of action for violation of a county anti-discrimination provision. 319 Md. 12, 24 (1990), superseded by statute, 1992 Md. Laws, Ch. 555. At the time, Montgomery County Code § 27-20(a) purported to “create[] a private cause of action to remedy violations of a county anti-employment discrimination ordinance.” McCrory, 319 Md. at 14. We considered whether § 27-20(a) exceeded the authority delegated to the County by Article XI-A of the Constitution of Maryland, also known as the Home Rule Amendment, and the Express Powers Act, which implements Article XI-A. Id. at 16-24; see generally Engage Armament LLC v. Montgomery County, 494 Md. 1, 32-33 (2026) (explaining the contours of the Home Rule Amendment and the Express Powers Act’s grant of legislative authority to charter counties). 9 We observed that the power provided to counties under § 3 of Article XI-A is the power “to enact local laws[.]” McCrory, 319 Md. at 17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Md. Const. art. XI-A, § 3). We further observed that the creation of a new judicial cause of action “has traditionally been done either by the General Assembly or by this Court under its authority to modify the common law of this State.” McCrory, 319 Md. at 20. Ultimately, we held “that an ordinance attempting to combat employment discrimination by creating a new private judicial cause of action is not a ‘local law’ under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, and thus is not within the power of Montgomery County to enact.” Id. at 24; see also Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 319 Md. 440, 444 (1990) (invalidating a similar Howard County ordinance). In response to our decision in McCrory, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 555 of the 1992 Laws of Maryland, originally codified in former Article 49B, § 42 of the Maryland Code. Chapter 555 created a new civil cause of action for persons who were “subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the Montgomery County Code . . . for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief.” 1992 Md. Laws, Ch. 555. The following year, the General Assembly extended the new cause of action to persons subjected to acts of discrimination prohibited by the county codes of Prince George’s and Howard Counties. 1993 Md. Laws, Ch. 152. In 2009, that provision was moved to § 20-1202 of the State Government Article. At the time Mr. Watts filed his complaint, § 20-1202 provided: 10 (a) Scope of section. This section applies only in Howard County, Montgomery County, and Prince George’s County. (b) Civil action authorized. In accordance with this section, a person that is subjected to a discriminatory act prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action against the person that committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief. (c) Time for filing; venue. (1) An action under subsection (b) of this section shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discriminatory act occurred within 2 years after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act. (2) (i) Subject to paragraph (1) of this subsection, an action under subsection (b) of this section alleging discrimination in employment or public accommodations may not be commenced sooner than 45 days after the aggrieved person files a complaint with the county unit responsible for handling violations of the county discrimination laws. (ii) Subject to paragraph (1) of this subsection, an action under subsection (b) of this section alleging discrimination in real estate may be commenced at any time. (d) Fees and costs. In a civil action under this section, the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and costs. State Gov’t § 20-1202 (2021 Repl.). In Edwards Systems Technology v. Corbin, this Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of § 20-1202 that was premised on a violation of § 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code. 379 Md. 278, 300 (2004). We determined that § 20-1202 is not 11 an unconstitutional local law 6 both because it applies to three counties and because “it 5F creates a new cause of action in the circuit courts,” which the General Assembly, unlike a county, is competent to do. Id. at 296. We further observed that § 2-222 itself was within the authority of Prince George’s County to enact because a chartered county generally has the authority to prohibit discrimination occurring in the county, to define the elements of a claim by one injured by such discrimination, to provide for an adjudicatory administrative proceeding by which the injured party may obtain relief, and to provide for a traditional judicial review action in the circuit court for a party aggrieved by the final administrative decision. Id. at 298. And the creation of a new state cause of action for violation of prohibitions in county codes was within the authority of the General Assembly because “it is ordinarily not a constitutionally impermissible delegation of legislative authority for a legislative body to adopt a standard promulgated by a different governmental entity.” Id. at 299. The establishment of a cause of action in § 20-1202 of the State Government Article for violation of, among other provisions, § 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code thus 6 Charter counties may enact only local laws; a law enacted by a charter county that is not a local law is unconstitutional. Assanah-Carroll v. Law Offs. of Edward J. Maher, P.C., 480 Md. 394, 424-25 (2022) (“[I]f an ‘ordinance enacted by a charter county does not constitute a ‘local law’ within the meaning of Article XI-A, it is beyond the authority of a charter county and, therefore, is unconstitutional.” (quoting Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 441 n.1 (2000))). With respect to charter counties, the General Assembly may not enact local laws; a local law enacted by the General Assembly for a charter county is unconstitutional. Baltimore City Bd. of Elections v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 489 Md. 465, 479 (2025) (“[U]nder Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3, in a local jurisdiction governed by charter, only the local legislature may enact local laws[.]”); see generally Engage Armament, 494 Md. at 32-33, 65-68. 