In the Matter of Chase

In the Matter of Michael Chase, No. 69, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Kehoe, S., J. Background: Appellant applied to the Maryland State Police for a handgun carry permit in October 2022. The Department denied the application based on his 2009 Virginia felony conviction for conspiracy to commit grand larceny, for which he received a three‑year sentence with all but 30 days suspended. That denial was upheld first by the Office of Administrative Hearings and then by the Circuit Court for Charles County. On appeal, Appellant argued that his out‑of‑state conviction should be converted to the equivalent Maryland offense and statutory penalty—an approach used for “disqualifying crimes” under Public Safety § 5‑101(g)(3). Holdings: The Court held that although Public Safety § 5‑306(a)(2)(i) appears clear on its face, it is ambiguous as applied to out‑of‑state convictions; however, the statutory language, structure, and legislative history demonstrate that the Maryland equivalency analysis from § 5‑101(g)(3) does not apply to handgun permit eligibility. Instead, § 5‑306(a)(2)(i) relies on the actual sentence imposed, including suspended portions. Because Appellant’s Virginia conviction was a felony and carried an imposed sentence exceeding one year, he is disqualified from obtaining a handgun permit under any interpretive scenario. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and the Department’s denial of his application. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – PUBLIC SAFETY § 5‑306(a)(2)(i) – AMBIGUITY AS APPLIED TO OUT‑OF‑STATE CONVICTIONS Although the language of Public Safety § 5‑306(a)(2)(i) is facially clear, its application to out‑of‑state convictions is ambiguous, permitting the court to examine statutory context, legislative history, and related case law to determine legislative intent. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – DISTINCTION BETWEEN “CARRIES” AND “HAS BEEN IMPOSED” Public Safety § 5‑101(g)(3) focuses on the statutory maximum penalty an equivalent Maryland offense “carries,” while Public Safety § 5‑306(a)(2)(i) relies on the actual sentence “imposed.” This linguistic distinction forecloses importing the § 5‑101(g) equivalency framework into § 5‑306. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – CHANGE FROM “COULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED” TO “HAS BEEN IMPOSED” Legislative history shows that earlier draft language referring to a sentence that “could have been imposed” was replaced with the enacted text “has been imposed,” signaling an intent to rely on an applicant’s actual, individualized sentence rather than a hypothetical maximum penalty. CRIMINAL LAW – DEFINITION OF “SENTENCE IMPOSED” – SUSPENDED SENTENCES A sentence is “imposed” when the court pronounces it, even if execution is suspended; the imposed term includes both executed and suspended portions. FIREARMS – DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSSESSION PROHIBITIONS AND CARRY PERMITS QUALIFICATIONS Public Safety § 5‑306 creates stricter qualification criteria for obtaining a handgun permit than Public Safety § 5‑133 does for prohibiting possession of firearms; ineligibility for a handgun permit is not limited to “disqualifying crimes” under § 5‑133(b)(1). FIREARMS – HANDGUN PERMIT ELIGIBILITY – OUT‑OF‑STATE CONVICTIONS – NO CONVERSION TO MARYLAND OFFENSE REQUIRED The equivalency analysis used for “disqualifying crimes” under Public Safety § 5‑101(g)(3) does not apply to Public Safety § 5‑306(a)(2)(i). The two provisions serve distinct legislative purposes and employ materially different statutory language. Section 5‑306(a)(2)(i) contains no textual directive to convert an out‑of‑state conviction to a Maryland equivalent offense, and such conversion is inconsistent with the statutory focus on the actual sentence imposed. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – PROPER BASIS FOR DENIAL – ERRONEOUS REASONING YET CORRECT RESULT Even where the Administrative Law Judge misstated the statutory ground for denial, the agency’s ultimate decision must be affirmed if the record demonstrates that the denial was legally correct under the appropriate statutory provision. Circuit Court for Charles County Case No. C-08-CV-24-000133 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 69 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL CHASE ______________________________________ Berger, Kehoe, S., Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Kehoe, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 8, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.08 '00'04- 14:52:44 Gregory Hilton, Clerk  On October 9, 2022, Appellant, Michael Chase (“Mr. Chase”), applied to the Maryland Department of State Police (“Department”) for a permit to carry a handgun. The Department denied Mr. Chase’s application due to his 2009 conviction in Virginia for conspiracy to commit grand larceny, a felony, in which he received a three-year sentence of incarceration with all but 30 days suspended and two years of supervised probation. Mr. Chase appealed the denial of his handgun permit application (“Application”) to the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), which affirmed the Department’s denial on February 2, 2024. Mr. Chase then filed for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County, which affirmed the ruling of the OAH and decision of the Department. Mr. Chase now appeals the judgment of the circuit court to this Court. In this case, we consider the language of § 5-306 of the Public Safety Article, 1 which enumerates the qualifications to obtain a permit to wear and carry a handgun (“handgun permit”) in Maryland. Our focus is on the qualification that the applicant “has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed[.]” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(2)(i). For it is this language that is at issue in the appeal before us. 1 All statutory citations, unless indicated otherwise, refer to the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety. I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED The questions presented for our review, which we have rephrased and separated into three questions, 2 are as follows: 1. Whether § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is clear and unambiguous as it applies to out-of-state convictions? 2. Whether the Maryland equivalency analysis applies to out-of-state convictions under § 5-306(a)(2)(i)? 3. Whether it was proper for the Department to deny Mr. Chase’s handgun permit application under § 5-306(a)(2)(i)? For the reasons stated herein, we answer in the negative to the first two questions and in the affirmative on the last question, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County and the decision of the Department. II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Denial by the Maryland Department of State Police Mr. Chase applied for a handgun permit with the Licensing Division of the Department on October 9, 2022. Through a criminal background investigation, the Department discovered that in September of 2008, Mr. Chase was charged in Alexandria, Virginia with possession of burglarious tools, disregarding or eluding a law enforcement 2 Mr. Chase presented the question for our review in his brief as follows: “Was the Department’s disapproval of Appellant’s CCW application proper?” The Department presented the question as: “Was it proper for the Department to deny Mr. Chase’s application for a handgun carry permit under Public Safety § 5-306(a)(2) on the basis that he had been convicted of a felony in Virginia?” 2 command, and grand larceny–stealing property greater than $200 not from a person. 3 All charges were considered to be felonies in Virginia at the time. On December 15, 2008, nolle prosequi was entered on the first two charges. On March 12, 2009, in the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria, Mr. Chase pled guilty to conspiracy to commit grand larceny and was sentenced to incarceration for three years with all but 30 days suspended and two years of supervised probation. The Department denied Mr. Chase’s Application due to his 2009 Virginia conviction. Initially, the Department denied the Application on December 12, 2022, based on § 5-133(b)(1), 4 determining that Mr. Chase had been convicted of a disqualifying crime under § 5-101(g). 5 Mr. Chase requested an informal review of the denial. On March 19, 2023, First Sergeant John Hickey, Assistant Commander of the Licensing Division, sustained the denial. After consultation with Assistant Attorney General Mark Bowen, the Department revised the basis for the denial. In an updated denial letter dated June 28, 2023, Mr. Chase VA Code Ann. § 18.2-95 (1998) (grand larceny); § 18.2-22 (1983) (conspiracy to 3 commit felony). 4 Section 5-133(b)(1) reads: “Subject to § 5-133.3 of this subtitle, a person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) has been convicted of a disqualifying crime[.]” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133(b)(1). 5 Section 5-101(g) defines a “Disqualifying crime” as: (1) a crime of violence; (2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-101(g). 3 was advised the denial was based on his conviction of a felony or misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year has been imposed, pursuant to § 5- 306(a)(2). 6 B. Appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings On May 30, 2023, Mr. Chase appealed the denial of his Application to the OAH. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November 7, 2023. Senior Trooper Matthew Spencer (“Sr. Tpr. Spencer”), on behalf of the Licensing Division, Handgun Permit Unit, presented the Department’s case. 7 Mr. Chase’s Application and criminal record were entered into evidence. Sr. Tpr. Spencer testified that the initial denial based on a disqualifying crime pursuant to § 5-133(b)(1) was the incorrect basis for the denial. He further advised that the Department was “no longer arguing that Mr. Chase is prohibited from the possession of firearms [under § 5-133(b)(1)], only the issuance of a handgun permit [under § 5-306(a)(2)(i)].” On cross-examination, Sr. Tpr. Spencer clarified that the “disapproval is about the sentence [Mr. Chase] received, not the crime, per se.” The evidence presented by Mr. Chase at the hearing detailed the restoration of his civil rights in Virginia and his subsequent eligibility for various firearms-related licenses, 6 Section 5-306(a) reads, in pertinent part: “the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds: [. . .] (2)(i) has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed[.]” