In re: A.T.

In Re: A.T., No. 2218, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Nazarian, J. CIVIL PROCEDURE –JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS The requirement for law enforcement to file a complaint of juvenile delinquency with the Department of Juvenile Services within fifteen days of the delinquent event, as provided in Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol, 2025 Cum. Supp.), § 3-8A-10(l)(1) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), begins to run only when a juvenile has been arrested or detained. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS – RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL A pre-adjudication delay during which a juvenile wasn’t charged, arrested, or placed in custody does not implicate the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment and the delay cannot be measured from the date of the delinquent act. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. C-16-JV-24-000677 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 2218 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ IN RE: A.T. ______________________________________ Wells, C.J., Nazarian, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Nazarian, J. ______________________________________ Filed: September 30, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 17:56:44 2026.09.30 '00'04- Gregory Hilton, Clerk  A.T., a juvenile, (“A”) was found involved in a series of charges stemming from an incident that took place at his school on December 6, 2023. Six months passed between the incident itself and the date law enforcement forwarded a complaint identifying charges against A to the Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”). A contends that the delay between the incident and the complaint in this case violated his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial. He also challenges the juvenile court’s admission of witness testimony that identified him in video footage of the underlying incident. We hold that the six-month delay in initiating this case didn’t violate A’s constitutional rights and that the court allowed the identification testimony properly and we affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND On December 6, 2023, the victim was outside Bladensburg High School on his way to play baseball. A group of students surrounded him and started assaulting him. During the attack, the students took the victim’s baseball bat, shoes, and hat. The Bladensburg Police Department launched an investigation into the assault and Detective Sergeant Mahir Ayoub served as the lead investigator. During his investigation, Detective Ayoub identified the individuals involved in the assault and confirmed their names and identities with school security, who identified A as one of the perpetrators. The police didn’t arrest or detain any suspects while the investigation continued. Detective Ayoub completed his investigation on May 24, 2024, then filed an incident report (called a “J-1 report”) with DJS. On June 21, 2024, DJS forwarded its report to the State. After receiving the report, the State filed, on July 17, 2024, a juvenile petition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County charging A with second-degree assault, robbery, theft, and conspiracy to commit robbery. On August 8, 2024, the circuit court held its first preliminary hearing in the case. Defense counsel entered an appearance the next day. At a September 2024 hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case on jurisdictional and speedy trial grounds, arguing that police generated and signed the arrest report on December 19, 2023, but didn’t provide the report to DJS until May 24, 2024. This approximately six-month delay, counsel asserted, violated both statutory provisions governing the circuit court’s jurisdiction in juvenile cases and A’s speedy trial rights. Detective Ayoub testified at the hearing that his investigation was ongoing from December 2023 to May 2024 and that he added several supplements to his initial December 2023 report (indicated in the report by line breaks) during the intervening six months. The circuit court disagreed with A and found credible Detective Ayoub’s testimony that the investigation into the incident had continued between December 2023 and May 24, 2024, when the police filed the J-1 report with DJS. The circuit court found as well that A had not been arrested before the J-1 was filed. The court denied A’s motion to dismiss. The court held an adjudicatory hearing over three days in 2024: one in September, one in October, and one in November. On the second day of the hearing, in October 2024, the State called School Resource Officer Giresh Tiwari, a security assistant for the Prince George’s County Public Schools system, to testify. Officer Tiwari testified about a video that other Bladensburg High School students had taken during the assault and presented to him and his colleagues. On the stand, he identified a masked A as one of the perpetrators 2 pictured in the video. Officer Tiwari explained how he was able to identify A in the video based on his ongoing contact with him and other students: [My colleagues and I] have worked closely with these students throughout their time at Bladensburg High School. On a daily basis, we came into contact with a lot of them, not necessarily always for troubled events, but we’re always in the hallway, so we see these students throughout the day multiple times. We see them throughout their lunches. We’re in there with their lunches. And also, if they do get into any type of trouble whatsoever, they end up in our security office. Officer Tiwari stated that he had learned how to identify the students based on what clothes they wore, their build, stature, and other characteristics, such as glasses, “especially after COVID lifted” and the students returned to school. He stated as well that he had seen the students with masks on and was able to identify them even when they were wearing masks. A objected to Officer Tiwari’s identification, and the circuit court overruled the objection. The court found Officer Tiwari’s testimony sufficient to establish his familiarity with the students and found his identification credible. Ultimately, the circuit court found A involved in robbery, second-degree assault, and theft in connection with the December 6, 2023 incident and entered a disposition requiring A to serve eighteen months of supervised probation. A noted a timely appeal. 