Q.R. v. D.K.

Q.R. v. D.K., No. 2464, September Term, 2025. Opinion Filed on October 29, 2026, by Albright, J. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER In determining whether one is a de facto parent, the putative de facto parent’s maintenance of a residence other than the one in which they lived with the minor does not preclude putative de facto parent, per se, from establishing that they met the second prong of the test adopted in Conover v. Conover. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER In determining whether one is a de facto parent, the particular living arrangement of the putative de facto parent and the minor child must be considered. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER Ultimately, whether or not a putative de facto parent meets Conover’s second prong does not depend, exclusively, on whether that putative de facto parent maintains another residence, but on the contours of the household from the child’s point of view. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT The “de facto parenthood test measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child . . . without reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s origins.” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 574 (2018). “What matters . . . is the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child and the child’s best interests, not the relationship’s title or consanguinity.” Id. at 575. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT A putative de facto parent “bears the burden of proving the following when petitioning for access to a minor child: (1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.” Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 85 (2016). CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT Because “de facto parenthood would interfere with the relationship between legal parents and their children,” we require putative de facto parents to meet a “narrowly tailored [test] to avoid infringing upon the parental autonomy of a legal parent.” Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51, 75 (2016); Basciano v. Foster, 256 Md. App. 107, 144 (2022). CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT A “de facto parent” is “a party who claims custody or visitation rights based upon the party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-biological, non-adopted child.” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 570 (2018). CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT De facto parenthood arises when, “with the [legal] parent’s knowledge and consent,” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 238 Md. App. 561, 574 (2018) and while “labor[ing] alongside [the legal parent] in their family,” the de facto parent becomes “a psychological parent” to the child, V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 221 (2000). In these situations, “the child[] [has] a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.” V.C., 163 N.J. at 221. CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY Even though a parent’s fundamental right to parent is implicated in a custody case, parents in such cases do not necessarily enjoy “the full panoply of constitutional due process protections” afforded criminal defendants. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE > CONTINUANCE The Court “has consistently affirmed denials of motions to continue . . . in the absence of unforeseen circumstances to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably mitigated, where untimely requests were made, [and] where procedural rules were ignored[.]” Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc., 418 Md. 231, 242-43 (2011). PRETRIAL PROCEDURE > CONTINUANCE It is not an unforeseen circumstance to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably mitigated when the litigant requests their counsel to withdraw, and their counsel acts on the request. Circuit Court for Charles County Case No. C-08-FM-25-000604 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 2464 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ Q.R. v. D.K. ______________________________________ Leahy, Albright, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), ______________________________________ Opinion by Albright, J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 29, 2026 *Tang, Rosalyn, J. did not participate in the Court’s decision to designate this opinion for publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.10.29 14:58:44 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  In Conover v. Conover, 450 Md. 51 (2016), the Supreme Court recognized de facto parenthood and adopted a four-prong test, first established by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W. 2d 419 (Wisc. 1995), for determining when a putative de facto parent is in fact a de facto parent. Thus, after Conover, a putative de facto parent “bears the burden of proving the following when petitioning for access to a minor child:” (1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature. Conover, 450 Md. at 85. In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Charles County, the court concluded that Appellee D.K.1 is the de facto parent of a child born to Appellant Q.R. through artificial insemination while the parties were in a romantic relationship. Ms. R. does not dispute that Ms. K. satisfied the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Conover test. Instead, Ms. R. here argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Ms. K. and the minor lived together in the same household—Conover’s second prong. She contends 1 To protect the privacy