May. & City of Baltimore v. Abel

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Theresa Abel, et al., No. 26, September Term, 2025, Opinion by Booth, J. MARYLAND’S COMMON LAW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE Under Maryland common law, liability for private nuisance is established by considering not only the significance of the invasion of the plaintiff’s reasonable use and enjoyment of his or her land but also the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct or use of his or her property that causes the invasion. When considering the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct that causes the invasion, Maryland’s private nuisance common law requires that the defendant engage in wrongful conduct. A private nuisance claim may arise from more than one type of conduct. For example, it may arise from conduct that is negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous. Where a defendant’s conduct is not otherwise negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous, the conduct may be considered wrongful because it creates a continuous or recurring and unreasonable intrusion onto plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. Once it is established that a defendant’s wrongful conduct is creating a private nuisance by causing a significant and unreasonable interference with a plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of plaintiff’s land, the defendant is strictly liable for damages resulting therefrom. In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of Maryland determined that the plaintiffs failed to present legally sufficient evidence to generate a jury question on the issue of whether the invasion of their use and enjoyment of land was caused by wrongful conduct of the City of Baltimore. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No.: 24-C-22-005128 Argued: February 5, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 26 September Term, 2025 MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. THERESA ABEL, et al. Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Watts and Killough, J.J., dissent. Filed: July 29, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.29 '00'04- 10:49:01 Gregory Hilton, Clerk  This case arises out of a 2019 sewage backup that occurred in the home of Respondents Theresa and Christopher Abel (the “Abels”). The Abels sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”) in 2022, alleging claims for negligence and private nuisance. After the City unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, both claims proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the Abels’ case, and again at the close of the evidence, the City moved for judgment as a matter of law arguing, among other things, that the evidence did not meet the legal requirements for a finding of private nuisance. After the trial court denied the motions, the jury returned a verdict in the City’s favor on the negligence count. However, the jury found the City liable for creating a private nuisance associated with the 2019 backup and awarded the Abels damages. The City appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court judgment in an unreported opinion. This Court granted certiorari to determine the following questions, which we have rephrased: 1. Whether the Appellate Court erred when it held that, for purposes of establishing private nuisance liability, the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of land is determined solely by the significance of the interference with the plaintiffs’ right to use plaintiffs’ land. 2. Whether the Appellate Court erred when it held that, for purposes of establishing private nuisance liability, the requirement of continuousness or recurrence of the intrusion was met. 3. Whether the Appellate Court erred when it held that the evidence presented was sufficient to support private nuisance liability against the City for a single one-day sewer backup in the Abels’ basement in 2019. For the reasons set forth more fully herein, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.  I Procedural History In March 2024, the Abels presented the following evidence in connection with their negligence and private nuisance claims concerning the 2019 sewer backup in their basement.1 A. Testimony at Trial Ms. Abel testified that she and her husband had been renting their home at 2011 Griffis Avenue in Baltimore City since 2010. In the nine years they lived there, before the backup in 2019, Ms. Abel testified that she never had “any issues with sewage backups[.]” The Abels’ next-door neighbor also testified that she never had any sewer backups in her house. The Abels’ December 28 Backup Early in the day on December 28, 2019, Ms. Abel noticed “some water trickling out from underneath the base of the toilet” in the basement, a problem she had never had before. The water was light brown in color and smelled bad. The Abels put towels down to contain the water and called a plumber. The plumber came out but did not fix the issue, and the Abels left for the day, hoping the issue would resolve on its own. When they returned to their home at approximately 9:00 p.m., the water had spread further, the odor was like “the The Abels’ lawsuit against the City also included allegations of an additional 1 sewage backup that occurred in 2022. The jury found the City liable in negligence and nuisance for damages caused by that backup. According to the City, because of the finding of negligence, it did not challenge that award. The case before us involves only the 2019 backup, which was separate from and unrelated to the 2022 backup. 