12 rectified the problem that had been identified in McCrory and was constitutional. Id. at 296, 300. In sum, § 20-1202 of the State Government Article establishes a valid cause of action for committing a discriminatory act that is prohibited by § 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code. B. Factual & Procedural Background Mr. Watts was a correctional officer for the Prince George’s County Department of Corrections who underwent amputation of his left foot after an infection. In this lawsuit, Mr. Watts alleged that the Department discriminated against him in connection with his efforts to return to work. The Department eventually fired him for failing to comply with requirements that he asserted were discriminatory. Mr. Watts sued the County in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, contending that the Department illegally terminated his employment due to his disabilities and that the Department did so in retaliation for him raising discrimination concerns and requesting reasonable accommodations. He brought two counts of disability discrimination, one under MFEPA and the other under § 2-222 of the Prince George’s County Code, and a third count for retaliation under MFEPA. After a trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Watts and awarded $1,700,000 in damages. The verdict sheet combined the MFEPA and County Code discrimination claims, asking whether the jury found “by a preponderance of the evidence that [the County] committed disability discrimination.” The jury found that the County did discriminate and awarded $255,681 for back pay, $240,528 13 for future monetary losses, and $601,895.50 for “Other Damages” on that claim. The jury also found that the County “committed retaliation” and awarded $601,895.50 in “Other Damages,” but awarded no back pay or future monetary losses. The County filed a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial and remittitur. Regarding remittitur, the County argued that the jury’s verdict should be capped under both MFEPA and the LGTCA. The County first argued that MFEPA caps the jury’s award for all damages other than back pay at $300,000. See State Gov’t § 20-1009(b)(3)(iv). The County also argued that the back pay award should be reduced to $197,720, for a total award of $497,720. In the alternative, the County contended that the LGTCA cap of $400,000 per occurrence applies to all the unliquidated damages awarded by the jury, including future monetary losses and other damages, which, after adding the reduced back pay, would have resulted in a total award of $597,720. Mr. Watts responded that the MFEPA caps were “irrelevant” because neither State Government § 20-1202 nor the Prince George’s County Code places any limit on the damages that may be recovered. In the event the court disagreed, he argued that any cap would apply only to the “Other Damages” awards and not to back pay or future monetary losses, and that it would apply separately to the awards for discrimination and retaliation. He also argued that the jury’s back pay award was correct. Mr. Watts further argued that the LGTCA damages cap did not apply because MFEPA specifies that a plaintiff’s remedies are the same regardless of whether the 14 employer is a local government or a private entity. See State Gov’t § 20-902(a). He also argued that the LGTCA is inapplicable because statutory disability discrimination and retaliation claims are not “tortious acts or omissions” for purposes of the LGTCA. In the alternative, Mr. Watts contended that the LGTCA cap would apply only to unliquidated damages, not the jury’s awards for back pay or future monetary loss, and that it should apply separately to the discrimination and retaliation awards. The trial court, relying on this Court’s opinions in Town of Riverdale Park v. Ashkar, 474 Md. 581 (2021), Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311 (2015), and Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary’s County v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676 (2010), ruled that the LGTCA damages cap applied to the entire award and reduced the jury’s verdict to $400,000. The trial court also awarded Mr. Watts costs and attorney’s fees, and it denied the County’s other motions. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the LGTCA limitation on liability for “tortious acts and omissions” did not apply to Mr. Watts’s claims. Watts v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. App. 332, 335 (2025). The court concluded, based on its interpretation of this Court’s reasoning in Espina and Williams v. Morgan State University, 484 Md. 534 (2023), that the LGTCA does not encompass statutory discrimination and retaliation claims. Watts, 267 Md. App. at 348-53. We granted certiorari to determine whether disability discrimination and retaliation claims brought under MFEPA and claims premised on a violation of the anti-discrimination 15 in employment provision of the Prince George’s County Code are subject to the damages cap in the LGTCA. Prince George’s County v. Watts, 493 Md. 168 (2026). DISCUSSION The issue before us is one of statutory construction: whether the LGTCA cap on damages that can be awarded against a local government for the “tortious acts or omissions” of its employees applies to Mr. Watts’s statutory disability discrimination and retaliation claims. We review statutory interpretation issues without deference. Bowens v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 492 Md. 608, 615-16 (2025). “The goal of statutory construction is to discern and carry out the intent of the Legislature.” Engage Armament, 494 Md. at 35 (quoting Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616, 644 (2024)). “We begin with the text, which we view wholistically and in its full context, employing available tools for textual analysis.” In re Bowman, ___ Md. ___, ___, Misc. No. 26, Sep. Term 2025, 2026 WL 1791569, at *9 (June 23, 2026). “Presuming the General Assembly intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, we also seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Engage Armament, 494 