Shuler v. State

Montay D. Shuler v. State of Maryland, No. 57, September Term, 2025, Opinion by Booth, J. JURY INSTRUCTIONS — VOLUNTARINESS OF CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS — “SOME EVIDENCE” STANDARD In a criminal case in which the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, second- degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter, the State sought to admit a defendant’s custodial statement in rebuttal as a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes. The trial court refused to give the defendant’s requested voluntariness instruction set forth in Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction-CR 3:18. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the defendant failed to generate “some evidence” to support his requested instruction, and therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give it under the facts of this case. HARMLESS ERROR The Court further held that even if the trial court had erred in refusing to give the instruction, any error in not giving defendant’s instruction on voluntariness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No.: 121306006 Argued: May 5, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 57 September Term, 2025 MONTAY D. SHULER v. STATE OF MARYLAND Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Watts and Biran, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. Filed: July 20, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.20 08:52:15 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  This appeal arises from a trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the voluntariness of statements made by defendant Montay D. Shuler during a custodial interrogation. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State charged Mr. Shuler with first- and second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and various firearms offenses, in the shooting deaths of two individuals during a marijuana purchase. Mr. Shuler testified that he acted in self-defense. To impeach Mr. Shuler, the State introduced his prior statement denying all involvement in the shooting during a late-night, uncounseled custodial interview after his arrest. Although Mr. Shuler conceded that the statement was admissible, he requested a pattern jury instruction directing the jury that it could consider his prior statement only if it first found that the statement was voluntary. The trial court denied Mr. Shuler’s request. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Mr. Shuler of first- and second- degree murder, but found him guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and illegal possession of a regulated firearm. The court imposed a total sentence of 70 years’ incarceration, with the first 10 years to be served without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Mr. Shuler argued that the trial court erred in failing to give a voluntariness instruction. The Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed his conviction. Shuler v. State, 267 Md. App. 465 (2025). In the court’s view, a voluntariness instruction was not required because (1) Mr. Shuler’s prior statement was offered for impeachment purposes, (2) the statement was not a confession, but was instead exculpatory on its face, and (3) the record did not include “some evidence” from which a jury could find Mr. Shuler’s statement was involuntary. Id. at 508–09. We granted Mr. Shuler’s petition for writ of certiorari to answer the following questions, which we have slightly rephrased: 1. Whether the Appellate Court erred in holding that the defendant was not entitled to the pattern jury instruction on the voluntariness of his custodial statement because it was offered for impeachment purposes and the content of his statement was “exonerating.” 2. Whether Mr. Shuler presented “some evidence” that his custodial statement was not voluntarily given to generate the voluntariness instruction. For the reasons that we discuss more fully below, we answer the first question “yes,” and the second question “no.” We disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that Mr. Shuler was not entitled to the voluntariness instruction on the basis that the statement was offered only for impeachment purposes and the content of his statement was facially exculpatory. However, we agree with the Appellate Court’s third conclusion—that the record did not include “some evidence” from which a jury could find that Mr. Shuler’s statement was involuntary. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in refusing to give Mr. Shuler’s requested voluntariness instruction, we determine that such an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. 