Douglas Ray Lindsey v. Samantha Dawn Hammond
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2025-CA-1063
JudgeL. Jones
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1063-MR
DOUGLAS RAY LINDSEY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE LORI N. GOODWIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-CI-501695
SAMANTHA DAWN HAMMOND APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING
IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, L. JONES, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.
L. JONES, JUDGE: Douglas Ray Lindsey (Douglas), pro se, brings this appeal
from a July 22, 2025 order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting relief pursuant to
CR1 59.05 by vacating, in part, an order of October 16, 2024, modifying child
support. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Douglas and Samantha Dawn Hammond (Samantha) are the
biological parents of one minor child, E.J.L., born in 2021. The underlying action
was initiated on June 8, 2023, when Douglas filed a petition seeking an order of
shared parenting and a modification of child support (Petition). Therein, Douglas
averred the following:
4. The parties were awarded joint custody and equal
shared parenting time of the minor child in a paternity
action styled Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for
Health and Family Services, ex rel. Samantha D.
Hammond v. Douglas R. Lindsey, Case No. 21J501734,
(sic) Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division Three.
5. Pursuant to an order entered in said paternity action on
December 14, 2022, the parties share 50/50 equal
parenting time with the minor child with each party
parenting the child every other week from Sunday to
Sunday at 5:00 p.m. EST. In addition to the foregoing
parenting schedule, [Douglas] was ordered to pay
[Samantha] $300 per month for child support.
June 8, 2023 Petition; Trial Record (TR) at 1-2.
A hearing was conducted on Douglas’s Petition, and by order entered
October 16, 2024, the family court made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law:
The Court finds that the parties have chosen to be
voluntarily underemployed and finds that [Douglas’s]
gross income shall be $4,225.00, and [Samantha’s]
income shall be is (sic) $11,845.83 per month. The
health/vision and hearing insurance costs testified to by
each party shall be allowed to be claimed and [Samantha]
should remit the monthly sum of $175.72 to [Douglas].
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Considering the alleviation of [Douglas’s] obligation of
$300.00 per month and the imposition of $175.72 per
month from [Samantha] to [Douglas], the statutory
requirement of 15% change has been met.
October 16, 2024 order at 4-5.2
Samantha filed a timely CR3 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate
the October 16, 2024 order. A hearing on the CR 59.05 motion was conducted on
November 18, 2024; however, an order disposing of the motion was not entered
until July 22, 2025. In the July 22, 2025 order, the family court found Douglas’s
gross income to be $3,356.59 and Samantha’s gross income to be $7,682.13. After
considering the cost of insurance paid by each party and the cost of Samantha’s
work-related child-care costs, the family court determined Douglas would owe
Samantha $5 per month in child support. Given the nominal amount of child
support owed, the family court determined it was unnecessary for either party to
remit child support to the other. See KRS4 403.212(6). Accordingly, the family
court vacated the portion of the October 16, 2024 order that established a monthly
2
The October 16, 2024 order is not in the circuit court record on appeal; however, the order was
located on CourtNet with an “entered” notation appearing on the bottom of the document
indicating the order was entered on October 16, 2024.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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child support obligation of $175.72 to be paid by Samantha to Douglas; the child
support was ordered retroactive to July 26, 2023.5 This appeal follows.
We initially note that Douglas’s pro se brief is deficient for failure to
comply with RAP6 32(A)(4)7 as there is not a proper preservation statement at the
beginning of each argument. Instead of identifying the action he took to preserve
the error, Douglas merely identifies the family court’s ruling on the issue. Not one
of the preservation statements in Douglas’s brief indicates the action he took to
preserve the issues for appellate review.
When a party fails comply with the rules of appellate procedure, this
Court has three options: “(1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review;
5
A motion to modify child support was filed by Douglas on July 6, 2023. However, the July 22,
2025 order modifying child support ordered that the child support was retroactive to July 26,
2023. This was likely a typographical error as child support is ordered retroactive to the date of
the filing of the motion to modify. See Giacalone v. Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. App.
1994).
6
Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
7
RAP 32 provides, in relevant part:
(A) Appellant’s Opening Brief. An appellant’s opening brief
must contain the following sections, in the following order.
...
(4) An argument conforming to the statement of points
and authorities, with ample references to the specific
location in the record and citations of authority
pertinent to each issue of law and which shall contain at
the beginning of the argument a statement with
reference to the record showing whether the issue was
properly preserved for review and, if so, in what
manner.
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(2) to strike the brief or its offending portions; or (3) to review the issues raised in
the brief for manifest injustice only.” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky.
App. 2010) (citation omitted). The basis for reviewing an unpreserved error in a
civil case is for manifest injustice. CR 61.02 governs and provides: “A palpable
error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by. . . an
appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for
review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error.” And “the manifest injustice standard of
review is reserved only for errors in appellate briefing related to the statement of
preservation.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021). It is also
worth noting that “[r]equiring a statement of preservation saves this Court the time
of canvassing the record in order to determine if the claimed error was properly
preserved for appeal.” S.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Fam. Servs., 585 S.W.3d
769, 777 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Given the lack of compliance with the preservation statement
requirements of RAP 32(A)(4), we have opted to review Douglas’s contentions of
error solely for palpable error that results in manifest injustice. See Ford, 628
S.W. 3d at 155. We will proceed accordingly with a review for manifest injustice
rather than the otherwise applicable standards of review.
