Janet Louise Payne Glisson and William Bradley Glisson v. Edward Jay Ellington, Kathy Riser Ellington, Group One Realty, L.L.C. D/B/A Coldwell Banker Realty One and John Christopher Stephenson
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket57,110-CA
JudgeHunter
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Judgment rendered November 18, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 57,110-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
JANET LOUISE PAYNE Plaintiffs-Appellants
GLISSON AND WILLIAM
BRADLEY GLISSON
versus
EDWARD JAY ELLINGTON, Defendants-Appellees
KATHY RISER ELLINGTON,
GROUP ONE REALTY, L.L.C.
D/B/A COLDWELL BANKER
REALTY ONE AND JOHN
CHRISTOPHER STEPHENSON
*****
Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 62,496
Honorable Thomas Wynn Rogers, Judge
*****
AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, Counsel for Appellants
BENSON & PAINE, LLC
By: Lee H. Ayres
Codi D. Setters
NAPPER & MADDEN LAW Counsel for Appellees,
OFFICE & TITLE COMPANY John Chris Stephenson,
By: Michael Ryan Madden John Christopher
Stephenson, Martha Sue
Stephenson, Kiley
Edwards Stephenson,
and Katie Stephenson
Steed
OFFICE OF W. KYLE GREEN, LLC Counsel for Appellees,
By: Rebekah H. Wade Edward J. Ellington and
Kathy Riser Ellington
GALLOWAY, JOHNSON, Counsel for Appellees,
TOMPKINS, BURR & SMITH Group One Realty,
By: Richard G. Duplantier, Jr. L.L.C. and Coldwell
Patricia P. Wattigny Banker Realty One
Parker William Bradley
*****
Before COX, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
HUNTER, J.
Plaintiffs, Janet Louise Payne Glisson and William Bradley Glisson,
appeal a district court judgment granting a motion for summary judgment
filed by defendant, Group One Realty, L.L.C. d/b/a Coldwell Banker Group
One Realty. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
FACTS
On May 18, 2021, defendants, Edward Jay Ellington and Kathy Riser
Ellington (“the Ellingtons”), signed an “Exclusive Right to Sell Agreement”
to sell immovable property located at 126 Llanfair Drive in Ruston,
Louisiana. The Ellingtons designated defendant Group One Realty (“Group
One”) as their broker and defendant John Christopher Stephenson as their
agent. Stephenson had been an agent and broker with Group One since
2012.
On May 21, 2021, plaintiffs, Janet and William Bradley Glisson,
signed an agreement to purchase the property from the Ellingtons for
$429,000. Stephenson also acted as plaintiffs’ agent. The sale was
completed, the closing took place on July 22, 2021, and plaintiffs moved
into the house on August 7, 2021. Prior to the purchase, the inspections of
the home and swimming pool revealed several issues, some of which were
corrected prior to closing. After moving into the home, plaintiffs alleged
they began noticing “numerous defects to the interior and structure of the
home,” and they notified the Ellingtons, Stephenson, and Group One and
requested they remedy the alleged defects. Defendants failed to do so.
On August 5, 2022, plaintiffs filed a “Petition in Redhibition, for
Damages, Breach of Contract, and Fraud.” Plaintiffs alleged the residence
was uninhabitable “due to structural damage, rodent infestation, and
redhibitory defects which renders it unfit for the purpose it was constructed
for.” Plaintiffs also alleged defendants “knowingly and intentionally
misrepresent[ed] the condition and inhabitability of the property purchased.”
Additionally, plaintiff averred defendants failed to disclose and intentionally
concealed major defects in the home, such as the hidden damage to the shed;
a crack in the concrete on the carport; a leaking sink inside a cabinet; an
underground rotted return air pipe, which was disconnected from the HVAC
and “filled with stagnant ground water and open to the interior of the home
*** causing foul smelling air, insects, and reptiles to come into the home”;
the pool was not functional; the gas had been disconnected from the furnace;
and the air conditioning ducts “contained the remains of several dead rodents
and rodent feces.”1
On September 22, 2022, Group One filed peremptory exceptions of no
cause of action and prescription and dilatory exceptions of vagueness and
ambiguity. Group One raised the following arguments: (1) plaintiffs had
contractually waived their claims of redhibition; (2) the claims of redhibition
had prescribed; and (3) plaintiffs’ allegations against Group One were vague
and were not pled with particularity. The district court granted the
exceptions, in part, and dismissed the redhibition claims against Group One.
