Full Opinion

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0040-MR O’BRYAN GRAIN FARMS, INC. APPELLANT APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00325 DONALD PETERS; CAPPAD, INC.; GEORGE SCHADLER; AND RICK MURPHY APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: CETRULO, A. JONES, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES. JONES, A., JUDGE: O’Bryan Grain Farms, Inc. (“O’Bryan”) appeals from orders of the Daviess Circuit Court (“trial court”) denying its request to conduct limited discovery, granting expedited relief in favor of Donald Peters (“Peters”), George Schadler (“Schadler”), Rick Murphy (“Murphy”), and CAPPAD, Inc. (collectively, “Appellees”) pursuant to Kentucky’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (“KUPEPA”),1 Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 454.460 through KRS 454.478, and awarding attorney’s fees and costs. O’Bryan contends that the trial court improperly denied its request for limited discovery under KRS 454.466(4), erroneously concluded that its defamation action was subject to dismissal under the KUPEPA, and abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Having carefully reviewed the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND O’Bryan owns and operates swine farming operations and related waste-handling facilities in Daviess County, Kentucky. Peters, Murphy, and Schadler reside in close proximity to certain of O’Bryan’s operations. Peters and Murphy are members of CAPPAD, Inc. (“Community Against Pig Pollution and Disease”), a nonprofit organization formed to address concerns regarding the environmental impacts of concentrated animal feeding operations in Daviess County. Schadler is not a member of CAPPAD but shares similar concerns regarding O’Bryan’s operations. 1 Kentucky’s Act is modeled after the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 2020. UNIF. L. COMM’N, The Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (2020) (hereinafter cited as “Uniform Act (2020)”). Because Kentucky’s enactment differs in several important respects from the model act, and because this Opinion interprets Kentucky’s statutory text rather than the model legislation itself, we refer throughout this opinion to Kentucky’s enactment as the “Kentucky Uniform Public Expression Protection Act” or “KUPEPA” for short. -2- Beginning around 2014, the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet (“Cabinet”) investigated O’Bryan’s operations for alleged violations of Kentucky’s environmental laws. On May 11, 2021, the Cabinet initiated an administrative enforcement action before the Office of Administrative Hearings seeking civil penalties, revocation of O’Bryan’s operational permit, and other remedial relief. The Cabinet later amended its administrative complaint to include additional alleged violations. In December 2021, Peters moved to intervene in the administrative proceeding, and the hearing officer granted the motion in part on May 27, 2022. At the time the trial court ruled in this case, the administrative proceeding remained pending.2 On February 9, 2024, O’Bryan sent Peters, Schadler, Murphy, and CAPPAD a cease-and-desist letter asserting that they had made “numerous false statements regarding the business operations and environmental compliance of O’Bryan Grain Farms and its entities, not only to the community but repeatedly to environmental cabinets,” and demanding that they cease making “false statements, falsely reporting environmental violations, and the overall harassment of O’Bryan 2 We take judicial notice that, following the trial court’s rulings, a final agreed order was entered in Energy and Environment Cabinet v. Jerry Wayne O’Bryan d/b/a Jerry O’Bryan Hog Farm, No. DOW-20-3-0035 (Ky. Energy & Env’t Cabinet, Off. of Admin. Hearings Mar. 25, 2026). Under the agreed order, O’Bryan agreed to undertake specified remedial measures and to pay a stipulated civil penalty of $45,000 in settlement of the administrative enforcement action. See Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Ky. App. 2004) (“A court may properly take judicial notice of public records and government documents, including public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the internet.”). -3- Grain Farms and/or its related entities.” Record (“R.”) at 311-12. The letter further advised that if the alleged conduct continued, O’Bryan would pursue “all legal remedies to eliminate the defamation and recoup all available monetary damages.” Id. Approximately one month later, on March 18, 2024, O’Bryan filed the underlying action asserting a single claim for defamation. The complaint alleged, in relevant part: From 2022 to 2023, and prior to, Defendants spoke and published of and concerning this Plaintiff, certain slanderous, false, malicious, and defamatory words alleging misconduct in the operation of their pig farms to the community, other businesses and to various governmental regulatory agencies with the specific intention of causing it harm. R. at 1-3. The complaint further alleged that Appellees knew their statements were false or acted recklessly