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(2)(i). 7 Although Mr. Chase had the burden of proof, the parties agreed the Department would present its case first. 4 federally and in Maryland. Counsel for Mr. Chase entered into evidence a July 9, 2020 order from the Governor of Virginia restoring Mr. Chase’s civil rights 8 and a September 17, 2020 order from the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria restoring Mr. Chase’s firearm privileges. 9 Mr. Chase’s State of Maryland Firearms Dealer License, dated September 7, 2023, Federal Firearms Dealer’s License, dated July 27, 2023, and a Notice of Approval for Designated Collector Status from the Maryland State Police, dated July 8, 2023, were also admitted into evidence. While not entered into evidence, Mr. Chase’s Handgun Qualification License, dated June 27, 2023, was marked for identification. Mr. Chase testified that he operates a firearms transfer business, MJ’s Properties d/b/a Guns and Ammo, purchasing and distributing firearms in the State of Maryland. Mr. Chase further explained that he has “a Federal Firearm License that allows [him] to distribute, sell, and deliver firearms federally, [] in any state where a customer might purchase a firearm.” During his testimony, Mr. Chase acknowledged his conviction in Virginia and that the sentence imposed was three years of incarceration with all but 30 days suspended. He clarified that he never went “to prison” but instead completed 30 days of community service with the City of Alexandria as part of his sentence. In closing argument, Sr. Tpr. Spencer asserted: 8 The civil rights restored by the Governor’s order included the “rights to vote, hold public office, serve on a jury, and to be a notary public.” The Governor’s order did not restore the right “to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms[.]” 9 The circuit court’s order permits Mr. Chase to “possess, transport, and carry a firearm, ammunition, or a stun weapon.” 5  The argument as to what the Maryland equivalent charge would be and what statutory penalty is, is irrelevant in this matter. We’re not making the argument that Mr. Chase has been convicted of a crime prohibiting him from the possession of a handgun. We’re arguing that Mr. Chase received a sentence greater than [one] year for the conviction he received, which would prohibit him from the issuance of a handgun permit in the State of Maryland. Counsel for Mr. Chase in closing argument maintained that when the conviction originates from out-of-state, the Department must use the equivalent Maryland offense and penalty to determine whether the conviction is disqualifying. Here, the equivalent offense is theft from $100 to $1,500 and the statutory maximum penalty is six months incarceration. Accordingly, counsel argued that Mr. Chase is eligible for a handgun permit and the Department erred in their denial. On February 2, 2024, the ALJ issued its written decision, sustaining the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application. The ALJ made the following factual findings: 1. On October 9, 2022, [Mr. Chase] filed an original application to obtain a handgun permit, under the category of personal protection. 2. As part of the application process, the Department conducted a criminal background check of [Mr. Chase]. 3. On September 25, 2008, in the Circuit Court [of] the City of Alexandria, Virginia, [Mr. Chase] was charged with Conspiracy to Commit Grand Larceny of Property with an aggregate value of $200.00 or more, a felony. On March 12, 2009, he was convicted of the crime and sentenced to three years[’] incarceration, of which two years and eleven months were suspended. [Mr. Chase] was placed on supervised probation for two years. [] 4. [Mr. Chase’s] conviction has not been expunged. 5. [Mr. Chase] operates a firearms business in Maryland in which he purchases and sells firearms. He has current federal and Maryland firearms licenses. [] 6  6. On [September 17, 2020], the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria, Virginia restored his rights to purchase and maintain firearms. [] The ALJ disagreed with Mr. Chase’s argument that the Department must convert an out-of-state conviction to the equivalent Maryland offense and penalty. According to the ALJ, the “equivalency provision” that Mr. Chase advocates, originates from case law that does “not apply to felony convictions under section 5-101(g)(2) [] but instead apply only to misdemeanor convictions.” 10 Moreover, the ALJ agreed with the Department that “Maryland is not required to follow another state’s decision to restore handgun rights.” 