Full Opinion

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #051 FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the 30th day of October, 2026 are as follows: BY Burris, J.: 2026-C-00448 STEVE CROOKS, ET AL. VS. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL. (Parish of Rapides) APPELLATE COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS AMENDED. REMANNED. SEE OPINION. Weimer, C.J., dissents in part and assigns reasons. SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2026-C-00448 STEVE CROOKS, ET AL. VS. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL. On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides BURRIS, J. In this class action, we reduce the attorney fee award to $16,713,656.20. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The underlying facts of this case were set forth in Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, 19-0160 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So. 3d 574, opinion corrected on reh’g (4/9/20) (“Crooks I”). As explained therein, in 1962, the United States began constructing various structures in and around the Catahoula Basin to promote navigation on the Ouachita and Black Rivers. Upon completion of the project, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service began managing the water levels in and around the Catahoula Basin. The State, through the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, also granted mineral leases in the area known as Catahoula Lake. In 2006, Steve Crooks and Era Lea Crooks filed a class action alleging they represented a class of landowners in the Catahoula Basin whose property was affected by increased water levels from the project. The trial court certified the plaintiffs as one class, but subdivided the class into two groups, the Lake Plaintiffs and the Swamp Plaintiffs, depending on the location of their properties. The Lake Plaintiffs sought (1) ownership of the land between the ordinary low and ordinary high water mark of the Little River located within the area known as Catahoula Lake; (2) a declaration that these lands were unlawfully expropriated by the navigation 1 project; (3) damages for this inverse condemnation; and (4) recovery of the mineral royalty and other payments received by the State from mineral leases granted over the property. The Swamp Plaintiffs owned overflow lands located in the southwestern portion of the Catahoula Basin. Because ownership of these swampland tracts was not disputed, these plaintiffs sought only a declaration of unlawful expropriation and damages for the inverse condemnation. See Crooks I, 340 So 3d at 577. The key issue presented to the trial court for the Lake Plaintiffs was the classification of the area known as Catahoula Lake. The Lake Plaintiffs argued the area was actually the banks of the Little River, thus conferring on the Lake Plaintiffs ownership of the lands between the ordinary low and the ordinary high water mark. La. Civ. Code art. 456 (“The banks of navigable rivers or streams are private things that are subject to public use. The bank of a navigable river or stream is the land lying between the ordinary low and the ordinary high stage of the water.”). The State countered, arguing Catahoula Lake is a lake and the State owns the bed and waters below the ordinary high water mark. La. Civ. Code art. 450 (“Public things that belong to the state are such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore.”). See Crooks I, 340 So. 3d at 577. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the body of water in the Catahoula Basin in 1812 was a permanent river that seasonally overflowed and covered its banks. Thus, the riparian landowners, the Lake Plaintiffs, are the owners of these riverbanks. The trial court also found the State liable for the inverse condemnation of these lands because of the significant obstruction of the natural servitude of drainage. See Crooks I, 340 So. 3d at 578. 2 Specifically, the trial court declared the Lake Plaintiffs the owners of 22,813.48 acres of land and awarded them expropriation damages in the amount of $28,745,438.40 based on $1,260.00 per acre, and $4,694,309.68 in oil and gas royalties. The trial court also declared the Swamp Plaintiffs the owners of 7,580 acres of the overflow lands and awarded expropriation damages in the amount of $9,550,800.00, based on the same value of $1,260.00 per acre. It further awarded legal interest on all awards to run from May 4, 2006, until paid. The trial court set attorney fees for class counsel in the amount of $22,075,843.82 and ordered seventy- five percent of the attorney fee award to be paid by the State and twenty-five percent to be assessed against the class common fund pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5111 and La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 595. A judgment on all claims was signed on May 15, 2017.1 On appeal, the appellate court found that since the taking of class plaintiffs’ land was committed by the United States, not the State, La. R.S. 13:5111 did not apply. Thus, 100% of the attorney fees should be assessed against the common fund pursuant to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 597. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed in 1 Regarding ownership of the land, this judgment stated: IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the body of water in the Catahoula Basin in 1812 was a permanent river that seasonally overflowed and covered its banks. