Full Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT 2026 CA 0537 VERSUS JOSHUA BRISCOE & LINETEC SERVICE L.L.C. Judgment Rendered: NOV 2 0 2026 ON APPEAL FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SECTION 26 IN AND FOR, THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE STATE OF LOUISIANA DOCKET NUMBER C770892 THE HONORABLE RICHARD " CHIP" MOORE, JUDGE PRESIDING Lorcan L. Connick Counsel for Defendant -Appellant John W. Joyce Arch Insurance Company Michael A. Blascio New Orleans, Louisiana J. Patrick Gaffney Counsel for Plaintiff A - ppellee Stephen P. Scullin Jacob Tramble, as Curator for David J. Scotton Sherri Tramble Patrick R. Stewart New Orleans, Louisiana and Richard F. Zimmermann, III Justin R. Glenn Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Michael P. Frug6 A.M. " Tony" Clayton Port Allen, Louisiana Simon N. Levitsky Counsel for Defendant -Appellee Nashville, Tennessee Crawford & Company and Broadspire Service., Inc. Kelly L. Murphy Counsel for Defendant -Appellee Charlotte, NC AFCO Premium Credit, LLC Matthew C. Guy Counsel for Defendant -Appellee Evan P. Gaudet Acrisure, LLC New Orleans, Louisiana Jeffrey M. Suprenant Counsel for Defendant -Appellee Mark J. Chaney, III Bank of America, N.A. Patrick Calhoun, Jr. New Orleans, Louisiana Carroll Devillier, Jr. Counsel for Defendant -Appellee Lawson Nguyen Willis Towers Watson Insurance Baton Rouge, Louisiana Services West, Inc.; Willis Towers Watson Northeast, Inc.; Willis Towers Watson Midwest, Inc.; Willis Tower US, LLC & Willis Towers Watson Southeast, Inc.; Marsh & Mclennan Agency, LLC BEFORE® W LFE, STROMBERG, AND FIELDS, JJ. 2 FIELDS, J. Defendant -appellant, Arch Insurance Company (" Arch"), appeals the trial court' s judgment denying its " Motion to Stay and Enjoin Enforcement of Writs of Fieri Facias, Garnishment Orders, and Notices of Seizure and to Set for Immediate Hearing" (" motion for preliminary injunction"). After the appeal was lodged, plaintiff -appellee, Jacob Tramble, as curator for Sherri Tramble (" Tramble"), filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. For the following reasons, we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal and dismiss the appeal as moot. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Following a motor vehicle accident, Tramble sued Joshua Briscoe, the driver of the other vehicle, Briscoe' s employer, Linetec Service, L.L.C. (" Linetec"), and its insurer, Arch, in the Twenty -Seventh Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Landry. Tramble v. Briscoe, 2025- 423 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 7/ 2/ 26), 2026 WL 19051411 1- 2, writs denied, 2026- 00996 and 2026- 01043 ( La 10/ 28/ 26), _ So. 3d—, 2026 WL 3228208. After the trial of the matter, on November 14, 2024, the trial court signed a $ 219, 742,924. 31 plus interest and costs second amended judgment (" the money judgment") in favor of Tramble and against Briscoe, Linetec, and Arch. See Id. at * 2. Briscoe and Linetec appealed, and the Third Circuit amended the judgment award to $ 40, 000,000. 00 in general damages and $ 41, 300, 219.00 in future medical expenses and affirmed the judgment as amended. Id. at * 28. Arch was not an appellant in that appeal. While the matter was pending on appeal, on November 21, 2025, Tramble filed an ex parte petition to make the money judgment executory in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. In the petition, Tramble alleged that he obtained a money judgment against Arch on November 14, 2024, for 219, 742, 924. 31. Tramble further alleged that since the judgment was rendered, Arch had not taken a suspensive appeal and the delay therefore had expired. Tramble 3 asserted that the money judgment had not been fully paid by Arch, and therefore, Tramble wished to make the judgment executory in East Baton Rouge Parish. Tramble requested that the court make the judgment executory on an ex parte basis as authorized by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2782. On November 25, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment, making the money judgment executory. Tramble subsequently filed numerous Supplemental Petitions for Garnishment of Accounts and Requests for Writs of Fieri Facias against dozens of Arch' s business partners— including banks, brokers, and third -party administrators— purportedly in possession of Arch' s property. The trial court signed multiple orders, ordering the seizure of Arch' s assets. On December 7, 2025, Arch filed its motion