Full Opinion

Sugarloaf Alliance, Inc. v. Frederick County, Maryland, No. 32, September Term, 2025 MARYLAND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT – ATTORNEYS’ FEES – DETERMINATION OF AWARD – REMAND – Where trial court determined amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded to substantially prevailing complainant under Md. Code Ann., Gen. Provisions (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.) § 4-362(f), but it was not clear that trial court applied Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3), governing lodestar approach to calculation of attorneys’ fees, and court appeared to rely on improper factors in reducing amount of award, Supreme Court of Maryland reversed Appellate Court of Maryland’s judgment affirming award and remanded case to that Court with instructions to vacate trial court’s award and to remand case to trial court for it to reconsider petition for attorneys’ fees. Circuit Court for Frederick County Case No. C-10-CV-22-000369 Argued: March 10, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 32 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ SUGARLOAF ALLIANCE, INC. v. FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J. Watts Booth Biran Gould Eaves Killough, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. Gould, Eaves, and Killough, JJ., dissent. ______________________________________ Filed: July 14, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.07.14 10:39:05 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk This case involves an issue as to an award of attorneys’ fees under the Maryland Public Information Act (“MPIA”), Md. Code Ann., Gen. Provisions (2014, 2019 Repl. Vol.) (“GP”) §§ 4-101 to 4-601. “The MPIA governs access to public records”1 and “reflects the legislative intent that citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide- ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their government.” Trs. of Walters Art Gallery, Inc. v. Walters Workers United, 492 Md. 92, 119, 340 A.3d 786, 802 (2025) (citation modified). The MPIA provides that “[a]ll persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees” and “unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result,” the MPIA “shall be construed in favor of allowing inspection of a public record,” with the least cost and delay to the person that requests the inspection. GP § 4-103(a), (b). A custodian of records, however, shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record under circumstances specified in the statute, such as where, by law, the public record is privileged or confidential. See GP § 4-301(a). Typically, a person who wants to inspect a public record submits a written application to the custodian. See GP § 4-202(a). Under GP § 4-203(a)(1), “the custodian shall grant or deny the application promptly, but not more than 30 days after receiving the application.” Pursuant to GP § 4-203(b)(1), “[a] custodian who approves the application shall produce the public record immediately or within a reasonable period that is needed to 1 Under GP § 4-101(k)(1)(i), a “public record” is defined as the original or any copy of any documentary material that “is made by a unit or an instrumentality of the State or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business[.]” retrieve the public record, but not more than 30 days after receipt of the application.” Under GP § 4-203(b)(3), “[f]ailure to produce the public record in accordance with this subsection constitutes a denial of an application that may not be considered the result of a bona fide dispute unless the custodian has complied with paragraph (2) of this subsection and is working with the applicant in good faith.”2 Where “a person or governmental unit is denied inspection of a public record or is not provided with a copy, printout, or photograph of a public record as requested, the person or governmental unit may file a complaint with the circuit court.” GP § 4-362(a)(1). Under that circumstance, the defendant has the burden of sustaining a decision to deny inspection of a public record or to deny providing a copy, printout, or photograph of a public record. See GP § 4-362(b)(2). Where needed, the circuit court is permitted to examine the public record at issue in camera “to determine whether any part of the public record may be withheld” under the MPIA. GP § 4-362(c)(2). Under the MPIA, a defendant governmental unit may be liable to a complainant for 2 GP § 4-203(b)(2) provides: If the custodian reasonably believes that it will take more than 10 working days to produce the public record, the custodian shall indicate in writing or by electronic mail within 10 working days after receipt of the request: (i) the amount of time that the custodian anticipates it will take to produce the public record; (ii) an estimate of the range of fees that may be charged to comply with the request for public records; and (iii) the reason for the delay. -2- statutory damages and actual damages as follows: (1) A defendant governmental unit is liable to the complainant for statutory damages and actual damages that the court considers appropriate if the