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that there be judgment herein recognizing that the class of plaintiffs identified as the riparian landowner plaintiffs (also known as the “Lake Plaintiffs”) are the legal owners of the river banks in the Catahoula Basin, consisting of 22,813.84 acres of lands located between the ordinary low water mark of the Little River and the ordinary high water mark of 36 feet mean sea level of the Little River, which lands are depicted in light blue and referred to as the bed and bottom of the so-called “Catahoula Lake” on the State’s exhibit introduced into evidence and identified as FW 202, a copy of which is attached hereto and made part of this final judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that there be judgment herein recognizing that the class of plaintiffs identified as the overflow landowner plaintiffs (also known as the “Swamp Plaintiffs”) are the legal owners of the 7,580 acres of land patented by the State of Louisiana in the southwestern portion of the Catahoula Basin, which lands are identified as property listing nos. 29 through 83, and as the lands owned by W.H. Ward Properties, Inc., on the State’s exhibit introduced into evidence and identified as FW 202, a copy of which is attached hereto and made part of this final judgment. 3 all other respects. Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, 17-0750 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/28/18), 263 So. 3d 540. This court granted a writ of certiorari and found plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims against the State for compensation had prescribed. See Crooks I, 340 So. 3d at 584. Thus, the expropriation award of $28,745,438.40 to the Lake Plaintiffs and $9,550,800.00 to the Swamp Plaintiffs was reversed. Id. at 587. In all other respects, the appellate court judgment was affirmed. Id. Thereafter, this court granted rehearing, solely for the purpose of correcting a footnote in the original opinion to clarify that the award for attorney fees, expert witness fees, and costs was not at issue in the writ application. Id. at 587 (on rehearing). After this court reversed the expropriation award, a disagreement arose between class counsel and some members of the class regarding attorney fees. These plaintiffs retained substitute counsel and filed a Motion to Set Attorneys’ Fees of Class Counsel. These plaintiffs argued the attorney fees should be reduced proportionally because of the reduction of the total award that occurred. The plaintiffs argued that the common fund now only contained money from the royalties awarded to the Lake Plaintiffs. Class counsel opposed, arguing res judicata barred re-litigation of the 2017 attorney fee award. Class counsel also believed the common fund consists of more than just the royalties awarded because it also includes the future royalties and the value of the ownership rights secured over the land. The lower courts found the attorney fee issue had already been decided and was res judicata. See Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, 23-0478 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/6/24) 2024 WL 954450 at *5. This court granted plaintiff’s writ application and issued a per curiam directing the trial court to reconsider the award in light of the significant reduction in the overall damages ultimately awarded to the class. Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, 24-0432 (La. 6/25/24), 386 So. 3d 1073 (“Crooks II”). 4 On December 6, 2024, the trial court held a hearing to reconsider the attorney fees. The trial court used the Lodestar Method multiplying the total billable hours of 13,108.75 by an hourly rate of $425.00 per hour to reach an attorney fee award of $5,571,218.75. Legal interest was also awarded from December 6, 2024 until paid. On appeal, the appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to apply a multiplier to the baseline lodestar fee. Crooks v. State Through Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, 25-0478 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/4/26), 433 So. 3d 21, 33. It multiplied the trial court’s award of $5,571,218.75 by a factor of four to increase the attorney fee award to $22,284,875.00. Id. at 34. This is roughly equivalent to the original attorney fee award, which was based on a one-third percentage of the monetary award without considering the value of the property. However, this is less than the original percentage method when factoring in the value of the property and royalties. The appellate court considered that the evidence at trial established the land is valued at $68,200,000.00 and that the royalty amount has increased to approximately $9,000,000.00, for a total value of $77,200,000.00. Had it not been for the efforts of class counsel over twenty years of litigation, the class would not have $77,200,000.00 in land and royalties. Thus, it found the award of $22,284,875.00 fair and reasonable. The appellate court also awarded interest from the date of the first attorney fee award, May 15, 2017. Id. at 33-34 Class plaintiffs applied to this court and we granted certiorari. Crooks v. State through Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, 26-0448 (La. 6/25/26), --- So. 3d ---. DISCUSSION A court may award attorney fees in a class action when “as a result of the class action a fund is made available, or a recovery or compromise is had which is beneficial, to the class.” La. Code of Civ. Proc. art. 595(A). An appellate court 5 reviews an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Covington v. McNeese State University, 12-2182 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 343, 348. Courts have relied on two methods to calculate class action fee awards, the percentage of the fund approach and the lodestar approach. See Andrew J. Trask, Fee Multipliers in Class Actions, 86 La. L. Rev. 405, 406 (2026). The percentage of the fund approach calculates the fee based on the benefit the class receives. Id. The lodestar approach calculates the fee by multiplying the reasonable amount of time expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. Here, the trial court used the lodestar approach, multiplying the total billable hours of 13,108.75 by an hourly rate of $425.00 per hour to reach an attorney fee award of $5,571,218.75. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to apply a multiplier to the baseline lodestar calculation. Thus, it multiplied the trial court’s award by a factor of four, which increased the attorney fee award to $22,284,875.00. We now consider the propriety of this enhancement. Under the lodestar approach, the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the results obtained. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). However, a strong presumption exists that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee, and therefore, it should only be enhanced or reduced in rare and exceptional cases. Covington, 118 So.3d at 351 citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). In Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010), the United States Supreme Court set forth a framework for enhancement of a lodestar award in the context of federal fee-shifting statutes. The court explained that an enhancement may not be awarded based on a factor that is subsumed in the lodestar calculation. Id. at 553. The novelty and complexity of a case generally may not be used as a ground 6 for an enhancement because these factors are presumably reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel. Id. The quality of an attorney’s performance generally should not be used to adjust the lodestar either because considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party’s counsel’s representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly rate. Id. The fee applicant has the burden of proving the enhancement is necessary by specific evidence that supports the award. Id. citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 901 (1984) (An enhancement must be based on evidence that enhancement was necessary to provide fair and reasonable compensation.). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected any contention that a fee determined by the lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation. The lodestar method was never intended to be conclusive in all circumstances. Instead, there is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553-554. Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhancement award may be justified. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several factors that may support an enhancement. An enhancement may be appropriate where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value. Perdue, at 554-55. An enhancement may be appropriate if the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and litigation is exceptionally protracted. Id. at 555. There may also be extraordinary circumstances supporting an enhancement when an attorney’s 7 performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees. Id. at 556. The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that there are rare circumstances where superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account in the lodestar calculation. Id. at 554. Enhancement requires specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel. Id. citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 897. Notably, this framework developed within the context of federal civil rights cases, which allow the prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney fee from the non-prevailing party. See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550. This is at odds with the general rule in the American legal system that each party must pay its own attorney fees. Id. This is also distinguishable from the instant case because class counsel does not seek their fee from the non-prevailing party. Rather, they seek their fee from the common fund brought into existence through their own work and effort. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee from the fund. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). This common fund doctrine rests on the perception that those who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense. Id. In both fee shifting cases and common fund cases the attorney fee is ultimately financed by the opposing party. However, the Supreme Court has placed greater restrictions on attorney fees recovered from fee shifting provisions than those recovered from common funds. While fee shifting cases explain the logic behind multipliers, courts often do not follow this reasoning in class actions. Trask, 86 La. L. Rev. at 411. Federal courts instead apply the Johnson factors to adjust the lodestar in a class action. See e.g. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 586 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. Tex. 2008). The twelve Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service 8 adequately; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney because he accepted this case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 755. Based on one or more Johnson factors, the court may apply a multiplier to adjust the lodestar up or down if that factor or factors are not already taken into account by the lodestar itself. Id. at 756 The Johnson factors allow courts more leeway to apply a multiplier than the very restrictive framework set forth in Perdue. However, there is commonality between the two approaches as both consider whether the baseline fee is adequate to attract and compensate counsel considering the resources expended on the case. We find it persuasive that even applying the stricter guidelines developed for fee shifting cases, this case still appears to be the rare exception where a multiplier is appropriate. For similar reasons, the more permissive Johnson factors also support enhancement. An enhancement