In re: Expungement Petition of James W.

In re Expungement Petition of James W., No. 1117, Sept. Term, 2025. Opinion Filed on October 28, 2026, by Wells, C.J. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – EXPUNGEMENT – CONTESTED PETITIONS – STATUTORY WAITING PERIODS Under Md. Code, Criminal Procedure Article § 10-110(c), a petition to expunge an eligible conviction may not be filed until a set waiting period has passed after the person satisfies the sentence. When the State’s Attorney or a victim files a timely objection, § 10-110(f)(2) directs the court to order expungement after a hearing if it finds, among other things, that the conviction is eligible under subsection (a) and the person is eligible under subsection (d). Subsection (f)(2) does not mention subsection (c). This case dealt with whether a court that makes the subsection (f)(2) findings must grant a petition filed before subsection (c)’s waiting period has run. Subsection (f)(2) is ambiguous on this point, but read within the statutory scheme, it does not override subsection (c). If leaving subsection (c) out of a provision that directs expungement were enough to dispense with the waiting periods, there could never be grounds for denying a petition, contested or not. A State’s objection that a petition was filed too early would trigger a hearing at which that objection could not matter. The General Assembly also put an express “good cause” exception to the waiting periods in § 10-105, and it included no comparable provision in § 10-110. Consistent with In re Vincent S., 255 Md. App. 163 (2022), which refused to let another provision override § 10-110(c)’s time limits, a court may not grant under subsection (f)(2) a petition filed before the applicable waiting period has passed. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – EXPUNGEMENT – SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT – DOMESTICALLY RELATED CRIMES – FIFTEEN YEAR WAITING PERIOD Section 10-110(c)(2) bars filing a petition to expunge a second-degree assault conviction under Md. Code, Criminal Law Article § 3-203 until seven years after the sentence is satisfied. Section 10-110(c)(3) sets a fifteen-year period for an offense classified as a domestically related crime under Md. Code, Criminal Procedure Article § 6-233. The REDEEM Act of 2023 moved these offenses into separate paragraphs and cut the period for second-degree assault from fifteen to seven years. When a second-degree assault conviction is classified as domestically related, the fifteen- year period in subsection (c)(3) applies. The plain language of subsection (c)(3) covers such a conviction, and nothing in it carves out second-degree assault. The two provisions do not conflict. Subsection (c)(2) sets a minimum waiting period but does not authorize filing once seven years have passed, and a petition filed after fifteen years satisfies both provisions. Reading subsection (c)(2) to control would add an exception the statute does not contain. It would also mean a domestic classification lengthens the waiting period from five to fifteen years for offenses under the general rule but has no effect on second- degree assault, which the General Assembly deliberately gave a longer-than-general period. In this case, James W.’s 2016 second-degree assault conviction was designated domestically related. He completed probation in April 2018 and petitioned for expungement in May 2025. Because fifteen years had not passed, the petition was premature. We reverse the circuit court’s order granting expungement and remand with instructions to vacate it. Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-K-15-006895 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 1117 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ IN RE EXPUNGEMENT PETITION OF JAMES W. ______________________________________ Wells, C.J., Kehoe, S., Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wells, C.J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 28, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.10.28 '00'04- 15:27:07 Gregory Hilton, Clerk  In May 2025, appellee, James W., filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking to expunge records relating to his 2016 conviction for second-degree assault. After a hearing, the court granted Mr. W.’s petition over the State’s objection. The State timely appealed and presents a single question for our review, which we quote: Did the circuit court err in granting James W.’s petition for expungement of records for his 2016 conviction for second-degree assault, as it was a domestically related offense that will not be eligible for expungement until fifteen years after satisfaction of the sentence? We answer that question in the affirmative and therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court. As the underlying facts are irrelevant to the resolution of this appeal, instead, we discuss the pertinent procedural history. BACKGROUND On April 19, 2016, Mr. W. pled guilty on an agreed statement of facts to one count of second-degree