court finds that any defendant knowingly and willfully failed to: (i) disclose or fully to disclose a public record that the complainant was entitled to inspect under this title; or (ii) provide a copy, printout, or photograph of a public record that the complainant requested under § 4-205 of this title. (2) An official custodian is liable for actual damages that the court considers appropriate if the court finds that, after temporarily denying inspection of a public record, the official custodian failed to petition a court for an order to continue the denial. (3) Statutory damages imposed by the court under paragraph (1) of this subsection may not exceed $1,000. GP § 4-362(d). Pursuant to GP § 4-362(f), if the circuit court “determines that the complainant has substantially prevailed, the court may assess against a defendant governmental unit reasonable counsel fees and other litigation costs that the complainant reasonably incurred.” Where fee-shifting statutes such as the MPIA are involved, determining the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fee award is generally done by using the lodestar approach, under which factors listed in Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3) are to be considered. See Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamilton, 416 Md. 325, 334, 7 A.3d 1, 6 (2010). Generally, the lodestar approach involves multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate, with adjustments made based on factors set forth in Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3). See id. at 333-34, 7 A.3d at 6. Sugarloaf Alliance, Inc. (“Sugarloaf”), Petitioner, is a non-profit organization -3- “dedicated to preserving, protecting, and restoring the unique natural and historical aspects of the Sugarloaf Mountain area and its environment[.]” In October 2021, Sugarloaf filed two MPIA requests with Frederick County, Maryland (“the County”), Respondent. After acknowledging receipt of Sugarloaf’s requests, the County took no apparent action and produced no documents for Sugarloaf. Eight months later, in June 2022, Sugarloaf filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, alleging that the County violated the MPIA by failing to timely produce the requested records. Almost two months later, the County filed an answer to the complaint and sent 20 documents to Sugarloaf in response to the MPIA requests, but withheld 136 other items, claiming they were exempt from disclosure under various privileges. Following a bench trial, in June 2023, the circuit court issued an oral ruling, directing the County to submit 13 of the withheld documents for in camera review and to provide Sugarloaf with the remaining documents. The County complied with the order. In August 2023, Sugarloaf filed a petition for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, seeking a total of $48,813.62. At a hearing on the petition, before addressing the request for attorneys’ fees, as to the withheld documents it reviewed in camera, which ended up being 15 documents, the circuit court ruled that 14 of the documents were properly withheld and that it would not order disclosure of the documents. After receiving evidence and hearing argument from the parties about Sugarloaf’s petition for attorneys’ fees, the circuit court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, Sugarloaf filed a supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees, seeking an additional $6,648. At the end of September 2023, the circuit court issued a written opinion and order, awarding Sugarloaf attorneys’ fees in -4- the amount of $25,000. In a separate order issued the same day, the circuit court denied Sugarloaf’s supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees, with a notation that the request should have been presented at the hearing on the original petition. Sugarloaf noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, and the County noted a cross-appeal. On May 1, 2025, in a reported opinion, the Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment awarding Sugarloaf $25,000 in attorneys’ fees, but vacated the order denying Sugarloaf’s supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees and remanded the case for further proceedings on the supplemental petition. See Sugarloaf All., Inc. v. Frederick County, 265 Md. App. 199, 204, 244, 246-47, 334 A.3d 1150, 1153, 1177, 1178 (2025). The Appellate Court concluded that the circuit court had not arbitrarily exercised its discretion or clearly erred in adjusting downward the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded, and affirmed the $25,000 in attorneys’ fees awarded to Sugarloaf in response to its initial petition. See id. at 244, 334 A.3d at 1177.3 Sugarloaf filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. See Sugarloaf All., Inc. v. Frederick County, 492 Md. 410, 344 A.3d 675 (2025). In this Court, Sugarloaf contends that the circuit court correctly applied the lodestar approach to the initial calculation of fees but abused its discretion by cutting the award of attorneys’ fees almost in half for reasons that, according to Sugarloaf, are inconsistent with the