of the parties and the minor child, we refer to the parties and adult witnesses by their initials and refer to the minor child by randomly selected initials. We mean no disrespect in doing so. that, because this finding was in error, the court abused its discretion in concluding that Ms. K. is the minor’s de facto parent. Ms. R. points to the fact that Ms. K. maintained another residence in the District of Columbia and argues that Ms. K.’s doing so negates the living-together prong per se. We disagree. Ms. R. presents two questions for our review,2 which we have rephrased as follows: I. Did the circuit court err when it found Ms. K. and the minor child lived together in the same household and, on that basis, abuse its discretion when it concluded that Ms. K. is a de facto parent to the minor child? II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. R.’s Motion for Continuance at the custody trial? We answer both questions in the negative and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Early Relationship and Pregnancy Ms. R. and Ms. K. were previously involved in a romantic relationship. The parties met in 2018 and began dating in 2020. The parties were never engaged or married. 2 Ms. R. presented the questions as follows: I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by determining that Appellee was a de facto parent when she maintained an entirely separate residence and did not live in the same household with the minor child? II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for a continuance so that Appellant could have counsel present to assist her at an evidentiary hearing involving the determination of de facto parenthood after her prior counsel withdrew from the case two days prior to said hearing? 2 During their entire relationship, Ms. K. maintained an apartment in the District of Columbia, and Ms. R. maintained a residence in Maryland.3 In 2019, Ms. R. prepared to have a child through the process of artificial insemination by undergoing two surgeries, the first in 2019 and a second in 2020. The parties shared in the planning of the pregnancy. Specifically, Ms. K. went to doctor’s appointments with Ms. R., helped to pay for the mobile application used by the fertility clinic to select the donor, discussed the characteristics of the ideal donor, filtered out donors that didn’t meet their criteria, listened to the voices of potential donors, and paid the additional fee to hear the voices of the potential donors. Ms. K. assisted in selecting the donor. Together they selected a donor of Asian descent because they “didn’t want to go with a white sperm donor” and Ms. K. didn’t want “a Spanish donor.” Ms. R. received her first intrauterine insemination injection in 2021. Ms. K. took Ms. R. to her insemination appointments, recounting that for one appointment, she had to “pick up the canister [of sperm,] put it in [her] car[,] and take [the canister and Ms. R.] to [be] inseminated.” Following the insemination procedure, Ms. R. would “lay in the bed all day” at Ms. K.’s District of Columbia apartment. In December 2021, after five cycles of intrauterine insemination injections, Ms. K. received a call from Ms. R. exclaiming, “we’re pregnant.” 3 Ms. R. lived in an apartment in Columbia, Maryland, when she and Ms. K. began their relationship. In 2024, Ms. R. and the minor child moved to their current residence, a townhome in Waldorf, Maryland. 3  The Birth of Q.D. Ms. R. gave birth to Q.D. on August 19, 2022, via cesarian-section. Many family members, including Ms. R.’s mother and father, traveled to Maryland to be with Ms. R. for the birth of her son. Under hospital policy, only one person was allowed to accompany Ms. R. into the operating room. Ms. R. selected Ms. K. to be with her in the operating room and witness the birth of Q.D. While Ms. R. recovered from giving birth, Ms. K. stayed with her for “periods of time” in the maternity department, “leav[ing] to go to work” and returning to the hospital “in the evening.” Ms. K.’s name was not on Q.D.’s birth certificate. Even so, Q.D. calls her “mama Mǔqīn” (mother in Mandarin). Family Life From his birth, Q.D. lived with Ms. R. Following Q.D.’s birth, Ms. K. ate meals, cleaned, slept, and left for work from Ms. R.’s Maryland apartment. Ms. K. would depart from “work at 3:30 p.m.,” go to her District of Columbia apartment “to take care of [her] cat[,]” drive to the grocery store to purchase items for Ms. R. and Q.D., and return to Ms. R.’s apartment to “be with [her] and [Q.D.] throughout the night.” Q.D. gave Ms. K. Mother’s Day and birthday cards addressed to Mǔqīn in Ms. R.’s handwriting. Ms. K. listed Q.D. as the “beneficiary for all her assets.” Ms. K. slept at Q.D.’s home on most nights from August 2022, when Q.D. was born, until November 2022 when the romantic relationship “deteriorated.” Moreover, the parties began to disagree on how to raise Q.D. In March 2023, seven months after Q.D. was born, the parties were no longer “consistently spend[ing] the night together.” 