Full Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #051 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of October, 2026 are as follows: BY Guidry, J.: 2026-C-00358 HON. ROBERT E. JONES, III, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, AND HON. PAUL N. SENS, HON. CHARLENE LARCH MASON, HON. MARK J. SHEA, HON. BOBBIE SMITH, HON. JOSEPH B. LANDRY AND HON. STEVEN M. JUPITER, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE JUDGES OF THE MUNICIPAL AND TRAFFIC COURT OF NEW ORLEANS VS. AMY TREPAGNIER, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS C/W HON. ROBERT E. JONES, III, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, AND HON. PAUL N. SENS, HON. CHARLENE LARCH MASON, HON. MARK J. SHEA, HON. BOBBIE SMITH, HON. JOSEPH B. LANDRY AND HON. STEVEN M. JUPITER IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE JUDGES OF THE MUNICIPAL AND TRAFFIC COURT OF NEW ORLEANS VS. AMY TREPAGNIER, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER FOR THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS (Parish of Orleans Civil) COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT VACATED, TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED. SEE OPINION. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2026-C-00358 HON. ROBERT E. JONES, III, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, AND HON. PAUL N. SENS, HON. CHARLENE LARCH MASON, HON. MARK J. SHEA, HON. BOBBIE SMITH, HON. JOSEPH B. LANDRY AND HON. STEVEN M. JUPITER, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE JUDGES OF THE MUNICIPAL AND TRAFFIC COURT OF NEW ORLEANS VS. AMY TREPAGNIER, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS C/W HON. ROBERT E. JONES, III, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, AND HON. PAUL N. SENS, HON. CHARLENE LARCH MASON, HON. MARK J. SHEA, HON. BOBBIE SMITH, HON. JOSEPH B. LANDRY AND HON. STEVEN M. JUPITER IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE JUDGES OF THE MUNICIPAL AND TRAFFIC COURT OF NEW ORLEANS VS. AMY TREPAGNIER, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER FOR THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans Civil GUIDRY, J. This case presents a claim under La. Const. art. X, § 2. Upon the application of the judges of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans, we granted review to address the applicability of certain provisions of Article X, § 2 in regard to the Municipal and Traffic Court’s unclassified service. Having considered the constitutional provisions at issue, as well as relevant statutes, we find, as the trial court did, that the Civil Service Commission for the City of New Orleans has no authority over the terms of employment of the Municipal and Traffic Court’s unclassified service. Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 2024, the judges of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans determined that the technological demands of their court warranted the employment of a new technology officer, answerable to the judges en banc. The judges specifically sought a court technology officer to “provid[e] court leadership with technical advice, guidance, and direction to carry out major plans and procedures.” The judges discussed the technology officer position with the Chief Administrative Office of the City of New Orleans, after which the position was approved. Later, in a letter to the personnel director for the City of New Orleans, Amy Trepagnier, the judges requested the classification of the technology officer position, noting that the position was new and fell under the direction of the Municipal and Traffic Court judges. The judges’ request to designate the technology officer position as “unclassified” was referred to the Civil Service Commission for the City of New Orleans and considered at meetings in February and March of 2025. At the March meeting, the judges argued the new position fell under the unclassified service and should be designated as such. However, the Civil Service Commission, reasoning that there were similar positions in the classified service, denied the judges’ request.1 Thereafter, on May 13, 2025, the judges filed a petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment. As stated in the petition, the judges sought an order 1 According to the Commission, its Rule III, Section 7.1 had not been satisfied. That rule provides: At its discretion, the City Civil Service Commission may add additional positions to the unclassified service, if: (a) after a thorough review and analysis of the duties and responsibilities of the position, the Commission has determined that they neither are appropriate for, nor should they be performed by, a classified employee and, (b) the position is essentially of a sensitive nature, having considerable discretion and policy-making authority, which is not subject to further review or modification and, (c) the position is audited on a regular basis by the Civil Service Department to determine the continuing appropriateness of the unclassified status. 