purpose of the MPIA. Sugarloaf argues that in determining the $25,000 award, the 3 The Appellate Court held, however, that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the supplemental petition based solely on Sugarloaf’s failure to raise it at the hearing on the original petition. See Sugarloaf All., Inc., 265 Md. App. at 247, 334 A.3d at 1178. -5- circuit court considered factors beyond those that are set forth in Maryland Rule 2- 703(f)(3), and that the circuit court’s use of the factors was “without reference to any guiding rules or principles” and constituted an abuse of discretion. (Citation modified). Sugarloaf requests that the $25,000 award of attorneys’ fees be vacated and that the case be remanded to the circuit court “for a proper analysis of the attorneys’ fee award consistent with the requirements of the MPIA[.]” The County responds that the circuit court determined a reasonable award of $25,000 in attorneys’ fees and requests that we affirm the award.4 Upon review of the circuit court’s opinion and order in which it awarded $25,000 in attorneys’ fees to Sugarloaf, we conclude that in determining the amount of the attorneys’ fee award, the circuit court considered circumstances not included in the factors set forth in Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3) and that at least two of the factors discussed by the court were not relevant or appropriate for consideration under the lodestar approach— namely, that it would not ascribe an evil motive to County officials and that the citizens of the County would bear the burden of the attorneys’ fees award. In its opinion, after finding that Sugarloaf’s attorneys’ fees, totaling $48,813.62, were “customary and reasonable[,]” and discussing the two objectionable factors, without further explanation, the circuit court announced an award of $25,000. We are unable to 4 The County raises no issue with respect to the Appellate Court vacating the circuit court’s denial of the supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees and remanding the matter for reconsideration and has not filed a cross-petition concerning the matter. As such, the Appellate Court’s remand of the case to the circuit court for consideration of the supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees is not in dispute. -6- conclude that the circuit court followed established principles or the Maryland Rules in determining the award, given that, after observing that the number of hours expended and hourly fees charged by Sugarloaf were reasonable, the circuit court forsook application of Maryland Rule 2-703(f)(3) and considered circumstances that were not appropriate for determination of an attorneys’ fee award. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court did not follow the established standard for determining an attorneys’ fee award and abused its discretion in determining the amount of the award. We reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the award of $25,000 in attorneys’ fees and remand the case to that Court with instructions to vacate the circuit court’s award and to remand the case to the circuit court for it to reconsider the petition for attorneys’ fees.5 BACKGROUND Sugarloaf’s MPIA Requests In February 2020, the Frederick County Planning Commission (“the Planning Commission”) conducted a Sugarloaf Community Meeting and Open House. During the meeting, Commissioners advised that the Planning Commission was starting work on a draft of a Sugarloaf Treasured Landscape Management Plan (“the Plan”). According to Sugarloaf, in March 2021, without explanation, the Frederick County Division of Planning and Permitting (“the Division”) proposed significant changes to a draft of the Plan, which, among other changes, involved zoning reconfigurations. In July and September 2021, 5 Nothing in our holding alters the Appellate Court’s judgment vacating the circuit court’s denial of Sugarloaf’s supplemental petition for attorneys’ fees and remanding for the circuit court to reconsider the supplemental petition. -7- members of the community voiced concerns about the Plan at Planning Commission meetings. Sugarloaf had begun to suspect that the County had been secretly communicating with Amazon Web Services about rezoning a large portion of the Sugarloaf region to construct industrial data centers. On October 19, 2021, George Winkler, who was Sugarloaf’s president at the time, submitted on Sugarloaf’s behalf two MPIA applications to Assistant County Attorney Andrew J. Ford, the County’s MPIA Coordinator. In the first request, Sugarloaf asked for “[c]opies of any emails, sent or received by [the County’s Director of the Division], residing on any email servers owned, managed, used, or controlled by [the] County, which contained the word ‘Sugarloaf’” for the period of February 1 to April 30, 2021. In the request, Sugarloaf stated that the County’s Director of the Division is in charge of the office “responsible for textual changes made to the draft Sugarloaf Treasured Landscape Management Plan in or around early March 2021” and asserted that the “origin, impetus, author(s), and purpose of” the changes to the