11 Ultimately, the ALJ concluded: The Department disapproved [Mr. Chase’s] application because he had a disqualifying conviction. It presented evidence showing that [Mr. Chase] has a conviction in [Virginia] for grand larceny, a felony conviction with a sentence for more than one year. As of the date of the hearing, this conviction was not expunged. [Mr. Chase] did not offer any evidence to dispute these facts. Accordingly, I conclude that [Mr. Chase] has failed to establish that the Department’s disapproval of his application was incorrect. With that, the ALJ upheld the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application. 10 McCloy, McCloud, McLean, and Brown specifically analyze misdemeanors as “disqualifying crimes” under § 5-101(g)(3), not felonies under § 5-101(g)(2). See generally In the Matter of Mark McCloy, 488 Md. 326 (2024); McCloud v. Dep’t of State Police, 200 Md. App. 725 (2011), aff’d sub nom., McCloud v. Dep’t of State Police, Handgun Permit Rev. Bd., 426 Md. 473 (2012); Maryland State Police v. McLean, 197 Md. App. 430 (2011); Brown v. Handgun Permit Rev. Bd., 188 Md. App. 455 (2009). 11 Mr. Chase did not argue before the circuit court, and does not now argue before this Court, that the restoration of his civil rights and firearm privileges in Virginia affects his eligibility to obtain a handgun permit in Maryland. Therefore, we do not address the issue. 7  C. Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Charles County On February 23, 2024, Mr. Chase filed for judicial review of the ruling from the OAH in the Circuit Court for Charles County. The court held a hearing on February 24, 2025, during which the parties presented oral arguments. Mr. Chase repeated the arguments previously made before the OAH, that an out-of- state conviction must be converted to the equivalent Maryland offense and penalty to determine eligibility for a handgun permit. In addition, Mr. Chase asserted that the “OAH’s ruling in this matter was not supported by substantial evidence, was erroneous as a matter of law, and was arbitrary and capricious.” As such, Mr. Chase requested that the circuit court reverse the ruling of the OAH and the Department’s denial of his Application. The Department argued again that Mr. Chase’s conviction “for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed,” pursuant to § 5-306(a)(2)(i), rendered him ineligible to obtain a handgun permit. The Department highlighted that the case law relied upon by Mr. Chase applies to “disqualifying crimes” under § 5-133(b)(1) and § 5-101(g), not to § 5-306(a)(2)(i). Consequently, the denial was proper and the Department requested that the ruling of the OAH be affirmed. From the bench, the circuit court affirmed the ruling of the OAH and the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application. In its ruling, the court explained: I have reviewed the filings in this case. I read the memorand[a] and looked at the Office of Administrative [Hearings] record and the record in this case. [. . .] 8  [Mr. Chase] makes some very interesting arguments regarding the inter-relation of the statutes, the legislative history regarding the statutes and the presentation was very enlightening in this, in all of that and how all of these matters tie together. And in light of the changes that are occurring in the Court’s interpretations of gun laws recently, there’s been substantial litigation in that field. However, I have to go back to the requirement that the Court interpret the language if it’s clear and unambiguous. In this case in looking at [§] 5-306[(a)(2)(i)], it indicates that the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds has not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment [] for more than one year has been imposed. The way this statute is written is clear, it’s not ambiguous and the sentence doesn’t require any interpretation. The court issued its written order on March 3, 2025. Mr. Chase now appeals the judgment of the circuit court to this Court. Additional facts may be included in the discussion as they become relevant. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, such as the Department’s decision to deny a handgun permit application, we review: the agency’s decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court. A reviewing court will affirm the decision of the agency when it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record and it is not erroneous as a matter of law. Because an agency’s decision is presumed prima facie correct, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency. McCloud, 200 Md. App. at 729 (quoting McLean, 197 Md. App. at 437). Moreover, “[w]hen we review an agency decision that is a mixed question of law and fact, we apply the substantial evidence test, that is, the same standard of review we would apply to an agency factual finding.” Brown, 188 Md. App. at 467 (quoting Comptroller of Treasury v. 9 Science Applications Int’l Corp., 405 Md. 185, 192–93 (2008)) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). As there are no facts in dispute here, the question of whether the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application was proper is a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. However, weight is given “to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing where the interpretation is longstanding and falls within the agency’s area of expertise.” Id. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, “administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight.” McLean, 197 Md. App. at 438. IV. DISCUSSION On appeal before this Court, Mr. Chase argues that the language of § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is ambiguous and, therefore, we must rely on the rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the statute. According to Mr. Chase, § 5-306(a)(2)(i) must be interpreted consistently with Maryland’s practice of converting out-of-state convictions to the equivalent Maryland offenses and penalties, as established in case law interpreting § 5- 101(g)(3). Applying that framework, Mr. Chase asserts that his Virginia felony conviction for conspiracy to commit grand larceny should be converted to Maryland’s misdemeanor theft under Criminal Law Article § 7-104(g)(2) for “theft of property or services with a value of at least $100 but less than $1,500[.]” See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 7- 104(g)(2). Because the statutory maximum penalty for a first offense under Criminal Law Article § 7-104(g)(2) is six months, Mr. Chase urges that we apply that penalty to his 10 conviction and cap his sentence at six months, even though the sentence imposed was three years. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 7-104(g)(2)(i)(1). Lastly, Mr. Chase argues that because § 5-306(a)(2) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies, which requires us to construe the statute in his favor. For those reasons, Mr. Chase requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the circuit court and order the issuance of a handgun permit. The Department counterargues that § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is clear and unambiguous, and therefore, our analysis does not need to go beyond the plain meaning of the statute. Moreover, the Department disputes that § 5-306(a)(2)(i) mandates the conversion of out- of-state convictions to the equivalent Maryland offenses and penalties, as required by case law interpreting § 5-101(g)(3). Section 5-101(g)(3) differs in its language and purpose from § 5-306(a)(2)(i), which implies that the statutes be interpreted separately. Similarly, the phrase “sentence imposed” is clear and unambiguous. The Department argues that Mr. Chase’s approach to disregard the actual imposed sentence and instead “invent a sentence based on what an individual hypothetically could have been sentenced to” creates an absurd result and contravenes the plain meaning of the statute. Lastly, the Department avers the rule of lenity only applies to criminal statutes, which § 5- 306(a)(2) is not. See Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 676 (2015). As such, the Department requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the circuit court, upholding the Department’s denial of Mr. Chase’s Application. A. Handgun Permits: Public Safety § 5-301, et seq. First, to purchase and possess a handgun legally in Maryland, one must obtain a Handgun Qualification License (“HQL”) from the Department, pursuant to § 5-117.1. See 11 Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-117.1. To qualify for an HQL, one must be at least 21 years old, pass a Department approved firearms safety course, reside in Maryland, and not be prohibited from buying or possessing a handgun under federal or State law. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-117.1(d); see also McCloy, 488 Md. at 330. Next, to purchase a specific handgun, one must submit a firearm application to a licensed dealer or designated law enforcement agency. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety §§ 5-117, 5-118. The firearm application requires information about the handgun to be purchased and personal information about the applicant, including an affirmation that the applicant has never been convicted of a “disqualifying crime.” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-118(b); see also McCloy, 488 Md. at 330–31. Section 5-133 enumerates the restrictions on the possession of regulated firearms, including handguns. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133. An individual is prohibited from possessing a handgun in Maryland if the individual “has been convicted of a disqualifying crime[.]” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133(b)(1). 12 A “disqualifying crime” is defined in § 5-101(g) as “(1) a crime of violence; (2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than [two] years.” Md. Code Ann., Pub Safety § 5-101(g). Those convicted of a disqualifying crime will be ineligible for an HQL and will have their firearm application denied. 12 Section 5-133 lists other disqualifications that would prohibit an individual from legally possessing a regulated firearm. None of these other disqualifications are pertinent for our discussion. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133. 