or negligently in making them. Id. O’Bryan simultaneously served written discovery on the Appellees. On April 19, 2024, Appellees moved for expedited relief pursuant to KUPEPA, asserting that O’Bryan’s complaint was based on communications protected by the statute. The trial court entered an agreed order establishing a briefing schedule for Appellees’ KUPEPA motion. As part of that order, the “parties expressly acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that [O’Bryan’s] pending discovery [was to be] stayed by operation of statute. KRS 454.466(4).” -4- Thereafter, O’Bryan moved for leave to conduct limited discovery pursuant to KRS 454.466(4), arguing that additional discovery was necessary to respond to the motion for expedited relief. The trial court denied the motion, and O’Bryan filed its response to the KUPEPA motion. O’Bryan later sought leave to supplement its response to the motion for expedited relief with additional materials obtained through public-records requests, which the trial court likewise denied. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for KUPEPA expedited relief. The court concluded that the challenged claims arose from communications protected by KUPEPA and that O’Bryan had failed to establish a prima facie case sufficient to overcome the statute’s burden-shifting framework. The court therefore dismissed O’Bryan’s complaint with prejudice and subsequently awarded Appellees’ attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $46,998.60 pursuant to KRS 454.478. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS A. The History, Purpose, and Enactment of the KUPEPA. To place the issues before us in the proper context, it is helpful to begin with a brief review of the history of legislation designed to protect public -5- participation and Kentucky’s adoption of its own version of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act. The KUPEPA and similar legislation arose primarily to combat SLAPP suits. The acronym “SLAPP” refers to a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, a term coined by Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan to describe lawsuits brought, not principally to obtain relief on the merits, but to discourage, intimidate, or punish individuals for exercising their constitutional rights to speak, petition the government, associate with others, or otherwise participate in matters of public concern. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 1-6 (1989); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506, 506-07 (1988). The defining characteristic of such actions is the use of litigation as a means of suppressing constitutionally protected participation. Penelope Canan, George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 385, 387 (1988); Gordon v. Marrone, 155 Misc. 2d 726, 736, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 202 A.D.2d 104, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1994). The concern giving rise to anti-SLAPP legislation, like KUPEPA, was not merely that some lawsuits ultimately lacked merit. Rather, legislatures -6- recognized that the litigation process itself could chill the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights. Hamilton v. Prewett, 860 N.E.2d 1234, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Even where a defendant ultimately prevails, the costs of discovery, motion practice, trial preparation, and prolonged litigation may discourage citizens from speaking publicly, participating in governmental proceedings, petitioning public officials, or otherwise engaging in civic affairs. As a result, beginning with Washington in 1989, state lawmakers across the country began enacting anti- SLAPP statutes. Uniform Act, Prefatory Note, 1-3 (2020). These anti-SLAPP laws were far from uniform, varying dramatically in both procedure and substance. In response to the patchwork of state anti-SLAPP statutes, in 2020, the Uniform Law Commission approved the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act. Id. In doing so, the model drafters sought to establish “a clear process through which SLAPPs can be challenged and their merits fairly evaluated in an expedited manner,” while simultaneously preserving the ability of persons possessing meritorious claims to obtain meaningful judicial relief. Id. The Uniform Act therefore reflects an effort to balance two equally important principles: protecting the constitutional freedoms of speech, press, petition, and association while preserving legitimate civil actions seeking redress for actionable conduct. Id. -7- In 2022, Kentucky became only the second state to adopt legislation based upon the Uniform Act.3 KUPEPA, which took effect on July 14, 2022, is codified at KRS 454.460 through KRS 454.478. It is important to recognize, however, that Kentucky did not adopt the Uniform Act verbatim. Instead, the General Assembly made several significant modifications before enactment, including, for example, materially expanding the categories of actions excluded from KUPEPA’s coverage. Compare Uniform Act § 3 (2020) with KRS 454.462(2). Consequently, while