draft plan “are of great public interest and import.” In the second request, Sugarloaf asked for the following for the period of February 1 to April 30, 2021: Copies of any emails, sent or received by Frederick County personnel, residing on any email servers owned, managed, used, or controlled by Frederick County, containing any of the following search phrases: “enhanced mitigation of negative environmental impacts” “high-quality design elements” “sectors of biological sciences and technology services” -8- “existing biological and information technology hub” or “critical digital infrastructure[.]” (Bolding omitted). In the second request, Sugarloaf asserted that the search terms “are all present in or related to specific textual changes made to the draft Sugarloaf Treasured Landscape Management Plan in or around early March 2021” and again stated that the changes to the draft plan were of public interest and import. On the same day that the requests were submitted, Mr. Winkler received two automated and two non-automated emails from Mr. Ford, each relating to a different one of the MPIA requests, which confirmed that Sugarloaf’s MPIA requests had been received. The County failed to produce the requested records within 30 days of receiving Sugarloaf’s MPIA applications, even though GP § 4-203(a)(1) provides that the custodian of records “shall grant or deny the application promptly, but not more than 30 days after receiving the application.” Complaint and Answer On June 24, 2022, Sugarloaf filed a complaint against the County and Mr. Ford alleging that the public records it sought under the MPIA had been wrongfully withheld. Sugarloaf alleged that, although it had made the two MPIA requests on October 19, 2021, and the County had assigned the requests tracking numbers, “[t]o date, no records ha[d] been provided to” Sugarloaf, “either to its then-President Winkler, or to his successor, current President Mr. Stephen Black, in disregard of” the County’s and Mr. Ford’s “legal obligations pursuant to the MPIA.” Sugarloaf brought two counts against both the County -9- and Mr. Ford for violation of the MPIA, one for each records request. In each count, Sugarloaf alleged that the County and Mr. Ford received the MPIA applications on October 19, 2021, and were “required, by law, to produce the records not later than November 18, 2021[,]” i.e., within 30 days, and that the County and Mr. Ford violated the MPIA in failing “to respond as required and fail[ing] to permit inspection of responsive public records.” Sugarloaf alleged that the County and Mr. Ford had “failed to assert any privilege, confidentiality provision, or MPIA disclosure exception in support of [its] denial, because no such exception exists” and that the County and Mr. Ford had “failed to petition the Court for an order to continue the denial as required by [GP] § 4-362(d)(2).” Sugarloaf alleged that the County and Mr. Ford had failed to comply with the MPIA and were liable to Sugarloaf “for statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and other costs of litigation.” Sugarloaf requested injunctive relief, “including an order to produce the requested public records.”6 On August 12, 2022, the County filed an answer, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses. Motions for Summary Judgment On August 12, 2022, the same day the County’s answer was filed, Sugarloaf filed a motion for summary judgment. Four days later, on August 16, 2022, counsel for the 6 Sugarloaf named Mr. Ford as a defendant as to both counts and alleged that Mr. Ford, “acting for [the] County and himself, knowingly, willfully, and wrongfully denied inspection of a public record to” Sugarloaf. The circuit court ultimately dismissed Mr. Ford as a defendant in the case, finding that Mr. Ford’s actions were “regrettable” and “disappointing,” but that they did not rise to the level of being knowing and willful so as to warrant damages under GP § 4-362(d). Sugarloaf did not challenge the circuit court’s judgment on that point before the Appellate Court and Mr. Ford was not a party to the appeal in that Court. - 10 - County sent to Sugarloaf’s counsel 20 documents in response to the MPIA requests, along with “Vaughn indices” identifying the 20 documents that were provided and an additional 136 documents that were withheld, which the County claimed were exempt from disclosure under various privileges and exemptions under the MPIA.7 On September 12, 2022, the County filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In a memorandum of law in support of the cross-motion and in opposition to Sugarloaf’s motion for summary judgment, the County contended that Sugarloaf had “been provided a response to its [M]PIA requests and any delay in responding was unintentional.” The County asserted that its response to the MPIA requests “was provided free-of-charge” and “was inadvertently delayed due to administrative oversight.” The County maintained that, because Sugarloaf had been provided with the requested documents, the matter was moot. On November 2, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment. At the hearing, Sugarloaf contended that the County’s nondisclosure of the requested records constituted “discretionary denials[,]” and that the County was required to make a particularized showing that the denials were in the public’s best interest, rather than just withhold documents “on the basis of [] blanket privilege.” 