12  Even if successful in obtaining an HQL and purchasing a handgun legally, it is still illegal to “wear, carry, or transport a handgun, whether concealed or open, on or about the person,” unless a “permit to wear, carry, or transport the handgun has been issued under Title 5, Subtitle 3 of the Public Safety Article[.]” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-203(a)(1); (b)(2); see also Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-303 (“A person shall have a permit issued [. . .] before the person carries, wears, or transports a handgun.”). 13 Upon receipt of a handgun permit application, the Secretary of the State Police must conduct a criminal history records check on the applicant to determine whether the applicant is qualified for the permit. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-305. Section 5-306 enumerates the qualifications an applicant must possess to successfully obtain a handgun permit. For the case before us, the pertinent part of § 5-306 reads: (a) Subject to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the Secretary shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds: [. . .] (2)(i) has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed[.] Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(2)(i). Also relevant for our discussion here is the qualification that the applicant “is not otherwise prohibited by State or federal law from There are, of course, other exceptions to this prohibition. None of these other 13 exceptions are pertinent to recite for our discussion here. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-203(b). 13 purchasing or possessing a handgun.” Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a)(10)(ii). 14 Accordingly, someone who is prohibited from possessing a firearm due to a conviction of a disqualifying crime under § 5-133(b)(1) is likewise ineligible to obtain a handgun permit under § 5-306(a). See McCloud, 200 Md. App. at 730; see also Md. Code Regs. 29.03.02.03; Md. Code Regs. 29.03.01.03. 15 However, not everyone who is ineligible for a handgun permit is prohibited from possessing a firearm. 14 Other disqualifications include, but are not limited to: being convicted of a crime involving controlled dangerous substances; being a respondent against whom a protective order has been entered; being an alcoholic, addict, or habitual drug user; suffering from certain mental disorders; or exhibiting a propensity for violence or instability that would render handgun possession a danger to others. See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a). Applicants must also complete a certified firearms training course before obtaining a handgun permit. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-306(a-1). 15 The Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) for the Department on the qualifications for the issuance of a handgun permit, in pertinent part, reads: A. Qualifications. In accordance with Public Safety Article, §5-306, Annotated Code of Maryland, a person is eligible for issuance of a handgun permit only if the person: [. . .] (2) Is not prohibited from possessing a handgun under COMAR 29.03.01.03 or otherwise prohibited from purchasing or possessing a handgun under federal or State law; (3) Has not been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than [one] year has been imposed, unless the person has been pardoned or the United States Attorney General has granted relief; [. . .] Md. Code Regs. 29.03.02.03. COMAR 29.03.01.03, as cited above, regarding the restrictions on the possession of regulated firearms, including handguns, in pertinent part, reads: A. A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: 14  B. Statutory Interpretation To ascertain the meaning of a statute, “[w]e first look to the language of the statute to determine its plain meaning[.]” McCloud v. Dep’t of State Police, Handgun Permit Rev. Bd., 426 Md. 473, 479 (2012). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, “we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner.” McLean, 197 Md. App. at 440 (quoting Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571 (2005)). “We do not add words or ignore those that are there.” Id. We read the statute as a whole, ensuring that “no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 (2007) (quoting Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 420 (2007)). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to any other rules of statutory interpretation. McCloud, 426 Md. at 480. However, if the language is ambiguous, that is, “subject to more than one interpretation,” we may look to “the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose” to determine the meaning of the statute. Brown, 188 Md. App. at 468 (quoting Opert v. Crim. Injs. Comp. Bd., 403 Md. 587, 593 (2008)). When relevant, we may look at [. . .] (4) Has been convicted of: (a) A crime of violence; (b) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; (c) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than [two] years; or [. . .] Md. Code Regs. 29.03.01.03. 