Full Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 30, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0782-MR SCOTT O’LOUGHLIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AND STEFAN GEARHART, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 17-CI-005454 DAVE’S TOWING SERVICE, INC. APPELLEE AND NO. 2025-CA-0842-MR DAVE’S TOWING SERVICE, INC. CROSS-APPELLANT CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE ACTION NO. 17-CI-005454 SCOTT O’LOUGHLIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED AND STEFAN GEARHART, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED CROSS-APPELLEES OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: CETRULO, ECKERLE, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES. ECKERLE, JUDGE: This matter arises from a consumer class action concerning the towing of vehicles from private parking lots, allegedly in violation of Louisville Metro’s Private Towing Ordinance § 115.450 et. seq. (“the Ordinance”) and the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”), Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 367.110 et. seq. Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Scott O’Loughlin (“O’Loughlin”) and Stefan Gearhart (“Gearhart”), individually and on behalf of a certified class of others who are similarly situated (“the Class”) (collectively “Vehicle Owners”), challenge the Jefferson Circuit Court’s June 9, 2025, Memorandum and Order granting a directed verdict in favor of Appellee/Cross- Appellant, Dave’s Towing Service, Inc. (“Dave’s Towing”) as to the claims of the unnamed Class members. Dave’s Towing cross-appeals the Trial Court’s contemporaneous, directed verdict in favor of Vehicle Owners as to Dave’s -2- Towing’s liability for violating the Ordinance and for damages. After a thorough review of the issues, and after having conducted oral arguments, we find that the Trial Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the KCPA and Kentucky Constitution, because Vehicle Owners did not purchase or consume services from Dave’s Towing and failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisite for damages. Hence, as the Trial Court acted without authority, we must vacate the rulings, directed verdicts, and judgments that it issued. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On Sunday, June 11, 2017, O’Loughlin’s vehicle was parked at his condominium complex located at 3320 Bardstown Road in Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky. The parking lot was being resurfaced, but O’Loughlin was uncertain of the work timeline. At approximately 9:00 a.m., a neighbor alerted O’Loughlin that his car was being towed. O’Loughlin approached Dave’s Towing’s driver and requested relief. The driver advised O’Loughlin that he could release the vehicle in exchange for a payment of $75 in cash. O’Loughlin could not furnish the cash, and Dave’s Towing then impounded O’Loughlin’s vehicle, towing it from the condominium parking lot to Dave’s Towing’s storage yard1 at 1 Ordinance § 115.450(D) (Lou. Metro Am. Ord. No. 236-2007, approved Nov. 12, 2007), defining “storage yard” as “[a]ny property used by a private tow operator upon which vehicles that have been privately impounded are stored.” This version of the Ordinance was in effect during the Class Period identified infra. The Ordinance was amended on November 11, 2021. -3- 4822 Poplar Level Road, which is also in Louisville. Later the same day, O’Loughlin traveled to Dave’s Towing’s storage yard to attempt to retrieve his vehicle. Finding no attendant present, he contacted Dave’s Towing by telephone and was advised that he could not retrieve his vehicle until the following day. On June 12, 2017, O’Loughlin returned to the storage yard again for his vehicle. Dave’s Towing’s staff told O’Loughlin that it did not accept credit cards, only cash, for the payment of impound fees. On June 13, 2017, O’Loughlin returned with a cash payment of $213, whereupon Dave’s Towing released O’Loughlin’s vehicle. On Saturday, August 19, 2017, Gearhart parked his vehicle at Sergio’s World of Beers (“Sergio’s”) located at 1604 Story Avenue in Louisville. Gearheart went to Butchertown Social, an adjacent bar and music venue. Approximately 30 minutes later, Gearhart witnessed Dave’s Towing removing his vehicle. Gearhart contacted Dave’s Towing by telephone and was advised that he could retrieve his vehicle at its storage yard. Gearhart arrived at Dave’s Towing’s storage yard on the same evening but found no attendant present. After Gearhart called Dave’s Towing again, an employee arrived and informed Gearhart that Dave’s Towing could only accept a cash payment for his impound fee. Gearhart went to an ATM to withdraw cash, returned to the storage yard, and paid $138 in cash for the release of his vehicle. -4- On October 16, 2017, O’Loughlin and Gearhart filed a complaint in their individual capacities and on behalf of the Class, whose motor vehicles were towed from private parking lots by Dave’s Towing or its agents allegedly in violation of the Ordinance between June 11, 2012, and the