Full Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2026-CA-0043-ME TAMARA WILLIAMS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-90285 JEFFREY C. WILLIAMS AND LESLIE WILLIAMS APPELLEES OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND COMBS, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Tamara Williams appeals the Montgomery Circuit Court’s order denying her petition for a writ to prohibit the district court from adjudicating her mental capacity when renouncing her late husband’s will. We conclude the district court is adjudicating an adversary proceeding without subject matter jurisdiction, which has been reserved to the circuit court pursuant to KRS1 24A.120. We reverse and remand with instructions to enter a writ of the first class. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH APPELLATE RULES AND THE RECORD Before proceeding with our review, we again are compelled to remind those who hold themselves out as appellate advocates of the importance of complying with Kentucky’s Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP). All the briefs are comparably noncompliant. We refrain from sanctions, this time, to reach the merits so that the parties are not prejudiced by such noncompliance. The failings relating to the record present a different problem. Our review has more to do with the circuit court’s interpretation of Kentucky law and less with the considerable discovery, motions, and discovery orders entered in district court. Therefore, the absence of those documents from the certified record will not affect our review. Nevertheless, both parties reference that material, but improperly. Both parties’ counsels opted to create an appendix and fill it with copies from their own files and with digital downloads from a site that does not substitute for the official record paginated and certified by the court clerk. Such a practice is not authorized. Again, these failings will not hinder our ability to reach the merits, and we decline our option of sanctions. However, we advise counsel to abandon this rule-violating practice. 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -2- BACKGROUND2 Tamara is the widow of Julian D. Williams who passed away in February 2023 after 54 years of marriage. Julian’s will names as co-executors his son and daughter by a prior marriage, Jeffrey C. Williams and Leslie A. Williams (hereafter “Real Parties in Interest” or “RPIs”). In July 2023, the Montgomery District Court admitted Julian’s will to probate and the Real Parties in Interest, as executors, began administration of the sizable estate. The will created a trust. The interest generated by the trust corpus was to be divided equally among three beneficiaries, Tamara and the two RPIs. Upon Tamara’s death, the trust corpus would be divided between the two RPIs. In November 2023, Tamara executed a timely renunciation of Julian’s will pursuant to KRS 392.080, electing to receive her more beneficial statutory entitlement as Julian’s surviving spouse in accordance with KRS 392.020. No one disputes that Tamara receives more of the estate by electing to renounce the will. In February 2024, the RPIs moved to invalidate Tamara’s renunciation. They brought their motion as individuals or beneficiaries, not as executors.3 They argued Tamara lacked sufficient mental capacity to understand 2 Because the parties do not cite to the certified record, we draw this factual background from the briefs. 3 Tamara says they challenged the renunciation “in their individual capacity.” (Appellant’s Brief at 1). The RPIs say they challenged the renunciation “as beneficiaries.” (Appellees’ Br. at 2). -3- the nature and effect of her renunciation and that she was unduly influenced by her nephew and niece, John Maxwell Reynolds and Ann-Whitney Reynolds Garner, to whom Tamara granted powers of attorney two years earlier. The RPIs’ position was that the only way to reach a correct and lawful settlement of Julian’s estate was to invalidate Tamara’s renunciation. With no evidence to support their allegation of Tamara’s incapacity, the RPIs succeeded in persuading the district court that they were entitled to take discovery to find such evidence. Written discovery and some depositions and affidavits were obtained by both sides before the parties filed competing motions. On September 3, 2025, the district court entered orders denying Tamara’s motion to distribute the estate consistently with her election to renounce the will. She believed that would be a correct and lawful settlement.4 The court also denied the RPIs’ motion to subject Tamara to an independent medical examination, but ordered Tamara to give her deposition. Before her deposition could be taken, Tamara filed a petition in Montgomery Circuit Court seeking a writ of prohibition of the first class because the district court was proceeding outside its jurisdiction by adjudicating an adversary proceeding of the type reserved to a circuit court’s subject matter 4 As we discuss below, Tamara could have fashioned that motion as an original complaint in accordance with KRS 395.510 and KRS 395.515 and filed it in the circuit court which has subject matter jurisdiction of that very cause of action. -4- jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 24A.120. She argued alternatively for a writ of the second class because the district court was proceeding within its jurisdiction but erroneously by compelling Tamara to prove she was mentally competent when she renounced the will, despite the absence of such requirement in the controlling statute, KRS 392.080. Because our holding is that Tamara is entitled to a writ of the first class, we refrain from addressing the circuit court’s ruling, the standard of review, and the analysis of the argument regarding a second-class writ. The circuit court ruled that Tamara was not entitled to a writ of the first class, explaining as follows: Granted the Motion of [the RPI] upon first glance, appears to be an adversarial proceeding. However, this Court is bound by the majority opinion in McElroy v Taylor, 977 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1998).