3  II. DISCUSSION A presents two issues on appeal, which we rephrase: (1) Whether the circuit court, sitting as juvenile court, erred in denying his motion to dismiss his juvenile delinquency proceedings for pre-adjudication delay; and (2) whether the juvenile court erred in exercising its discretion to permit Officer Tiwari to identify him in the cell phone video.1 We hold that the court didn’t err in either instance. First, the juvenile court didn’t err in denying A’s motion to dismiss because A had never been arrested, and thus the statutory time periods had not begun, and because no delay of constitutional dimension occurred for speedy trial purposes. Second, the juvenile court did not err in exercising its discretion to permit Officer Tiwari to identify A from the cell phone video because the evidence was relevant and the officer had substantial familiarity with him. In a juvenile delinquency matter tried without a jury, we “review the case on both the law and the evidence.” Md. Rule 8-131(c); see In re Elrich S., 416 Md. 15, 30 (2010) (citing Md. Rule 8-131(c)). We “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the 1 A phrased his Questions Presented as follows: 1. Did the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss where the police failed to forward a complaint to the Department of Juvenile Services for over five months and where the first adjudication date was nine months after the incident and the ultimate adjudication date was ten months after the incident? 2. Did the trial court err in allowing a school resource officer to identify a masked figure in a video as appellant? The State phrased its Questions Presented as: 1. Did the juvenile court properly deny A.T.’s motion to dismiss his juvenile delinquency proceedings for pre-adjudication delay? 2. Did the juvenile court properly exercise its discretion in permitting School Resource Officer Tiwari to identify A.T. in the cell phone video? 4 evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). We review questions of law—including a circuit court’s interpretation of Maryland statutes, the Maryland Rules, and the Constitution—de novo. Nesbit v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72 (2004) (citation omitted); see DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 62 (2010) (“[T]he interpretation of the Constitution . . . is a question of law.”). A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err In Denying A.T.’s Motion To Dismiss His Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings For Pre-Adjudication Delay. 1. The juvenile court denied A.T.’s motion to dismiss correctly because law enforcement committed no procedural violation. To analyze the first issue A presents on appeal, we start with an overview of the juvenile delinquency process. A juvenile justice case begins in Maryland when a youth is brought to a DJS intake office, either because they were or are the subject of a citizen complaint, arrested by police, or transferred from adult court. Juvenile Justice Process, Md. Dep’t of Juv. Servs., https://djs.maryland.gov/juvenile-justice/juvenile-justice-process, archived at https://perma.cc/WX9Z-GGEZ; see Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol, 2025 Cum. Supp.), § 3-8A-10(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) (“An intake officer shall receive (1) [c]omplaints from a person or agency . . . and (2) [c]itations issued by a police officer [with probable cause to arrest].”). Within fifteen days after a law enforcement officer takes a minor into custody, the officer must file a complaint with an intake officer at DJS. CJ § 3-8A-10(l)(1). If the child is referred to a diversion program, the officer may 5 file the complaint more than thirty days, but no later than 120 days, after taking the child into custody. CJ § 3-8A-10(l)(2). After the intake officer receives a complaint, the officer has fifteen days to determine whether the court has jurisdiction and whether judicial action is in the best interests of the child. CJ § 3-8A-10(c)(1). Based on that determination, the officer must make a recommendation to the State’s Attorney. CJ § 3-8A-10(c)(3). During that period, the intake officer may authorize the filing of a petition, propose an informal adjustment of the matter, or decline to authorize a petition. Id. If the intake officer refers the matter for further action, the State’s Attorney then must file a petition alleging delinquency within thirty days of that referral unless the court extends the time for good cause shown. CJ § 3-8A-13(b). Once the State files a delinquency petition with the court, the court must hold an adjudicatory hearing. The adjudicatory hearing must start within sixty days after the earlier of (1) service of the petition or (2) the entry of appearance of counsel for the respondent. Md. Rule 11-421 (a), (b)(2). If the State files a petition for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and if the juvenile court denies that petition later or the State withdraws it, the court must