1
Stephenson died on February 13, 2023. Thereafter, plaintiffs amended the
petition to substitute as defendants “The Estate of John Chris Stephenson, Martha Sue
Stephenson in her capacity as surviving spouse of John Chris Stephenson, Kiley Edwards
Stephenson, and Katie Stephenson Steed, as heirs of John Chris Stephenson” (“the
Stephenson defendants”). The claims pertaining to the Stephenson defendants are not at
issue in this appeal.
2
On November 17, 2025, Group One filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing plaintiffs did not identify any acts of intentional fraud or
misrepresentation committed by or on behalf of Group One. More
specifically, Group One asserted the allegations set forth in plaintiffs’
petition did not concern it and failed to specify how it misrepresented or
suppressed the truth in connection with the sale. Group One further noted an
“Independent Agent Agreement” existed between it and Stephenson and
attached documents indicating the buy/sell agreement signed by plaintiffs
provided that Stephenson was “an independent contractor for Broker” and
“shall not be an employee of the sponsoring or qualifying broker.”2
Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion for
summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against Group One with
prejudice. The court found that Stephenson was an independent agent, and
plaintiffs “fail[ed] to provide anything to establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to the status of John Chris Stephenson as an independent
contractor. Consequently, Group One Realty cannot be held vicariously
liable for any of the actions of John Chris Stephenson.” The court also
found that there is nothing in the record to establish that Paula Beasley, the
managing broker for Group One, “knew of any defects, had any reason to
know, or provided any incorrect information to [plaintiffs].” The district
court stated:
2
Further, Group One argued that plaintiffs were provided with a property
disclosure document, engaged a company to inspect the property and a separate company
to inspect the swimming pool, and received inspection reports for the property and the
condition of the pool. Group One also asserted that plaintiffs accepted and signed a
waiver of warranty contained in the Act of Sale, which provided the property was being
sold “as-is” and specifically stated the sellers were relieved and released “from any and
all claims for any vices or defects in said property, whether obvious or latent, known or
unknown, easily discoverable or hidden, and particularly for any claim or cause of action
for redhibition.”
3
***
Neither the Restated Petition of the Petitioners [n]or Janet
Glisson’s affidavit filed in opposition to Group One Realty’s
Motion for Summary Judgment provide[s] any facts to show
that anyone associated with Group One Realty had any
knowledge of the defects claimed by Petitioners. No facts are
alleged to indicate that anyone at Group One Realty had any
reason to make inquiry regarding any of these defects or had
any reason to even suspect that the defects existed. Neither of
the inspection reports provided to the Petitioners pointed to any
of the defects claimed by Petitioners.
The Property Disclosure Statement provided to the Petitioners
was completed by the Ellingtons and clearly is their
representation of the condition of the home. R.S. 9:389B states
that “The licensee is not liable for any error, inaccuracy or
omission in a Property Disclosure Document, unless the
licensee has actual knowledge of the error, inaccuracy or
omission by the Seller.” None of the genuine material facts
claimed by the Petitioners indicate anyone related to Group One
Realty actually knew of the defects or had any reason to know.
***
Plaintiffs appeal.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in treating the pleading filed
by Group One as a motion for summary judgment. They argue Group One
had filed an exception of vagueness, in which it claimed plaintiffs’
allegations were vague and did not allege fraud or mistake with particularity,
and the district court overruled the exception. Thereafter, Group One filed a
motion for summary judgment on the same grounds – plaintiffs “failed to
state any alleged cause of action for fraud against Group One with
particularity required by [La. C.C.P. arts.] 856 and 891.” According to
plaintiffs, the motion for summary judgment was merely a “do over” for the
previously denied exception of vagueness, and any alleged failure to plead
with particularity must be addressed by an exception of vagueness, not by
motion for summary judgment.
4
Further, plaintiffs argue the district court violated La. C.C.P. art.
966(F) by granting summary judgment on grounds not raised in the motion
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue pursuant to Art. 966(F), the district
court was permitted to render judgment “only as to those issues set forth” in
Group One’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs further assert Group
One did not specifically assert that plaintiffs lacked factual support for the
claims asserted against Group One and did not explicitly argue that there
were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding the claims of
fraud and misrepresentation. Therefore, the district court improperly granted
the motion for summary judgment on those grounds.