2  I Facts and Proceedings A. Factual Background1 On the evening of August 5, 2021, several 911 calls reported that a shooting occurred near the intersection of Flowerton Road and Wicklow Road in Baltimore City. The police responded to the 4300 block of Flowerton Road and found a red Ford Focus. Brian Palmer and Darrin Stewart, who were both deceased, were in the car. Mr. Palmer was in the driver’s seat and Mr. Stewart was in the front passenger seat. Each man had been shot in the head twice and in the lower abdomen once. Crime scene technicians recovered evidence at the scene, including bullets, bullet fragments, 9mm cartridge casings, suspected controlled dangerous substances, and a cell phone belonging to Mr. Palmer. A digital forensic download of Mr. Palmer’s cell phone revealed that he had been texting a man named Raekwon Griffin about a narcotics sale. Specifically, Mr. Griffin was negotiating the purchase of a pound of marijuana from Mr. Palmer. In the text messages, Mr. Griffin gave Mr. Palmer the address of 4313 Flowerton Road as the location to meet to complete the sale. Mr. Griffin asked if Mr. Palmer would “front him” the drugs, meaning that he would pay at a later date, but Mr. Palmer declined. Mr. Griffin then texted Mr. Palmer, “My brother going to be with me, we going half, if that’s cool with you.” Mr. Palmer wrote back, “That’s fine, red Focus pulling up.” 1 The facts presented in this section are based on the testimony and other evidence introduced at trial. 3  One day after the homicides, at 7:53 p.m., Mr. Shuler was arrested when he was seen driving a white Subaru that a 911 caller had identified as fleeing the area immediately after the shooting. The police transported him to the station house, where, after being advised of his Miranda2 rights, Mr. Shuler agreed to speak with detectives. In Mr. Shuler’s statement to the detectives, which was videotaped, he denied being involved in the shootings or being in the vicinity when they occurred. After the arrest, the police obtained a warrant to search the white Subaru, which was registered to Mr. Shuler. Under the driver’s seat, the police found a Ruger 57 semi- automatic handgun that belonged to one of the victims. Mr. Shuler’s and Mr. Griffin’s fingerprints were found in the Subaru. The Ruger was ruled out as the murder weapon because the casings found at the scene were a different caliber. Historical cell analysis of Mr. Shuler’s and Mr. Griffin’s phone numbers placed both cell phones near the scene of the murder at the time it occurred. Using Mr. Shuler’s phone number, Sergeant Seong Koo3 searched the jail call database and found that two calls were placed to Mr. Shuler’s number from the Baltimore City Detention Center—one on the day of the murders shortly after they occurred and one the following day. During the August 5, 2021 call, Mr. Shuler stated, “I just caught an and one” which, according to Detective Bryan Kershaw, who testified as an expert in code for criminal conduct, means “double murder.” Mr. Shuler told the person at the detention center with 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 At the time of Mr. Shuler’s arrest, Seong Koo was a detective. He was promoted to sergeant in May 2022. We will refer to him as Sergeant. 4 whom he was speaking that they “came up on a P”—meaning “pound.” The person calling Mr. Shuler told him to hold onto the gun for him, and they discussed a $3,000 price for the gun. In the second call, Mr. Shuler stated that he was “holding onto [a 57]” and “got rid of the 9 right away.” B. Mr. Shuler’s Trial Testimony4 At trial, Mr. Shuler raised self-defense and defense of others, and he testified in his defense. Mr. Shuler gave the following account of the events that transpired on August 5, 2021. On that day, he encountered Mr. Griffin, a friend, who wanted to “buy some weed.” They traveled in Mr. Shuler’s Subaru to the street in front of Mr. Griffin’s old residence on Flowerton Road and waited. When the red Ford Focus arrived, Mr. Griffin got out of the car and walked over to it. Mr. Griffin and the driver began to fight over money, and the driver reached for a gun. Mr. Shuler testified that Mr. Griffin and the driver “were fighting over one gun and the money at the same time.” Mr. Shuler testified that he got out of his car, and he saw the passenger reaching under his seat. Mr. Shuler pulled out his own gun and shot the passenger. Mr. Shuler alleged that Mr. Griffin and the driver continued to fight, so Mr. Shuler also shot the driver. Mr. Shuler testified that he only shot twice, but because he was using a “ghost gun,” it malfunctioned, and more than two bullets discharged. After Mr. Shuler shot the driver, Mr. Griffin had the driver’s gun in his hand, 4 The State tried Mr. Shuler twice for these crimes. The first trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict. The issues before us relate exclusively to the second trial. 5 and Mr. Shuler took the driver’s gun to “get rid of it.” Mr. Shuler acknowledged that after the homicides, he received calls from a friend in the detention center. When asked why Mr. Shuler did not tell the police his self-defense account of the shooting, he testified as follows: Because—I didn’t tell them because I felt like I was going to get charged for murder and me telling them that I just killed somebody in self-defense is basically me admitting to first—well, not first-degree but murder which I know there’s no self-defense law so I never would have gotten a chance for self-defense or no type of bail anything, so I just told them I didn’t know nothing about it. C. The State Seeks to Introduce Mr. Shuler’s Custodial Statement After Mr. Shuler’s testimony in the defense’s case, the prosecutor indicated she intended to recall Sergeant Koo and to introduce Mr. Shuler’s recorded statement to police in order to impeach his in-court testimony. The following exchange occurred: [PROSECUTOR]: It’s the statement, I intend on introducing the Defendant’s statement at this time. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Which? I don’t think its admissible, Your Honor. The State needs to notify us in advance. We could have a motions hearing on it. You said you weren’t going to use it so. [PROSECUTOR]: I don’t think there’s any requirement that the State notifies. Also, this is in the rebuttal case so. THE COURT: That’s the only thing that I can think. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s hard to argue it’s not admissible. THE COURT: Don’t do that, don’t make me laugh. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I apologize, Judge. I mean, at this point, we need to be involuntary in the sense that it was beaten out of him and we’re not contending that’s what happened. 6 THE COURT: You can’t contend that, and so I think the issue is you presented a case which you have a right to do, and she has a right to rebut it. This is—is it going to be a whole testimony, the whole statement? [PROSECUTOR]: Yes, sorry. * * * THE COURT: What’s in the statement? [PROSECUTOR]: He says he lets other people use his car. He didn’t know the gun was there. THE COURT: I’m sorry? [PROSECUTOR]: He says that he didn’t know the gun was there, he lets other people use his car and denies any knowledge of the gun. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s a denial statement, essentially. So yeah, they arrest him. Do you know anything about this homicide? No, lots of people use my car. What about the gun? I don’t know about the gun. THE COURT: Really? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He’s playing cooperative. THE COURT: All right, and 45 minutes of that? Can we just find some way to—and again, you know I’m just asking. Can we find some way to stipulate that he made a statement to the officers? Again, that’s between the two of you. [PROSECUTOR]: I don’t know about a stipulation. I’ll think about it over lunch and see what we can do. THE COURT: Okay. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If Koo wants to say what he said, then—you know. There’s not really a dispute about what he said. [PROSECUTOR]: I don’t know, I’m sorry. THE COURT: No, the record’s clear so I don’t mind that I’m saying this. 7  I really do want to get this to them, but I absolutely do let you try the case the way you want. It just seems to me that if you two can talk and possibly work—and look, if you can’t, I’m not mad at either one of you. You’re both doing a great job but yeah, let’s just see if that can be—and if not, like I said, it is what it is. After the colloquy concerning the admissibility of Mr. Shuler’s recorded statement, the discussion turned to jury instructions. THE COURT: Now, the only other problem is if you do play the statement, you’ve already acknowledged that there’s nothing about the statement that is objectionable. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah, I think he—we don’t have a Miranda issue, and again, I don’t think there’s a voluntariness issue. THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Do either of you think that if you choose to play the statement, is there another instruction that you think is needed or—? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think we need— [PROSECUTOR]: The voluntariness— THE COURT: The question is do you need that? [PROSECUTOR]: I don’t think we need it, Your Honor. THE COURT: Are you using it as a prior inconsistent statement? I mean — so again what instruction—because I’m happy to give what we have, and you just say there’s more testimony, but again if you two think about it, there’s another instruction that’s unique, I need to know because I’ve got to put it in, and I want to put it in quickly, so as soon as you—well, you’ll—yeah. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would—out of an abundance of caution I would add voluntariness, Your Honor? THE COURT: What do you mean by—when you say—voluntary statement or—? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. 8 THE COURT: I thought that you just said that you don’t—again, I’m asking, that you don’t believe it’s an issue? So, here’s the problem, I don’t think this is relevant because you already acknowledged that it wasn’t a voluntary— voluntary is just not an issue. So, if it’s voluntary, and this [is] not an issue, then we don’t need to get into all of the alleged, surrounding circumstances. It’s a matter of what he said. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’ll take a look. I think if there is any significant voluntary, that the truthfulness of the statement can be impacted by the custodial nature of the interrogation, but I’ll—I understand where you are, Judge. THE COURT: That’s fine and so—but then I guess, let’s see here. So are you using it to impeach or are you using it to corroborate with his testimony here—because I guess here’s the issue. If you’re saying that he had other people in the car, let other people drive the car, what—again, I’m asking for this purpose, how is that relevant to what’s been generated, that he had other people [i]n the car? He’s already acknowledged that he had the car and obviously he had the gun. [PROSECUTOR]: I’m using it to impeach. THE COURT: So, if you’re using it—what is it that you’re impeaching then? [PROSECUTOR]: Basically, his whole self-defense claim. THE COURT: Huh? [PROSECUTOR]: His entire self-defense claim, I mean, he— THE COURT: No, I’m asking, I’m listening. [PROSECUTOR]: Basically, his entire—the entire testimony that he just said, because at no point did he say literally anything that he said on the stand today during his statement and— THE COURT: So that aspect of it, okay. So I guess I didn’t need to give B, prior statement to impeach, you’ll agree with, I mean, under the circumstances? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s fine. 9  THE COURT: From a legal standpoint. I’ll give the—and then you’ll talk to me quickly later on after lunch about whether or not—anything about the voluntary statement? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. THE COURT: I’m inclined not to give it, but if you have a legal reason, I’ll certainly hear it. D. Mr. Shuler’s Custodial Statement to the Police Is Admitted Sergeant Koo testified that he, along with Sergeant Sufian Hassan, interviewed Mr. Shuler on August 7, 2021. The video footage of Mr. Shuler’s recorded statement to the two police officers was admitted into evidence without objection.5 The video recording of the interview shows that when the detectives entered the interview room to question him, Mr. Shuler was unshackled, lying on the floor, with two bottles of water and a bag of snacks on the table. As Sergeants Koo and Hassan entered the room, Sergeant Koo said to Mr. Shuler, “Hey, man.” Mr. Shuler got off the floor, stretched, and sat in a chair across from Sergeant Koo at the interrogation table. Sergeant Hassan sat in a chair set back from the table, close to the door, diagonally facing Mr. Shuler. Sergeant Koo introduced himself and Sergeant 5 The video recordings of Mr. Shuler’s custodial statement were admitted as the State’s Exhibits 45A and 45B. As Sergeant Koo testified, and as the video footage confirms, State’s Exhibits 45A and 45B both capture Mr. Shuler’s custodial interrogation. The camera placement depicted by Exhibit 45A is over the door and inside the interrogation room, facing Mr. Shuler’s left side. It permits the viewer to see almost the entire interrogation room, Mr. Shuler, Sergeant Hassan, and Sergeant Koo. By contrast, Exhibit 45B is an “overhead” camera. Its focal point is the interview table, documents, and movements by Mr. Shuler or Sergeant Koo that enter the frame. 10 Hassan to Mr. Schuler, asked Mr. Schuler if he was alright, and inquired if there was anything he needed before beginning questioning. Sergeant Koo asked Mr. Shuler, “Are you good, man? You sure? You need to do anything before we start?” Mr. Shuler nodded his head in response to “are you good” and shook his head when asked if he needed do to do anything before they started. Sergeant Koo then placed an Advice of Rights Form and a pen in front of Mr. Shuler and asked him to read his Miranda rights out loud from a form. After Mr. Schuler read each right, Sergeant Koo asked whether Mr. Shuler understood what he had just read and, if so, to indicate his acknowledgment by writing his initials next to the portion he had just read. Mr. Schuler acknowledged his understanding by nodding in response to Sergeant Koo’s questions and initialing next to each right. The fourth and final item on the form included a waiver sentence—“I have been advised of my rights and I freely and voluntary waive my rights and agree to talk with police without having an attorney.” Before initialing next to this item, Mr. Shuler asked, “Why can’t I have an attorney talk with—” Sergeant Koo answered, “so like I said, it all applies. We want to talk to you. Like I said everything that you just read applies.” Sergeant Hassan then stated: So—so basically at this point, right? You are under arrest. Right? So we have to read you your rights just to talk to you. Okay? So now that last line, just basically saying that you are agreeing to talk with us without an attorney present. Now, that doesn’t say that—I mean, you can stop talking at any point or whatever. That’s—you know that one of the statements up above, okay? You could—you could stop at any point. We—we won’t ask any questions of you. But . . . You want to read it again? 