decisions construing the Uniform Act and other states’ enactments may provide persuasive guidance, the text adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly necessarily controls our analysis. B. KUPEPA’s Framework. KUPEPA establishes an expedited procedural framework through which courts determine, at an early stage of the litigation, whether claims arising from specified communications should proceed through the ordinary course of civil litigation or must be dismissed with prejudice. Davenport Extreme Pools & Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 155 (Ky. App. 2024). Of course, not all civil actions fall within the scope of KUPEPA. It only comes into play where a 3 UNIF. L. COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE BILL TRACKING, UNIFORM PUBLIC EXPRESSION PROTECTION ACT, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community- home?CommunityKey=4f486460-199c-49d7-9fac-05570be1e7b1#LegBillTrackingAnchor (last visited Jul. 15, 2026). -8- pleading4 is filed “that asserts a cause of action to which KRS 454.460 to 454.478 applies[.]” KRS 454.464. Such a cause of action is one that is being asserted against another party based on either a: (a.) Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; (b.) Communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; or (c.) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Kentucky Constitution, on a matter of public concern. KRS 454.462(1), and that does not fall within one of the ten exceptions set forth in KRS 454.462(2)(a).5 Upon review, if the defending party believes that the initiating pleading includes a covered claim, it may file “a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss the cause of action in whole or in part.”6 KRS 454.464. The motion 4 We refer to this filing as the “initial pleading.” The initial pleading may be “a complaint, crossclaim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading.” Id. 5 Hereinafter, we shall refer to a “cause[] of action to which KRS 454.460 to 454.478 applies” as a “covered claim.” 6 Hereinafter, we shall refer to this motion as an “anti-SLAPP motion.” -9- must be filed within sixty days of service of the initiating pleading on the moving party.7 A party’s filing of an anti-SLAPP motion fundamentally alters the trajectory of the underlying litigation. Pursuant to KRS 454.466(1)(a), when an anti-SLAPP motion is filed “[a]ll other proceedings between the moving party and responding party, including discovery and any pending hearing or motion, shall be stayed[.]”8 As the Uniform Law Commission observed, the automatic stay is one of the Act’s central procedural protections because, absent such a provision, the protections afforded by the statute could largely be defeated simply by requiring a defendant to endure the burdens and expense of full discovery before the court determines whether the action should proceed. Uniform Act, § 4 cmt. 1 (2020). The General Assembly nevertheless recognized that limited discovery may occasionally be necessary to permit meaningful resolution of an expedited motion. Accordingly, KRS 454.466(4) creates a narrow exception to the automatic stay, requiring the trial court to permit limited discovery upon a showing that 7 The trial court may permit an anti-SLAPP motion to be filed later than sixty days “on a showing of good cause[.]” KRS 454.464. 8 KRS 454.466(1)(a)’s mandatory stay shall remain in effect until a final order on the anti- SLAPP motion is entered and the time to appeal that order pursuant to KRS 454.476 has expired. KRS 454.466(2). Notwithstanding that stay, the trial court may, for good cause shown, hear and rule on motions unrelated to the pending anti-SLAPP motion, including motions seeking special or preliminary injunctions to “protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.” KRS 454.466(7). During the stay, the trial court may also rule on motions seeking to voluntarily dismiss a claim or part of a claim or to sever a claim. KRS 454.466(6). -10- specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied—or failed to satisfy—a burden imposed by KRS 454.472 and that such information is not reasonably available absent discovery. KUPEPA therefore authorizes only the discovery necessary to resolve the expedited motion itself; it does not permit general merits discovery while the anti-SLAPP motion remains pending. Following any authorized discovery, the trial court must promptly hear the anti-SLAPP motion.9 KRS 454.468. In ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court must “consider the pleadings, the [anti-SLAPP] motion, any reply or response to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”10 The trial court must grant the anti-SLAPP motion if: (a) The moving party establishes under KRS 454.462(1) that KRS 454.460 to 454.478 applies; (b) The responding party fails to establish under KRS 454.462(2) that KRS 454.460 to 454.478 does not apply; and (c) Either: 9 Ordinarily, the motion must be heard within sixty days after it is filed. The court may extend that deadline only to permit limited discovery authorized by KRS 454.466 or for good cause shown, and any hearing delayed for good cause must nevertheless be scheduled on an expedited basis. Id. 10 Under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03 this includes pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits. CR 56.03. -11- 1. The responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action; or 2. The moving party establishes that: a. The responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; or b. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part of the action. KRS 454.472(1). Thus, KUPEPA requires the trial court to undertake a three-part, burden-shifting analysis. In the first phase, the trial court effectively decides whether KUPEPA applies. It does so by first determining whether the responding party’s cause of action is based on communications and/or rights protected by KUPEPA. The burden is on the moving party to make the initial showing that KUPEPA applies. If the trial court holds that the moving party has not carried that burden, then the anti-SLAPP motion is denied, the stay of proceedings is lifted, and the parties proceed to litigate the merits of the case.11 If the trial court determines that the moving party has carried its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the responding party to show its cause of action fits within one or more of KUPEPA’s ten enumerated exceptions. KRS 454.462(2)(a). If the responding 11 The moving party, however, has a right to an interlocutory appeal of the denial of its anti- SLAPP motion. KRS 454.476. -12- party meets this burden—for example, by showing that its cause of action is based on the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act—then KUPEPA does not apply, and the motion is denied.12 If the responding party fails to establish an exception applies, then the trial court proceeds to the second step of the analysis. In the second phase, the trial court determines if the responding party has established a prima facie case as to each essential element of its cause of action. KRS 454.472(1)(c)1. In this phase, the burden is on the responding party. If the trial court determines that the responding party has not carried its burden to establish a prima facie case, the anti-SLAPP motion is granted, the responding party’s cause of action is terminated with prejudice, and then the moving party may seek its “court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and reasonable expenses related to the [anti-SLAPP] motion.” KRS 454.478. If the trial court determines that the responding party has carried its burden, then the court proceeds to the third and final step of the analysis. In the third phase, the trial court determines if the responding party has a legally viable cause of action. In this phase the burden shifts back to the moving party to show either that the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted or there is no genuine issue as to any 12 The responding party may be entitled to court costs, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses related to the motion, if the court determines that the anti-SLAPP motion was brought without good cause. KRS 454.478(2). -13- material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. KRS 454.472(1)(c)2. If the moving party makes such a showing, the anti-SLAPP motion is granted; if it fails to make such a showing, the motion is denied. C. O’Bryan’s Motion for Discovery Under KRS 454.466(4). On June 5, 2024, just two days before its response to Appellees’ anti- SLAPP motion was due under the parties’ agreed scheduling order, O’Bryan moved for leave to conduct limited discovery pursuant to KRS 454.466(4). Specifically, O’Bryan sought an order requiring Appellees to answer a series of interrogatories principally requesting that they identify the communications they contended were protected under KUPEPA, the statements they maintained were true, and the communications upon which they relied in asserting the various statutory protections set forth in their motion for expedited relief. Appellees objected, arguing that the requested discovery was unnecessary to permit O’Bryan to respond to the anti-SLAPP motion and, given the complaint’s generalized allegations of defamation, improperly sought to require Appellees to identify every communication they had made concerning O’Bryan without first identifying the allegedly defamatory statements forming the basis of the action. The trial court denied the motion. In doing so, it concluded that O’Bryan failed to establish that the requested information was “not reasonably available unless discovery [was] allowed,” as required by KRS 454.466(4). The -14- court relied, in part, upon O’Bryan’s February 9, 2024 cease-and-desist letter, which asserted that Appellees had made “numerous false statements regarding the business operations and environmental compliance of O’Bryan Grain Farms,” as well as representations made by O’Bryan’s counsel during the July 3, 2024 hearing demonstrating that O’Bryan was already aware of the communications it believed to be defamatory. Consequently, the court concluded that