2 hippo house at the zoo,” and the basement bathtub “looked like it had mud in it” that was “maybe four, five inches” deep. Ms. Abel testified that, at some point after 9:00 p.m. on December 28, 2019, they called the City’s 311 “nonemergency service number” to report their backup and were told that the City’s responders “were busy” responding to other calls but that someone would be out to address the issue within 24 hours of the call. The City’s corporate designee confirmed that when 311 receives reports of sewage backups, those reports become service requests that are “put into a queue” so that the City’s cleaning truck crews can respond to those calls in order. When the Abels woke up the next morning on December 29, the sewage water had spread further out on the basement floor. At 10:00 a.m., the Abels again called the City’s 311 nonemergency service number. Ms. Abel further testified that, at some point after noon, they called the City’s 311 nonemergency service number a third time, but this time asked to speak with a supervisor. Their discussion led the City’s supervisor to escalate their case’s priority. The City’s crew arrived with a sewer cleaning truck by 2:30 p.m., roughly 17 hours after the Abels’ first call to the City’s 311 nonemergency service number. The water stopped backing up into the Abels’ basement roughly 15 minutes after the City’s truck arrived at their home. 3  At trial, it was undisputed that the backup was caused by a clog in the City’s main sewage line.2 The Abels’ expert witness in sewer system engineering, Anthony Paglia, testified that “there are no written standards as far as response time in the industry” regarding how quickly a sewer operator should respond to a call about a sewer backup. He was not permitted to testify as to any non-written standard regarding response times in the industry. The expert then tried to testify as to why the City took 17 hours to respond to the Abels’ backup; however, he was not permitted to answer because the court determined that his response would have assumed facts not in evidence. On cross-examination, the Abels’ expert admitted that the City had not adopted any industry standards in its policy on standard procedures. He also conceded that his knowledge of the incidents at issue came solely from the City’s service reports. After the Abels’ landlord paid for a remediation company to clean their basement, an offensive odor remained for “about a week,” according to Ms. Abel, or “at least a 2 A City Department of Public Works (“DPW”) employee explained the differences between the “lateral” sewage lines that service each house and the “main” sewage line, where all sewage flows in the middle of the street: [Defense Counsel:] Can you describe to the jury what a main line is? [DPW employee:] The main line is the main -- it’s the circle of pipe that’s in the middle of the street where all your sewage goes to from the laterals. [Defense Counsel:] And can you explain a lateral, please? [DPW employee:] The laterals is connected to the main line, which goes in the middle of the street. The laterals to go to each -- service of each house or building. 4 month,” according to Mr. Abel. Photographs from the 2019 backup and the damage it caused were admitted into evidence. After the 2019 backup, the Abels did not have any other issues with their sewer for more than two years. Ms. Abel testified that the fair market value of their home was $75,000 when they bought it in 2021, though they paid $45,000 for it. She also testified that in her neighborhood, the rental value of a one-bedroom basement unit similar to theirs was $600 per month. Upstream Backup on December 23 On December 23, 2019—five days before the backup into the Abels’ home—one of the Abels’ upstream neighbors experienced a sewer backup. The Abels’ expert witness testified that the City had cleared this blockage “and cleaned 300 feet of the sewers” on that date. He also testified that “[t]he standard in the industry is to clean the areas of the sewer that were affected by the blockage[,]” and that after that earlier blockage, “[t]he condition of the sewer was such that the blockage had been removed.” The Abels’ expert tried to testify that it was his opinion that the City had failed to properly clean the sewer, but the court sustained an objection and granted a motion to strike for lack of any factual basis for that opinion. He was then allowed to testify that, in his opinion, the City should have cleaned further upstream in the sewer than it did on December 23, 2019, and that the failure to do so allowed the rags, grease, and debris upstream in the sewer to form the blockage that caused the backup in the Abels’ basement five days later on December 28, 2019. 