assault in violation of Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”). The hearing sheet from that proceeding contains a notation identifying the case as “domestic related.” The circuit court sentenced Mr. W. to ten years’ incarceration, with all but time served suspended, followed by two years of supervised probation. It also ordered him to complete 40 hours of community service and a 26-week abuser intervention program. Finally, the court prohibited Mr. W. from having any unlawful contact with the victim. On May 9, 2025, Mr. W. filed a petition for expungement of records pertaining to the second-degree assault conviction. In that petition, he affirmed: On or about 04/19/2016, I was convicted . . . of . . . a crime specified in [CR] § 3-203 . . . . Seven (7) years have passed since the satisfactory completion  of the sentence(s) imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision. Since the date of conviction[,] I have not been convicted of a crime not now eligible for an expungement. I am not now a defendant in any pending criminal action. On May 20, 2025, the State filed an Answer to Petition for Expungement, asserting that because the assault conviction was designated “domestic related,” Maryland Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol., 2024 Supp.), § 10-110(c)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) prohibited Mr. W. from filing a petition to expunge records relating to that offense until fifteen years after satisfying the sentence imposed. At the July 23, 2025 hearing on the motion, the State reiterated that because the second-degree assault conviction was designated “domestic related,” it would not be eligible for expungement until fifteen years after Mr. W. had satisfied his sentence. Mr. W., through counsel, responded that he had “completed his probation [in] April 2018” and contended that the conviction was eligible for expungement because seven years had elapsed since that time. The court explained, however, that although second-degree assault was ordinarily subject to a seven-year waiting period, a fifteen-year waiting period applied to domestically related crimes. The court therefore stated that it did not think it could order the requested expungement unless counsel could identify another statutory basis for doing so. In response, Mr. W.’s counsel invoked CP § 10-110(f)(2). At the time, that provision required the court to order expungement if, after a hearing, it made four enumerated 2 findings.1 The first was that the conviction was “eligible for expungement under subsection (a) of this section[.]” CP § 10-110(f)(2)(i). Addressing that criterion, the court observed that subsection (a) expressly included second-degree assault among the offenses eligible for expungement. The State maintained, however, that because Mr. W.’s conviction had been classified as a domestically related crime, CP § 10-110(c)(3) precluded him from seeking expungement until fifteen years after satisfying his sentence. Upon examining the hearing sheet from the April 19, 2016, plea proceeding, the court confirmed the domestically related designation. It then acknowledged that CP § 10- 110(c)(3) prescribed a fifteen-year waiting period for domestically related crimes. The court observed, however, that subsection (f)(2)(i) did not simply require that the conviction be eligible for expungement generally. Had the provision done so, the court reasoned, subsection (c)’s waiting period likely would have been dispositive. Instead, subsection (f)(2)(i) specifically required that the conviction be eligible for expungement “under subsection (a)[,]” which expressly included second-degree assault. After hearing additional argument regarding whether expungement would be in the interest of justice, the court returned to the language of CP § 10-110(f)(2). It again questioned why subsection (f)(2)(i) referred to eligibility under subsection (a), rather than eligibility for expungement generally, stating: I’m not sure why [CP § 10-110(f)(2)(i)] refers only to being eligible for expungement under Subsection (a), rather than it just saying that the person has to be eligible for expungement. 1 The General Assembly has since amended CP § 10-110 to add a fifth enumerated finding to subsection (f)(2). See 2025 Md. Laws, ch. 95, § 1. 3  I mean, one would assume that [if] the legislature meant for it to include that it is a person who has to be eligible for expungement under all circumstances, that it would have just ended with [“]eligible for expungement.[”] The court then reasoned that because it remained “torn” over how to reconcile the statutory provisions and “the State ha[d] the burden,” it was “probably” required to grant the petition. The court therefore granted Mr. W.’s petition but stayed the order for 30 days to afford the State an opportunity to appeal. The court memorialized its oral ruling in a written order entered on July 24, 2025. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW “As a general rule, ‘the expungement statute seems to lodge no discretion in the court, but to mandate either granting or denying the relief, based upon statutorily defined entitlement, or the lack of it.’” In re Vincent S., 255 Md. App. 163, 170 (2022) (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Nelson, 156 Md. App. 558, 568 (2004)). See also In re Abhishek I., 255 Md. App. 464, 468-69 (2022) (“A court has no discretion to deny expungement if a person is statutorily entitled to it.”). “Whether a petitioner is statutorily entitled to the expungement of a prior arrest or conviction is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Vincent S., 255 Md. App. at 169-70. Accord In re Dione W., 243 Md. App. 1, 3 (2019) (“[A] person’s eligibility for expungement is a question of law that is subject to de novo review.”). Accordingly, we review the decision to grant Mr. W.’s expungement petition without deference to the court’s legal conclusion. See Robert B. v. State, 193 Md. App. 620, 626 (2010). 4  DISCUSSION A. Parties’ Contentions The State contends that the circuit court erred in granting Mr. W.’s petition to expunge his 2016 second-degree assault conviction because the offense was classified as “domestically related” and therefore was not eligible for expungement until fifteen years after he satisfied the sentence imposed, as required by CP § 10-110(c)(3). Specifically, the State argues that the court misinterpreted CP § 10-110(f)(2) by construing that subsection as compelling expungement regardless of whether the applicable waiting period under CP § 10-110(c)(3) had elapsed. According to the State, the court contravened established principles of statutory construction by reading CP § 10-110(f)(2) in isolation, without regard to the timing requirements set forth in CP § 10-110(c). Mr. W. responds that the circuit court properly granted his petition under CP § 10- 110(f)(2). He emphasizes that subsection (f)(2) directed the court to order expungement if it found, among other things, that the “conviction was eligible for expungement under subsections (a) and (d) of the statute,” but did not require the court to consider the fifteen- year waiting period under CP § 10-110(c)(3). Alternatively, Mr. W. argues that the legislative history of CP § 10-110 reflects the General Assembly’s intent to establish “a separate, more lenient, standard for expungement of second-degree assault regardless of its nature.” Specifically, he cites a 2023 amendment to CP § 10-110(c), which separated second-degree assault and domestically related crimes into subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3), respectively, while reducing the waiting period for second-degree assault from fifteen to 5 seven years and retaining a fifteen-year period for domestically related crimes. On that basis, Mr. W. contends that the seven-year period for second-degree assault governs regardless of whether the conviction is classified as domestically related. B. Principles of Statutory Construction As the resolution of this appeal turns on our interpretation of CP § 10-110, we begin with the pertinent principles of statutory construction. “The ‘cardinal rule’ of statutory construction is ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.’” In re Richard M., 256 Md. App. 445, 454 (2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Watts v. State, 457 Md. 419, 430 (2018)). “In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jamison v. State, 450 Md. 387, 396 n.9 (2016) (quoting Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224 (2006)). In conducting that plain-language analysis, “[o]ur inquiry is not confined to the specific statutory provision at issue on appeal.” Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 687 (2020). Rather, “the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[.]” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, we read each statutory subsection in conjunction with the others to “‘give effect to the whole statute and harmonize all of its provisions.’” Scott v. State, 351 Md. 667, 674 (1998) (quoting Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436 (1994)). Consistent with that principle, “‘[a] plain reading of the statute assumes none of its language is superfluous or nugatory.’” Robert B., 193 Md. App. at 635 (quoting Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 350 (2008)). Relatedly, we will neither “add or delete language 6 so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, nor . . . construe a statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Haile v. State, 431 Md. 448, 467 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Bivens v. Clark, 491 Md. 345, 364 (2025) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In construing ambiguous statutory language, however, “courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under consideration.” Peterson v. State, 467 Md. 713, 728 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Statutory language is ambiguous when it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the language is unambiguous when read in isolation, but ambiguous