Full Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2026-CA-0362-ME S.K.S. APPELLANT APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-AD-00061 M.A.F.; P.M.F., A MINOR CHILD; AND R.A.F. APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, ECKERLE, AND A. JONES, JUDGES. JONES, A., JUDGE: S.K.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the McCracken Circuit Court’s (“family court”) judgment granting M.A.F.’s (“Stepmother”) petition to adopt P.M.F. (“Child”) without Mother’s consent. See KRS1 199.502. On appeal, Mother challenges the family court’s findings under KRS 199.502(1)(a), (e), and 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. (g), as well as its determination that the adoption was in Child’s best interests. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Mother and R.A.F. (“Father”) were never married but were involved in a long-term relationship during which Child was born in January 2013. Their relationship ended in 2017, when Child was four years old. In 2018, Father initiated a juvenile action to establish paternity, custody, support, and related matters. The parties thereafter entered into an agreed order establishing Father’s paternity and awarding him sole custody of Child. The agreed order granted Mother overnight visitation two days each week, on Sundays and Wednesdays, as well as ten days of vacation each year. It also required Mother and Father to keep one another reasonably informed concerning Child’s whereabouts, health, and welfare. For a time, Mother continued to have regular contact with Child and exercised her visitation rights. Her last in-person contact with Child, however, occurred on February 14, 2020, and she last spoke with Child by telephone on Mother’s Day that year. Mother acknowledged that she thereafter stopped attempting to maintain contact with Child while struggling with substance abuse. Mother testified that she abused opiates until May 2020 and, approximately four months later, began using methamphetamine. She continued using -2- methamphetamine until January 2022. According to Mother, she has remained sober since January 25, 2022. Mother did not immediately attempt to reestablish contact with Child after becoming sober. In December 2022, approximately eleven months after achieving sobriety, she contacted Father seeking to see Child. Mother estimated that she made approximately nine attempts to contact Father over the ensuing years through text messages, telephone calls, and social media. Father responded to one message by asking who was contacting him but otherwise did not respond. Father acknowledged that he blocked Mother’s telephone number and social media account. He also acknowledged that he did not keep Mother informed concerning Child’s whereabouts, health, and welfare as required by the 2018 agreed order. Father maintained, however, that Mother knew how to contact his grandmother, knew Child’s tablet number, and knew the address where Father and Child had historically resided. Despite Father’s lack of response, Mother did not seek judicial enforcement of her visitation rights until July 2025, when she filed a motion for visitation in the parties’ existing juvenile action. By that time, Mother had not seen Child for more than five years. Mother also acknowledged that she had not provided financial or other material support for Child since 2020. -3- In 2021, Father began a relationship with Stepmother, and the two married in August 2022. Stepmother has been involved in Child’s life since the beginning of that relationship. At the time of the proceedings below, Father and Child lived with Stepmother, Stepmother’s three children, and Father’s grandmother. Father and Child had resided with Father’s grandmother for many years, apart from the period during which Father and Mother lived together. Father described Stepmother as an excellent mother and testified that Child regarded Stepmother as her mother. Stepmother similarly described a close relationship with Child. She testified that she had assisted Child through puberty, attended to her medical and educational needs, and considered Child to be her own. Child had called Stepmother “Mom” since January 2022. On September 15, 2025, Stepmother filed the underlying petition seeking to adopt Child without Mother’s consent. Father entered an appearance, waived further notice, and consented to the adoption. The family court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child and, after Mother filed an affidavit of indigence, appointed counsel to represent Mother.2 The Cabinet for Health and Family Services investigated the proposed adoption and filed its confidential report on December 16, 2025. The Cabinet 2 Because Mother and Father were parties to the adoption proceeding, appointment of a GAL for Child was not statutorily required. See KRS 199.480(3); Wright v. Howard, 711 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Ky. App. 1986). -4- recommended that the adoption be granted if the remaining statutory requirements were satisfied. On December 22, 2025, the GAL filed her report. The GAL reported that Child had asked Stepmother to adopt her and clearly expressed her desire for the adoption to occur. The GAL likewise recommended that the petition be granted. Mother filed a response opposing the adoption on January 3, 2026. The family court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2026. Mother, Father, Stepmother, and B.S., Mother’s former husband and the father of her two older children, testified. Their testimony was generally consistent with the history set forth above. Mother testified concerning her addiction and subsequent sobriety, her efforts to reestablish contact with Child, and her present circumstances. At the time of the hearing, Mother had maintained her sobriety for nearly four years. She had been steadily employed for more than two years, had maintained a stable residence for approximately five years, and testified that she was able to provide Child with food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Mother also had custody of her minor son, whose placement in Mother’s home had been approved by the Department for Community Based Services.3 3 B.S. expressed concern about Child having contact with Mother’s minor son. B.S. testified that the son had significant behavioral problems, had