2 directing Ms. Trepagnier to enter the position of court technology officer onto the unclassified payroll system. The judges also sought to have the trial court declare that persons employed by the judges are in the unclassified service and that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the number or terms of those persons so employed. There were two hearings. Ms. Trepagnier and Judge Mark J. Shea, a judge with Municipal and Traffic Court, testified at the hearing on the writ of mandamus.2 Therein, Ms. Trepagnier stated that as personnel director she exercises authority over the city’s payroll system; Judge Shea explained that the court technology officer position had been approved by the City.3 At the hearing on the request for declaratory judgment, Ms. Trepagnier and Judge Shea again testified. Judge Robert E. Jones, III, chief and administrative judge for the Municipal and Traffic Court, also testified, explaining that while the judges understood that processes must be followed in order to place a new hire on the city’s payroll system, it was the judges’ position that the Civil Service Commission had “nothing to say” about who the judges hired for an unclassified position or how many unclassified employees were hired. Following the first hearing, the trial court granted the writ of mandamus, ordering Ms. Trepagnier to enter the technology officer position onto the unclassified payroll system.4 Thereafter, by a judgment dated July 9, 2025, the trial court granted the judges’ request for declaratory action. That judgment reads as follows: 2 At the same hearing, the Commission’s exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no cause of action, no right of action, prematurity, and vagueness/ambiguity were heard and overruled. 3 The record contains copies of email messages from the City’s Chief Administrative Office dated September 21, 2024 and November 7, 2024, stating that the request for the technology officer position was approved. 4 The judgment, signed on June 17, 2025, reads as follows: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Mandamus is GRANTED and the defendant Amy Trepagnier, in her capacity as Personnel Director of the City of New Orleans, is hereby directed 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant Amy Trepagnier, in her capacity as Personnel Director of the City of New Orleans, is hereby directed to enter onto the unclassified payroll system of the City of New Orleans the position of Chief Technology Officer of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that persons employed by the Judges of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans are, by the terms of Article 10, § 2(B)(10) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, in the unclassified service and that the Civil Service Commission for the City of New Orleans has no jurisdiction over either the number or terms of employment of persons so employed. On appeal, the judgment of the trial court was reversed. Jones v. Trepagnier, 25-0517 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/26), --- So.3d ---.5 We granted the judges’ writ application. Jones v. Trepagnier, 26-0358 (La. 6/25/26), --- So.3d ---. DISCUSSION This matter raises the threshold question of whether the rulemaking authority of the Civil Service Commission extends to the unclassified service of the Municipal and Traffic Court. As background, a civil service commission has the power to adopt and enforce rules regulating the conditions of employment of the classified service. New Orleans Firefighters Association Local 632 v. New Orleans, 590 So.2d 1172, 1175 (La. 1991). Specifically, each civil service commission is vested with broad rulemaking powers for the administration and regulation of the classified service, including the power to adopt rules for regulating employment, promotion, demotion, and qualifications, and generally to accomplish the objectives and purposes of the civil service system. See La. Const. art. X, § 10(A)(1). Under the civil service system, non-policy making, classified employees are selected on the basis of merit and can be discharged only for insubordination, incompetency, or improper conduct. Mathieu v. New Orleans Public Library, 09-2746, p. 4 (La. 10/19/10), 50 So.3d to enter onto the unclassified payroll system of the City of New Orleans the position of Chief Technology Officer of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans. 5 The City filed two separate appeals, which were consolidated. 4 1259, 1262. The unclassified service, however, is reserved for positions that are political, policy-making, or confidential in nature; unclassified employees are not entitled to the protections of the merit system of civil service. See generally Orazio v. Department of Police, 19-0230 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/19/19), 275 So.3d 340, writ denied, 19-01174 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So.3d 609; see also Smith v. Division of Administration, 362 So.2d 1101 (La. 1978). As noted at the outset, the principal issue herein involves the unclassified service. Louisiana Constitution article X, § 2 provides for both the classified and the unclassified service, stating: (A) Classified Service. The state and city civil service is divided into the unclassified and the classified service. Persons not included in the unclassified service are in the classified service. (B) Unclassified Service. The unclassified service shall include the following officers and employees in the state and city civil service: (1) elected officials and persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective offices; (2) the heads of each principal executive department appointed by the governor, the mayor, or the governing authority of a city; (3) city attorneys; (4) registrars of voters; (5) members of state and city boards, authorities, and commissions; (6) one private secretary to the president of each college or university; (7) one person holding a confidential position and one principal assistant or deputy to any officer, board, commission, or authority mentioned in (1), (2), (4), or (5) above, except civil service departments; (8) members of the military or naval forces; (9) teaching and professional staffs, and administrative officers of schools, colleges, and universities of the state, and bona fide students of those institutions employed by any state, parochial, or municipal agency; (10) employees, deputies, and officers of the legislature and of the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, each mayor and city attorney, of police juries, school boards, assessors, and of all offices provided for in Article V of this constitution except the offices of clerk of the municipal and traffic courts in New Orleans; (11) commissioners of elections, watchers, and custodians and deputy custodians of voting machines; (12) railroad employees whose working conditions and retirement benefits are regulated by federal agencies in accordance with federal law; and (13) the director, deputy director, and all employees of the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. 