Full Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #051 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of October, 2026 are as follows: BY Griffin, J.: 2025-C-01627 WINDWARD LAND, LLC AND MICHAEL MORRIS GULLEY VS. MARY LEE MANN, ET AL. C/W WILLIAM LAMONT FRAZIER, ALVIN EDWARDS AND KIANA EDWARDS AND VANESSA EDWARDS VS. WINDWARD LAND, LLC AND MICHAEL MORRIS GULLEY (Parish of Desoto) VACATED AND REMANDED. SEE OPINION. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2025-C-01627 WINDWARD LAND, LLC AND MICHAEL MORRIS GULLEY VS. MARY LEE MANN, ET AL. C/W WILLIAM LAMONT FRAZIER, ALVIN EDWARDS AND KIANA EDWARDS AND VANESSA EDWARDS VS. WINDWARD LAND, LLC AND MICHAEL MORRIS GULLEY On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Parish of Desoto GRIFFIN, J. We granted this writ to address the breadth of the prescriptive bar for actions by an unrecognized successor against third persons involving immovable property. Adhering to well-established definitions in the Civil Code, we find the prescriptive bar to also include buyers, donees, and transferees who subsequently acquire immovable property from unrecognized heirs and legatees. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This matter arises out of an action to partition immovable property in DeSoto Parish filed by Windward Land, LLC and Michael M. Gulley (collectively “Windward”). At issue are property interests in land designated as “Tract 2,” which, in 1924, was partitioned between Augustine Howard and Inez Howard each owning a fifty percent interest. The crux of the dispute is who ultimately acquired Augustine Howard’s half-interest in Tract 2. Augustine Howard died intestate in 1956. His succession resulted in a 1996 judgment of possession recognizing Earnestine Walker, the ancestor-in-title to Windward, as the sole heir of his estate. Defendants in the partition action are co- owners who trace their title back to Addie Edwards who purportedly acquired her interest through a 1955 deed executed by Zephyr Johnson, daughter of Inez and niece of Augustine (“Frazier-Edwards respondents”). In the midst of this complex litigation, the Frazier-Edwards respondents filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate the 1996 judgment of possession averring that Earnestine Walker, as an illegitimate child of Augustine Howard, was precluded from inheriting his estate under then-existing law.1 The trial court granted the motion declaring the 1996 judgment of possession without effect making Zephyr Johnson the rightful heir to Augustine Howard and resulting in the Frazier-Edwards respondents being sole owners of Tract 2 by virtue of proving better title through the 1955 deed in favor of Addie Edwards. Windward filed a motion for new trial arguing, among other things, that the Frazier-Edwards respondents’ collateral attack on the 1996 judgment of possession is barred by prescription. The trial court denied the motion and Windward appealed. The court of appeal affirmed, narrowly interpreting the prescriptive statute at issue, La. R.S. 9:5630, such that the phrase “successor of a deceased person” operates to only bar claims by heirs or legatees of a decedent, and not the Frazier-Edwards respondents as heirs and/or legatees of a third party transferee, Addie Edwards. Windward Land, LLC v. Mann, 56, 379, pp. 19-20 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/25), 425 So.3d 139, 153. Windward’s writ application to this Court followed, which we granted. Windward Land, LLC v. Mann, 25-1627 (La. 5/12/26), 432 So.3d 747. 1 “Testate and intestate succession rights … are governed by the law in effect on the date of the decedent’s death.” La. C.C. art. 870(B). Under former Article 919, in effect from 1908 to 1981, an “illegitimate” heir could not inherit in intestacy if there were any “legitimate” heirs of the deceased. The article was declared unconstitutional, but the ruling was held retroactive only to January 1, 1975. See Succession of Clivens, 426 So.2d 585, 600 (La. 1982) (on rehearing); Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1980). 2 DISCUSSION The dispositive issue before this Court is whether the collateral attack on the 1996 judgment of possession is prescribed under La. R.S. 9:5630. Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Benjamin v. Zeichner, 12-1763, p. 5 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 197, 201. The prescriptive period for actions by an unrecognized successor against third persons involving immovable property is governed by La. R.S. 9:5630 which, in relevant part, provides: An action by a person who is a successor of a deceased person and who has not been recognized as such in the judgment of possession rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, to assert an interest in an immovable formerly owned by the deceased, against a third person, or his successors, who has acquired an interest in the immovable by onerous title from a person recognized as an heir or legatee of the deceased in the judgment of possession is prescribed in two years from the date of the rendering of the judgment of