* The majority clearly stated “a surviving spouse’s decision to forego his bequest under the will of his spouse and to choose instead to take this statutory portion of his spouse’s estate is certainly a matter involving probate.” Id. at 931. The McElroy decision is factually different from the present case but confirms this Court’s holding that the Montgomery District Court has jurisdiction over the motion to set aside the renunciation. (R. 157–58). Despite ruling that McElroy’s majority opinion controlled, Special Judge Eddy Coleman expressed his agreement with Justice Cooper’s dissenting opinion rationale and said he believed that “whether the widow or widower was acting under undue influence when making that decision [to renounce the will] . . . should be a matter for the circuit court.” (R. 157 n.*). -5- The circuit court declined to address “whether such a cause of action [challenging the capacity of a renouncing surviving spouse] exists and if so, what is the standard of proof[.]” (R. 159). As discussed below, Young v. Young indicates no such cause of action exists. 8 Ky. 562 (1819). As for a standard of proof, would it be the same as that for finding testamentary capacity? See Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998) (“degree of mental capacity required to make a will is . . . less than that necessary to make a deed . . . or a contract.” (citations omitted)). After the circuit court denied the writ, Tamara brought this appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW The extraordinary remedy of any writ is cautiously granted. Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961). Still, one type of writ, commonly known as a first-class writ, may be granted when a lower court is acting on matters outside its subject matter jurisdiction. Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549, 551-52 (Ky. 2009). “One seeking a writ when the lower court is acting ‘outside of its jurisdiction’ need not establish the lack of an adequate alternative remedy or the suffering of great injustice and irreparable injury.” Id. at 552. See Imhoff v. House, 628 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Ky. 2021) (“The ‘no remedy through an application to an intermediate court’ requirement [for first-class writs] simply means that a writ petition must be first addressed to the next higher court.”). -6- In reviewing a lower court’s decision regarding a petition for a writ, we review its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 558 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Ky. App. 2018). Within this framework, we turn to the merits of Tamara’s appeal. ANALYSIS There are no facts in dispute relevant to the specific question under review—i.e., whether the district court is proceeding without subject matter jurisdiction. After reviewing the applicable law de novo, we conclude it is and that a writ of the first class is required. We agree with Judge Coleman’s judicial instinct that, as he stated, a surviving spouse’s mental state when renouncing a will “should be a matter for the circuit court.” Against that instinct, he believed he was “bound by the majority opinion in McElroy v. Taylor, 977 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1998).” We disagree and conclude he reads McElroy too broadly. As discussed below, Goff v. Edwards, 653 S.W.3d 847 (Ky. 2022), is more on point. But first, McElroy. McElroy says, “subparts (2) and (3) [of KRS 24A.120] grant the district court original jurisdiction over nonadversarial matters involving probate.” McElroy, 977 S.W.2d at 931. Adversarial proceedings and those provided for by statute fall under the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit courts. The statute says in relevant part: -7- District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in: .... (2) Matters involving probate, except matters contested in an adversary proceeding. Such adversary proceeding shall be filed in Circuit Court in accordance with the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be considered an appeal; (3) Matters not provided for by statute to be commenced in Circuit Court shall be deemed to be nonadversarial within the meaning of subsection (2) of this section and therefore are within the jurisdiction of the District Court[.] KRS 24A.120(2), (3). McElroy is not the final word, if there is one, that “disentangle[s] the overlap of district and circuit court jurisdiction in probate matters[.]” Goff, 653 S.W.3d at 850. The McElroy Court expressly said its holding is “limited to the issue before it. Namely, [whether] a district court . . . has jurisdiction to give effect to the renunciation of a will by the guardian of an incompetant [sic] adult.” Id. at 932 (emphasis added). That is, the only person KRS 392.080 identifies as having the right of renouncing the will is “the surviving spouse”; however, McElroy expanded the statute to include the surviving spouse’s court-appointed guardian. The district court’s role? McElroy says, “the modern district court is capable of