5 Additional positions may be added to the unclassified service and those positions may be revoked by rules adopted by a commission. La. Const. art. X, § 2 (emphasis added). Notably, Article X, § 2 carves out exceptions to the classified service with Section 2(B) enumerating the specific officers and employees who are excepted from the classified service and thereby placed in the unclassified service. Beyond the enumerated list, Section 2(B) contains a provision allowing “additional positions” to be added to the unclassified service (hereinafter referred to as “the commission provision”). The Civil Service Commission contends, through this commission provision, that the Constitution confers upon it the authority and discretion to add positions to the unclassified service. The judges, on the other hand, assert that the Constitution places their employees squarely in the unclassified service, to which the commission provision is inapplicable.6 Our task, then, is to interpret the constitutional provision at issue, the starting point of which is the language of the provision itself. See Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 00-0374, p. 5 (La. 10/6/00), 773 So.2d 663, 667. As a general rule, articles of the constitution are to be construed and interpreted using the same canons of interpretation applicable to statutes and written instruments. State v. Expunged Record No. 249,044, 03-1940, p. 4 (La.7/2/04), 881 So.2d 104, 107; Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry v. Sumrall, 98-1587, p. 4 (La. 3/2/99), 728 So.2d 1254, 1258. Words and phrases must be read in context and construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. See La. R.S. 1:3. A provision shall be construed to give meaning to its plain language. Standard Mortgage Corporation v. Jarrell, 20-0960, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So.3d 146, 150. When the language is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the provision shall be applied as 6 The judges contend that any rule of the Civil Service Commission purporting to assert jurisdiction over persons employed by the Municipal and Traffic Court is unconstitutional. 6 written and no interpretation may be made in search of the legislature’s intent. La. C.C. art. 9; In re Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Company, 98-3034, p. 10 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d 610, 615. Further, where it is possible, courts have a duty in the interpretation of a constitutional provision to adopt a construction which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. La. C.C. art. 13; Hollingsworth v. City of Minden, 01-2658, p. 4 (La.6/21/02), 828 So.2d 514, 517. We also emphasize, pertinently, that a civil service commission lacks the power to rule on the constitutionality of its own rules—a civil service commission cannot be called upon to judge the equity of its own rules. See Williams v. Civil Service Commission of City of New Orleans, 613 So.2d 733, 735 (La. App. 4 Cir.1993); see generally Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 98-1587 at pp. 8-9; 728 So.2d at 1261. Applying the above legal precepts to the matter before us, we conclude, as the trial court did, that the unclassified service of the Municipal and Traffic Court is outside of the jurisdiction of the rulemaking authority of the Civil Service Commission. Our determination is based on the plain language of Article X, § 2, noting that La. Const. art. V, § 32 continues the Municipal and Traffic Court under the judicial branch of state government,7 and thus together, Article X, § 2 and Article V, § 32 place the employees of the Municipal and Traffic Court (with one exception) in the unclassified service. See La. Const. art. X, § 2(B)(10) (providing that employees of offices under Article V, the judicial branch of state government, are 7 Louisiana Constitution article V, § 32 specifically provides: Except for provisions relating to terms of office as provided elsewhere in this Article, and notwithstanding any other contrary provision of this constitution, the following courts and officers in Orleans Parish are continued, subject to change by law; the civil and criminal district courts; the city, municipal, traffic, and juvenile courts; the clerks of the civil and criminal district courts; the civil and criminal sheriffs; the constables and the clerks of the first and second city courts; the register of conveyances; and the recorder of mortgages. [Emphasis added.] 