when considered in the context of a larger statutory scheme[.]” Syed v. Lee, 488 Md. 537, 594-95 (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To resolve such ambiguities, we consider other indicia of legislative intent, “including the history of the legislation[,] . . . the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Maryland Dep’t of Health v. Boulden, 495 Md. 191, 233 (2026) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Ultimately, regardless of whether we find statutory language ambiguous, we must arrive at a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible 7 with common sense.” Bethesda African Cemetery Coal. v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n of Montgomery Cnty., 489 Md. 1, 63 (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). C. Criminal Procedure Article § 10-110 In applying these principles, we begin with the plain language of CP § 10-110 as it existed when Mr. W.’s expungement petition was filed and adjudicated.2 Subsection (a) identifies the convictions for which a person may file an expungement petition and provides, in pertinent part: (a) A person may file a petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record, court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State if the person is convicted of: (1) a misdemeanor that is a violation of: * * * (vii) § 3-203 . . . of the Criminal Law Article[.] CP § 10-110(a). Subsection (c), in turn, prescribes when an expungement petition may be filed. At the time of the expungement hearing, it provided in relevant part: (c)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a petition for expungement under this section may not be filed earlier than 5 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision. 2 As noted above, the General Assembly amended CP § 10-110 effective October 1, 2025. See 2025 Md. Laws, ch. 95, § 1. Unless otherwise indicated, the pertinent provisions of CP § 10-110 remain unchanged from those in effect when the circuit court granted Mr. W.’s petition. Accordingly, we use the present tense when discussing those provisions, except when referring to language that governed Mr. W.’s petition but has since been amended. When addressing such language, we identify the applicable version of the statute and the relevant change. 8  (2) A petition for expungement for a violation of § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article or common law battery may not be filed earlier than 7 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision. (3) A petition for expungement for an offense classified as a domestically related crime under § 6-233 of this article may not be filed earlier than 15 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision.[3,4] CP § 10-110(c)(1)-(3) (2024) (emphasis added). Subsections (e)(3), (f), and (g) govern the disposition of an expungement petition after it has been filed. Subsection (e)(3) applies when no timely objection is made and states: “Unless the State’s Attorney or a victim files an objection to the petition for expungement within 30 days after the petition is served, the court shall pass an order requiring the expungement of all police records and court records about the charge.” CP § 10-110(e)(3). When a timely objection is filed, subsection (f) governs. As of Mr. W.’s expungement hearing, that subsection provided: (f)(1) If the State’s Attorney or a victim files a timely objection to the petition, the court shall hold a hearing. 3 CP § 6-233(a) defines “domestically related crime” as “a crime committed by a defendant against a victim who is a person eligible for relief, as defined in § 4-501 of the Family Law Article, or who had a sexual relationship with the defendant within 12 months before the commission of the crime.” 4 As part of its 2025 amendments to CP § 10-110, the General Assembly replaced “person satisfies” with “completion of” in each paragraph of subsection (c) and struck the phrase “or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision.” See 2025 Md. Laws, ch. 95, § 1. 9  (2) The court shall order the expungement of all police records and court records about the charge after a hearing, if the court finds and states on the record: (i) that the conviction is eligible for expungement under subsection (a) of this section; (ii) that the person is eligible for expungement under subsection (d) of this section;[5] (iii) that giving due regard to the nature of the crime, the history and character of the person, and the person’s success at rehabilitation, the person is not a risk to public safety; and (iv) that an expungement would be in the interest of justice.