may be appropriate if the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 555. This case was instituted in 2006 on a contingency fee basis. It has been ongoing for two decades. The attorneys have carried the expense of this prolonged litigation that included two trials, five writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and over half a million dollars in costs and expenses. We find this to be an extraordinary outlay of expenses that supports the application of a multiplier. An enhancement may also be appropriate in circumstances where an attorney’s performance involves an exceptional delay in the payment of fees. Id. at 556. These attorneys were first awarded attorney fees on May 15, 2017. Nearly a 9 decade later, their fee remains in dispute. This constitutes an exceptional delay in the payment of fees that supports the application of a multiplier. Finally, there may be circumstances where superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account in the lodestar calculation because the lodestar fee would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel. Id. at 554. Here, the attorneys undertook significant risks and have worked on a contingency fee basis for two decades. This litigation was an enormous effort and the primary goal, to determine that the Basin was a river owned by the private sector, was accomplished. The issues presented were novel and difficult, and the litigation was lengthy and expensive. Under these circumstances, the lodestar fee alone would not have been adequate to attract competent counsel. This factor also supports application of a multiplier. In sum, an enhancement may be appropriate when superior attorney performance is not adequately considered in the lodestar calculations, when the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted, and where the attorney’s performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554-56. All of these factors are present here. We therefore agree that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to apply a multiplier to the lodestar fee. Enhancement of the baseline fee is also supported by the affidavit of Dane Ciolino, a professor at Loyola Law School and an expert regarding legal fees. Mr. Ciolino’s affidavit in this matter was executed on September 7, 2016. In it he opined that the lodestar baseline fee in this case should be increased by a multiplier: [I]t is my opinion that an increase of the baseline lodestar by a multiplier in this case is appropriate for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs filed the Crooks suit in 2006–more than 10 years ago. Since then, their lawyers have invested time and costs for which they have yet to be compensated. Given this extraordinary delay, it is my opinion that a multiplier should be used. 10 Second, the lawyers representing the plaintiffs in the Crooks litigation undertook significant risk of loss. Given the risk undertaken by the lawyers, it is my opinion that a multiplier is appropriate. As to the amount of the multiplier, the nationwide mean multiplier used in lodestar cases is approximately 1.75. See generally Newberg on Class Actions § 15:50 (citing Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study on Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 811, 833-34 (2010) (reporting the mean multiplier to be 1.65); Theordore Eisenberg and Georffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 248, 247 tbl.14 (2010) (reporting the mean multiplier to be 1.81)). However, given the amount of time that the Crooks litigation has been pending, and the risk undertaken by the plaintiffs’ lawyers, it is my opinion that a higher than average multiplier should be applied, namely, a multiplier in the range of 2-4. Thus, the average multiplier used in lodestar cases is approximately 1.75, but Mr. Ciolino suggested a higher multiplier in the range of two to four. Multipliers between two and four are considered reasonable in complex class actions. Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 62 F.4th 704 (2d Cir. 2023) (lodestar multiplier of 2.45 in antitrust class action); Voulgaris v. Array Biopharma, Inc., 60 F.4th 1259 (10th Cir. 2023) (lodestar multiplier of 2.8 in securities fraud class action); In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2009) (lodestar multiplier of 2.6 in products liability class action); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) (lodestar multiplier of 3.65 in employee benefits class action); In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. La. 1997) (lodestar multiplier of 2.99 in mass tort class action); Riveman v. Burlington N.R. Co., 118 F.R.D. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (lodestar multiplier of 3.26 in class action involving bonds); In re Ikon Office Sols., Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (lodestar multiplier of 2.7 in securities fraud class action). However, Mr. Ciolino’s report also suggested reasonable hourly rates for the lawyers as follows: $350-450 per hour for the most senior or experienced lawyers; $250-350 per hour for partners; $100-250 per hour for associates; $50-80 per hour for paralegals and law clerks. Given these rates, he opined that a blended all-lawyer rate would range from $225-350 per hour. The multiplier and the underlying rate 11 must be considered together, and it is within this context that a multiplier of two to four was suggested. The trial court instead used an hourly rate of $425.00 per hour. Because a higher hourly rate was used in the baseline calculation, the appellate court erred in applying a multiplier at the very high end of the acceptable range. We instead find a multiplier of three to be the appropriate enhancement. Multiplying the trial court’s attorney fee award of $5,571,218.75 by a factor of three yields an attorney fee