An exception of vagueness is raised by dilatory exception. La. C.C.P.
art. 926(A)(5). On the trial of the dilatory exception, evidence may be
introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the
grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 930. The
purpose of the exception of vagueness is to place the defendant on notice of
the nature of the facts sought to be proved so as to enable him to identify the
cause of action, thus preventing future relitigation after a judgment is
obtained. Port City Glass & Paint Inc. v. Brooks, 52,534 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 516; Casares v. James M. Brown Builder, Inc., 44,561
(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/19/09), 17 So. 3d 1022, writ denied, 09-2055 (La.
11/20/09), 25 So. 3d 813.
A party may move for summary judgment for all or part of the relief
for which he has prayed. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(1). The summary judgment
procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action. The procedure is favored and shall be
construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). After an
5
opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be
granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that
there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3); Staten v. Glenwood
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 53,220 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So. 3d 280, writ
denied, 20-00591 (La. 9/23/20), 301 So. 3d 1184.
In the instant case, Group One filed its motion for summary judgment
and attached multiple exhibits, including the independent agent agreement
between Group One and Stephenson, the dual agency agreement between
Stephenson and plaintiffs, an affidavit executed by Paula Beasley, the
managing broker for Group One, the home and swimming pool inspection
reports, and the documents associated with the sale. In the motion and
supporting memorandum, Group One noted Stephenson was an independent
contractor, and it introduced the agreement between it and Stephenson to
support its claim. Group One also argued that plaintiffs failed to allege or
present evidence of fraud or misrepresentation committed by Group One or
any of its employees.
As stated above, La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3) provides that “a motion for
summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and
supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact
and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Throughout
the motion and accompanying documents, Group One referred to
Stephenson as an independent contractor and argued that plaintiffs’
allegations pertained to Stephenson and could not be attributable to Group
One.
6
We find Group One’s motion and argument were sufficient to put
plaintiffs on notice of Group One’s contention that since Stephenson was an
independent agent, Group One could not be held vicariously liable for any
alleged fraud or misrepresentations that may have been committed by
Stephenson. Accordingly, we find the motion, memorandum, and
supporting documents filed by Group One constituted a motion for summary
judgment and cannot be construed as an exception of vagueness or no cause
of action. Further, we find the district court properly considered the
arguments and documents submitted by the parties. Although in its reasons
for judgment, the court noted issues not raised by Group One, we find the
court did not base its ruling solely on those issues.3
Plaintiffs also contend the district court erred in granting the motion
for summary judgment filed by Group One. They argue, inter alia, that
summary judgment is improper because genuine issues of material fact are
in dispute regarding Stephenson’s status as an independent contractor.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with the appellate court
using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of
material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So. 2d 880; Logan v.
3
Appeals are taken from the judgment, not the written reasons for judgment.
Thus, the well-settled rule is that the trial court’s oral or written reasons for judgment
form no part of the judgment, and that appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for
judgment. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So. 3d 507; Union Fed. Credit
Union v. Thornton, 49,529 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/28/15), 162 So. 3d 414, writ denied, 15-
0404 (La. 5/1/15), 169 So. 3d 375.
7
Richland Par. Hosp., 56,127 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So. 3d 1208,
reh’g denied (5/15/25), writ denied, 25-00760 (La. 10/1/25), 417 So. 3d 570.
The burden of proof on a summary judgment motion remains with the
mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). However, if the mover will not bear the
burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for
summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him
to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for
one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support
sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that
the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the opponent
of the motion fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
summary judgment should be granted. Staten, supra.
A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be
essential to plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of
recovery. Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d
791; McGee v. Ashford Place Apartments, LLC, 54,795 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11/16/22), 351 So. 3d 899. A genuine issue is one regarding which
reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only
one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue and summary
judgment is appropriate. Hines v. Garrett, 04-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.
2d 764; McGee, supra.
Furthermore, in determining whether an issue is genuine, a court
should not consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate
testimony, or weigh evidence. McGee, supra; Marioneaux v. Marioneaux,
8
52,212 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 254 So. 3d 13. The prohibition on making
credibility determinations on summary judgment extends to expert affidavits
admitted without objection. McGee, supra; Aziz v. Burnell, 21-187 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 329 So. 3d 963; Thompson v. Center for Pediatric and
Adolescent Med., LLC, 17-1088 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/15/18), 244 So. 3d 441.
Finally, the court must draw those reasonable inferences from the undisputed
facts which are most favorable to the party opposing the motion; likewise,
all doubt must be resolved in the opposing party’s favor. McGee, supra;
Wyrick v. Golden Nugget Lake Charles, LLC, 20-0665 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/30/20), 317 So. 3d 708.