O’Bryan had failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites necessary to obtain limited discovery. On appeal, O’Bryan argues that the trial court misconstrued KRS 454.466(4) and improperly denied discovery necessary to permit it to respond meaningfully to Appellees’ anti-SLAPP motion. It maintains that, without discovery, it could not determine which communications Appellees contended were protected under KUPEPA, which statements Appellees asserted were true, or which communications formed the basis of the statutory defenses advanced in their motion for expedited relief. As discussed above, the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion automatically stays all proceedings between the parties, including discovery. KRS 454.466(1)(a). That stay reflects one of KUPEPA’s principal procedural protections by preventing the responding party from defeating the purpose of the Act simply by subjecting the moving party to the burdens and expense of discovery before the trial court determines whether the action may proceed. At the same -15- time, the General Assembly recognized that, in limited circumstances, some discovery may be necessary to permit a fair determination of the expedited motion itself. Accordingly, KRS 454.466(4) provides that a trial court shall permit limited discovery if the responding party demonstrates both (1) that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy a burden imposed by KRS 454.472 and (2) that the information is not reasonably available unless discovery is allowed. KRS 454.466(4). Thus, while KUPEPA employs mandatory language, that mandate is not self-executing. A responding party is not entitled to discovery merely because it requests it. Rather, the responding party bears the burden of establishing each of the statutory prerequisites before the trial court’s duty to authorize limited discovery arises. KUPEPA therefore contemplates a focused evidentiary showing, not a generalized assertion that additional discovery would be helpful. Although Kentucky’s appellate courts have not previously addressed the standard governing review of a trial court’s determination under KRS 454.466(4), we perceive no reason to depart from the settled principles governing discovery rulings generally. Trial courts possess broad discretion in supervising discovery, resolving discovery disputes, and determining the proper scope of discovery. Southern Financial Life Insurance Co. v. Combs, 413 S.W.3d 921, 932 (Ky. 2013); Blue Movies, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, -16- 317 S.W.3d 23, 39 (Ky. 2010). That discretion necessarily includes determining whether a party has satisfied the statutory prerequisites for limited discovery under KRS 454.466(4), as well as defining the scope of any authorized discovery. See Richmond Health Facilities-Madison, LP v. Clouse, 473 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Ky. 2015). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s determination under KRS 454.466(4) for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Applying those principles, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Although O’Bryan’s interrogatories requested specific information, the trial court reasonably concluded that O’Bryan failed to satisfy the second statutory prerequisite by demonstrating that the requested information was unavailable absent discovery. Long before filing suit, O’Bryan had already asserted in its cease-and-desist letter that Appellees had made “numerous false statements” concerning its farming operations and environmental compliance. Likewise, during the hearing on its discovery motion, O’Bryan acknowledged that it was aware of the communications it believed were defamatory. These circumstances reasonably supported the trial court’s determination that O’Bryan already possessed sufficient knowledge of the allegedly actionable statements to formulate its response to the anti-SLAPP motion. -17- Moreover, the discovery O’Bryan sought exceeded the limited purpose contemplated by KRS 454.466(4). Rather than seeking information unavailable from any other source and necessary to resolve a burden imposed by KRS 454.472, O’Bryan sought to require Appellees to catalogue the universe of communications they contended were protected under KUPEPA and to identify every communication they maintained was truthful or otherwise privileged. KUPEPA’s limited-discovery provision is not intended to permit a responding party to require the moving party to identify every potentially protected communication before the responding party identifies the communications forming the basis of its own cause of action. Instead, the statute authorizes only that discovery necessary to resolve the expedited motion itself. Because the record supports the trial court’s determination that O’Bryan failed to establish the statutory prerequisites set forth in KRS 454.466(4), we find no abuse of discretion in its denial of limited discovery. D. O’Bryan’s Motion to Supplement Its Response. Following the denial of its request for limited discovery, O’Bryan sought leave to supplement its response to Appellees’ anti-SLAPP motion with documents it obtained through open-records requests directed to the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet. O’Bryan argued that the materials demonstrated Appellees’ allegations regarding environmental violations were false and therefore -18- were relevant to the issues presented by the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion. Trial courts possess broad discretion to manage their dockets, including establishing and enforcing filing deadlines and determining whether to permit supplemental filings. Nebraska Alliance Realty Co. v. Brewer, 529 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Ky. App. 2017). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision declining to permit O’Bryan’s supplemental filing for an abuse of discretion. Id. As previously noted, a trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. We discern no abuse of discretion here. KUPEPA contemplates the prompt resolution of anti-SLAPP motions. See KRS 454.468. Although the statute authorizes the trial court to consider evidence that would be admissible in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, nothing in KUPEPA requires a trial court to permit a responding party to supplement the record after briefing has concluded with materials obtained through subsequent open-records requests. Nor has O’Bryan demonstrated that the proffered materials were necessary to respond to the anti-SLAPP motion or that the denial of its motion prejudiced its ability to oppose expedited relief. Under these circumstances, the trial court acted well -19- within its discretion in declining to reopen the briefing and delay resolution of the pending motion. Having concluded that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in its discovery-related rulings, we turn to the merits of its order granting expedited relief under KUPEPA. Unlike the discovery rulings discussed above, the trial court’s determinations regarding the applicability of KUPEPA and the parties’ respective burdens under KRS 454.472 present questions of law. Accordingly, our review of those determinations is de novo. Davenport, 698 S.W.3d at 150. E. Appellees Established that KUPEPA Applies. Under KRS 454.472(1)(a), the moving party bears the burden of establishing that the responding party’s cause of action is one “to which KRS 454.460 to 454.478 applies.” More specifically, Appellees were required to demonstrate that O’Bryan’s defamation claim is based upon one or more of the categories of communications protected by KRS 454.462(1). As an initial matter, we observe that neither O’Bryan’s complaint nor its subsequent filings identify with any specificity the allegedly defamatory statements giving rise to this litigation or which Appellee made them. Instead, the complaint broadly alleges that, “[f]rom 2022 to 2023, and prior to, Defendants spoke and published . . . certain slanderous, false, malicious, and defamatory words alleging misconduct in the operation of their pig farms to the community, other -20- businesses and to various governmental regulatory agencies . . . .” Likewise, O’Bryan’s February 9, 2024 cease-and-desist letter asserts only that Appellees made “numerous false statements regarding the business operations and environmental compliance of O’Bryan Grain Farms and its entities, not only to the community but repeatedly to environmental cabinets.” Consequently, the precise communications underlying O’Bryan’s claim cannot be identified from the pleadings alone, a situation O’Bryan could have remedied but chose not to do so. Nevertheless, the record sufficiently establishes the nature of the communications upon which O’Bryan bases its action. By O’Bryan’s own description, the allegedly defamatory statements consist of communications concerning the environmental compliance of its swine farming operations that were directed to the Cabinet, made in connection with the Cabinet’s ongoing administrative enforcement proceeding, or communicated to members of the community regarding the environmental impacts of O’Bryan’s operations. Those are precisely the types of communications contemplated by KRS 454.462(1). First, to the extent the alleged statements were made to the Cabinet or during the pending administrative enforcement action, they constitute communications made in a governmental proceeding. KRS 454.462(1)(a). Likewise, statements concerning issues under consideration in that proceeding fall squarely within KRS 454.462(1)(b), which protects communications relating to -21- matters under review in governmental proceedings. The administrative record establishes that the Cabinet’s enforcement action concerned the environmental compliance of O’Bryan’s concentrated animal feeding operations, the very subject matter identified in O’Bryan’s complaint and cease-and-desist letter. Moreover, the remaining communications alleged by O’Bryan likewise concern matters of public concern within the meaning of KUPEPA. The General Assembly intentionally drafted the Act to apply broadly to speech concerning “matter[s] of political, social, or other interest to the community” and “subject[s] of concern to the public[.]” KRS 454.460(4). As this Court has recently recognized, KUPEPA’s protections are to be construed broadly. Davenport, 698 S.W.3d at 155. Matters of public concern are not limited to governmental affairs or political discourse. Andes Roofing, LLC v. Rusnak, 726 S.W.3d 13, 19 (Ky. App. 2025). “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public[.]” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Certainly, statements concerning the environmental impact and regulatory compliance of large-scale swine farming operations located within a -22- local community qualify as matters of social and community interest under KRS 454.460(4). Indeed, O’Bryan’s own pleadings allege that Appellees communicated with governmental regulators and members of the community concerning those very subjects. Whether those statements ultimately prove actionable is a separate question addressed under the remaining steps of KUPEPA’s burden-shifting framework. For purposes of KRS 454.472(1)(a), however, Appellees established that O’Bryan’s defamation action is based upon communications falling within KRS 454.462(1). F. O’Bryan Failed to Establish that KUPEPA Does Not Apply. Having concluded that Appellees satisfied their burden under KRS 454.472(1)(a), the burden shifted to O’Bryan to establish that KUPEPA nevertheless did not apply because its cause of action fell within one of the statutory exclusions set forth in KRS 454.462(2). The General Assembly has identified ten categories of actions that are excluded from KUPEPA’s coverage. KRS 454.462(2). Under the burden-shifting framework established by KRS 454.472(1), however, it is the responding party’s burden to demonstrate that one or more of those exclusions applies. Here, although O’Bryan vigorously argued that Appellees failed to satisfy their initial burden under KRS 454.462(1), it did not separately argue before the trial court that its defamation action fell within any of the exclusions -23- enumerated in KRS 454.462(2). Nor does O’Bryan identify any applicable statutory exclusion on appeal. Accordingly, because O’Bryan failed to establish that KUPEPA does not apply under KRS 454.462(2), the trial court properly proceeded to the second phase of the statutory analysis to determine whether O’Bryan established a prima facie case as to each essential element of its defamation claim. G. O’Bryan Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Defamation. Having concluded that Appellees established that KUPEPA applies and that O’Bryan failed to establish the applicability of any statutory exclusion, we proceed to the second phase of KUPEPA’s burden-shifting framework. Under KRS 454.472(1)(c)1., the responding party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case as to each essential element of its cause of action. We review the trial court’s determination de novo. Davenport, 698 S.W.3d at 150. A prima facie case is one that, if unrebutted or unexplained, is sufficient to support the proposition for which it is offered. Davenport, 698 S.W.3d at 146. At this stage, the responding party must come forward with evidence establishing each essential element of its cause of action. Id.; KRS 454.472(1)(c)1. To prevail on a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must establish: (1) defamatory language; (2) about the plaintiff; (3) which is published; and (4) which causes injury to reputation. Toler v. Süd-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276, 282 -24- (Ky. 2014). Additionally, because truth is an absolute defense, the allegedly defamatory statement must be capable of being proven false. Cromity v. Meiners, 494 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Ky. App. 2015). Whether a statement is actionable likewise depends upon its context, including whether it constitutes an assertion of provable fact or a constitutionally protected expression of opinion. Id. at 502-04. The trial court concluded that O’Bryan failed to satisfy its burden because it never identified any specific statement constituting actionable defamation. We agree. Although O’Bryan repeatedly alleged that Appellees made “numerous false statements” regarding its farming operations and environmental compliance, neither its complaint, its response to the anti-SLAPP motion, nor the evidence submitted in opposition to that motion identified a single allegedly defamatory statement attributable to any particular Appellee. Nor did O’Bryan identify when the statements were made, to whom they were published, the context in which they were communicated, or explain why the statements were false. Instead, O’Bryan relied almost exclusively upon generalized assertions that Appellees had made false accusations concerning its environmental practices. That showing falls short of KRS 454.472(1)(c)1.’s requirement that the responding party establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of its cause of action. At this stage of the KUPEPA analysis, it was not sufficient for O’Bryan merely to allege that Appellees made false statements. Rather, it was -