4  Despite the change in Ms. R.’s and Ms. K.’s romantic relationship, the parties continued to co-parent Q.D. Ms. K. continued to contribute to the cost of daycare and purchase items for Q.D., including clothes, diapers, and food. Pleadings, Motions, and Petitions On April 22, 2025, Ms. K., pro se, filed a Complaint for Custody of Q.D., holding herself out as a de facto parent of Q.D. Three days later, Ms. K., still representing herself, amended her complaint. She sought joint physical custody and joint legal custody of Q.D. The Amended Complaint stated that joint custody was in the best interest of Q.D. because Ms. K. is “a fit and proper person to have joint physical [and joint legal] custody of [Q.D.]” Ms. K. claimed that she was “in [Q.D.’s] life since birth and cared for him because he is my son.” In her pleading, Ms. K. asserted that “[Q.D.] knows [her] as one of his mothers[,]” and that she “can provide a safe and stable environment for [Q.D.]” Ms. R. was served with the Summons and Amended Complaint for Custody on April 29, 2025. On April 29, 2025, the parties cross-filed petitions for protection. Ms. K. and Ms. R. both consented to the entry of a Final Protective Order (FPO) without admitting the allegations in the petitions. Under the issued FPOs, the parties were to have no contact with each other, and Ms. K. was to have no contact with Q.D. The FPOs were made effective through April 29, 2026. On June 2, 2025, Ms. R., represented by counsel, filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Custody (“Answer”). Ms. R. alleged that she is the “biological mother” of Q.D. and that Ms. K. “has no standing to request custody [or] visitation of the 5 minor child [because] she is not a biological parent, nor a de facto parent to the minor child.” In her Answer, Ms. R. declared, “Plaintiff fails the four-prong test to determine de facto parentage, as she does not meet any of the four requirements for de facto parentage, and therefore the ability to seek custody and/or visitation of the minor child.” (Emphasis added). Specific to the second prong, Ms. R. asserted that Plaintiff has not lived in the home of the minor child. The Plaintiff lives in Washington DC, and the Defendant and the minor child live, and have lived for the duration of the minor child’s life, in Waldorf, Maryland. The Plaintiff and Defendant have never cohabitated and shared a residence together. The custody trial was initially scheduled for July 21, 2025. Ms. K. requested, and was granted, a continuance on July 17, 2025, to, inter alia, (1) file a Second Amended Complaint to clearly state the necessary information showing her entitlement to the relief being requested, (2) respond to Ms. R.’s Answer because the “nature of the document reads like a Counter-Complaint[,]” and (3) allow her newly obtained counsel time to “prepare a proper case for de facto custody.” The trial was continued until September 26, 2025. On July 17, 2025, i.e, the day the continuance was granted, Ms. K. filed her Second Amended Complaint for De Facto Parent Status and Child Custody (“Second Amended Complaint”). Ms. K. asserted that together the parties decided to and planned for a baby “by way of genetic donor.” The Second Amended Complaint pled specific facts to support claims that: “through [Ms. R.’s] words and actions” she “consented to and fostered the bond that [Ms. K.] shares with the minor child[;]” the parties “existed at the same time and same place, having a sexual relationship, and raising a child like a 6 family[;]” the “parties worked together to ensure the minor child had what he needed[;]” Ms. K. made “financial contributions [] without the expectation of reimbursement as [] part of raising a child[;]” and the parties “operated like a couple raising a child together.” Specific to the disputed second prong of the de facto parenthood test, the Second Amended Complaint stated, “[t]hat since his birth, the minor child has resided with the Defendant, and the Plaintiff when she was there.” Ms. K. specifically requested “recogni[tion of] Plaintiff as a de facto parent to [Q.D.]” and “shared physical and shared legal custody of [Q.D.]” Also on July 17, 2025, Ms. K. filed her Answer to Defendant’s Counter-Complaint Titled Response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Custody (“Answer to Counter- Complaint”). Ms. K. denied that she lacked standing to request custody or visitation of Q.D. She further denied that she did not meet the four-prong de facto parent test. Ms. R. filed her Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for De Facto Parent Status and Custody (“Answer to Second Amended Complaint”) on August 15, 2025. While Ms. R. admitted to a romantic relationship with Ms. K., she denied each statement pertaining to planning the pregnancy, supporting Ms. R. during her pregnancy, and parenting of Q.D. that Ms. K. asserted. In answer to where Q.D. resided, Ms. R. admitted that Ms. K. “came to [Ms. R.’s] home in the evenings until [Q.D] was seven (7) months old.” The minor child has always resided with [Ms. R.], as she is his parent. The child has never resided with [Ms. K.], as the parties have never lived together. Further, [Ms. K.] only came to [Ms. R.]’s home in the evenings until the child was seven (7) months old. [Ms. K.] never stayed in [Ms. R.]’s home again after March 2023. 7  Ms. R. Asks Her Counsel to Withdraw On September 9, 2025, Ms. R.’s counsel—on Ms. R.’s request—filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. In support of the Motion, Ms. R.’s counsel stated: 1. Defendant has requested that Counsel withdraw from the case, and has provided her consent to this withdrawal of counsel by her signature on the attached Order of Withdrawal. . . . 2. Pursuant to Md. R. Civ. P. Cir. Ct. 2-132, this withdrawal will not cause undue delay, prejudice or injustice. Defendant is aware that the trial is set on the docket for September 26, 2025, and will not be asking for a continuance based on the withdrawal of counsel. 