[6] 5 CP § 10-110(d) states: (d)(1) If the person is convicted of a new crime during the applicable time period set forth in subsection (c) of this section, the original conviction or convictions are not eligible for expungement unless the new conviction becomes eligible for expungement. (2) A person is not eligible for expungement if the person is a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding. (3) If a person is not eligible for expungement of one conviction in a unit, the person is not eligible for expungement of any other conviction in the unit. 6 As noted above, the General Assembly’s 2025 amendments to CP § 10-110 added a fifth finding, namely “that the person has paid any monetary restitution ordered by the court in the original proceeding or does not have the ability to pay the restitution[.]” CP § 10-110(f)(2)(iv). The amendments also revised subparagraph (iii) to include the following italicized language: “that giving due regard to the nature of the crime, the history and character of the person, the person’s success at probation, parole, or mandatory supervision, and the person’s success at rehabilitation, the person is not a risk to public safety . . . . ” CP § 10-110(f)(2)(iii). 10 CP § 10-110(f) (2024). Finally, subsection (g) states: “If at a hearing the court finds that a person is not entitled to expungement, the court shall deny the petition.” CP § 10-110(g). D. Analysis 1. Subsection (f)(2) Does Not Displace Subsection (c)’s Waiting Periods. With this statutory framework in mind, we first address whether CP § 10-110(f)(2) permits a court to grant an expungement petition filed before the applicable waiting period under subsection (c) has elapsed. In contending that it does, Mr. W. relies on subsection (f)(2)’s omission of an express cross-reference to subsection (c). From that omission, he argues that if the court makes the on-the-record findings enumerated in subsection (f)(2), it must order expungement regardless of whether subsection (c)’s waiting period has elapsed. CP § 10-110 establishes a sequential expungement process.7 Considered within this statutory scheme, subsections (c) and (f)(2) perform distinct functions. Subsection (c) imposes a threshold temporal restriction on when an expungement petition may be filed. Subsection (f)(2), by contrast, governs the court’s disposition once a petition has been filed, “a timely objection to the petition” has been made, and a hearing has been held. As of the 7 As discussed above, subsections (a), (b), and (c) respectively identify the convictions for which a petition may be filed, the court in which it must be filed, and when it may be filed. Subsection (d) imposes additional restrictions on a petitioner’s eligibility for expungement. Once a petition is filed, subsection (e) governs service and notice, and directs the court to order expungement if a timely objection is not made. If an objection is timely filed, however, subsection (f) requires the court to hold a hearing and, if the enumerated findings are made, to order expungement. Conversely, subsection (g) requires the court to deny the petition if, after the hearing, it finds that the petitioner is “not entitled to expungement[.]” CP § 10-110(g). 11 hearing in this case, the findings enumerated in that provision concerned the eligibility of the conviction and the person, public safety, and the interest of justice. Subsection (c)’s filing restriction was therefore antecedent to and separate from those findings. That distinction, however, does not resolve the tension between the provisions. Read in isolation, subsection (f)(2) can reasonably be construed as identifying the exclusive findings that, once made, require the court to order expungement. Its express references to subsections (a) and (d) but not (c) therefore lend some support to the inference that compliance with subsection (c) is not a prerequisite to ordering an expungement under subsection (f)(2). Considered in the context of the larger statutory scheme, however, subsection (f)(2) can also reasonably be understood as governing the disposition of a petition filed in accordance with the threshold restrictions imposed elsewhere in the statute, including subsection (c). Under that construction, subsection (f)(2)’s omission of an express reference to subsection (c)’s mandatory waiting periods does not dispense with them. Because both interpretations are reasonable, we conclude that subsection (f)(2) is ambiguous as to whether its directive to order expungement upon those findings supersedes subsection (c)’s waiting periods. Accordingly, we consider the consequences of Mr. W.’s construction. See Bivens, 491 Md. at 364 (“If a statute is ambiguous, we may consider ‘the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.’” (quoting Briggs v. State, 413 Md. 265, 275 (2010))). 