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by
their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they
are employed. La. C.C. art. 2320. For an employer to be held liable for the
actions of an employee under article 2320, the plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) a master-servant relationship existed between the tortfeasor
and the employer, and (2) the tortious act of the tortfeasor was committed
within the scope and during the course of his employment with the
employer. Hughes v. Goodreau, 01-2107 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/31/02), 836
So. 2d 649, writ denied, 03-0232 (La. 4/21/03), 841 So. 2d 793; Brumfield v.
Gafford, 99-1712 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So. 2d 223. Therefore,
once it is determined that an employment contract exists, for purposes of the
employer’s vicarious liability in tort, it is necessary to determine what type
of employment contract exists, i.e., whether the employee is a mere servant
or an independent contractor. Hughes, supra. The distinction between a
mere servant and an independent contractor is a factual determination
9
decided on a case-by-case basis. Tower Credit, Inc. v. Carpenter, 01-2875
(La. 9/4/02), 825 So. 2d 1125.
Generally, although courts look at the totality of the circumstances,
the most important factor in determining whether an employment
relationship exists is the principal’s right of control and supervision over the
individual. Savoie v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 188 (La. 1977);
Smith v. Moreau, 17-0003 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/17), 222 So. 3d 761; Bouquet
v. Williams, 16-0134 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/28/16), 206 So. 3d 232, writ
denied, 16-2077 (La. 1/9/17), 214 So. 3d 870. When, as here, the issue is
whether the worker is an independent contractor or an employee, the court
should also consider if (1) a valid contract exists between the parties; (2) the
work is of an independent nature; (3) the contract allows for the work to be
done according to the contractor’s own methods, without being subject to
control and direction, except as to the result of the services to be rendered;
(4) a specific price for the overall undertaking is agreed upon; and (5) the
duration of the work is for a specific time and not subject to termination at
the will of either party. See, Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co.,
262 La. 102, 262 So. 2d 385 (La. 1972); Smith, supra; Bouquet, supra. The
distinction between an employee and an independent contractor is a factual
determination that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Tower Credit,
supra; Smith, supra.
In Hughes, supra, the First Circuit considered the issue of whether the
real estate agents were employees of the company or were independent
contractors. In that case, the buyers purchased a home from the sellers. At
the time of the sale, the sellers engaged the services of Roberta Broussard, a
sales associate for Prudential Louisiana Properties d/b/a Property Plus
10
(“Prudential”), to list and assist in the sale of their home. The buyers, who
were relocating from Alabama, engaged Sharon Haber, also a sales associate
of Prudential, to help them find a suitable home in Mandeville. Less than
six months after the buyers purchased and moved into the home, water
flooded the downstairs portion of the house following a heavy rain.
The buyers filed a lawsuit naming the sellers as defendants, alleging
the property contained a redhibitory defect, and seeking rescission of the
sale or, alternatively, reduction of the purchase price. The sellers answered
the lawsuit and filed third party demands against Prudential claiming they
were entitled to tort damages. Following a trial, the court concluded
Prudential was liable for negligent misrepresentation and awarded damages.
Prudential appealed, arguing it was not vicariously liable for the actions of
the real estate agents/sales associates because the sales associates were
independent contractors. In support of its argument, Prudential noted the
contractual agreements it entered into with its sales associates, in which
Prudential identified itself as a “broker” and the sales associates as
“independent contractors.”
The First Circuit employed the Hickman factors to determine whether
the real estate agents were employees of Prudential, despite the written
contracts. The Court concluded the real estate agents “were not independent
contractors of Prudential but mere servants for whom Prudential is
vicariously liable to third persons under La. C.C. art. 2320.” Id. at 659. The
Court stated:
Although the parties entered into a written contract in which
[the real estate agents] were identified as independent
contractors, and this designation may have some validity
between the parties, it is not binding or controlling on the rights
of third persons. The rights of third persons are controlled by
11
the substance, rather than the title, of the contractual
relationship between the parties. Prudential neither dictated the
number of hours the associates had to work nor the properties
for which they were responsible. And Prudential did not direct
the associates on how to spend their time at work. Conversely,
the testimony established that the associates worked exclusively
for Prudential, and as in Hickman, were not free to carry out
their work using their own methods because their written
employment contract required that they “comply with the
Policy and Procedures Manual prepared by Broker.”