3. Plaintiff[’]s counsel does not oppose the withdrawal as evidenced by their signature on the Order of Withdrawal, filed concurrently with the Motion. Ms. R. consented to the Motion’s proposed Order, signing it on September 9, 2025, under a line that said, in bolded capital letters, “Seen and Agreed.” The circuit court granted the Motion on September 24, 2025, and issued a notice to employ new counsel on the same day. After the circuit court granted counsel’s Motion to Withdraw on September 24, 2025, Ms. R. requested a continuance to obtain new counsel. In her Motion for Continuance, Ms. R. explained the timing of her filing: The Defendant was represented by legal counsel, Tara Steinnard Talley, who filed a motion to withdraw on or about [September 9, 2025]. At the time the Defendant attempted to contact the Court to request a continuance, the motion to withdraw had not yet been formally accepted, and the Court record still showed the Defendant as being represented by counsel. As a result, the Court instructed that any continuance must come from the attorney of record, even though the Defendant no longer had the benefit of legal representation in practice. The withdrawal was handled without proper notice or transition, and the Defendant was not adequately informed by former counsel that they would be required to represent themselves in the next hearing. 8 Ms. R. “d[id] not feel capable or competent to self represent” because “the best interests and custody of a minor child” are “serious[] legal issues.” Ms. R. asserted that she “ha[d] been making diligent efforts to retain new representation but ha[d] not yet been successful due to the short timeframe and logistical challenges.” “Th[e] request [was] made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay, but to ensure fairness, due process, and the competent presentation of the facts in this case.” The Motion for Continuance justified the request on “legal grounds and equity[,]” stating: Courts have consistently held that due process requires that parties be given a fair opportunity to secure legal representation, especially in matters affecting parental rights. Proceeding without counsel in a custody matter may lead to an unjust outcome that affects not only the parties, but also the well-being of the child involved. A brief continuance would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and would allow the Defendant the necessary time to retain new legal counsel and prepare for a full and fair hearing. Ms. R.’s Motion for Continuance requested a sixty-day continuance to retain new counsel. The circuit court denied Ms. R.’s Motion as a preliminary matter in the custody trial on September 26, 2025. Prior to denying the Motion, Ms. R. confirmed to the court that she had been notified by her prior counsel that a continuance would not be granted for lack of counsel. The circuit court also ascertained that Ms. R. had one witness (other than herself) present and ready to testify. And, while the court ruled that it would deny Ms. R.’s continuance motion, it did indicate, from the outset, that it would delay closing arguments so that Ms. R. could secure counsel. 9  The Custody Trial The custody trial started on September 26, 2025. Ms. K. was represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf. Ms. K. did not call any witnesses. The court admitted twenty-one of Ms. K’s exhibits into evidence including photographs, doctor appointment communications, daycare invoices, greeting cards, purchase receipts, bank and credit card statements, emails, and 6,852 pages of text messages between the parties. Ms. R., a pro se litigant during the evidentiary hearing, testified on her own behalf and called her sister, Ms. B., as a witness. Ms. R. offered one exhibit as evidence, but it was not admitted by the court. After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court adjourned, postponing closing arguments. The circuit court notified Ms. R. that she could obtain counsel to “argue the law” at closing argument. On November 14, 2025, the circuit court heard closing arguments and delivered its ruling orally on the record. The circuit court first summarized its findings of fact from the exhibits received into evidence and witness testimony. The exhibits[:] there were photographs, the sonogram, holding him at birth, [] being the one person chosen to go into the delivery room. [Q.D.] was in the hospital crib. There were texts about doctor’s appointments. There were happy birthday cards to Ms. [K.] from, quote, [Q.D.] to Mǔqīn[:] thanks for being a great mom. There was a card from Ms. [R.] saying, thanks for showing care and concern. There was a birthday card in January 25 from [Q.D.]. Happy Mother[,] and then there was a happy Mother’s Day, Mǔqīn, and the first birthday party photographs. []Ms. [K.] was the contact for [Q.D.] at the daycare. Ms. [K.] paid for the daycare. She used days off. There was a document, and I know, Ms. [R.], you said it didn’t prove anything, but it wasn’t contradicted. But [] it showed days off from work to care for [Q.D.] when there was no childcare. Lots of photos of Ms. [K]. with [Q.D.]