7 A “Vaughn index” is “a list of documents in the government’s possession, setting forth the date, author, general subject matter, and claim of privilege for each document claimed to be exempt from disclosure[,]” and it derives its name from Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Glass v. Anne Arundel County, 453 Md. 201, 213 n.11, 160 A.3d 658, 665 n.11 (2017) (citation modified). In Lamson v. Montgomery County, 460 Md. 349, 367, 190 A.3d 316, 327 (2018), we stated that a Vaughn index “has also been described as a system of itemizing and indexing that correlates each of the government’s justifications for its refusal to disclose the documents with the actual portions of the documents at issue.” (Citation modified). - 11 - The County contended that, although its response to the MPIA requests was “unintentionally untimely,” it was otherwise “complete and adequate.” The County asserted that, because it had responded to the MPIA requests and provided Vaughn indices, if Sugarloaf disagreed with the reasons as to why documents were withheld, Sugarloaf was required to advise the County of “the specific records, the specific reasons and disagreements.” According to the County, if an impasse was reached, Sugarloaf could ask the circuit court for an in camera review. After hearing argument on the motions, the circuit court proposed ordering Sugarloaf to file exceptions to the Vaughn indices and for the County to respond. Sugarloaf opposed the proposal, contending that, under the MPIA, the County had “one chance” to respond and justify withholding documents and that the County should not be given another opportunity “to think of another reason” for not disclosing documents. After taking a recess, the circuit court denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment. On January 26, 2023, the County filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and an accompanying memorandum in support, repeating in large part the arguments it made in its earlier cross-motion for summary judgment. On February 24, 2023, the circuit court denied the motion. Bench Trial On April 11, 2023, the circuit court conducted a bench trial, with the parties agreeing that the County would present its case first. The County called Mr. Ford as its sole witness. Mr. Ford testified that, after receiving Sugarloaf’s MPIA requests on October 19, 2021, he spoke with his boss, the County Attorney, about the requests, and the County Attorney - 12 - advised Mr. Ford that, on the same day, an entity named Stronghold8 “had reached out to the County Executive to set a meeting to talk about the Sugarloaf plan.” Mr. Ford testified that both he and the County Attorney thought that the two matters “were related” and he “operated on that assumption from the beginning[.]” Mr. Ford testified that the County Attorney later reported that the meeting between Stronghold and the County Executive, which occurred the following week, “had gone well, that [Stronghold] had had all [its] questions answered, and that [it] would be in touch if [it] needed anything else.” According to Mr. Ford, the outcome of the meeting did not change anything for him, and he continued to work with the County’s Interagency Information Services Division to respond to Sugarloaf’s MPIA requests. Mr. Ford testified that he learned that approximately 1,500 errors had been “generated because of the nature of the search” for responsive records, all of which “would have to be resolved one by one.”9 Mr. Ford testified as to what happened next: [A]t that point, I was becoming a little frustrated and disheartened that I was not going to be able to provide a response of how many records we had because I just didn’t know the answer. And again, it was at that point that I felt like I didn’t want to upset the apple cart. A meeting had gone well, they got, in my mind, the answers had all been given, and they’d be back in touch if they needed anything else. So that’s where I made the mistake of simply not documenting anything back to Mr. Winkler [of Sugarloaf]. 8 In its pretrial statement, the County stated that “Stronghold Sugarloaf Mountain is a non-profit corporation which owns and operates the mountain property for the public’s enjoyment and education in an appreciation of natural beauty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). 