filing of the complaint (“Class Period”). Record (“R.”) at 1-12. Specifically, Vehicle Owners alleged that, during the course of impounding their vehicles, Dave’s Towing committed multiple violations of the Ordinance by failing to obtain written, signed, and contemporaneous authorization from parking lot representatives to remove the vehicles and by refusing to accept commercially reasonable tender, including credit cards, for the costs of towing and storage. Vehicle Owners’ complaint asserted that Dave’s Towing regularly and continually violated the Ordinance, affecting hundreds of members of the Class. Further, Vehicle Owners alleged that Dave’s Towing compelled them to purchase its “services,” which they defined as the towing, storage, and release of their vehicles. R. at 9. Vehicle Owners claimed that they suffered actual damages, specifically the towing fees, because of Dave’s Towing’s knowing violations of the Ordinance. Finally, Vehicle Owners alleged that Dave’s Towing’s conduct violated the KCPA. They sought actual and punitive damages, costs, attorney’s fees, pre- and post-judgment interest, and “all other relief to which they are entitled under law or in equity.” R. at 9, 303. -5- On July 16, 2018, which was not quite one year into the litigation, Dave’s Towing filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the KCPA did not apply to the facts of the case, because Vehicle Owners did not purchase services from Dave’s Towing and thus did not constitute actual consumers. R. at 26-27. The Trial Court denied the motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, Dave’s Towing filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 77.02(2), alleging that Vehicle Owners failed to prosecute the claim over the course of two years. The Trial Court, however, found that Vehicle Owners had engaged in document discovery and pursued settlement negotiations, and it remanded the motions to dismiss and maintained the action on its docket.2 During subsequent discovery, Vehicle Owners sought to compel Dave’s Towing to provide full responses to written interrogatories. For example, they claimed that, in response to a request for all of its written contracts with private lots that were in effect during the Class Period, Dave’s Towing initially provided towing contracts from only two businesses – Sergio’s and Brown Suburban Condominiums. Ultimately, Dave’s Towing produced towing contracts for over 30 public and private entities in Louisville Metro, including the Kentucky State Fairgrounds, Louisville International Airport, numerous apartment 2 This two-year delay is only one example of the protracted nature of this action, which has persisted for over eight years. -6- complexes, and various retail businesses. R. at 1095-1126. Despite producing documents advertising that “impounds are our specialty,” Dave’s Towing conceded that it had no written policies regarding the towing, storage, and/or release of impounded vehicles. Id. Dave’s Towing also acknowledged that it obtained no contemporaneous, written authorizations from private parking lot owners permitting it to tow specific vehicles, which Ordinance § 115.456 requires. In his November 19, 2020, deposition, via Zoom, David Jones (“Jones”), the sole owner and corporate designee for Dave’s Towing, also admitted violating the Ordinance. He testified that his company did not retain “tow tickets,” on which its drivers documented information concerning each vehicle, including the location from which the vehicle was towed. R. at 189-90. Jones claimed that, once a vehicle owner paid the impound fee, “it’s over,” and he saw no need to retain the records. R. at 190, 194. Additionally, Jones confessed that Dave’s Towing could not produce contemporaneous, signed authorizations from representatives of the parking lots from which vehicles were towed. Further, he recognized that Dave’s Towing did not have an attendant at the storage yard 24 hours each day, seven days per week; it routinely denied people access to their vehicles until the next day; and it either could not or did not accept credit card payments for impound fees, all of which were contrary to Ordinance § 115.457. On December 19, 2021, Vehicle Owners sought Class certification -7- pursuant to CR 23, alleging that Dave’s Towing’s violations of the Ordinance had regularly occurred and continue to occur; that there were hundreds of members to the Class; that Vehicle Owners’ claims were typical of the Class; and that Vehicle Owners could fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Dave’s Towing filed a response objecting to the certification of the Class and moved to dismiss. By Order dated May 19, 2022, the Trial Court denied both parties’ motions. R. at 271-80. As to Class certification, the Trial Court held that although Vehicle Owners had “generally described their class and their claim and issues the Court may need to address, they [had] not done so with such precision that the Court [could] confidently craft an order that complies with CR 23.03(2).” R. at 277. Moreover, the Trial Court held that Vehicle