5  B. Motions for Judgment At the close of the Abels’ case, the City moved for judgment as a matter of law on both the negligence claim and the nuisance claim, arguing that the City had no notice of the backup, that the Abels’ expert’s testimony invited speculation, and that liability for private nuisance requires some sort of continuation. The circuit court denied the motions as to both claims, reasoning that the jury could find that the upstream backup that occurred five days prior to the Abels’ backup constituted constructive notice, and the jury could find, based on the expert testimony, that the City’s work performed five days prior could have caused the Abels’ backup. At the close of evidence, the City renewed its motions, and the court denied them again.3 C. The Verdict The jury found that the City was not liable for negligence but was liable for nuisance, awarding the Abels a judgment in the amount of $18,240.00 on the nuisance claim. The City noted a timely appeal. 3 Prior to jury deliberation, the court issued instructions to the jury, including, in relevant part: A nuisance is any unreasonable use of land that causes real, substantial, and unreasonable damage to or interference with another person’s ordinary use and enjoyment of his or her property. Generally, nuisance is all conduct that endangers life or health, offends the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use and enjoyment of property. The test is not [d]efendant’s negligence or whether the interference complies with applicable laws and regulations, but whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable. 6  Nuisance connotes a continuance of the complaining conduct, and a single act not likely to be repeated will not sustain a suit in nuisance. It must materially diminish the property’s value, seriously interfere with ordinary comfort and enjoyment. A suit in nuisance involves balancing the correlative rights of the parties. The utility of a defendant’s conduct and his or her rights are weighed against the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to his or her rights. The factors to be considered in this weighing are (a) the extent and character of the harm; (b) social value of the parties’ respective uses; (c) suitability of each use vis-à-vis the locality; (d) ability of the parties to avoid the harm. Proof of damage, loss, or inconvenience alone does not establish a nuisance, as there must also be evidence of a wrongful act. Nuisance includes all tangible intrusions on another’s property, including noise, odor, and lights, and is not contingent on physical impingement on the other’s property but on the substantial and unreasonable interference with the other’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. [L]awful possession of land without ownership is sufficient to bring action even if the possession is a prescriptive right acquired by adverse possession. Unreasonable use of land. Use of land is unreasonable if [] it is for the purpose of interfering with another person’s use and enjoyment, or it is prohibited by law or violates regulations that were adopted to control the use of property, or it is not suitable for the nature of the area and the use being made of other property in the area, or it causes interference with another person’s use and enjoyment and the interference could have been reduced or eliminated without too much hardship or too much expense. In determining whether the use of land was unreasonable, you should consider whether it was the kind of use an ordinary person would expect might interfere with the use and enjoyment of another person’s property or cause real and substantial injury to another person’s health or comfort. You should also consider the right of both parties to make a reasonable use and enjoyment of their property. The Plaintiff’s right to be free from interference with his or her use and enjoyment should be balanced against the Defendant’s right to use his or her property, and the Plaintiff must expect to endure some inconvenience or discomfort that results from the Defendant’s reasonable use of his or her property. 7  D. Appellate Proceedings On appeal, the City argued that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to establish private nuisance liability since there was no evidence that an unreasonable use of land or wrongful act by the City caused the backup, and there was no evidence that the backup was a continuous or recurring infringement on the Abels’ use of their property. Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Abel, No. 372, 2025 WL 829733, at *1, *2 (Md. App. Ct. Mar. 17, 2025). The Appellate Court disagreed with the City and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Id. at *1. After agreeing with the City that “liability [could not] be based on the mere use of land for a sewer system[,]” the Appellate Court characterized the question before it as “whether the condition created was either continuous or a recurring infringement on the Abels’ enjoyment of their property.” Id. at *3. The court stated that a finding of nuisance “does not turn on a showing of a failure to act reasonably or reckless, intentional, or abnormally dangerous conduct.” Id. Rather, the court determined, “[w]hether an interference is unreasonable is determined by the injury caused by the condition and not by the conduct of the party creating the condition.” Id. Applying these principles, the court determined that there was “evidence from which the jury could infer