9 In response to questions from the circuit court, Mr. Ford testified that he would have learned of the errors sometime in late October 2021, “within th[e] first 10 days after the request came in.” - 13 - Mr. Ford testified that he and Sugarloaf did not have any further communication until Sugarloaf filed the lawsuit.10 Mr. Ford testified that, after the lawsuit was served, the County began assembling documents in response to the MPIA requests, but that he did not participate in assembling documents the County believed were responsive to the requests. After the close of the County’s case, Sugarloaf moved for judgment on the ground that the County had not met its burden of production because it had produced “no firsthand knowledge as to why documents were withheld[.]” Sugarloaf asserted that Mr. Ford testified that he received the MPIA requests, that he was the proper recipient of such requests, that he gathered records, and that he then “intentionally disregarded the request[s].” Sugarloaf contended that the County had not satisfied its burden to show “that any of the [MPIA] exemptions appl[ied].” Sugarloaf argued: The description of the exemptions in the Vaughn Indices themselves are as conclusory as they got. The reasons listed therein do not give any particularized information. It’s merely boilerplate. And it’s boilerplate on specific exemptions where you would have to say, no, this would harm the public because of X specific reason, not a general county employees deserve to communicate in private because that’s not actually what the law is. The circuit court denied Sugarloaf’s motion, noting that the Vaughn indices had not yet been introduced into evidence and, as such, it was unable to review the County’s reasons for withholding documents. Sugarloaf called its president, Mr. Black, as its sole witness. Mr. Black testified that he was affiliated with Sugarloaf in October 2021 when the MPIA requests were Mr. Ford admitted that he had confused Sugarloaf and Stronghold and that he 10 “thought one was related to the other.” - 14 - submitted and that he was elected president of Sugarloaf in December 2021. Mr. Black testified that, after Sugarloaf submitted the MPIA requests, it received two confirmation emails that the requests had been received, and two automated replies, indicating that the requests had been entered into the County’s automated system. Mr. Black testified that the County did not provide documents or otherwise communicate with Sugarloaf until after Sugarloaf filed its lawsuit. Mr. Black testified that the documents Sugarloaf received from the County, after filing suit, were not all of the documents that had been requested. After closing argument, the circuit court took the matter under advisement, and the bench trial concluded. The Circuit Court’s Ruling On June 8, 2023, the circuit court reconvened to deliver an oral ruling. The circuit court made findings based on the evidence presented at the bench trial. The circuit court noted that, although there was “little or no actual testimony” concerning the events that caused Sugarloaf to submit MPIA requests, what it gleaned from the record is that Sugarloaf believed “there’ve been secret meetings among county officials and representatives of Amazon web services, to carve out a large parcel of land from the so- called Sugarloaf plan, for rezoning and/or development.” The circuit court determined that the actions of Mr. Ford, which “resulted in the effective denial of [Sugarloaf’s] request[,] were not knowing and willful.” The circuit court rejected the County’s argument that Sugarloaf “was required to amend its complaint to reflect the fact that it was dissatisfied with non-production of certain records and/or the content of the Vaughn indices.” Noting that the County chose to use - 15 - Vaughn indices to satisfy the burden of providing a valid reason for non-production of the requested items, the circuit court ruled that the County had not met the burden of persuading the court that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest: In determining whether the chosen method is adequate . . . the Court is required to consider judicial economy, the conclusory nature of any agency affidavits, bad faith on the part of the agency, disputes concerning the contents of the documents, whether the agency has proposed in camera inspection, and the strength of the public interest in disclosure, which the Court has considered here. *** [W]hile the County’s Vaughn indices provide some background information on preparation and distribution of the documents, in the Court’s view they fail to provide sufficient information about the persons among whom they were circulated, whether the documents were indeed vital to any agency decisions that might have been under consideration, and perhaps most importantly, whether any factual material existed within those documents that could have been disclosed after sanitizing . . . the documents. The circuit court ruled that it would “order production of all previously undisclosed documents” to Sugarloaf, subject to the following exception: “[W]ith regard to the items claimed to be subject to attorney-client privilege, and confidential commercial information privilege, the Court believes that an in-camera inspection should be made by it in order to make a responsible decision on those exemptions.” The circuit court identified the items, “13 documents in all[,]” and stated that it would look at the documents and “determine whether or not they meet any of the exemptions[.]”11 Consistent with its oral ruling, on the same day, June 8, 2023, the circuit court issued 11 The circuit court also stated that it wanted to hear from