***
Id. at 659.
In 2003, the year after Hughes was decided, the Louisiana Legislature
amended La. R.S. 37:1446, and enacted paragraph H, which provides:
A sponsored real estate licensee shall be an independent
contractor of the sponsoring or qualifying broker for all
purposes and shall not be an employee of the sponsoring or
qualifying broker, if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The real estate salesperson or associate broker is a licensee.
(2) Substantially all of the sponsored licensee’s remuneration
for the services performed is directly related to sales or
other output rather than the number of hours worked.
(3) There is a written agreement between the sponsored
licensee and the sponsoring or qualifying broker that
specifies that the sponsored licensee will not be treated as
an employee.
(Emphasis added).
The written agreement between Stephenson, the sponsored licensee,
and Group One, the sponsoring or qualifying broker, was entitled
“Independent Agent Agreement.” The agreement provided in relevant part
with emphasis added:
1. Listings and Cooperation. Broker shall make available to
Salesperson all current listings of the office. Broker may,
upon request, assist Salesperson in his or her work by advice
and instruction. Broker shall provide to Salesperson full
cooperation in every way possible. Nothing shall herein be
construed to require that Salesperson accept or serve any
particular listing or prospective listing offered by Broker;
12
nor shall Broker have any right or authority to direct that
Salesperson to see or service particular parties, or restrict
Salesperson’s activities to particular areas. Broker shall
have no right, except to the extent required by law, to direct
or limit Salesperson’s activities as to hours, leads, open
houses, opportunity for floor time, production, prospects,
reports, sales, schedules, services, inventory, time off,
training, vacation, or other similar activities.
***
3. Efforts by Salesperson. Salesperson shall work diligently
and with his or her best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and
all real estate listed with Broker[.] *** Broker obtains no
authority or right to direct or control Salesperson’s
activities, except as may be required by the statute of the
State of Louisiana and the rules and regulations of the
Louisiana Real Estate Commission, and the salesperson
assumes and retains discretion for methods, techniques and
procedures in soliciting and obtaining listings and sales,
rental, or leases of listed property.
***
5. Compensation of Salesperson. The compensation of the
Salesperson shall be based upon a proportionate share of the
commissions charged by the Broker for services rendered in
real estate transactions in which the Salesperson shall
perform any service pursuant to this Agreement, whereby a
commission is earned, the commission shall, when collected,
be divided between Broker and Salesperson pursuant to the
agreed schedule, and which Salesperson acknowledges he or
she has received.
***
8. Termination. This Agreement and the association created
hereby may be terminated by either parity at any time, upon
written notice given to the other. Upon termination,
Salesperson shall return all listings, manuals and materials,
forms and sales literature loaned to Salesperson by Broker.
Broker shall honor any accrued commission or pending
contracts upon termination of this Agreement.
***
It is undisputed that Stephenson was a licensed real estate agent at the
time of the sale and a valid agreement existed between him and Group One.
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Group One lacked the authority “to
direct or limit [Stephenson’s] activities as to hours, leads, open houses,
opportunity for floor time, production, prospects, reports, sales, schedules,
services, inventory, time off, training, vacation, or other similar activities.”
13
Furthermore, the agreement stated that Group One “obtains no authority or
right to direct or control [Stephenson’s] activities, except as may be required
by the statute of the State of Louisiana and the rules and regulations of the
Louisiana Real Estate Commission[.]”
However, a factor in determining whether a person is an independent
contractor, as opposed to an employee, is whether the termination or
discontinuance of the relationship is subject to the will of either party
without a corresponding liability for breach of contract. Paragraph 8 of the
agreement between Group One and Stephenson states, “This Agreement and
the association created hereby may be terminated by either party at any
time,” and there are no expressed consequences for termination.
The issue of whether a person is an employee or independent
contractor requires a case-by-case, fact-intensive inquiry. Based on the
evidence presented, reasonable minds could disagree as to whether the dual
right to terminate the agreement is sufficient to make Stephenson an
employee of Group One such that Group One could be deemed vicariously
liable for Stephenson’s alleged fraud/misrepresentations. Given the posture
of this case, summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly, we find the
district court erred in granting Group One’s motion for summary judgment.
We hereby reverse the court’s ruling and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the district court’s judgment granting
the motion for summary judgment is hereby reversed, and this matter is
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal
14
are assessed to defendant, Group One Realty, L.L.C. d/b/a Coldwell Banker
Group One Realty.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
15