Owners’ counsel had not provided enough information to show that they were competent to represent the Class as required under CR 23.07 but noted that “[s]hould [Vehicle Owners] make any further motions to certify class, they shall tender an order that meets the demanding requirements of CR 23.03 and 23.07.” R. at 278. The Trial Court declined to dismiss the matter for failure to state a claim, finding that Vehicle Owners had adequately pled their causes of action, and jurisdiction was proper. Specific to jurisdiction, the Trial Court stated as follows: While it is true that each of the Plaintiffs’ compensatory damages claims are in the hundreds of dollars and may -8- not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of Circuit Court, Plaintiffs have pleaded both punitive damages and attorney’s fees as part of the damages they suffered. None of those claims are frivolous given the alleged conduct of Defendant. Thus, in considering the alleged amount suffered as damages pursuant to those claims, Plaintiffs have met the jurisdictional amount requirement. Additionally, the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act explicitly allows for recovery of attorney’s fees and requires cases be brought in [C]ircuit [C]ourt. R. at 279-80. Neither the motion to dismiss nor the Trial Court’s order denying said motion addressed the issue of whether paying an impound fee constituted a purchase of services as required under the KCPA. Almost one year later, on April 4, 2023, Vehicle Owners filed an amended complaint expanding the Class Period and clarifying the definition of the Class as follows: “All individuals who paid impound fees to the Defendant for the release of vehicles that were towed and/or impounded by Defendant in Jefferson County, Kentucky from June 11, 2012, to November 16, 2021.” R. at 299. After further discovery, Vehicle Owners modified the Class definition as follows: “All individuals who paid impound fees to the Defendant for the release of vehicles that were towed and/or impounded from a private lot by the Defendant in Jefferson County, Kentucky from June 11, 2012[,] to November 16, 2021.” R. at 1220 (emphasis added). Several months later, on July 27, 2023, Vehicle Owners renewed their motion to certify the Class. By Memorandum and Order issued on December 7, -9- 2023, the Trial Court granted Class certification. R. at 402-17. The Trial Court specifically held that Vehicle Owners had “defined a Class in such a manner that the inclusion in the Class may be determined by . . . objective criteria” and that “the manner in which [Dave’s Towing] operated its impound business is a single course of conduct from which liability will be determined, such that common issues predominate over individual issues in this action.” R. at 415, 417. Further, the Trial Court held that the putative Class was “sufficiently large that joinder of all members is impracticable” and that Vehicle Owners’ counsel had sufficient experience to prosecute the case on behalf of the Class. R. at 416. Finally, in granting the Class certification, the Trial Court found that “[t]he measure of damages attributable to each impound performed by [Dave’s Towing] from June 11, 2012, to November 16, 2021, and the lack of other litigation concerning the manner in which [Dave’s Towing] impounds vehicles makes class certification the superior method of adjudication.” R. at 417. Almost six months later, on January 3, 2024, Dave’s Towing attempted to appeal the Class certification. The appeal having been filed outside of the ten days required for a notice of appeal, this Court directed Dave’s Towing to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Dave’s Towing failed to file a timely response to our show cause Order, and on March 12, 2024, this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. -10- Upon dismissal of the appeal and with the Class certification otherwise unchallenged, the underlying litigation proceeded with discovery. In interrogatories, Dave’s Towing cited CR 83 and asked Vehicle Owners to “identify and list, with specificity, the amount of compensatory damages that you are seeking in this action, and the method of calculation.” See Stefan Gearhart’s Answers to Defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories (Feb. 7, 2025), Exhibit 4 to Appellee’s/Cross-Appellant’s Brief. In response, Gearhart identified his individual compensatory damages as $138,4 the impound fee that Dave’s Towing charged him to release his vehicle, and “no more than $2,228,306 in class-wide compensatory damages which reflects all impound fees charged by Dave’s Towing during the class period.” Id.; see also Video Record (“V.R.”), 6/5/25 11:21:02. O’Loughlin’s response to the same interrogatory was neither filed of record nor introduced by either party. O’Loughlin testified that he incurred $213 in damages. The Trial Court scheduled a jury trial for June 3, 2025. On March 19, 2025, the Trial Court approved Vehicle Owners’ pre-trial notice plan, ordering 3 Although Dave’s Towing did not cite the rule with specificity, CR 8.01(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “When a claim is made against a party for unliquidated damages, that party may obtain information as to the amount claimed by interrogatories. If this is done, the amount claimed shall not exceed the last amount stated in answer to interrogatories; provided, however, that the trial court has discretion to allow a supplement to the answer to interrogatories at any time where there has been no prejudice to the defendant.” 