been placed in juvenile detention after physically and sexually assaulting B.S.’s fiancée, and, in B.S.’s opinion, posed a potential danger to Child. -5- Father acknowledged at the hearing that he had blocked Mother’s telephone number and social media account and had not kept Mother informed concerning Child as contemplated by the 2018 agreed order. He testified, however, that his telephone number had not changed, that he and Child continued to reside at his grandmother’s home, that Mother knew how to contact his grandmother, and that Child’s tablet number remained unchanged. Father further testified that Mother had provided no financial support for Child and that he supported Stepmother’s adoption of Child. Stepmother testified concerning her relationship with Child and the parental role she had assumed in Child’s life. Following the hearing, the family court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. With respect to the statutory grounds permitting adoption without Mother’s consent, the family court found that Stepmother had established by clear and convincing evidence the grounds contained in KRS 199.502(1)(a), (e), and (g). In reaching this conclusion, the family court relied principally on Mother’s lengthy absence from Child’s life, her substance abuse during a portion of that absence, her limited efforts to reestablish contact after attaining sobriety, her failure to seek judicial enforcement of her visitation rights until 2025, and her failure to provide financial or other support for Child since 2020. The family court also made specific findings concerning Child’s relationship with Stepmother: -6- The Father testified that the Step-Mother has been in the child’s life since their relationship began in 2021. The Father testified he has observed a close loving relationship between the child and the Step-Mother. The Step-Mother testified that she loves the child as her own daughter and has felt that way for several years. The Father, the Step-Mother, and the child live together in their home with the Step-Mother’s natural children and [Father’s] grandmother. The child’s guardian ad litem submitted a report to the Court describing the child’s wishes to be adopted by the Step Mother to whom she is bonded as mother and daughter. The guardian ad litem recommended the adoption as in the best interests of the child. The Cabinet of Health and Family Services also submitted a report to the Court recommending the adoption be granted. Based on these findings, the family court determined that adoption by Stepmother was in Child’s best interests and entered a judgment of adoption. This appeal followed. II. BRIEFING DEFICIENCIES Before addressing the merits, we must address deficiencies in the parties’ briefs. Kentucky’s appellate briefing rules are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are an important component of appellate procedure designed to facilitate meaningful review. As this Court explained in Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. App. 2010): Procedural rules “do not exist for the mere sake of form and style. They are lights and buoys to mark the channels of safe passage and assure an expeditious voyage to the right destination. Their importance simply cannot be disdained or denigrated.” -7- Id. at 696 (quoting Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Bischoff, 248 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Ky. 2007)). Indeed, appellate briefing rules “are not only a matter of judicial convenience. They help assure the reviewing court that the arguments are intellectually and ethically honest.” Id. at 697; see also Mullins v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 389 S.W.3d 149, 152-53 (Ky. App. 2012). Neither party’s brief is a model of compliance with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”).4 Most concerning, however, is Mother’s failure to comply with RAP 32(A)(4)’s preservation requirement. That rule requires an appellant’s brief to contain, at the beginning of each argument, “a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” RAP 32(A)(4). As we recently reiterated, “a party should provide preservation statements for each issue it wishes this Court to address.” W.I.S. v. K.M.B., 722 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. App. 2025). Mother did not do so. Instead, she included a single omnibus preservation statement on page six of her brief stating only that “[t]he issue is preserved through Appellant’s testimony, cross-examination of the Appellees and adverse ruling.” This statement neither identifies which of Mother’s several 4 Mother’s statement of points and authorities does not comply with RAP 32(A)(2), and Stepmother’s brief contains inadequate citations to the certified record and relies upon former Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 76.12 rather than the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See RAP 32(B)(3)-(4). -8- appellate arguments it purports to preserve nor directs us to where in the record any particular issue was presented to the family court. The preservation requirement serves an important purpose. It assures the reviewing court that an issue was presented to the trial court and is therefore properly before the appellate court, while also assisting the court in identifying the appropriate standard of review. Cotton v. NCAA, 587 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Ky. App. 2019) (quoting Oakley v. Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012)). It is not this Court’s responsibility to search the record to determine whether an issue was preserved. Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003). Mother’s failure to comply with RAP 32(A)(4) would permit us to impose an appropriate sanction for the briefing deficiency. See W.I.S., 722 S.W.3d at 577. Nevertheless, given the substantial parental rights implicated by an adoption without consent and the relatively limited record before us, we have independently reviewed the record to determine whether Mother’s arguments were presented to the family court. Our review reveals that, with an exception we address below, Mother sufficiently presented the issues she raises on appeal to permit our review of their merits. We therefore exercise our discretion to do so. Counsel for both parties are cautioned that future briefs should comply fully with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. -9- III. ANALYSIS Adoption is purely a creature of statute, and Kentucky courts require strict compliance with the statutory requirements governing adoption. S.B.P. v. R.L., 567 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Ky. App. 2018). The statutes governing adoption are contained in KRS Chapter 199. When, as here, an adoption is granted without the consent of a living biological parent, the proceeding effectively terminates the nonconsenting parent’s parental rights. M.S.S. v. J.E.B., 638 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Ky. 2022); B.L. v. J.S., 434 S.W.3d 61, 65 (Ky. App. 2014). An adoption without consent requires consideration of four distinct requirements: (1) did the petitioner comply with the jurisdictional requirements for adoption; (2) have any of the conditions outlined in KRS 199.502(1) been established; (3) is the petitioner of good moral character, of reputable standing in the community, and of ability to properly maintain and educate the child as required by the first portion of KRS 199.520(1); and (4) finally, will the best interest of the child be promoted by the adoption, and is the child suitable for adoption as required by the final portion of KRS 199.520(1). A.K.H. v. J.D.C., 619 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Ky. App. 2021). Mother does not challenge the first or third requirements. Accordingly, this appeal concerns whether Stepmother established a statutory ground for adoption without Mother’s -10- consent under KRS 199.502(1) and whether the adoption was in Child’s best interests under KRS 199.520(1). KRS 199.502(1) permits an adoption without the consent of a biological parent when the petitioner pleads and proves that any one of the conditions enumerated in that subsection exists. The family court found three such conditions applicable here: (a) That the parent has abandoned the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days; ... (e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6) months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child, and that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child; ... (g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child[.] KRS 199.502(1)(a), (e), (g). Because the statute requires proof of only one of the enumerated conditions, a finding supported by clear and convincing evidence -11- under any one of these subsections satisfies KRS 199.502(1). A.K.H., 619 S.W.3d at 432. “An adoption without the consent of a living biological parent is, in effect, a proceeding to terminate that parent’s parental rights.” B.L., 434 S.W.3d at 65 (citing Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2003)). Accordingly, in adoption without consent cases we apply the same standard of review that governs parental termination cases. Our review is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR 52.01 based upon clear and convincing evidence. The family court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there exists no substantial evidence in the record to support them. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky. App. 1998) (citing V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. App. 1986)). Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean uncontradicted proof; but rather, requires there is proof of a probative and substantial nature that is sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent minded people. Id. at 117. Under this standard, “we are required to give considerable deference to the [family] court’s findings, and we will not disturb those findings” unless the record provides no substantial support for them. K.R.L. v. P.A.C., 210 S.W.3d 183, 187 (Ky. App. 2006). -12- Mother raises several related challenges to the judgment. First, she argues that the family court erred in finding abandonment under KRS 199.502(1)(a) because her conduct after attaining sobriety demonstrates that she did not possess a settled purpose to relinquish her parental claims to Child. Relatedly, Mother maintains that Father’s efforts to obstruct her contact with Child, including blocking her communications and failing to comply with the agreed order, preclude a finding that her lack of contact was willful. Second, as to KRS 199.502(1)(e) and (g), Mother argues that the family court failed to make the required findings that there was no reasonable expectation of improvement in her ability to provide parental care or in her conduct. Third, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the family court’s best-interest determination. Finally, she argues that the family court failed to consider less drastic alternatives to adoption. We address these arguments in turn. A. Abandonment “Generally, abandonment is demonstrated by facts or circumstances that evince a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” O.S. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. App. 1983). KRS 199.502(1)(a), however, does not require abandonment to continue indefinitely. By its plain terms, the statute requires proof “[t]hat the parent has abandoned the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days[.]” -13- Substantial evidence supports the family court’s finding that Mother abandoned Child for substantially longer than the statutory period. Mother last saw Child on February 14, 2020, and last spoke with her in May 2020. Mother acknowledged that she then voluntarily ceased contact while struggling with substance abuse. She did not attempt to contact Child or Father again until December 2022, more than two and one-half years after her last communication. During this period, Mother did not provide Child with financial support, gifts, cards, or other parental care. This period of complete and voluntary absence alone far exceeded the ninety days required by KRS 199.502(1)(a). Mother nevertheless argues that her conduct after attaining sobriety demonstrates that she did not possess a settled purpose to relinquish her parental claims. We commend Mother’s efforts to overcome her addiction and do not discount the significant improvements she has made in her life. Those improvements, however, do not negate the family court’s finding that Mother had previously abandoned Child for the period required by