award of $16,713,656.20. A lawyer shall not collect an unreasonable fee. Rule 1.5(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. Courts may inquire as to the reasonableness of attorney fees as part of their prevailing, inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. State, Dept of Transp. and Development v. Williams, 597 So. 2d 439, 441-42 (La. 1992). We recognize that here the attorney fee exceeds the value of the monetary recovery. However, it is reasonable when the full value of the class action’s recovery is considered. La Code of Civ. Proc. art. 595(A) allows a court to award attorney fees “when as a result of the class action a fund is made available, or a recovery or compromise is had which is beneficial, to the class.” Emphasis added. The plain language of this article permits an attorney fee award not only when a fund is available, but also when some other type of recovery is had that is beneficial to the class. Here, class counsel succeeded in reclassifying the Catahoula Basin. This resulted in the Lake Plaintiffs being recognized as “the legal owners of the river banks in the Catahoula Basin, consisting of 22,813.84 acres of lands located between the ordinary low water mark of the Little River and the ordinary high water mark of 36 feet mean sea level of the Little River.” Class counsel submitted the affidavit of Michael Cope, a Louisiana licensed real estate appraiser, who stated that the fair market value of the land at issue was $3,100.00 per acre as of his October 24, 2024 affidavit. Establishing ownership of this land was a significant recovery that benefits 12 the class. Class counsel also recovered royalty payments for the class that stems from their newly recognized ownership of the land. Article 595 allows the court to grant attorney fees when a class action results in a fund or recovery that is beneficial to the class. This recovery includes the land, although we recognize some dispute remains between the parties as to its exact value. The trial court awarded legal interest from the date of its new award, December 6, 2024. The appellate court amended to allow interest from the date of the original award, May 15, 2017. The date interest begins to run on an award of attorney fees is the date on which they are awarded by the trial court because that is the date that their amount is ascertainable. Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Sons Loggers, 97-0110 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 1382, 1387-88. Attorney fees were awarded by the trial court on May 15, 2017. This award has been revised but never vacated. Thus, we agree that May 15, 2017, is the operable date for purposes of legal interest. In making this award, we are cognizant of the fact that additional expenses lie ahead. We recognize some money must remain in the common fund to bring this matter to fruition. Thus, the case is remanded to the trial court to decide what reserves should be retained in the common fund and how the attorney fees will be paid. CONCLUSION We amend the appellate court’s judgment to reduce the attorney fee award from $22,284,875.00 to $16,713,656.20. In all other respects, the appellate court’s judgment is affirmed. APPELLATE COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS AMENDED. REMANDED. 13 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2026-C-00448 STEVE CROOKS, ET AL. VS. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL. On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides WEIMER, C.J., dissenting in part. The long history of this class action is detailed in the majority opinion. The court now finds itself in the middle of the all too common issue of the value of services rendered by attorneys in a class action suit. There is no debate the attorneys who make up class counsel are eminently skilled and performed remarkable work in obtaining an overall favorable result for class members. However, because the original monetary judgment was substantially reduced on appeal, this court previously remanded the case to the district court to set a reasonable attorney fee: [I]n light of the significant reduction in the overall damages ultimately awarded to the class in this case, this matter is remanded to the district court for a hearing to determine a reasonable attorney fee, pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 595. Crooks v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 24-00432, p. 3 (La. 6/25/24), 386 So.3d 1073, 1075. This court explained that the attorney fee was fixed in a separate judgment after trial, and the issue did not arise until after a reversal of the “lion’s share” of the class plaintiffs’ damages award. Id, 24-00432 at 1-2, 386 So.3d at 1074-75. The court’s per curiam opinion expressed obvious concern given that the class members were liable for a $22,075,843.82 attorney fee award when their monetary recovery plummeted from approximately $42.9 million to approximately $4.7 million, plus interest. See id. This court is now tasked with evaluating whether the attorney fee awarded on remand was reasonable, as the purpose of lawsuits is not to enrich attorneys, but to ensure fair, just, and reasonable compensation. Following this court’s remand order, the district court used the lodestar method and determined a reasonable fee to be $5,571,218.75. The court of appeal approved the use of that method, but found the district court should have applied a multiplier to the baseline lodestar fee. By applying a factor of four to the district court’s $5,571,218.75 attorney fee award, the court of appeal increased the award to $22,284,875.00—more that the amount originally awarded post-trial and before the reversal of most of the monetary award on appeal. The majority finds application of a multiplier was correct, but lowers it to a