. In August of ‘22, there was a text from Ms. [R.] to Ms. [K.] saying, you’re a great mom[,] you’re a great parent. You’re so good for him. I see that you love him. 10  Okay. So, the testimony from my notes. [] They decided to have the child together, went to the fertility doctor together, looked at donors, she provided money for it, decided on the Chinese donor together, split the cost of hearing the donors’ voices, which was an extra cost in order to hear voices . . . The Defendant called her to say, we are pregnant. [] Ms. [K.] was put on the doctor’s forms as a parent and other matters also, other documents as well. She made [Q.D.] the beneficiary for all her assets. That she slept at [Ms. R.’s] house until 2022 when the relationship started to get rocky. [Ms. R.] denied that [Ms. K.] wanted a child or wanted marriage. [] She denies that Ms. [K.] went with her to her appointments. She states she didn’t want her involved and eventually broke up with her due to the discord. She tried to remain friends, but it was too stressful[,] that they had done all of the selection of the donor and all the other things alone. She never intended to do it with [Ms. K.], and that she wants sole custody, no visitation for [Ms. K]. She chose [Ms. K.] to be in the delivery room because they were still in a relationship then. But Ms. [K.] did not consistently spend the night with her. And anything she wrote[,] read[,] said or wrote concerning her being a mother was when they were still in a relationship. And she denied that Ms. [K.] paid for anything. And she stated what existed three years ago was not relevant. Ms. [R’s] sister testified that she lived with the Defendant since 2018. That Ms. [K.] was not on the lease. She had no keys. She did not live there. No recollection of[,] of Ms. [K.] buying or paying for anything over the years. After [Q.D.] was born, Ms. [K.] came maybe three days a week to spend the night. When they moved to Waldorf, she didn’t come as often. And she knows all this because she talks to her sister often and checks the Ring camera often. The circuit court determined, based on the admitted evidence, that Ms. K. met her burden on the four prongs of Conover v. Conover. The circuit court’s findings of credibility highlighted that Ms. K. was very credible in contrast to Ms. R. and Ms. B. The circuit court found that “everything [Ms. K.] said was true[,]” while Ms. R. and Ms. B. were “tr[ying] so hard to say this never happened . . . [but] it just didn’t ring true.” I actually found Ms. K. very, very credible. I think everything she said was true. She was very detailed. She was very specific. Very hurt when things didn’t go the way they had been going. Acknowledged that the relationship went[,] well[,] didn’t[,] went unwell, basically. Acknowledged that things 11  got different and got tougher, but did not feel that that changed her ability to be a parent to [Q.D.] ... What I thought about Ms. R.’s and her sister’s testimony was that it was strained to find none of the above. It was twisted to find none of the above. I did not find it credible. . . . [T]hey tried so hard to say this never happened[,] it was never my intention[,] I never meant it to be[,] I never expected this to be. And it just didn’t ring true to me. The circuit court found that Ms. K. met the first Conover prong, proving that Ms. R. consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship with Q.D. Number one is that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and fostered a petitioner’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the child. All right. The testimony is different. But here’s my take on it, because I have to find the credibility. ... I believe . . . and she knew so many details about why a Chinese person was selected. What about the voices? What about being in the delivery room? And, of course, Ms. R. says, well, that’s because we were in a good relationship then, but that changed later. . . . But I think that everything that Ms. K. testified was true. ... So, I think that everything that Ms. K. said did, in fact, happen. And I think that Ms. R. did, in fact, consent to and foster . . . Ms. K.’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the child. And I think she did that while it was in her best interest, while it was good for her, while the relationship was good, and then after the relationship went sour, just said, I don’t need this anymore. Finding that Ms. K. met the second Conover prong, the circuit court contemplated the extent to which Ms. K. and Q.D. must live together in the same household. The court noted the simplicity of the second prong when the parties are married and the complication of the requirement in the instant case. The court reasoned as to the second Conover prong that: 12  All right. Number two, that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household. The [] Kpetigo case was easy for the court because parties lived together for six years. They were married. So, no court in Maryland has said it’s got to be at least two years or it’s got to be this or it’s got to be that. And every time one of these cases comes out, they evolve. Going all the way back to Trox[el], if you wish, but Trox[el] was grandparents and that still holds true, that grandparents don’t get de facto parent rights unless they are. So, it is a factor to be considered. And I struggled with that because if we take that literally and we say, oh, no, they didn’t live together enough, they didn’t live together long enough, they didn’t live together frequently enough, then we’re done. And I don’t think that’s the way it’s meant to be. . . . So I think that, and I may be wrong, and if this case is appealed, I may be reversed, but I do not think it’s a hard and fast rule that takes away from the fact that these people did at least to some degree live together for some time while things were good, and then still continued to co-parent until things got really bad. The circuit court found that Ms. K. assumed obligations of parenthood by taking on significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and development, without the expectation of reimbursement, thereby establishing the third Conover prong. The circuit court recounted how Ms. K. purchased household items, contributed to the cost of daycare, and engaged in feeding, bedtime, and diaper changes, among other things: All right. Number three, where the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and