KRS 199.502(1)(a). A.F. v. L.B., 572 S.W.3d 64, 75 (Ky. App. 2019). The statute requires abandonment “for a period of not less than ninety (90) days”; it does not require that the abandonment continue uninterrupted until the filing of the adoption petition. Moreover, even Mother’s post-sobriety efforts to reestablish a parental relationship with Child were limited. Most significantly, Mother did not seek -14- judicial enforcement of her visitation rights until July 2025. Mother was aware throughout this period that an enforceable order granted her visitation with Child and required Father to keep her updated as to Child’s whereabouts, health, and general welfare. Yet, she allowed more than three years to pass after attaining sobriety, and more than five years after her last visit with Child, before asking the family court to enforce those rights. See R.P., Jr. v. T.A.C., 469 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Ky. App. 2015) (affirming a finding of abandonment where, among other circumstances, the father “could not articulate why obtaining visitation had not been a priority for him”). We recognize that Father did not facilitate Mother’s efforts to resume contact. To the contrary, Father acknowledged that he blocked Mother’s telephone number and social media account and failed to comply with the agreed order’s requirement that he keep Mother reasonably informed concerning Child. Those facts are relevant to the abandonment inquiry, but they are not dispositive. Father’s conduct beginning in December 2022 cannot account for Mother’s complete absence from Child’s life between May 2020 and December 2022. Nor did Father’s obstruction prevent Mother from seeking enforcement of the existing visitation order. Mother knew the order remained in place, yet she did not seek judicial relief until July 2025. -15- Considering the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the family court’s finding that Mother abandoned Child for a period exceeding ninety days. Accordingly, its finding under KRS 199.502(1)(a) was not clearly erroneous. B. KRS 199.502(1)(e) and (g) The family court additionally found that Stepmother established the conditions contained in KRS 199.502(1)(e) and (g). Mother argues that these findings are deficient because the family court did not determine that there was “no reasonable expectation of improvement” in Mother’s parental care and protection under subsection (e), or “no reasonable expectation of significant improvement” in Mother’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future under subsection (g). We agree that the family court’s substantive findings do not expressly address these prospective components of the statutory grounds. That omission, however, was not properly preserved. CR 52.04 provides: A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion pursuant to Rule 52.02. Mother did not request additional findings concerning the likelihood of improvement or otherwise bring the omission to the family court’s attention. -16- Accordingly, she cannot obtain reversal on appeal based upon the absence of those findings. In any event, the issue does not affect the disposition of this appeal. KRS 199.502(1) requires proof of only one of its enumerated conditions. Because substantial evidence supports the family court’s finding of abandonment under KRS 199.502(1)(a), any error associated with its additional findings under subsections (e) and (g) is harmless. See CR 61.01. We therefore need not determine whether the evidence independently established those additional statutory grounds. C. Best Interests Mother next argues that the family court’s finding that adoption was in Child’s best interests was legally insufficient. We disagree. “Best interests” regarding children is not an explicitly defined term in our jurisprudence, and its determination is generally committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 769 (Ky. 2008). Although some statutes provide enumerated factors to guide a best-interest determination, see, e.g., KRS 403.270(2), KRS Chapter 199 contains no comparable list applicable to an adoption proceeding. Instead, KRS 199.520(1) requires the family court to determine that “[t]he best interest of the child will be promoted by the adoption and that the child is suitable for adoption.” -17- Here, the family court did considerably more than merely recite the statutory language. It found that Stepmother had been involved in Child’s life since 2021 and that Child and Stepmother shared a close and loving relationship. Stepmother testified that she loved Child as her own daughter. Child lived in an established household with Father, Stepmother, Stepmother’s children, and Father’s grandmother. The GAL reported that Child wished to be adopted by Stepmother and described the two as bonded as mother and daughter. Both the GAL and the Cabinet recommended that the adoption be granted. These findings demonstrate that the family court considered Child’s existing family relationships, home environment, expressed wishes, and the recommendations of the professionals involved in the proceeding. Nothing in KRS 199.520 required the family court to make findings concerning a prescribed list of factors, and nothing in this record suggests that it failed to consider the evidence bearing on Child’s best interests. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the family court’s determination that Child’s best interests would be promoted by the adoption. D. Less Drastic Alternatives Finally, Mother argues that the family court was required to consider alternatives less drastic than adoption. Kentucky law formerly imposed such a requirement. See D.S. v. F.A.H., 684 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Ky. App. 1985). The law -18- has since changed. As this Court explained in B.L., “[t]he current statute and its corresponding case law contain no requirement that a court consider means less drastic than adoption prior to a judgment of adoption.” 434 S.W.3d at 67. Accordingly, the family court did not err by failing to consider less drastic alternatives. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the McCracken Circuit Court. ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Steven Ellingsworth Jennifer Peek Paducah, Kentucky Paducah, Kentucky Kristen Simpson Paducah, Kentucky -19-