12  The implications of Mr. W.’s interpretation become clearer when subsection (c) is considered in relation to the two paths an expungement petition may follow after filing. If no timely objection is filed, subsection (e)(3) directs the court to order expungement and contains no express reference to subsection (c). If, as Mr. W. claims, the omission of subsection (c) from a provision directing expungement were sufficient to render its waiting periods inapplicable, the court would be required to grant an uncontested petition filed before the prescribed waiting period had elapsed. When a timely objection is filed, Mr. W.’s construction of subsection (f)(2) would likewise require expungement whenever the enumerated findings were made, notwithstanding the petition’s premature filing. Thus, under the interpretive principle Mr. W. advances, subsection (c)’s waiting periods could not furnish a basis for denying a petition under either path. That consequence is particularly problematic when the State’s objection is based on the petition’s premature filing. If the State’s Attorney timely objects on the ground that the petition was filed before subsection (c)’s waiting period had elapsed, subsection (f)(1) would require the court to hold a hearing. Under Mr. W.’s interpretation of subsection (f)(2), however, the court would be compelled to grant a premature expungement petition if it made the findings enumerated in that provision. The State’s objection would therefore trigger a hearing, but the premature filing that prompted it could not provide a basis for denying relief. That anomalous result weighs against construing subsection (f)(2)’s omission of subsection (c) as implicitly nullifying subsection (c)’s waiting periods once a timely objection has been filed. 13  Mr. W.’s interpretation is further weakened when CP § 10-110 is considered alongside CP § 10-105, which contains an express exception to the waiting periods it prescribes. The General Assembly enacted CP § 10-110 in 2016. See 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515, § 2. In so doing, it expanded the range of convictions eligible for expungement beyond the offenses then enumerated in CP § 10-105(a)(9). See Vincent S., 255 Md. App. at 179- 80. At that time, CP § 10-105(c)(6) read: “A petition for expungement based on the conviction of a crime under subsection (a)(9) of this section may not be filed within 3 years after the conviction or satisfactory completion of the sentence, including probation, that was imposed for the conviction, whichever is later.”8 CP § 10-105(c)(6) (2016). Paragraph (8) of that subsection, in turn, provided: “A court may grant a petition for expungement at any time on a showing of good cause.”9 CP § 10-105(c)(8) (2016). The provision thus “grants courts discretionary authority to relieve a petitioner of the time requirements for filing an expungement petition” imposed by the preceding paragraphs of that subsection. Vincent S., 255 Md. App. at 174. In enacting CP § 10-110, the General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of CP § 10-105(c)(8)’s “good cause” exception. See id. at 181 (“‘[W]e presume that, when the Legislature enacted the later of the two statutes, it was aware of the one earlier enacted.’” (quoting Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 129 (2000))). 8 This paragraph was amended by 2025 Md. Laws, ch. 95, § 1, and presently provides: “A petition for expungement based on the conviction of a crime under subsection (a)(9) of this section may not be filed within 3 years after the completion of the sentence.” 9 This provision is currently codified as CP § 10-105(c)(9). 14 Its inclusion also demonstrates that the General Assembly knew how to authorize departure from an otherwise applicable waiting period when it wished to do so. CP § 10-110, however, contained no comparable provision. That statutory contrast supports an inference that the omission of such a provision from CP § 10-110 was deliberate and weighs against construing subsection (f)(2) as implicitly creating an exception to subsection (c)’s waiting periods. Our decision in Vincent S. reinforces that inference. There, Mr. S. filed petitions under CP § 10-110 seeking to expunge convictions for two counts of first-degree burglary and one count of felony theft. In opposing those petitions, the State argued, inter alia, that the waiting period prescribed by CP § 10-110(c) had not elapsed with respect to the burglary counts and that a subsequent conviction—which was itself ineligible for expungement—precluded expungement of both the burglary and theft convictions under CP § 10-110(d).10 Following a contested hearing, the circuit court denied Mr. S.’s petitions. On appeal, Mr. S. contended that the “good cause” provision, then codified as CP § 10-105(c)(9), authorized the circuit court to grant his petitions notwithstanding his failure to satisfy the statutory criteria of CP § 10-110(c) and (d). We rejected that contention, holding that CP § 10-105(c)(9)’s “good cause” exception does not apply to expungement petitions filed pursuant to CP § 10-110. Reading CP § 10-105(c)(9) in context, we 10 As noted above, CP § 10-110(d)(1) provides: “If the person is convicted of a new crime during the applicable time period set forth in subsection (c) of this section, the original conviction or convictions are not eligible for expungement unless the new conviction becomes eligible for expungement.” (Emphasis added.) 15 explained that the provision was “properly construed as granting courts the discretion to relieve a petitioner of the time requirements set forth in the immediately preceding eight subsections of § 10-105.” 