deciding whether a renunciation of a will is in a ward’s best interest” just as equity courts did before the Judicial Article became law in 1976. Id. These are not the issues now before this Court. -8- At least two facts distinguish McElroy and render it inapplicable. First, in McElroy the election to renounce the will had not yet occurred; in the case under review, renunciation is in the past and the RPIs want to invalidate Tamara’s completed personal election retrospectively. Second, in McElroy the surviving spouse’s disability was already a judicially adjudicated fact; in this case, the RPIs seek an order retroactively invalidating renunciation by convincing a court they defeated the legal presumption that Tamara possessed the requisite capacity. See Caldwell v. Hatcher, 248 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Ky. 1952) (“[I]t will, and should be presumed that one conveying property has sufficient mental capacity to do so, the burden of proving otherwise being upon those who question it.”).5 The RPIs’ success is essential to their vision of what will constitute the “correct and lawful settlement of the estate, or . . . distribution of the assets[.]” KRS 395.515. But even with the distinctions between McElroy and this case, the opinion still illuminates our analysis. McElroy sets out a helpful hypothetical. In McElroy, “Oreada Taylor, executrix of Hazel Bellmar’s estate, opposed the renunciation” by Hazel’s surviving spouse, William, the ward of the guardian who wanted to do the actual renouncing. 977 S.W.2d at 930. What authority did Taylor, the executrix, have to prevent renunciation? The Supreme Court said she 5 Before Kentucky revised its statutes, a surviving spouse had to renounce her deceased spouse’s will by executing a deed. Georgetown Nat. Bank v. Ford, 285 S.W. 218, 222 (Ky. 1926). -9- had none. Furthermore, it said she would not have had the right even to raise the issue but for the question about the guardian’s scope of authority. The Supreme Court said: Were it not for the fact that a guardian had been appointed for Mr. Bellmar, Ms. Taylor [the executrix] would not participate in the renunciation decision at all. KRS 392.080. “[W]hen the election is made within the time allowed and in the proper manner, it is wholly immaterial what reasons induced the devisee to make the election. Its validity cannot be inquired into.” Harding’s Adm’r, 140 Ky. at 279, 130 S.W. 1098 [(1910)]. McElroy, 977 S.W.2d at 931–32 (emphasis added). The hypothetical might rightly be called dicta but for the fact it merely quotes existing case law, albeit case law well over a hundred years old. To be clear, Harding’s Administrator remains good authority and says a renunciation’s “validity cannot be inquired into[,]” not even by an executor. Id. There was no guardian in either Harding’s Administrator or McElroy’s hypothetical. And there is none in this case. The RPIs, at least in their roles as executors, have no power to question “what reasons induced [Tamara] to make the election” and none to “participate in the renunciation decision at all.” Id. Not surprisingly, renunciations were challenged before McElroy. But those challenges alleged technical noncompliance with the authorizing statute. See, e.g., Sanders v. Pierce, 979 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Ky. App. 1998) (One of “the central questions to this appeal are whether . . . appellant made a timely -10- renunciation of the will.”). Clearly, that is a probate matter involving a probate court’s simple, nonadversarial overseeing of timely and compliant form completion and filing with the clerk. Contesting a surviving spouse’s legal capacity to accomplish that task is far beyond routine probate matters. As for the suggestion the RPIs’ claim is nonadversarial, common sense tells us no one accused in a judicial proceeding of being insane would ever consider the charge nonadversarial. Cantrell v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission, 450 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Ky. 1970) (“[C]ommon sense must not be a stranger in the house of the law.”). In conducting research, we were bound to ask whether any opinion ever addressed a challenge to a surviving spouse’s capacity at the time he or she renounced a will. The answer turned out to be yes, but it has been quite some time. Our search for that answer yielded one opinion with a fact pattern resembling that of the instant appeal, and it is directly on point. The case is Young v. Young, 8 Ky. 562 (1819), and, as with the century-old Harding’s Administrator case, we see no expiration date affecting its currency. Young was never reversed and we know of no reason to disqualify it from our consideration. It harmonizes with and is part of the heritage of Harding’s Administrator and McElroy. In Young, a surviving spouse, Phoebe Young, “introduced and proved by two witnesses a deed, sealed and delivered according to law, renouncing all -11- interest under the will.” Young, 8 Ky. at 562. Caleb Young, whether as executor or beneficiary we do not know, during a hearing before the county (now district) court “inquired of a witness whether or not [Phoebe], at the time of executing the deed of renunciation, was of sound mind or capable of any deliberate act[.]” Id. The county court ruled “that the evidence was incompetent [and] rejected the inquiry.” Id. Kentucky’s highest court said: [W]ithout deciding what would otherwise have been the effect of the will, we have no doubt, but that after renouncing her interest under it, whatever may have been her incapacity, she can not be prevented from asserting her claim of dower. The deed of renunciation, as she would not be permitted to stultify herself,[6] is unquestionably binding upon her, and as she would not be allowed thereafter to assert [a] claim to the property given her by the will, upon no principle of propriety or law, should any other be permitted by the introduction of evidence of her incapacity, to defeat her recovery of dower. Id. at 562–63.7 Given the principle thus stated, our Supreme Court would have to reverse Young before this Court could ignore it, and before such a claim as the 6 “Stultify, . . . 