possession. The dispute at issue turns on the determination of who is considered a “successor of a deceased person.”2 Windward argues the court of appeal erred by giving La. R.S. 9:5630 an overly restrictive interpretation which defeats the public policy purpose of the prescriptive period – stability of title. See Succession of Clivens, 426 So.2d 585, 593, 596-97 (La. 1982) (on rehearing). The Frazier-Edwards respondents maintain the court of appeal’s strict interpretation was correct in limiting the prescriptive statute’s reach only to unrecognized heirs and legatees of a decedent.3 See Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232, pp. 6-7 (La. 3/30/12), 89 So.3d 1145, 1149 (“prescription statutes are strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the claim sought to be extinguished”). We disagree. 2 The court of appeal correctly observed there are no grounds to declare the 1996 judgment of possession an absolute nullity. See La. C.C.P. art. 2002. 3 Although somewhat nuanced, the fulcrum of the Frazier-Edwards respondents’ theory of the case is their contention that the 1996 judgment of possession is invalid. 3 The prescriptive bar in La. R.S. 9:5630 applies not only to actions by unrecognized heirs and legatees, but also to actions by buyers, donees, or transferees who subsequently acquire the immovable property from such heirs and legatees.4 Although the statute itself does not define the term “successor,” it is well-settled that courts should turn to related provisions of the positive law to discern a statute’s meaning and context. See Kling v. Hebert, 23-0257, pp. 3-4 (La. 1/26/24), 378 So.3d 54, 57 (citing Menard v. Targa Resources, L.L.C., 23-0246, p. 4 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 1238, 1242); Bergeron v. Richardson, 20-1409, p. 9 (La. 6/30/21), 320 So.3d 1109, 1116 (“Louisiana courts must begin every legal analysis by examining primary sources of law, consisting of constitution, codes, and statutes”). The Civil Code broadly defines “successor” as “a person who takes the place of another.” La. C.C. art. 3506(3). This definition includes “the particular successor, such as the buyer, [or] donee.”5 Id. Thus, the Frazier-Edwards respondents are “successors” whose actions are subject to the two-year prescriptive period and have long since expired. The plain language of these statutory provisions is reinforced by the 1982 Revision Comments to La. R.S. 9:5630 which emphasize the policy behind the statute is to “[strengthen] the position of acquirers of property as it affords protection to them not only against suits of omitted heirs but also against suits by third persons.” See also Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 10-2605, p. 4 (La. 3/13/12), 89 So.3d 307, 312 (“While the Official Revision Comments are not the law, they may be 4 As the more specific statute, the prescriptive period of La. R.S. 9:5630 controls rather than La. C.C. art. 3502 – the latter broadly covering an action for the recognition of inheritance rights. See Burge v. State, 10-2229, p. 5 (La. 2/11/11), 54 So.3d 1110, 1113. Even were the thirty-year prescriptive period of La. C.C. art. 3502 to apply, it “commences to run from the day of the opening of the succession” which, under La. C.C. art. 934 (both the current and then-existing version), would be Augustine Howard’s death in 1956. 5 Article 3506 was revised by Acts 2025, No. 488, §1; however, as the 2025 Revision Comments observe, the “term ‘successor’ has also been retained given its importance throughout the Civil Code, but its meaning has not been changed. The term ‘successor by particular title’ has been modernized and changed to the term ‘particular successor’ solely for consistency purposes.” The prior version of Article 3506 similarly defined “successor” in subsection (28) as “the person who takes the place of another.” It further stated this included “the successor by particular title, such as the buyer, donee or legatee of particular things, the transferee.” 4 helpful in determining legislative intent.”). Similarly, in Succession of Clivens, this Court recognized the importance of stability of title and the legislature’s prompt action in reducing the prescriptive period in La. R.S. 9:5630 from ten to two years within which a judgment of possession may be challenged. 426 So.2d at 596-97. We further agree with Windward that a strict interpretation, such as that imputed by the court of appeal, would countenance the absurd result of enabling an individual to circumvent the prescriptive period merely by transferring their purported interested in an immovable to a third party. We therefore find the collateral attack on the 1996 judgment of possession advanced in the Frazier-Edwards respondents’ motion for declaratory judgment is barred by prescription. Accordingly, the 1996 judgment of possession is valid and transferred Augustine Howard’s fifty percent interest in Tract 2 to Earnestine Walker. DECREE For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the lower courts are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED 5