11 After looking down at the Advice of Rights form for approximately 25 seconds, Mr. Shuler brought his pen to the paper and asked, “can I sign?” Before beginning the interrogation, Sergeant Koo confirmed that Mr. Shuler did not have any questions and asked him, “you good man?” Mr. Shuler responded, “cool.” Sergeant Koo began the questioning by asking Mr. Shuler basic information such as his name, date of birth, address, cell phone number, height, weight, and where he attended high school. Mr. Shuler provided all of that information. In addition, Mr. Shuler confirmed that he graduated from high school, that he was currently sober, and that he was not injured or hurt. Mr. Shuler gave his place of employment and advised that he worked Monday through Saturday. After covering background information, Sergeant Hassan asked Mr. Shuler if he knew why he was arrested. Mr. Shuler shook his head negatively. Mr. Shuler recounted what he did on the date of his arrest. Mr. Shuler said that he had driven his Subaru to Giant, but he lets “friends” drive his car and “lend[s] [his] keys out when [h]e’s at work because he do[esn’t] drive it when he [goes] to work.” After approximately ten minutes of questioning, Sergeant Hassan asked Mr. Shuler about the gun that police found in his car: [Sergeant Hassan:] Look man, we ain’t—we ain’t here to play no games, alright? So, we’re just going to start a real conversation, all right? * * * All right, we’re—we’re both grown men here. Okay? We know that you knew what was underneath your driver’s seat. Okay? It’s your car. You’re the only one who uses it. Okay? You know, I’m no—I’m not trying to be hard on you. I’m just saying let’s cut the bull. Okay? So is it your gun? 12 Mr. Shuler responded, “I don’t own any guns.” In response to further questioning about the gun, Mr. Shuler stated that he didn’t know how the gun got there. The detectives asked Mr. Shuler to recount his day again, and he stated that he woke up, went to work, came home, took a shower, changed his clothes, and went to Towson to get something to eat with a girl. When the detectives asked for the girl’s name, Mr. Shuler said, “Can I get an attorney? I don’t want to talk.” The detectives ceased questioning Mr. Shuler and advised him that they would get him an attorney. Before leaving the room, the detectives confirmed that Mr. Shuler did not need anything such as water or the restroom. E. The Trial Court’s Determination that the Evidence Did Not Generate the Voluntariness Instruction Prior to the court instructing the jury, Mr. Shuler’s counsel repeated his request for the court to give Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:18 (“MPJI-Cr 3:18”),6 6 The entirety of the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:18 (“MPJI-Cr- 3:18”) is as follows: You have heard evidence that the defendant made a statement to the police about the crime charged. [You must first determine whether the defendant made a statement. If you find that the defendant made a statement, then you must decide whether the State has proven] [The State must prove] beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntarily made. A voluntary statement is one that under all circumstances was given freely. [[To be voluntary, a statement must not have been compelled or obtained as a result of any force, promise, threat, inducement or offer of reward. If you decide that the police used [force] [a threat] [a promise or inducement] [an offer of reward] in obtaining defendant’s statement, then you must find that the statement was involuntary and disregard it, unless the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the [force] [threat] [promise or inducement] [offer of reward] did not, in any way, cause the defendant to make the 13 instructing the jury to determine the voluntariness of Mr. Shuler’s statement, and the following colloquy ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor. We can discuss the Jury instructions. We covered some of that ground, but we could cover it as well here on the record. I would ask the Court to give statement to the Defendant, [MPJI-Cr] 3:18, with that. THE COURT: Say that again. statement. If you do not exclude the statement for one of these reasons, you then must decide whether it was voluntary under the circumstances.]] In deciding whether the statement was voluntary, consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including: (1) the conversations, if any, between the police and the defendant; (2) [whether the defendant was advised of (pronoun) rights;] (3) the length of time that the defendant was questioned; (4) who was present; (5) the mental and physical condition of the defendant; (6) whether the defendant was subjected to force or threat of force by the police; (7) the age, background, experience, education, character, and intelligence of the defendant; [(8) whether the defendant was taken before a district court commissioner without unnecessary delay following arrest and, if not, whether that affected the voluntariness of the statement;] (9) any other circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, give it such weight as you believe it deserves. If you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, you must disregard it. 14 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m sorry, Your Honor. [MPJI-Cr] 3:18 is a statement of the Defendant suggesting that the Jury—and I agree that not the entire instruction would be appropriate but part of it is in this circumstance appropriate. I’d ask the Court to give that. I understand that the State is suggesting the statement that was introduced, custodial statement of—made by Mr. Shuler taken by Detective Koo and other members of the police is offered for impeachment only, and with that, Your Honor, we’d submit. We do request [MPJI-Cr] 3:18 formally. THE COURT: State, do you want to be heard? [PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Do you object? [PROSECUTOR]: I object. THE COURT: I do believe that based on the fact that the statement of the Defendant was presented during the State’s rebuttal and the purpose of the rebuttal was because the Defendant did in fact testify that there was no motion prior. Again, I’m not faulting defense counsel for no motion, but the defense counsel acknowledged that the statement was a voluntary statement, is that correct, for the record? There’s no pretrial motion, right? I’ll strike right through that part. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, the State had not intended to introduce the statement and she’s the case-in-chief. THE COURT: Correct, and so because of that, there is no pretrial motion, correct? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. THE COURT: But this is a separate issue because the statement is not being offered as a statement against the Defendant but more of impeachment of the Defendant and the Court believes that it is not appropriate to use pattern instruction 3:18 over defense objection. 15 With respect to Mr. Shuler’s prior statement, the court instructed the jury that it was admitted “only to help you decide whether to believe the testimony that [Mr. Shuler] gave during the trial.” The court further instructed, “It is for you to decide whether to believe the trial testimony of Montay Shuler in whole or in part. You may not use the earlier statement for any purpose other than to assist you in making that decision.” F. Conviction and Sentencing The jury found Mr. Shuler guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter, one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon, two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and one count of illegal possession of a firearm. The jury acquitted Mr. Shuler of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. The court sentenced Mr. Shuler to 70 years’ imprisonment. G. Appellate Court of Maryland Mr. Shuler timely appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court of Maryland. Among other things,7 Mr. Shuler challenged the ruling of the trial court declining to give the instruction on the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement, MPJI-Cr 3:18. The Appellate Court affirmed his conviction. Shuler v. State, 267 Md. App. 465 (2025). 7 Mr. Shuler also made certain Fourth Amendment arguments, contending that the trial court should have suppressed evidence discovered as a result of his warrantless arrest and the seizure of his car because the police lacked probable cause. Shuler v. State, 267 Md. App. 465 (2025). The Appellate Court rejected Mr. Shuler’s Fourth Amendment claims, and Mr. Shuler did not petition for this Court’s review of those issues. 16  The Appellate Court gave three reasons for its conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the voluntariness instruction. First, the court reasoned, Mr. Shuler’s “statement was not admitted to prove guilt[]” and “its use was limited to impeachment[.]” Id. at 508. Second, “even if the statement were considered for its substance,” and not limited to impeachment purposes, the court stated that it was “exonerating” and was not a confession. Id. Third, the court held that even if the statement was a confession, Mr. Shuler failed to present “some evidence” that his statement was not voluntarily given. Id. The court noted that it was Mr. Shuler’s burden to provide “some evidence” that his statement was not voluntarily given, and determined that his reliance on the fact that his statement occurred in custody, late at night, and by two police officers, did not satisfy that threshold. Id. at 509. Mr. Shuler filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. Shuler v. State, 493 Md. 168 (2026). II Standard of Review In a criminal jury trial, the trial court “may, and at the request of a party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding.” Md. Rule 4-325(c). When a party requests an instruction on the law8—such as 8 In Hollins v. State, we discussed an important nuance regarding the difference in the standard of review concerning a trial judge’s failure to give an instruction on a question of law, which we review de novo, as opposed to a trial judge’s failure to give an instruction related to facts and factual inferences, which is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 489 Md. 296, 308–10 (2024). In this case, the voluntary statement instruction involves a question of law, and therefore, we conduct a de novo review of the legal question of whether the defendant produced “some evidence” to generate the instruction. 