that the act of clearing In determining what reasonable amount of interference, inconvenience, or discomfort the Plaintiffs should be expected to tolerate, you should consider the right of the Defendant to use his or her property or to conduct his or her affairs in a reasonable manner, the extent of interference that would result from the Defendant’s reasonable use of his or her property or conduct of his or her affairs, the circumstances under which the interference occurred, the nature of the area in which the real property is located, and the uses being made of other property in the area. 8 [the sewer line] was not done properly[,]” which the jury “could find . . . caused or contributed to the backup in question, thus satisfying the causation requirement[.]” Id. at *4. In response to the City’s assertion that a private nuisance cannot be established by a singular occurrence that does not involve wrongful conduct, the Appellate Court rejected the City’s characterization of the act as constituting a single occurrence. Id. at *5. Instead, the court stated that, based upon its review of the evidence, “the backup was both ongoing,” and “interfered with the Abels’ reasonable use and enjoyment of their home,” and therefore, “a jury could reasonably find that the interference was continuous or repetitive, substantial, and offensive or inconvenient to the normal person.” Id. (citation modified). On this basis, the Appellate Court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to create a question for the jury, and that the circuit court therefore properly denied the City’s motion for judgment. Id. II Parties’ Contentions The City asserts that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for judgment because the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to establish a private nuisance. Specifically, the City contends that (1) there was no evidence that an unreasonable use of land or wrongful act by the City caused the backup, and (2) there was no evidence that the backup was a continuous or recurring infringement on the Abels’ use of their property. The City argues that, under Maryland common law, the tort of private nuisance requires not only that the plaintiffs suffer an unreasonable interference with their right to utilize their land, but also that the defendant’s use of his or her land involve wrongful conduct—conduct that is either intentional and unreasonable or otherwise legally 9 actionable because it is negligent, reckless, or involves abnormally dangerous conditions or activities. The City points out that the jury found that the City was not negligent for the 2019 backup, and there was no allegation that the City was reckless or that its operation of its sewer system involved an abnormally dangerous activity. Finally, the City asserts that there is no evidence that the intrusion was recurring or continuous. The City contends that where the defendant’s conduct is not wrongful, our case law requires that the defendant’s conduct be unreasonable. As for the reasonableness of the defendant’s use, the City asserts that all of our case law involving private nuisance involves continuous or recurring intrusions onto the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of plaintiff’s property. The City argues that in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the City’s motion, the Appellate Court applied an incorrect legal standard for determining whether a defendant is liable for private nuisance when it stated that private nuisance liability is determined by “the injury caused by the condition and not by the conduct of the party creating the condition.” Abel, 2025 WL 82733, at *3. According to the City, Maryland case law requires either wrongful conduct by the defendant in order for the defendant to be liable for private nuisance, or an unreasonable use of land which arises when the defendant’s conduct creates a continuous or recurring intrusion onto the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property.4 4 In its brief, the City argues that our case law aligns with § 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979). The City recognizes that this Court has not adopted § 822 and that in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. CAE-Link Corporation, 330 Md. 115 (1993), we declined to adopt it when the defendant in that case requested that we do so. In the context of this case, we determine that we do not need to decide whether our case law 10  For their part, the Abels assert that they presented evidence to establish the City’s liability for private nuisance. The Abels point out that under Taylor v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133 (1917), the City’s operation and maintenance of the sewage system may constitute a private nuisance. The Abels argue that strict liability is the standard for private nuisance under Maryland law and direct us to this Court’s opinion in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. CAE-Link Corporation, 330 Md. 115, 141 (1993). The Abels also contend that the City misapplies the cases upon which it relies. According to the Abels, the question of whether the City’s conduct was “continuous or recurring” was also appropriately submitted to the jury. The Abels argue that the jury could have considered not