15 “the statute’s structure, including the title, and how the statute relates to other laws.” Id. The primary goal in statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.” McCloud, 426 Md. at 479 (quoting Robinson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 424 Md. 41, 50 (2011)). “Additionally, we must always give the statute a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” McCloud, 426 Md. at 480 (quoting State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 422 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). C. Whether § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is Clear and Unambiguous as it Applies to Out-of-State Convictions First, we address whether § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is unclear or ambiguous. Mr. Chase argues that § 5-306(a)(2)(i) is ambiguous, questioning how the statute treats out-of-state convictions, particularly for states that do not use felony-misdemeanor classifications; whether the statute means “all felonies and only misdemeanors with a year or more incarceration imposed,” or whether it means “either a felony or a misdemeanor where a year or more was imposed[;]” and “what does it mean to have a sentence imposed” and whether we use Maryland’s definition or the definition of the other jurisdiction. However, we need not answer all of these questions to resolve the appeal before us. Whether a statute is clear and unambiguous may depend on the issue presented in the case. See Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648 (1997) (“Statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.”). For example, in Brown, this Court concluded 16 that the language of § 5-101(g)(3) 16 was ambiguous “with respect to which state’s penalty is the proper measure.” 188 Md. App. at 473. Whereas in McLean, we concluded that § 5-101(g)(3) was clear and unambiguous “with respect to the issue presented in [that] case[,]” which was whether the statutory penalty was to be considered at the time of conviction or at the time of the handgun permit application. 197 Md. App. at 432, 440. Brown was convicted in the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) for possession of a dangerous weapon, which was a misdemeanor offense that carried a maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment in D.C. Brown, 188 Md. App. at 459. Under D.C.’s statutory maximum penalty, Brown’s conviction would not be a disqualifying crime. However, Brown’s conviction was equated to the Maryland offense of wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon, which is a misdemeanor subject to imprisonment of up to three years, and thus considered a disqualifying crime under § 5-101(g)(3). Id. The issue presented in Brown was “whether the Board erred in concluding that Brown was convicted of a misdemeanor in [D.C.] for which the equivalent Maryland offense carries a potential statutory penalty of more than two years.” Id. at 461. We concluded that the statute was ambiguous with respect to this issue and held that under § 5-101(g)(3) a “conviction’s potential punishment is measured by reference to the penalty under the law of Maryland[.]” Id. at 473, 480. Another issue raised in Brown was whether to use the past or present equivalent offense and penalty. Id. at 486. However, we declined 16 Public Safety § 5-101(g)(3) states that a “disqualifying crime” includes “a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty for more than [two] years.” 17 to answer that question “in Brown’s case because the penalty for the comparable Maryland offense has been the same at all times since Brown’s conviction.” 17 Id. McLean was convicted of a misdemeanor that, at the time of his handgun permit application, carried a maximum sentence of more than two years, which would be disqualifying. McLean, 197 Md. App. at 432. However, at the time of the conviction, the offense carried a maximum sentence of not more than six months, which would not be disqualifying. Id. at 433. Therefore, the issue turned on the word “carries” in the phrase “a person who has been convicted of a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than two years may not possess a regulated firearm.” Id. at 440. We concluded that for the issue in that case, the statute was not ambiguous and held that in § 5-101(g)(3) the “word ‘carries’ expresses the present tense—i.e., that the statutory penalty to be considered is the penalty in effect at the time that qualification is being considered.” Id. The ultimate issue presented here is whether it was proper for the Department to deny Mr. Chase’s Application under § 5-306(a)(2)(i). First, we disregard the following arguments unnecessary to resolve the appeal before us. We agree with the Department in that we need not address how the statute applies to out-of-state convictions from states that do not use felony-misdemeanor classifications, because the conviction in this case originated in Virginia, which does use felony-misdemeanor classifications. Just as we declined to decide in Brown whether the past or present penalty applied, we likewise need 17 This question was later answered in McLean. 197 Md. App. at 440. 18 not address this question that Mr. Chase raises here—how the statute applies to out-of-state c