7 unclassified except those in the offices of the clerk of the Municipal and Traffic Court). The inquiry does not end here, however, as it is the language of the commission provision which is particularly at issue. As shown above, similar to the provisions for the employees of the Municipal and Traffic Court, Article X, § 2(B) also assigns to the unclassified service the employees, deputies, and officers of the legislature and of the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, each mayor and city attorney, of police juries, and of school boards, as examples. By contrast however, and importantly, only one private secretary to the president of each college or university and one person holding a confidential position and one principal assistant or deputy to any officer, board, commission, or authority mentioned in Sections 2(B)(1), (2), (4), and (5) are placed in the unclassified service. See La. Const. art. X, § 2(B)(6) and (7). A reading in full of Article X, § 2 reveals that it is not simply that positions may be added to the unclassified service by commission provision, as argued by the Civil Service Commission. Rather, where a limit, by constitutional provision, is imposed upon the number of unclassified positions, therein “additional positions” may be added by the Commission. This is so because any position not specified as unclassified is classified; to create additional positions within the unclassified system is to change the status of a classified position, thereby invoking the rulemaking authority and jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. And in keeping with the objective of Civil Service Commission, our interpretation limits the Commission’s power solely to the administration and regulation of the classified service. See La. Const. art. X, § 10(A). In other words, the commission provision is applicable to Sections 2(B)(6) and (7), which, by provision restrict the number of positions in the unclassified service. However, where no numerical limit is imposed upon the Municipal and Traffic Court’s unclassified service, the commission provision is inapplicable. Any 8 other interpretation would lead to absurd results. Surely, the Commission cannot amend the Constitution by adding new categories of officers and employees to the already enumerated unclassified service. Indeed, Article X, § 2 dictates the positions in the unclassified service, which includes the Municipal and Traffic Court’s technology officer position.8 The Civil Service Commission’s contention that La. R.S. 13:2496 operates to limit each of the judges to four unclassified employees, and that approval by the Commission is required for any unclassified position exceeding that number is unsupported by the language of the statute. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:2496 provides: A. In addition to any employee otherwise provided by law, each judge shall appoint four employees as the judge may deem necessary to expedite the business and functions of the court and shall fix their salaries and benefits. B. The salaries and benefits shall be paid by the city of New Orleans on the warrant of the appointing judge. C. The above appointees of the judge, or judges, of the court shall not be included in the civil service system, and shall be considered, for all intents and purposes, as unclassified personnel of the court and shall be included in the unclassified pay plan of the city of New Orleans. While each judge “shall appoint” four employees, nowhere in the language of the statute are the judges, especially when acting collectively, prohibited from appointing more. There would be no reason to provide that the judges together may defray “any expense” of the court from the consolidated judicial expense fund, if indeed, the judges were so limited. See La. R.S. 13:2496.2.9 Moreover, the explicit contention that Commission approval is required for the addition of unclassified 8 It is clear from the record that the court technology officer position is not within the office of the clerk, and no assertion of such is made herein. 9 The statute provides in pertinent part: A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, a majority of the judges of the Municipal and Traffic Court of New Orleans may authorize a payment from the consolidated judicial expense fund of the court to defray any expense of the court including but not limited to salary supplements for any personnel as in their discretion may be necessary to expedite the business and function of the court. [Emphasis added.] 9 court positions is unsupported by a plain reading of La. R.S. 13:2496, and, as we have expressed herein, unsupported by La. Const. art. X, § 2. Having so found, we now turn our attention to the judges’ request for declaratory judgment and the writ of mandamus, noting that in a declaratory judgment action, there must exist a concrete, justiciable controversy framing the facts in order to avoid the rendering of an advisory opinion. See Goodwin v. City of Mandeville, 18-1118, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/19), 277 So.3d 822, 828, writ denied, 19-01083 (La. 10/8/19), 319 So.3d 856. A person is entitled to relief by declaratory judgment when his rights are uncertain or disputed in an immediate and genuine situation and the declaratory judgment will remove the uncertainty or terminate the dispute. Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, Division of Administration, Office of State Purchasing, 95-2105, p. 7 (La. 3/8/96), 669 So.2d 1185, 1191. The critical element necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is that the public official to whom the writ is directed may exercise no element of discretion when complying in the performance of a ministerial duty.10 See La. C.C.P. art. 3863; Hoag v. State, 04-0857, p. 7 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1023. Based on our review of the facts, we find a concrete, justiciable controversy, and thus conclude, as the trial court did, that the judges are entitled to declaratory relief. Further, given the facts and our present decision, we agree that the personnel director had a ministerial duty to enter the court technology officer position onto the unclassified payroll system. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we find the court of appeal erred. We vacate the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the trial court. COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT VACATED, TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED. 10 A ministerial duty is a “simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.” Hoag v. State, 04-0857, p. 7 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1023. 10