Md. at 35 (quoting Westminster Mgmt., 486 Md. at 644-45). If a statute is ambiguous either inherently or in context, we search for legislative intent in other indicia, including “the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it.” Id. at 36 (quoting Westminster Mgmt., 486 Md. at 645). “[I]n every case, the statute must be given 16 a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Id. (quoting Westminster Mgmt., 486 Md. at 646). Furthermore, when interpreting multiple statutes in tandem, we aim to “harmonize” their provisions so that each statute “may be given effect.” Engage Armament, 494 Md. at 40 (quoting Doe v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 713 (2008)). I. TORTIOUS ACTS OR OMISSIONS UNDER THE LGTCA The County contends that acts of discrimination and retaliation in violation of MFEPA and State Government § 20-1202 are civil wrongs that constitute “tortious acts or omissions” under the LGTCA, and so are subject to the LGTCA cap on damages. Mr. Watts, relying largely on our recent opinion in Williams, argues that the LGTCA does not apply to any statutory claims. The County responds that Williams did not resolve the issue in dispute here. Given the centrality of our decision in Williams, which interpreted the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) rather than the LGTCA, we will begin there. Before doing so, however, we pause to make an observation about the general utility of relying on cases interpreting the MTCA to help interpret the LGTCA, and the other way around. Although the MTCA pertains to the State and the LGTCA to local governments, the statutory schemes share a number of similar features, including ensuring recovery for successful plaintiffs by substituting government liability for the liability of individual personnel, protecting personnel whose tortious acts are merely negligent from liability, limiting the potential liability of government entities, and requiring timely notice of claims. Given the 17 many similarities between those two statutory schemes, we have often found it useful to compare them. See, e.g., State v. Young, ___ Md. ___, ___, No. 27, Sep. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1801178, at *6-7 (June 23, 2026) (relying in part on our adoption of the “cause” test to identify the number of occurrences under the LGTCA in adopting the same test for the same purpose under the MTCA); Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 131-32 (2005) (applying our decision about the constitutionality of the MTCA’s 180-day claim requirement to the LGTCA’s 180-day notice requirement “because of the similarity of terminology and purpose in the two statutes”). Here, as well, it is natural to look to a case interpreting the MTCA, which uses “tort action” and “tortious acts or omissions” interchangeably in describing the acts of personnel for which the State may be responsible, State Gov’t § 12-104(a)(1) (waiving the State’s immunity for certain “tort action[s]”); id. § 12-104(a)(2)(ii) (providing that the State’s immunity is not waived for intentional “tortious acts or omissions”), in interpreting the LGTCA’s use of “tortious acts or omissions” to describe the acts of personnel for which local governments may be responsible, see Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-302. However, there are important differences between the two statutory schemes that may result in divergent interpretations of even similar terms in some instances. As we recently explained, the two laws “emerge[d] from different starting points.” Young, ___ Md. at ___, 2026 WL 1801178 at *7 n.7. Although the State enjoyed complete sovereign immunity from tort claims at common law, local governments enjoyed a narrower governmental immunity. Id. The MTCA partially waived the State’s sovereign immunity 18 to allow plaintiffs to recover something from the State where they previously could not recover anything. Id. The LGTCA, by contrast, was enacted at least in part in response to concerns about the need to limit the existing liability of local governments, as they were becoming difficult to insure. Id. Applying the MTCA to a particular statutory claim thus effectuates a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, and such waivers are construed narrowly in favor of the State. See Bd. of Educ. for Wicomico County v. Sturm, ___ Md. ___, ___, No. 54, Sep. Term, 2025, 2026 WL 1800743, at *9 (June 23, 2026). By contrast, determining that the LGTCA applies to a particular statutory claim does not necessarily invoke the same consideration. And while the State’s tradeoff of its own liability for immunity for its personnel is a key feature of the MTCA, Williams, 484 Md. at 551-52, local governments were already subject to liability for many of the claims covered by the LGTCA. A. Williams v. Morgan State University In Williams, we held that federal statutory claims are not “tort action[s]” for which the State has partially waived its sovereign immunity under the MTCA. 484 Md. at 554. Mr. Watts contends that our reasoning in Williams establishes that state statutory claims cannot be “tortious acts or omissions” under the LGTCA. We disagree. The plaintiff in Williams alleged that she was wrongfully terminated in violation of two federal statutes. Id. at 539. She asserted that her federal statutory claims were “tort actions” and, therefore, fell within the scope of the State’s partial waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA. Id. at 545. The State argued that its sovereign immunity 19 barred the suit because the MTCA did not waive immunity for federal statutory claims. Id. at 545-46. The plaintiff claimed that this Court had already broadened the scope of “tort action[]” to reach “beyond common law tort actions” in such a way that the term would encompass federal statutory claims. Id. at 548-50. That argument was based on three opinions of this Court, none of which involved federal statutory claims. We rejected that argument after analyzing those cases. We first discussed that in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528 (2009), we had held “not that the plaintiff’s [Maryland Consumer Protection Act] claim was a ‘tort action,’ but that