hold an adjudicatory hearing within thirty days of the denial or withdrawal. Md. Rule 11-421(b)(4). If the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt at the adjudicatory hearing that the minor committed one or more delinquent acts alleged in the petition, the court must hold a separate disposition hearing. Md. Rule 11-422(a). If the disposition hearing is not held on the same day as the adjudicatory hearing and the respondent is not in detention or community detention, the disposition hearing shall be held not later than thirty days after 6 the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing. Md. Rule 11-422(b)(3)(A). A violation of any of these procedural timelines may warrant dismissal, but only in extraordinary and egregious circumstances. In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 109–10 (1987). In determining whether a violation warrants dismissal, a judge presiding over a juvenile case must examine the totality of the circumstances, as required by Md. Rule 1-201. In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 109. The judge also must bear in mind the overriding purpose of the juvenile statute—rehabilitation—along with the fact that this purpose will ordinarily not be served by dismissing a juvenile proceeding. Id. (“Neither the juvenile nor society should be denied the benefits of the juvenile’s rehabilitation because of a technical violation of [now 11-421’s] scheduling requirements.”).2 The overriding purpose of “Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme is to rehabilitate 2 The court in In re Keith W. relied on Maryland Rule 914, the predecessor to the current Rule 11-421. Rule 914 required the juvenile court to hold the adjudicatory hearing within sixty days after service of the juvenile petition, or, if the State filed a petition for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, within thirty days of a decision by the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction: An adjudicatory hearing shall be held within sixty days after the juvenile petition is served on the respondent unless a waiver petition is filed, in which case an adjudicatory hearing shall be held within thirty days after the court’s decision to retain jurisdiction at the conclusion of the waiver hearing. However, upon motion made on the record within these time limits by the petitioner or the respondent, the administrative judge of the county or a judge designated by him, for extraordinary cause shown, may extend the time within which the adjudicatory hearing may be held. The judge shall state on the record the cause which requires an extension and specify the number of days of the extension. In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 101–02 (quoting Md. Rule 914). 7 and treat delinquent juveniles so that they become useful and productive members of society.” Id. at 106. Consistent with this purpose, the juvenile subtitle is designed “[t]o provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of any child coming within the provisions of this subtitle; [and] to provide for a program of services and treatment consistent with the child’s best interests and the promotion of the public interest.” CJ § 3-802 (a)(1)–(2). In In re Keith W., the juvenile appellant’s adjudicatory hearing was delinquent under Maryland Rule 914 (the predecessor to the current Rule 11-421) because it was neither held within thirty days of August 2, 1985, when the juvenile court denied the State’s waiver petition, nor postponed for extraordinary cause by an administrative judge or his designee. 310 Md. at 102. But despite this violation, the Supreme Court held that dismissal was inappropriate, reasoning that dismissing would undermine the legislature’s overriding goal of ensuring that “the particular needs of juveniles are met when they encounter the juvenile justice system.” Id. at 107. In this case, the alleged delinquent act occurred on December 6, 2023. Detective Ayoub submitted his final report on the incident to DJS on May 24, 2024. DJS forwarded the report to the State’s Attorney’s Office on June 21, 2024, well within the thirty-day period under CJ § 3-8A-13(b). After receiving DJS’s recommendation, the State charged A on July 17, 2024. The circuit court held its first preliminary hearing regarding potential juvenile detention on August 8, 2024. The first day of the adjudicatory hearing was September 17, 2024. At no point during this time was A arrested or detained, events that would have started the clock for the statute’s fifteen-day filing requirement. See CJ 8 § 3-8A-10(l)(1). Because no triggering event occurred, the statutory timeline never began to run and no violation of the statutory timelines occurred. A argues that the statute’s silence on the time period within which law enforcement must forward a complaint to DJS should be construed in his favor, and specifically to begin running from the time of the incident. To support this contention, A relies on In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50 (2002), a case in which the juvenile defendant was neither detained nor served with a petition until three years and four months after an arrest. Id. at 54, 61. In that case, and after noting that the statutory and regulatory scheme for juvenile proceedings provided no protections for a juvenile who “is not detained and has no notice of a petition being filed,” the Court held that the juvenile’s due process right to a speedy adjudication had been violated by the three-year-and-four-month delay between his brief arrest and his adjudication. Id. at 61, 81. But the key there was that the juvenile in In re Thomas J. was arrested and released and then waited three years for the delinquency proceedings to resume. Id. at 54, 61. Indeed, and