only the 2019 backup but also the backup that occurred two years later to find the requisite “recurrence” or “continuance” necessary to maintain an action for private nuisance. The Abels also contend that in Exxon Mobile Corporation v. Albright, 433 Md. 303 (2013), this Court upheld a finding of a private nuisance involving a single act of misconduct. In any event, the Abels argue, the Appellate Court appropriately held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the backup was continuous or repetitive. III Standard of Review We conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for judgment. Webb v. Giant of Md., LLC, 477 Md. 121, 137 (2021). In effectuating that review, aligns with § 822 of the Restatement. We therefore do not consider the City’s argument on this issue. 11 we conduct the same analysis as the trial court; that is, we look “at the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and evaluate[] whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to generate a jury question as to the cause of action at issue.” Id. If we determine “that the evidence permits only an inference in favor of the moving party regarding the issue presented, then that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Here, the parties dispute the legal elements for establishing private nuisance under our case law. Our analysis of the requisite elements of the tort of private nuisance is a question of law that we examine without deference. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 569 (2020). IV Discussion We recently discussed the differences under Maryland common law between a public nuisance, which is a public action, and a private nuisance, which is a tort. Express Scripts, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 493 Md. 329, 366 (2026). In that case, in connection with a certified question related to whether a local government could bring a tort action for public nuisance against certain companies for the licensed dispensing of and administration of benefits plans for opioid drugs, we were asked to determine whether Maryland recognized a common law tort of public nuisance based upon the definition contained in § 821B of the Second Restatement of Torts. Id. at 334. In answering the certified question, we discussed, among other things, the English common law of nuisance, Maryland’s common law of public and private nuisance and the differences between the two actions, and the Second Restatement’s expansion of the common law public nuisance doctrine from a public action to a tort. Id. at 360–83, 393–97. After engaging in that discussion, we 12 reached the following conclusions, among others. Id. at 393–97. Although on occasion our cases discuss public and private nuisance together, they are distinct actions, and we have consistently followed the common law principles that define each action. Id. at 393–94. A public nuisance is “an injury to the public at large or to all persons who come into contact with it, whereas a private nuisance is an injury to an individual or a limited number of individuals only.” Id. at 370 (quoting Adams v. Comm’rs of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 170 (1954)) (citation modified).5 Public nuisance was historically punishable as a crime, id. at 361–62, 394, and Maryland has not expanded the public nuisance doctrine beyond the traditional historical principles embodied in the common law—namely, that a public nuisance action was not regarded as a tort but was instead a public action by a government entity to pursue criminal prosecutions or seek injunctive relief to abate harmful conduct, id. at 334, 395–97, 413. “By contrast, private nuisance is a tort involving a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.” Id. at 394 (citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 80 (1994)). “A plaintiff in a private nuisance action may be entitled to injunctive relief or damages if the plaintiff establishes that he or she has suffered an injury that is different in kind from that suffered by members of the public.” 5 “Nuisances are also classified as ‘nuisances per se’ and ‘nuisances in fact.’” Express Scripts, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 493 Md. 329, 370 (2026) (quoting Adams v. Comm’rs of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 170 (1954)). A nuisance per se “is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances regardless of location or surroundings.” Adams, 204 Md. at 170. A nuisance in fact is an act, occupation, or structure that becomes a nuisance only “by reason of the circumstances, location, or surroundings.” Id. The Abels do not contend that the City’s operation of a sewer system is a nuisance per se. 13 Id. (citing Cook v. Normac Corp., 176 Md. 394, 397 (1939); Garitee v. City of Balt., 53 Md. 422, 436–37 (1880); Houck v. Wachter, 34 Md. 265, 269 (1871)). In answering the certified question related to the public nuisance doctrine, we explained that we did “not need to discuss the specific elements necessary to establish a private nuisance.” Id. at 376. For purposes of that case, we determined that it was “sufficient to note that a finding of [private] nuisance requires evidence of an unreasonable and substantial interference with a plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property.” Id. (citing Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 377 (1975); Hamilton Corp. v. Julian, 130 Md. 597, 599 (1917)). We further explained that “[t]he alleged injury to the use and enjoyment of property must be of such a nature as to diminish materially the value of the property and to seriously interfere with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment of it.” Id. (citing Carr’s Beach Amusement Co. v. Annapolis Rds. Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 222 Md. 392 (1960); Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641 (1938); Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123 (1873)). In this case, the parties ask us to determine whether the tort of private nuisance is established under Maryland law by proving that any conduct on the defendant’s land causes an unreasonable and substantial interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property, or whether the interference must arise from wrongful conduct. A. Maryland’s Common Law of Private Nuisance Maryland’s private nuisance law encompasses a wide swath of conduct for which we have determined that a defendant is liable when such conduct causes a significant, unreasonable invasion of a plaintiff’s reasonable use and enjoyment of land. The invasions 14 include increased surface water flow, offensive odors, noise, vibrations, and conditions that cause sickness and nausea. As we discuss below, some cases involve negligent conduct by the defendant that causes an intrusion onto the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. Other cases involve non-negligent conduct that causes a continuous or recurring invasion of the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. 1. Cases Involving Otherwise Tortious Conduct Our private nuisance jurisprudence includes a handful of cases in which the harm to the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her property was caused by the defendant’s negligent conduct. In other words, the defendant was liable for causing a substantial intrusion onto the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property because the defendant breached an existing legal duty. In Short v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, 50 Md. 73 (1878), this Court described these principles in a private nuisance case in which a railway company cleared its tracks after a heavy snow. Instead of placing the snow in the street, the railroad company dumped the snow into the gutter, thereby obstructing the natural flow of water from the street and causing an adjacent property owner’s home to flood after the snowfall turned to heavy rains. Id. at 80. This Court affirmed the damages award in favor of the property owner. Id. at 84. We explained that, although the railroad company had the right to remove the snow from its tracks in connection with its business operation and to place the snow in the street, it had no right to throw the snow in the gutter and cause the obstruction of the natural flow of water from the street, which would have been an act of negligence. Id. at 83–84. This Court explained that the railroad company was “obliged to 15 exercise ordinary care and prudence, not only in removing the snow from its track, but also in throwing it on the street.” Id. at 84 (citation modified). The Court concluded that whether such ordinary care was undertaken was a question for the jury. Id. In Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Albright, 433 Md. 303 (2013), this Court examined the plaintiffs’ various tort claims, including a claim for private nuisance, arising from a series of negligent acts involving an underground gasoline tank that caused significant water contamination to nearby property owners’ wells. We summarized the defendant’s various negligent acts that led to the contamination. Id. at 317–21. First, Exxon failed to follow safety measures during construction. Id. at 318. After the station was in operation, during maintenance work, an Exxon contractor negligently drilled a hole into a gas line. Id. at 319. After a leak detection system set off an alarm, the contractors who were sent to investigate incorrectly concluded that no leak existed, and incorrectly recalibrated the leak detection system such that the alarm system could no longer detect the actual leak when the fuel system was reactivated. Id. at 319–20. As a result of this confluence of events, the leak continued, uninterrupted, without activating the alarm system. Id. at 320. One month later, the leak was discovered after an employee noticed inventory discrepancies. Id. By then, over 26,000 gallons of gasoline had been released into the underground environment and entered potable wells located on nearby properties. Id. We affirmed the 16 jury’s award of damages to certain plaintiffs for their loss of use and enjoyment of their properties arising from the contamination of their well water. Id. at 415–17.6 2. Cases Involving Continuous or Recurring Intrusions Many of our private nuisance cases involve a defendant’s legitimate business activity where the defendant is engaging in conduct that is causing a continuous or recurring intrusion upon an adjoining or nearby property that causes an injury shown to be of such a character as to diminish materially the value of the property, seriously interfering with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment of it. In such cases, we have held that “where a trade or business as carried on interferes with the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment by another of his [or her] property a wrong is done to a neighboring owner for which an action lies[.]” Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 645 (1938). Moreover, “it makes no difference that the business [is] lawful and one useful to the public and conducted in the most approved method.” Id.; see also Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis, 213 Md. 465, 474 (1957); Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 276 (1890). “Virtually any disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance so long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable and such would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person.” Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. CAE-Link 6 We disagree with the Abels that Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Albright, 433 Md. 303 (2013) supports a finding of private nuisance here. As noted above, in Albright, there were several negligent acts on the defendant’s land that led to the plaintiffs’ well contamination. Id. at 317–21. Here, the jury found in favor of the City on the negligence claims related to the 2019 backup. 17 Corp., 330 Md. 115, 125 (1993) (citing Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 159 (1956) (quoting William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts 406–07 (2d. ed. 1955))). The cases in which we have affirmed a finding of private nuisance based upon non- negligent conduct involve continuous or recurring conduct. See, e.g., Corbi v. Hendrickson, 268 Md. 459, 468–69 (1973) (affirming injunction of certain conduct related to a nightclub operation causing excessive noise to nearby residential properties); Bishop Processing Co., 213 Md. at 476 (affirming a judicial decree requiring an animal processing plant to implement additional measures to reduce nauseating odors affecting many nearby properties); Fox v. Ewers, 195 Md. 650, 662 (1950) (affirming injunctive relief in connection with defendant’s parking and storing trucks containing asphalt, which created a nauseating odor and were started at early morning hours thereby creating loud noises); Meadowbrook Swimming Club, 173 Md. at 644 (affirming injunction where certain conduct related to an amusement venue’s outdoor dancing and bands was causing excessively loud noise); Washington Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Albrecht, 157 Md. 389, 401 (1929) (affirming an injunction requiring a fabric cleaning and dyeing factory to alter its business practices to prevent the intrusion of smoke and gasoline vapors onto surrounding properties); Susquehanna Fertilizer Co., 73 Md. at 282–83 (affirming a damages award in favor of the owner of five dwelling houses against owner of a fertilizer factory whose business created daily noxious fumes that discolored clothing hung out to dry, grimed up windows, and corroded tin on houses); Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1, 13 (1881) (remanding the case for the issuance of an injunction where a slaughterhouse was continuously emptying blood and animal waste into a stream that created an unbearable 18 stench, making a downstream mill operator’s employees sick); Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516, 520 (1879) (affirming injunctive relief in connection with a factory operation’s vibrations that caused walls to shake on adjoining property). A survey of our case law reveals that, in cases in which this Court has upheld a determination of private nuisance that did not otherwise involve negligent conduct, they all involved a continuous or recurrent invasion. None of the cases involved a single invasion. Our observation here is consistent with the same observation that we made in Wynkoop v. City of Hagerstown, 159 Md. 194, 202 (1930): “A nuisance necessarily involves the idea of continuance[.]” a. Cases Involving Intrusion of Surface Waters Another category of private nuisance is “surface water” cases—cases involving claims for damages or injunctive relief arising from an increase in surface flow of water on a plaintiff’s property because of activities undertaken on a defendant’s property. These cases arise from a rule of civil law that governs the flow of surface water, which this Court first applied in Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company v. Davis, 68 Md. 281 (1888). Under Maryland’s surface water rule, the owners of land are entitled to have surface waters flow naturally over the land of the lower landowner, and the lower landowner cannot obstruct the running of water from the higher land onto his own. Id. at 289; see also Hancock v. Stull, 206 Md. 117, 119 (1955); Biberman v. Funkhouser, 190 Md. 424, 428–29 (1948); Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 657 (1943). However, although the upper owner has the right to have surface waters flow naturally over the land of the lower owner, the upper owner cannot artificially increase or concentrate the natural 19 flow. Battisto v. Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 546 (1956).