255 Md. App. at 175. We then observed that “[c]onspicuously absent from § 10-110 is a provision conferring upon courts the authority to grant expungement petitions at any time for good cause shown.” Id. at 180. We further reasoned that Mr. S.’s interpretation of § 10-105(c)(9) “would make meaningless surplusage of the time limitations set out in § 10-110(c)(1)-(3).” Id. at 181 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we concluded that “the General Assembly did not intend the ‘good cause’ proviso in [CP] § 10-105 to apply to expungement petitions filed pursuant to [CP] § 10-110.” Id. at 181- 82. Although Mr. S.’s argument rested on CP § 10-105(c)(9) rather than CP § 10- 110(f)(2), both proposed interpretations would permit another statutory provision to override CP § 10-110(c)’s time limitations. In Vincent S., we rejected such a construction, concluding that the plain language of CP § 10-105(c)(9), when read in context, did not support Mr. S.’s interpretation and that his construction would render CP § 10-110(c)’s time limitations meaningless. That reasoning counsels against construing CP § 10- 110(f)(2) to create an implicit exception to subsection (c)’s waiting periods. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that subsection (f)(2) does not authorize a court to grant an expungement petition filed before the applicable waiting period under subsection (c) has elapsed. 16  2. Subsection (c)(3)’s Fifteen-Year Waiting Period Applies to a Second-Degree Assault Conviction Classified as a Domestically Related Crime. We turn now to Mr. W.’s alternative contention that his expungement petition was timely under the seven-year waiting period for second-degree assault prescribed by CP § 10-110(c)(2) rather than the fifteen-year period for domestically related crimes under CP § 10-110(c)(3). He argues that the legislative history of CP § 10-110 reflects the General Assembly’s intent to establish “a different time frame [for second-degree assault] than the one for domestically related crimes.” As enacted, CP § 10-110(c) provided: (c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a petition for expungement under this section may not be filed earlier than 10 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision. (2) A petition for expungement for a violation of § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article or for an offense classified as a domestically related crime under § 6-233 of the Criminal Procedure Article may not be filed earlier than 15 years after the person satisfies the sentence or sentences imposed for all convictions for which expungement is requested, including parole, probation, or mandatory supervision. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515, § 2. Before § 10-110 took effect, however, the General Assembly amended subsection (c)(2) to add common-law battery to that provision, while retaining the fifteen-year waiting period. See 2017 Md. Laws, ch. 703, § 1. The relevant language of subsection (c) remained substantially unchanged until it was amended as part of the REDEEM Act of 2023. 2023 Md. Laws, ch. 683, § 1. By that amendment, the General Assembly (i) reduced the generally applicable waiting period under subsection (c)(1) from 17 ten to five years, (ii) removed offenses classified as domestically related crimes from subsection (c)(2), (iii) reduced the waiting period for second-degree assault and common- law battery from fifteen to seven years, and (iv) placed domestically related crimes in the newly created subsection (c)(3), while retaining a fifteen-year waiting period for such offenses. See 2023 Md. Laws, ch. 683, § 1. Mr. W. does not dispute that his second-degree assault conviction was designated as “domestically related.” Rather, he argues that, by reducing the waiting period for second-degree assault from fifteen to seven years and placing second-degree assault and domestically related crimes in separate paragraphs, the General Assembly intended the seven-year period to govern second-degree assault even when the conviction is classified as domestically related. We are not persuaded. By its plain language, CP § 10-110(c)(3) applies to “[a] petition for expungement for an offense classified as a domestically related crime under § 6-233 of this article[.]” A second-degree assault conviction so classified clearly falls within that description, and nothing in subsection (c)(3) excludes such a conviction merely because it is also subject to subsection (c)(2). Critically, applying subsection (c)(3) to a domestically related second- degree assault does not conflict with the filing restriction imposed by subsection (c)(2). Subsection (c)(2) prohibits the filing of a petition to expunge a second-degree assault conviction until seven years after the sentence is satisfied. It does not affirmatively authorize the filing of such a petition after that seven-year period has elapsed or provide that seven years is the exclusive waiting period for a second-degree assault conviction. 18 Because a petition filed after fifteen years necessarily sati