2. In law, to alledge [sic] or prove to be insane, for avoiding some act.” N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, 5th ed. (1830), 801. Applied here, this phrase means she could not rescind her renunciation even by her own claim she was insane at the time. 7 Legal researchers should be aware of an error in Westlaw’s reproduction of this opinion and should quote only from the original hard copy volume. In Volume 8 of Kentucky Reports (and many of the earliest volumes of Kentucky cases), the compiler placed his own editorial comments in the margins of the page. These comments are not part of the opinion. In Young v. Young, the editorial comment Westlaw incorporates in its version of the opinion says: -12- RPIs are pursuing could be brought in either a district or circuit court. Until it is reversed, Young may or may not find favor with the court that does have jurisdiction. And that returns us to the question before us—which court, district or circuit, has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the RPIs’ claim that the correct and lawful settlement of Julian’s estate requires invalidating Tamara’s renunciation of his will? We continue by returning to the circuit court’s analysis and application of McElroy in denying Tamara’s petition for a writ. The circuit court appears to have seen a surviving spouse’s capacity and a guardian’s authority as tantamount issues. We disagree and find the issue of a surviving spouse’s capacity more analogous to that of a testator’s capacity for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction. Compare a testamentary capacity contest and a contest challenging a surviving spouse’s capacity to elect renunciation. Both adjudications will determine the correct and lawful settlement of the estate and distribution of its assets. When parties who stand to benefit from a decedent’s estate take contrary positions regarding proper settlement and distribution, that adversarial proceeding A widow renouncing by deed the provision made for her in the will and claiming her dower, will be permitted to deny her capacity, when she executed the deed of renunciation, nor will a stranger be permitted to question that fact. Not only is that paragraph not a part of the opinion, in this case it contradicts the actual holding. The compiler’s note says a widow “will be permitted to deny her capacity” while the opinion says “she would not be permitted to stultify herself” which has the opposite meaning. See supra, n.6. -13- must be adjudicated by the circuit court. Consider the testamentary capacity dispute first. A will contest alleging the decedent’s lack of testamentary capacity is brought under KRS 394.240, which says, “Any person aggrieved by the action of the District Court in admitting a will to record or rejecting it may bring an original action in the Circuit Court . . . .” See, e.g., West v. Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Ky. 1992). That statute says nothing about testamentary capacity. The substantive basis for the claim of testamentary incapacity is KRS 394.020, which establishes the condition for making a will; the testator must be a “person of sound mind[.]” The two statutes read together make testamentary capacity contests “adversarial proceedings[.]” KRS 24A.120(2), (3). Such contests are not “nonadversarial” because they are (eliminating the double negative) “[m]atters . . . provided for by statute to be commenced in Circuit Court . . . .” KRS 24A.120(3). The statutes that authorize a will contest based on the decedent’s lack of testamentary capacity do not provide the authority for contesting the surviving spouse’s capacity to renounce a will. But other statutes do because the real issue the Montgomery District Court is adjudicating is the “correct and lawful settlement of the estate, or . . . distribution of the assets” or both. KRS 395.515; KRS 395.510. -14- The election to renounce a will, or not, is merely the fork in the asset- distribution road. In this case, renunciation puts Tamara on the more favorable path in terms of asset distribution; rescinding renunciation is the RPIs’ more beneficial route and is necessary to their view of the correct and lawful settlement. That is the real dispute, and Goff v. Edwards makes this clear. The issues in Goff required the Supreme Court “to once again consider the interplay of district and circuit court jurisdiction in matters related to probate.” 653 S.W.3d at 848. Like this case, Goff was an appeal of a lower court’s ruling on a writ petition. Like this case, Goff included allegations of “self-dealing through the misuse of the Power of Attorney[.]” Id. at 849. When these and other allegations were filed in circuit court against the attorney-in-fact, Goff, she moved to dismiss “on the basis that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the claims[,]” but that the district court did. Id. The court denied the motion. Id. Goff then sought a writ of the first class just as Tamara did but took the opposite position—she argued the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over such probate matters. Id. This Court ruled “that the Jefferson Circuit Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims alleged . . . , making a first-class writ unavailable” to send the case back to district court. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed after “conclud[ing] the Court of Appeals reached the correct result . . . , albeit for different reasons.” Id. at 853. It is for -15- those different reasons that we conclude in this case that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Tamara’s mental capacity at the time she elected to renounce Julian’s will. As the Supreme Court said, “[T]he plain language of the statutes, the foundation for discerning legislative intent, . . . leads to the conclusion that the . . . Circuit Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of the underlying case.” Id. at 850. The Court then discussed our restructured court system under “the new Judicial Article” and the jurisdiction statutes for circuit and district courts newly found in Chapters 23A and 24A. Id. at 851. Our focus is on what the Court said next. We find, as the Court in Goff found, that “KRS Chapter 395 contains the other statutes at issue in this case. KRS 395.510 . . . is a statute which allows circuit court jurisdiction for settlement of a decedent’s estate.” Id. Pursuant to that statute, “the circuit court jurisdiction extends to an action by ‘a representative, legatee, distributee or creditor’ of the decedent in order to settle the decedent’s estate.” Id. at 852 (quoting KRS 395.510(1)). “Actions initiated pursuant to KRS 395.510 and similar cases brought prior to the Kentucky Revised Statutes codification have long been called ‘settlement suits.’” Id. (citing Harris v. Harris’ Adm’r, 145 S.W. 369 (1912)). The Court continued, noting that “KRS 395.515, unchanged since 1964, see 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 105 § 1, provides further guidance for understanding -16- the initiation of a circuit court action to settle an estate and the circuit court’s role in such suit.” Id. at 852. The significance is found in “KRS 395.515’s identification of issues which may be adjudicated by the [circuit] court” in these KRS 395.510 “settlement suits.” Id. at 852 n.10. The Supreme Court quoted KRS 395.515 in bold and italics when it identified those issues, as follows: if it appears that there is a genuine issue concerning the right of any creditor, beneficiary or heir-at-law to receive payment or distribution, or if it appears that there is a genuine issue as to what constitutes a correct and lawful settlement of the estate, or a correct and lawful distribution of the assets, such issues may be adjudicated by the court . . . . Id. at 852–53 (quoting KRS 395.515) (emphasis original). The RPIs, in their capacities as beneficiaries, initiated the claim against Tamara by motion in district court. That claim effectively raises “a genuine issue concerning the[ir] right . . . to payment or distribution” in a greater amount under the will because they allege Tamara’s incapacity invalidates her renunciation. Tamara’s motion to distribute the estate consistently with her election to renounce the will raises a “genuine issue as to what constitutes a correct and lawful settlement of the estate, or a correct and lawful distribution of the assets[.]” The circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction of both. Like the Supreme Court’s decision in Goff, we reach our conclusion that the circuit court “has subject-matter jurisdiction of the underlying action” by -17- applying “the plain language of the jurisdiction statutes to the facts of this case.” Id. at 853. “[T]he circuit court’s jurisdiction provided within KRS 395.510 and KRS 395.515 allows it, as stated in KRS 395.515, to resolve settlement and distribution claims ‘if it appears that there is a genuine issue as to what constitutes a correct and lawful settlement of the estate, or a correct and lawful distribution of the assets.’” Id. (quoting KRS 395.515). “[A]s there appears to be a genuine issue as to what constitutes a correct and lawful settlement of the Estate and/or a correct and lawful distribution of the assets . . . , [t]his action, an adversarial proceeding, falls within the bounds of KRS 395.510 and KRS 395.515.” Id. at 853–54. That is also our finding. That is the genuine issue in this case. As Tamara noted, “More than three (3) years have passed since [Julian] died, and more than two (2) years have passed since [the RPIs] filed their Motion to Set Aside [Tamara’s] renunciation.” (Appellant’s Br. 2). That delay in the RPIs’ settlement as executors of the estate is a result of their pursuit of a claim as beneficiaries of the estate. If they believe the estate’s correct and lawful settlement or a correct and lawful distribution of its assets requires invalidating Tamara’s renunciation, the proper course is to initiate a cause of action pursuant to KRS 395.510 and KRS 395.515 in the proper court with subject matter jurisdiction, Montgomery Circuit Court. -18- CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the Montgomery Circuit Court’s January 2, 2026, Order Denying Writ of Prohibition and REMAND with instructions to issue a writ of the first class prohibiting the Montgomery District Court from acting on matters outside its subject matter jurisdiction. ALL CONCUR. BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Ed Monarch Earl Rogers III Louisville, Kentucky Morehead, Kentucky -19-