for preliminary injunction and memorandum in support thereof. Therein, Arch contended the trial court violated the Louisiana and U.S. constitutions by ordering seizure of its assets to execute a personal injury judgment because it was a direct action defendant that paid its full policy limit. Arch further contended that as a direct action defendant, it could have no liability beyond its policy limits.' Arch noted that the money judgment had been suspensively appealed by Briscoe and Linetec. Therefore, Arch argued the money judgment was not a final, enforceable judgment. Finally, Arch argued that the many procedural defects in the action violated its due process rights. Arch also requested attorneys' fees under La. Code Civ. P. art. 2298. In support of its motion for preliminary injunction, Arch attached the following exhibits: Tramble' s June 8, 2022 petition for damages; Arch' s Insurance Business Auto Declaration for policy no. ZACAT9262801; the November 14, 2024 money judgment; the June 27, 2025 Partial Satisfaction of Judgment; the transcript I Arch alleged that the terms and limits of Arch' s Policy were produced in discovery and admitted into evidence without objection at the trial of the underlying matter. M of October 31, 2024 hearing on Arch' s motion for new trial; and the December 18, 2024 order granting Briscoe and Linetec' s joint motion for suspensive appeal. Tramble opposed Arch' s motion for preliminary injunction. Tramble contended that Arch could not collaterally attack the money judgment. Tramble further contended that the money judgment was a final judgment against Arch from which no appeal lies; therefore, no court had jurisdiction to change the money judgment " regardless ofthe magnitude of thefinal judgment' s error." ( Emphasis in original). Tramble also argued that Arch did not benefit from the appeals filed by Briscoe and Linetec. Tramble pointed out that Arch' s proposed order that requested that Tramble be enjoined without a hearing was a TRO and argued the garnishments are procedurally proper under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Finally, Tramble contended that Arch' s requested relief required a contradictory hearing and a stay had no basis in law. Following an emergency hearing on December 17, 2025, the trial court denied Arch' s motion for preliminary injunction.2 The trial court also denied Arch' s request to stay the effect of the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction while Arch sought relief with this court. The trial court also excluded the affidavit of Brian First, President of Arch, which Arch filed in support of its motion for preliminary injunction, but allowed Arch to proffer the affidavit. A judgment to that effect was signed on January 6, 2026. Arch appeals the trial court' s denial of its motion for preliminary injunction.' z On December 19, 2025, this court issued an interim order staying the trial court' s December 17, 2025 ruling, which denied Arch' s Motion to Stay and Enjoin Enforcement of Writs of Fieri Facias, Garnishment Orders and Notices of Seizure and the Execution of all Writs of Fieri Facias, Garnishment Orders and Notices of Seizure. Tramble v. Briscoe, 2025- 1310 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 12/ 19/ 25) ( unpublished). On February 23, 2026, this court lifted the stay. Tramble v. Briscoe, 2025- 1310 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2/ 23/ 26), 2026 WL 497535, * 1, writ denied, 2026- 00250 ( La. 4/ 28/ 26), 432 So. 3d 121 ( per curiam). The supreme court stayed the matter but subsequently lifted the stay. Tramble v. Briscoe, 2026-00250 ( La. 4/ 28/ 26), 432 So. 3d 121 ( per curiam). 3 On December 18, 2025, Arch filed a motion to appeal the trial court' s December 17, 2025 order issued in open court denying Arch' s " Motion to Stay and Enjoin Enforcement of Writ of Fieri Facias, Garnishment Orders, and Notices of Seizure and its request of preliminary injunction therein", and the trial court granted Arch' s motion to appeal on December 22, 2025. The judgment was signed on January 6, R ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1. The [ trial court] disregarded the Judgment language casting Arch in judgment only " as insurer of the employer, Linetec," and authorized execution beyond Arch' s Policy limit in contravention of Louisiana Supreme Court precedent— interpreting even more general judgment language— which held that, absent proof of bad faith, an insurer cannot be held liable beyond its policy limit.... 