factor of three, thereby reducing the attorney fee award to $16,713,656.20. Finding application of any multiplier inappropriate in this case, I must respectfully dissent. In class actions, attorney fees are allowable “when as a result of the class action a fund is made available, or a recovery or compromise is had which is beneficial, to the class.” La. C.C.P. art. 595. Class counsel successfully had the Catahoula Basin classified as a river, rather than a lake, resulting in plaintiffs being recognized as legal owners of the land located between the low and high water marks.1 In addition to the value of that land, class counsel recovered approximately $4.7 million in past oil and gas royalty payments for those plaintiffs. Thus, class counsel obtained both a monetary fund and a beneficial recovery for the class, and both should be taken into consideration when determining reasonable attorney fees. 1 The total acreage recovered by class counsel for class members has not yet been calculated. Based on my reading of Judge Boddie’s reasons for judgment, it appears that he determined there are approximately 22,813.84 acres in the Catahoula Basin below the high water mark. Thus, this acreage would include land already owned by the plaintiffs prior to suit, as well as land owned by the State and any land owner who opted out of the class action. The land was valued at $3,100.00 per acre. 2 The lodestar method used by the lower courts is an acceptable approach for courts to use to determine a reasonable fee, as it produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010). This method of calculation is objective and, thus, limits the discretion of the trial judge, permits meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably predictable results. Id. at 552. In using this method, the initial estimate of a reasonable attorney fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate, which is to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 12- 2182, p. 5 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 343, 348. The district court performed this calculation by multiplying the undisputed total hours of 13,108.75 by an hourly rate of $425.00 per hour to reach an attorney fee award of $5,571,218.75. The court of appeal enhanced that figure by applying a multiplier of four, thereby, increasing the fee to $22,284,875.00. A strong presumption exists that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee and, therefore, it should only be enhanced or reduced in rare and exceptional cases. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552. The majority finds this is such a case, noting factors supporting enhancement (when superior attorney performance is not adequately considered in the lodestar calculations; when the attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionably protracted; where the attorney’s performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fee) were all present in this case. But, if an enhancement to the lodestar calculation is allowed, it cannot be based on a factor which is subsumed in the lodestar calculation. 3 Covington, 12-2182 at 12, 118 So.3d at 351 (citing Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553). In my opinion, this is where the majority errs. In their applications of the lodestar method, the lower courts and the majority relied on the expert report of Professor Dane Ciolino. Notably, Professor Ciolino stated that the reasonable hourly rates for the lawyers involved in this case would range from $225.00 to $350.00 per hour (blending rates for all levels of lawyers). Although he opined that a multiplier between two and four was appropriate to account for the delay in compensation and the risk for taking the case on contingency, that opinion was provided in conjunction with the lower base rate range. The application of an enhancement is not warranted here because any delay in compensation and risk of loss was already clearly accounted for in the district court’s upward deviation in the base rate to $425.00 per hour. It is also worth noting that Professor Ciolino’s opinion was expressed when he considered the case prior to the substantial reduction in damages when the attorneys had achieved a much more successful outcome. In Louisiana, an award of attorney fees is reviewed by the appellate court for an abuse of discretion. Covington, 12-2182 at 6, 118 So.3d at 348. The trial court’s factual findings will not be set aside absent manifest error. Id. While the fee may be on the lower end of compensation for such a long and complex class action case, I cannot say the district court abused its vast discretion in setting the fee, especially when considering it exceeded the $4.7 million in monetary damages actually awarded to class plaintiffs. As a final note, although not directly related to this court’s majority opinion, I must express concerns regarding future collection of the attorney fee. There is no question that the cash available in the common fund is not sufficient to satisfy the $16,713,656.20 plus interest attorney fee awarded by the majority opinion. Although 4 the total acreage of the land recovered for class members has not been fully calculated, it is likely of a sufficient value to satisfy the attorney fee award. However, the only way class counsel can fully collect their fee is to take it in kind–whether class members transfer certain property or whether class counsel obtains a judicial mortgage on the property. I have strong reservations regarding the propriety of the attorneys effectively becoming co-owners of property with class members, or allowing the attorneys to place a judicial mortgage on the property with the ability to force a sale. Such a scenario appears disconcerting at a minimum. For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent in part. 5