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Douglas initially contends the family court erred in its calculation of
child support. The entirety of Douglas’s first argument is a mere four sentences
and provides:
The Family Court committed a clear error of law in its
July 22, 2025 Order by invoking the exception to
imputation under KRS 403.212(3)([e])1. This statute
prohibits imputing potential income only for a parent
caring for a child “age three (3) or younger.” The minor
child, born May 18, 2021, was over three years old when
the Appellee filed her CR 59.05 motion on October 25,
2024, and was over four years old when the July 22, 2025
Order was entered (TR 1; Appx A). The court’s
subsequent decision to vacate the prior support obligation
based on an inapplicable and expired statute is a
fundamental error of law warranting reversal.
Douglas’s Brief at 3.
KRS 403.212(3)(e)1. governs imputing income to unemployed or
underemployed parents and provides, in relevant part:
If there is a finding that a parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed, child support shall be
calculated based on a determination of potential income,
except that a finding of voluntary unemployment or
underemployment and a determination of potential
income shall not be made for a parent who is . . . caring
for a very young child, age three (3) or younger, for
whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility[.]
In the case sub judice, the family court properly applied the exception
to the rule when it imputed income to Samantha after determining she was a
voluntarily underemployed parent. See KRS 403.212(3)(e)1. The exception found
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in KRS 403.212(3)(e)1. provides that income will not be imputed to a parent
voluntarily underemployed if the parent is “caring for a very young child, age three
(3) or younger, for whom the parents owe a joint legal responsibility.” It is
undisputed that Samantha and Douglas shared joint legal responsibility of E.J.L.
So, while E.J.L. was three years old, the family court properly declined to impute
income to Samantha although she was voluntarily underemployed. However, after
E.J.L.’s fourth birthday on May 18, 2025, Samantha was no longer entitled to the
exception set forth in KRS 403.212(3)(e)1. Without application of the exception,
the income imputed to Samantha as a result of her voluntary underemployment
must be included in her income for purposes of calculating child support. In other
words, upon E.J.L.’s fourth birthday, on May 18, 2025, Samantha was no longer
entitled to the exception and the income imputed to her from voluntary
underemployment must be considered in the child support calculation. Therefore,
we vacate that portion of the July 22, 2025 order that failed to impute income to
Samantha after May 18, 2025, and remand for entry of an order consistent
therewith.
Douglas next contends the family court erred by vacating the
previously ordered child support of $175.72 to be paid by Samantha to Douglas.
Douglas argues that “child support payments vest when due and cannot be
modified prior to the date the motion to modify was properly filed.” Douglas’s
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Brief at 10. Douglas is correct in his argument that child support payments vest
when due and cannot be modified prior to the date the motion to modify was filed.
See Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Ky. App. 2006). However, in this
case, the child support was ordered to be paid retroactive to the date of the motion
to modify, July 6, 2023. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the July 22, 2025
order that provided child support was to be modified retroactively to the date of the
motion to modify, July 6, 2023.
Douglas next contends the family court erred by not applying the
shared parenting credit pursuant to KRS 403.211(2). Douglas asserts that the July
22, 2025 order did not reference the established 50/50 parenting arrangement and
did not contain any findings of fact regarding application of the shared parenting
credit. Douglas also noted the child support worksheet referenced in the July 22,
2025 order as being attached was not, in fact, attached to the order.
A review of the July 22, 2025 order reveals the following reference to
equal parenting time as set forth in the October 16, 2024 order as follows:
In its October 16, 2024 [o]rder, the Court considered the
testimony and evidence of gross income of the parties,
pursuant to KRS 403.212(2) and concluded that the equal
parenting time resulted in a deviation from the child
support guidelines as provided in K.R.S. (sic)
403.213(1).
...
-8-
That portion establishing monthly obligation of child
support from [Smanatha] to [Douglas] effective July 26,
2023 is hereby vacated and held for naught. The
remaining holdings and provisions of the Court’s October
16, 2024 order, other than as modified herein, shall
remain undisturbed.
July 22, 2025 order at 1-2; TR at 281-82.
It is well established that it is the responsibility of an appellant to
ensure the complete record is before the appellate court. Brannock v. Brannock,
598 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Ky. App. 2019) (citing Gambrel v. Gambrel, 501 S.W.3d 900,
902 (Ky. App. 2016)). And, when an appellate court is presented with an
incomplete record, “[w]e must presume that the missing parts of the record support
the findings of the trial court.” Brannock, 598 S.W.3d. at 95 (citing Harmon v.
Harmon, 13 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Ky. 1928)). As the record on appeal does not
contain the aforementioned child support worksheet, we must assume the missing
document supports the family court’s award of child support as it pertains to the
shared parenting credit. This conclusion is further bolstered by the language in the
July 22, 2025 order that references application of the shared parenting deviation
and the October 16, 2024 order which states that provisions of the July 22, 2025
order not specifically modified remained intact. This would include the deviation
for shared parenting time. In other words, application of the shared parenting
deviation survived the July 22, 2025 order.
We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand to the family court for an order of child support to be entered in accordance
with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Douglas Ray Lindsey, pro se Samantha Dawn Hammond, pro se
Munfordville, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky
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