17 whether a criminal defendant’s statement to the police was voluntary—a trial court is required to give a specific instruction to the jury when three conditions are met: (1) the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) the requested instruction is applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the requested instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in the jury instructions actually given. Jarvis v. State, 487 Md. 548, 564 (2024). In this case, the parties agree on the first and third conditions. That is, Mr. Shuler’s requested pattern jury instruction on voluntariness is a correct statement of law, and no other instruction addressed voluntariness. The only question is whether the instruction was applicable to the facts. We conduct a de novo review of the second condition—whether the evidence was sufficient to generate the desired instruction. Hollins v. State, 489 Md. 296, 309 (2024); see also Bazzle v. State, 426 Md. 541, 550 (2012) (“The threshold determination of whether the evidence is sufficient to generate the desired instruction is a question of law for the judge.” (quoting Dishman v. State, 352 Md. 279, 292–93 (1998))). “In assessing whether a particular jury instruction is applicable under the facts of a given case, a defendant must, as an initial matter, produce ‘some evidence’ sufficient to raise the jury issue.” Jarvis, 487 Md. at 564 (citation modified). “In determining whether there was ‘some evidence’ to support the instruction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused.” Hollins, 489 Md. at 309 (citing Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 221–222 (1990)). As we explained in Dykes, the “some evidence” threshold is low. 319 Md. 216–17. “It calls for no more than what it says—‘some,’ as that word is understood in common, everyday usage.” Id. “As long as the relied-upon evidence, if believed by a 18 rational juror, supports the proponent’s claim, the proponent has met the burden of showing that the requested jury instruction applies to the facts of the case.” Hollins, 489 Md. at 312 (citation omitted). III Discussion Before this Court, Mr. Shuler argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to give the voluntariness instruction, and that the Appellate Court erred in affirming the circuit court’s judgment. Mr. Shuler argues that two of the reasons for the Appellate Court’s holding—that the voluntariness instruction was not required because the statement was introduced for impeachment purposes and was facially exculpatory—are inconsistent with this Court’s case law. Mr. Shuler further contends that he produced “some evidence” to generate the voluntariness instruction. For its part, the State concedes that, under this Court’s case law, the voluntariness analysis applies to all custodial statements, including facially exculpatory ones, no matter how the State uses them at trial. The State asserts, however, that the Appellate Court correctly determined that Mr. Shuler failed to produce “some evidence” to generate the voluntariness instruction. The State further argues that even if the trial court erred in failing to give the instruction, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In considering the parties’ arguments, it is instructive to discuss the applicable law that governs the admissibility of confessions, as well as the legal framework by which we consider whether “some evidence” has been produced to generate the voluntariness instruction. 19  A. General Standard for Admissibility of a Confession “Only voluntary confessions are admissible as evidence under Maryland law.” Hill v. State, 418 Md. 62, 74 (2011) (quoting Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517, 531 (2004)). “A confession is admissible only if it is freely and voluntarily made and the defendant making the confession knew and understood what he or she was saying.” Hill, 418 Md. at 74 (citation modified). “To be voluntary, a confession must satisfy federal and state constitutional strictures as well as the Maryland common law rule that a confession is involuntary if it is the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police.” Id. The voluntariness of a defendant’s statement is evaluated under Maryland’s “two- tiered approach” articulated in Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 604 (1995). The first step proceeds before the court and out of the presence of the jury, with the State bearing the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 151 (1979); see also State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 31, 38 (1977) (“The federal constitutional test with respect to the judge’s preliminary decision is that of a preponderance of the evidence[.]”). “Courts that are asked to determine at a suppression hearing whether a confession was made voluntarily must examine the totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and the confession.” Hill, 418 Md. at 75 (citing Knight, 381 Md. at 532). If the court determines that the statement has been voluntarily given, the issue may proceed to the second tier—where it is submitted at trial to the jury, which “has the final determination, irrespective of the court’s preliminary decision, whether or not the confession is voluntary, and whether it should be believed.” Hof, 337 20 Md. at 604 (quoting Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 144 (1976)). The jury may use the statement in determining guilt, but only if the State persuades the jury of the voluntariness