unlike A, he had no notice that a petition had been filed for more than three years after his arrest. Id. at 61. A’s circumstances stand in stark contrast: not only was A never arrested, but he received notice of the State’s petition and his first hearing well before the hearing occurred. The delay between the initiation of the police investigation and law enforcement’s decision to file a complaint with DJS, before the State had charged A formally by filing a petition with the court, not only was dramatically shorter here, but doesn’t raise the same due process concerns—at that point, nothing had started. The investigation could have concluded with a decision to charge something different or not to 9 charge at all. The juvenile court denied the motion to dismiss correctly.3 2. The juvenile court denied A’s motion to dismiss correctly because the delay between the incident and law enforcement’s filing of the complaint with DJS wasn’t constitutionally significant. A asserts next that the time between the incident and his trial violated his right to a speedy trial. The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 395 (1990). The Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees this same right, Md. Const. art. 21, and our courts have held that it applies to juvenile proceedings. In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 70 (2002). To determine whether an individual’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, we apply a balancing test derived from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Bailey, 319 Md. at 396; see In re Thomas J., 372 Md. at 72 (adopting the Barker 3 The parties agree that September 17, 2024 was the first day of A’s adjudication. This means that it was sixty-two days after the State filed its petition with DJS. This delay violated Maryland Rule 11-421 because the hearing should have been held by Monday, September 16, 2024. See Md. Rule 1-203(a) (providing that the computation of any period of time prescribed by the Maryland Rules or by statute begins to run after the day of the triggering event; that if the period of time is more than seven days, intermediate weekends and holidays are counted; and that the last day of the period is counted as well unless it falls on a weekend or holiday, in which case the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday). But A didn’t raise this issue in the circuit court, and even if he had, mandatory dismissal would have been an inappropriate sanction for beginning the adjudication—of which, again, A had notice well in advance—a day late. See In re Ryan S., 369 Md. 26, 49–51 (2002) (noting that mandatory dismissal isn’t always an appropriate sanction for a Rule 11-114 (now Rule 11-421) violation and holding that dismissal was appropriate in the case before it due to the lack of reasonable continuity caused by a three-month postponement in the middle of the adjudicatory proceedings); In re Keith W., 310 Md. at 103, 107. 10 test in juvenile proceedings). Four factors guide this constitutional determination: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 409 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). The first factor, the length of delay, is measured from the date of arrest or the filing of an indictment, information, or other formal charges to the date of trial. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1971); State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 569 (1984) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1977)). Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, an inquiry into the other factors isn’t necessary. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. For that reason, the length of delay plays a dual role “because a delay of sufficient length is first required to trigger a speedy trial analysis, and the length of the delay is then considered as one of the factors within that analysis.” State v. Kanneh, 403 Md. 678, 688 (2008). The Supreme Court of Maryland has held on several occasions that a delay greater than one year and fourteen days is presumptively prejudicial. See Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 223 (2002). We can’t assess the length of the delay, though, until we know the starting point for measuring it. Bailey, 319 Md. at 410. A argues that the delay should be measured from the date of the delinquent act, but that’s inconsistent with the scope of the speedy trial right itself. On its face, the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee applies only after a criminal prosecution has begun and only to individuals who have been accused formally. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313. This constitutional right offers no protection to individuals who have not yet been accused and it does not obligate the government to discover, investigate, 11 or accuse a person within any set period of time.4 Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959). Indeed, the wording the framers selected is difficult to reconcile with any intent to protect against pre-accusation delay. Marion, 404 U.S. at 314.5 Accordingly, we hold that a pre-adjudication delay during which the juvenile hasn’t been charged, arrested, or placed in custody does not implicate the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment, and the delay cannot be measured from the date of the delinquent act itself. And this ends the speedy trial inquiry as well: without a delay of constitutional dimension, we don’t go on to consider the other factors. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err In Exercising Its Discretion To Permit Officer Tiwari To Identify A. Next, A argues that the juvenile court erred in allowing Officer Tiwari to identify A from the cell phone video because his identification was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. Our review of the trial court’s decision to admit Officer Tiwari’s identification as evidence involves a two-step process of analysis. First, we consider de novo whether the evidence is relevant. Portillo Funes v. State, 469 Md. 438, 478 (2020) (citing Ford v. State, 462 Md. 3, 46 (2018)). Second, if it is relevant, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting relevant evidence that should have been 4 Limitations periods apply, of course, but those are statutory and there’s no limitations issue here. 5 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights doesn’t mirror this text but does grant the right to a speedy trial in “all criminal prosecutions.” Md. Const. art. 21 (emphasis added). While these differences may or may not matter, neither party briefed and argued this point, so we won’t decide it in this case. 12 excluded as unfairly prejudicial. Montague v. State, 471 Md. 657, 673 (2020). An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Williams v. State, 457 Md. 551, 563 (2018) (citing Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 325 (2017)). 1. Officer Tiwari’s testimony was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The threshold question for admissibility is whether the evidence is relevant, whether it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Md. Rule 5-401. This sets a low bar: evidence need only have some tendency, however slight, to make a fact more or less probable. Williams, 457 Md. at 564 (citing State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 727 (2011)). As a general rule, relevant evidence is admissible. Md. Rule 5-402. But a trial court may exclude relevant evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or other countervailing concerns. Md. Rule 5-403. But evidence isn’t unfairly prejudicial under Rule 5-403 merely because it damages one party’s case. Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 392 (2013). Probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice only where the evidence carries some adverse effect beyond its tendency to prove the fact or issue for which it was admitted. State v. Heath, 464 Md. 445, 464 (2019). And the decision to admit evidence rests ultimately within the sound discretion of the trial court. Portillo Funes, 469 Md. at 479 (citing Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511, 530 (2006)). Officer Tiwari identified A from still images from the cell phone video, and his 13 testimony was highly relevant to the trier of fact. The officer’s ability to identify A as a person depicted in that video made it more probable that he was one of the perpetrators, and definitely more so than it would have been without that identification. In determining that this evidence was admissible, the trial court considered several factors: Officer Tiwari’s familiarity with the students, his years working at the school, his regular contact with students during lunch, his ability to recognize the students with masks on, and his ability to identify the students in the video on more than one occasion. A contends that Officer Tiwari’s role as a security officer carries disproportionate weight because of his position of authority. But this juvenile case was tried to a judge, not a jury. The court was able to give the testimony whatever weight it deserved, and there was nothing so intrinsically weighty about the officer’s testimony to render it unduly prejudicial or otherwise inadmissible based solely on his position. The identification was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial and the court acted well within its discretion in admitting it. 2. Officer Tiwari’s identification wasn’t an improper lay opinion. Finally, A argues that Officer Tiwari’s identification was an improper lay opinion. For a lay witness’s identification of a person depicted in a video to be admissible, the witness must occupy a better position than jurors to determine whether the image captured on camera depicts the defendant. Moreland v. State, 207 Md. App. 563, 572–73 (2012). A witness satisfies this standard and may testify to the identification properly where the witness has substantial familiarity with the defendant. Id. at 573. The witness’s level of familiarity affects the weight of the identification, not its admissibility. Id. at 572 (citing Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 383–84 (Colo. 1996)). 14  In Moreland v. State, 207 Md. App. 563 (2012), this Court held that the witness had substantial familiarity with the defendant because the witness had known the defendant for forty to forty-five years. Id. at 573. Although the witness had not seen the defendant for about four years prior to the identification, we found that this gap affected only the weight of the identification, not its admissibility. Id. The witness there recognized that the defendant lost weight and was exhibiting signs of paralysis that did not exist before, providing a basis for his familiarity. Id. Although Officer Tiwari may not have had decades-long familiarity with A, like the witness in Moreland had with the defendant, 207 Md. App. at 573, Officer Tiwari’s testimony laid a foundation for the identification and the bases supporting it. He revealed that his interactions with the students were more frequent in recent years and enabled him to recognize students by their build, stature, and identifying features such as glasses. The court was free to decide for itself what weight to give the testimony, but Officer Tiwari was in a better position than an average person to identify the defendant from a still image, and therefore was not an improper lay witness. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS. 15