development, including contributing towards . . . the child’s support. And I think that clearly happened. Payments were made, daycare was paid for, groceries were bought, diapers were bought, many things were paid for, diapers were changed, bottles were fed to the child, putting the child to bed, you know, all of those things were definitely happening. Obviously, less and less as Ms. R. started pulling back, and then not at all once Ms. R. really pulled back. But I think that there’s no question that Ms. K. did all of those things to the extent that she was able to, even as it got less and less, including the stalking and hanging around and that kind of stuff that when you were still trying to see him. Prior to the circuit court making a positive finding on the fourth Conover prong, it sought clarity from the parties on Q.D.’s age. Upon confirming that Q.D. was 13 approximately two and a half or two and three quarters, the circuit court concluded that Ms. K. “has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a [] bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.” The court summarized: He’s old enough to know who’s who. Children that age, [are] old enough to understand who feeds him, who changes his diaper, who plays with him, who takes him places, who’s at his daycare when they’re doing little events and things like that. He’s old enough to . . . know that. And so, . . . I do think that there was enough time for . . . a sufficient length of time for there to have been established . . . a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature. I think that did happen. After finding that Ms. K. met all four Conover prongs, the court concluded that Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D. The circuit court again noted the difficulty in determining to what extent the putative de facto parent must live with the minor child. Nonetheless, the court found that the burden was met by Ms. K.: I do find that there is a de facto parenthood relationship because I think that all of these factors are met. And I know that the argument can easily be made from a legal standpoint about living together and about how long they lived together or didn’t live together, but I don’t think that the way the law is developing that it’s meant to create particular cutoff times and especially when the other parent is the one cutting off the time. Having found that Ms. K. is a de facto parent, the circuit court then moved to the best interest analysis under the Sanders-Taylor factors.4,5 The court found that it would be 4 See Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 304-11 (1986); Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 420(1997). 5 The circuit court found: that “there’s no question [Ms. R. and Ms. K. are] both fit parents[;]” there was “no negative indication” as to the “character and reputation of the parties[;]” that “Ms. K. is extremely sincere and wants [access]” but “no willingness on Ms. R.’s part to share custody[;]” that Ms. K. would “maintain the child’s relationship with the other parent[;]” that Q.D. is not old enough to have a preference regarding 14 in the best interest of Q.D. to maintain a relationship with his de facto parent. To this end, the circuit court granted Ms. K. visitation with Q.D. and physical and legal custody to Ms. R. In conformity with its oral findings, the circuit court issued its “Amended Order of Court” on December 23, 2025.6 This timely appeal followed. We add additional facts below as necessary. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under Maryland Rule 8-131(c), this Court reviews “both the law and evidence” when reviewing actions tried without a jury. B.O. v. S.O., 252 Md. App. 486, 501 (2021). Our Supreme Court distilled “three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes[.]” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003) (citation modified). First, when the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 8-131(c) applies. Id. “A trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.” Azizova v. Suleymanov, 243 Md. App. 340, 372 (2019) (citation modified). “[We] will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131. custody; that the geographic proximity allows for easy access; each party has a stable home for the child; there are no known financial issues; the parties are employed; the child’s health is not at issue; Q.D. had a good relationship with both parties; the parties were separated for “seven months” which is “[not] that long” and “[Q.D.] would remember” and “certainly get used to reestablishing his relationship with Ms. K.[;]” no prior abandonment or surrender of custody; and no evidence of “potential disruption of the child’s social and school life.” 6 The order was amended (without substantive changes) because the original order did not upload properly. 15  Second, “if it appears that the court erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586. Third, “when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion[,] . . . the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. There is an abuse of discretion when: no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, when the court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when its decision is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court. Jose v. Jose, 237 Md. App. 588, 598–99 (2018) (citation modified). DISCUSSION I. The circuit court did not err when it found that Ms. K. and Q.D. lived together in the same household, nor did it abuse its discretion in its ultimate conclusion that—having met the four prongs of Conover—Ms. K. is a de facto