Sugarloaf’s counsel on the issue of attorneys’ fees. The parties conferred with the circuit court about a potential hearing date. - 16 - a written order directing the County to submit specified withheld documents for in camera review and to provide Sugarloaf with the remaining records. On June 20, 2023, the County filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied in a memorandum opinion and order issued on July 25, 2023. Sugarloaf’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees On August 10, 2023, Sugarloaf filed a petition for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, seeking $48,813.62. Sugarloaf contended that it was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under the MPIA, specifically GP § 4-362(f), stating: Sugarloaf substantially prevailed in this action, the public derived significant benefit from Sugarloaf’s successful MPIA action, Sugarloaf, itself, derived no commercial or personal benefit from this action other than serving the public interest, and . . . the County[’s] withholding of the requested documents did not have a reasonable basis in law but, rather, was motivated by the desire to avoid the scrutiny that disclosure to the public of the documents sought and obtained by Sugarloaf would cause. On August 28, 2023, the County filed an opposition to the petition, arguing that, “[a]bsent any evidence that prosecution of this suit was necessary for [Sugarloaf] to receive the records it initially requested, it cannot be said that [Sugarloaf] substantially prevailed in this matter.” On September 6, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing to rule on the in camera materials it had reviewed after the bench trial and to hear argument on the petition for attorneys’ fees. As to the documents, which were “15 documents or sets of documents,” the circuit court ruled that 14 were properly withheld and that it would not order - 17 - disclosure.12 The circuit court noted, though, that it appeared that the County had already provided several of the documents to Sugarloaf. Next, the circuit court turned to the issue of attorneys’ fees. In support of the petition, Sugarloaf called Mr. Black as its sole witness. Mr. Black testified that the Sugarloaf plan “is a zoning and planning process” and that, during the crafting of the plan, there had been a “‘mysterious’ change” “to redraw the boundaries of this plan area to remove a chunk of ground off . . . what is the eastern side of Sugarloaf Mountain to the west of . . . I-270.” Mr. Black testified that one of the purposes for Sugarloaf’s MPIA requests “was to try to understand why this change was made in the draft plan[,]” which he characterized as trying “to uncover the details of this, at that point, secret Amazon project.” According to Mr. Black, he later learned that the reason that the Sugarloaf plan was modified was indeed “because the County was trying to carve out ground from the Sugarloaf region for heavy industrial development[,]” in particular, an “Amazon development project[,]” “without informing any of the citizens about it, without engaging in any public comment or public dialogue.” Mr. Black testified that the records Sugarloaf received as a result of the circuit court’s decisions were “a sea change in [Sugarloaf’s] understanding of those secret efforts . . . on a number of different aspects.” When asked about the value of the documents, Mr. Black testified: [A]s a direct result of the released documents, we now have a very accurate understanding of the sites and the parts of Southern Frederick County that 12 As to the fifteenth document, at the end of the hearing, counsel for the parties agreed to confer about the document and “figure it out.” - 18 - were under consideration for this heavy industrial development that are currently agricultural. We understand the depth of county staff’s involvement in repeated meetings in drafting . . . ordinances. We understand now the concept of the critical digital infrastructure floating zone as the mechanism that was going to be used to implant these industrial facilities into otherwise very rural areas. We understand the time lines that this was all supposed to occur on. We understand now from these documents that public involvement, public comment, public participation was going to be . . . explicitly pushed to the side in favor of this project through no matter what the opposition was. I think all of these things we would not have known were it not for these released records. Mr. Black testified that, although he thought “Amazon may have moved on, [] the data center industry is still very interested in ground in Frederick County[,]” and the documents that Sugarloaf obtained were “useful to inoculate the system, the government and the citizenry, . . . against that same kind of action being taken by some other entity . . . in the immediate future.”13 On redirect, Mr. Black testified that the records that were released in August 2022, during the initial disclosure, were “things like planning commission agendas and staff reports,” “things that . . . you can get on the internet. You don’t have to ask for them.” Mr. Black testifie