2. The [ trial court] ignored the Judgment' s language explaining that Arch by stipulation of the parties) did not appear at trial because it was a direct action defendant, and authorized execution against Arch beyond the terms and limit of its Policy in violation of the Direct Action Statute.... 3. The [ trial court] permitted seizure of Arch[' s] assets above the Policy limit, in violation of the Louisiana and U.S. Constitutions, which guard against the deprivation of property without due process and the impairment of contractual rights.... 4. The [ trial court] failed to recognize that the Direct Action Statute is procedural, and that Arch' s liability can be only derivative of its insureds' liability and instead allowed execution to proceed while the insureds' suspensive appeal was pending.... 5. The [ trial court] improperly relied on inadmissible extrinsic evidence in reaching its ruling while disregarding Arch' s proffered affidavit evidence.... A preliminary injunction is an interlocutory procedural device designed to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a trial on the merits. Stevens v. St. Tammany Parish Government, 2016- 0197 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1/ 18/ 17), 212 So. 3d 562, 565. Generally speaking, plaintiffs seeking issuance of a preliminary injunction bear the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie showing that they will prevail on the merits and that irreparable injury 2026, rendering the appeal premature, however, Tramble did not seek to dismiss Arch' s appeal as premature. Nevertheless, the appeal was not subject to dismissal, as the judgment was later signed and was substantially the same as the orally pronounced judgment, and Tramble was given fair notice of Arch' s intent to appeal, of the granting of the appeal, and of the perfection of the appeal. See Reed v. Superior Motors, 415 So. 2d 219, 220 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 1982) (" The appeal, originally premature, is not subject to dismissal if the judgment is later signed and is substantially the same as the judgment orally pronounced, and the appellee is given fair notice of the appellant' s intent to appeal, of the granting of the appeal, and of the perfection of the appeal.") or loss will result without the preliminary injunction. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3601; Hill v. Jindal, 2014- 1757 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 17/ 15), 175 So. 3d 988, 1002, writ denied, 2015- 1394 ( La. 10/ 23/ 15), 179 So. 3d 600. Although a trial court' s judgment on a preliminary injunction constitutes an interlocutory ruling, a party aggrieved by a judgment granting or denying a preliminary injunction is entitled to an appeal. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3612( B); Stevens, 212 So. 3d at 565- 66. However, appellate review of a trial court' s issuance of a preliminary injunction is limited. The issuance of a preliminary injunction addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Hill, 175 So.3d at 1002. DISCUSSION Tramble filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot." Therein, Tramble argues that Arch' s devolutive appeal from the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction is moot because the underlying judgment has been satisfied in full. According to Tramble, on May 8, 2026, Arch paid the remainder of the judgment, which resulted in full satisfaction of the judgment, and Tramble filed a satisfaction of judgment into the trial court record and moved the trial court to dismiss all garnishment, which the trial court granted. Tramble therefore argues no garnishments exist to be enjoined rendering Arch' s appeal moot. Tramble contends that under settled law, a devolutive appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction becomes moot if the act sought to be enjoined occurs during the appeal. An issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that issue has been deprived of practical significance or made abstract or purely academic. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal District v. Department of Transportation & Development, a In support of his motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, Tramble attached multiple exhibits including: Plaintiff' s Satisfaction of Judgment, Plaintiff' s Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss Garnishments, and an order granting the motion to dismiss garnishment proceedings. Attachments to a motion do not form part of the record on appeal, and, thus, cannot be considered. Anthem Bank & Trust v. Nickroo, 2019- 1216 La. App. 1st Cir. 7/ 6/ 20), 2020 WL 3638256, * 2 ( unpublished). Therefore, these exhibits cannot be considered. h 2024- 0099 (La. App. I st Cir. 9/ 20/ 24), 405 So. 3d 695, 700. Otherwise stated, a case is moot when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useft'd purpose and give no practical relief or effect. If the case is moot, there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the court can operate; that is, jurisdiction, once established, may abate if the case becomes moot. The controversy must normally exist at every stage of the proceeding, including the appellate stage. Stevens, 212 So.3d at 566- 67. In the specific context of a preliminary injunction, courts will not review a case in which only injunctive relief is sought and where the need for the injunctive relief has ceased to be a justiciable issue. Id. at 567. This is so because an flnjunction may be used to prevent but not to correct a wrong; it cannot be employed to redress an alleged consummated wrong or undo what has already been done." Id. at 567. Therefore, when an appeal is taken from an order denying injunctive relief and the act sought to be enjoined is accomplished pending appeal, the appeal must be dismissed as moot. Id. at 567 citing Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Develop., 507 So. 2d 1233, 1235 ( La. 1987) vacating an order enjoining a public works construction contract where the parties conceded that the project was " over ninety percent complete, i.e., substantially complete[,]" and explaining that injunctive relief is not available to enjoin a fait accompli). Arch opposes the motion to dismiss, arguing that the instant appeal is not moot because this court' s determination of the appeal will impact directly its statutory claims for wrongful seizure damages, claims to millions in sheriff' s fees and costs, and claims of illegality. Arch urges this court to disregard Tramble' s executory process cases which Arch argues apply a procedural rule that does not apply here. Arch notes that the cases cited by Tramble arise from foreclosure proceedings involving defenses and procedural objections to an executory proceeding under La. M Code Civ. P. art. 2642.' Arch further argues that this appeal is not moot because Tramble' s scheme is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In the instant case, Arch' s motion for preliminary injunction, which sought to enjoin enforcement of writs of fieri facias, garnishment orders, and notices of seizure, was the sole matter adjudicated at the December 17, 2025 hearing. The trial court' s judgment denying Arch' s motion for preliminary injunction is the only matter before this court, and it is undisputed that the money judgment that was the subject of the writ of fieri facias and garnishment orders was satisfied during the pendency of this appeal. In fact, Arch concedes in its opposition to the motion to dismiss the appeal that the money judgment was satisfied. Therefore, the act Arch sought to enjoin was accomplished during the pendency of this appeal. Thus, we find the appeal is moot and must be dismissed as such.' CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Jacob Tramble, as curator for Sherri Tramble, and dismiss Arch Insurance Company' s appeal of the January 6, 2026 judgment. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Arch Insurance Company. MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2642 provides: A. Defenses and procedural objections to an executory proceeding may be asserted either through an injunction proceeding to arrest the seizure and sale as provided in Articles 2751 through 2754, or a suspensive appeal from the order directing the issuance of the writ of seizure and sale, or both. B. A suspensive appeal from an order directing the issuance of a writ of seizure and sale shall be taken within fifteen days of service of the notice of seizure as provided in Article 2721. The appeal is governed by the provisions of Articles 2081 through 2086, 2088 through 2122, and 2124 through 2167, except that the security therefor shall be for an amount exceeding by one- half the balance due on the debt secured by the mortgage or privilege sought to be enforced, including principal, interest to date of the order of appeal, and attorney fees, but exclusive of court costs. 6 Having found that the appeal should be dismissed as moot, we decline to consider the merits of Arch' s assignments of error. Z