4 Ordinance § 115.451 establishes fee limits for impounds “of not more than $138 for removal and the first 24 hours of storage, and up to but not more than $25 per calendar day thereafter.” -11- them to publish a “short[-]form notice in an advertisement in the Courier Journal that shall run from April 13, 2025[,] to April 27, 2025.” R. at 1334. On May 1, 2025, on Vehicle Owners’ motion, the Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on the sole issue of whether Dave’s Towing had violated the Ordinance by refusing to accept credit card payments for impound fees. Finding that the Ordinance, specifically § 115.457(B), required that Dave’s Towing “unequivocally” and “without exception” accept all commercially reasonable tender, including credit card payments, the Trial Court held that Dave’s Towing breached the Ordinance as a matter of law. R. at 1361. Accordingly, the Trial Court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact on that issue and that “Plaintiffs [were] entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to liability on this issue.” Id. The Trial Court did not state whether “Plaintiffs” meant O’Loughlin and Gearhart only or if partial summary judgment included the Class. The Trial Court did hold that there were genuine issues of material fact as to Vehicle Owners’ other claims, including whether Dave’s Towing violated the KCPA. “The evidence presently in the record does not show that [Dave’s Towing] willfully charged Plaintiffs impound fees for the release of their vehicles, which constituted ‘unlawful, unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts.’” R. at 1364-65. Again, the Trial Court did not address the issue of whether, -12- as a matter of law, the payment of an impound fee resulting from a tow constituted a purchase of services under the KCPA. Shortly before trial, the Trial Court considered several evidentiary motions, including Vehicle Owners’ motion to take judicial notice of the contents of websites for the offices of the Secretary of State (“SOS”) and the Jefferson County Property Valuation Administrator (“PVA”), for use at trial. The Trial Court granted the motion, taking judicial notice that the SOS and PVA records “are what they purport to be.” R. at 1391. However, the Trial Court explicitly held that it could not “interpret those records for the jury and declare that a specific owner is a public or private entity.” R. at 1391-92. Rather, the Trial Court explained that it remained Vehicle Owners’ burden “to prove to the jury, either through a witness or by persuading the jury to make their own decision based on the plain language of the documents, that a property from which cars were removed is private property.” Id. At trial, O’Loughlin and Gearhart testified regarding their individual experiences with Dave’s Towing and their incurrence of actual damages in the amounts of $213 and $138, respectively. Despite having issued pre-trial notice to the Class, Vehicle Owners neither identified for the record nor called as witnesses any other presumptive Class members. -13- Instead, they sought the testimony of two Louisville Metro employees, who testified that Dave’s Towing routinely reported by telephone its tows to the Louisville Metropolitan Police Department (“LMPD”), which logged the information received into a database management system. Those employees also authenticated and explained an LMPD spreadsheet, listing the tows that Dave’s Towing reported during the Class Period. The spreadsheet identified Dave’s Towing as the requesting tow operator, listed the addresses from which and to which the vehicle was towed, and included the date and time of the tow. The spreadsheet did not list the vehicle identification numbers or the Vehicle Owners’ names but did generate unique identifiers for each vehicle towed that could then be generated from the LMPD database. Finally, the spreadsheet did not distinguish whether the addresses listed for the tows were from private or public parking lots. At trial, Jones testified that his company conducted impound tows during the Class Period and through the date of the trial and charged affected owners the maximum rate for removal permitted under Ordinance § 115.451. He confirmed that he had active contracts with many private, commercial businesses, only some of which he provided in discovery. When confronted with his deposition and a prior lawsuit, Jones admitted that he understood the specific requirements of the Ordinance but did not follow it. He stated that Dave’s Towing -14- conducted impounds in Louisville “by the way they tell us to do.” V.R., 6/4/25 at 11:48:45-11:49:01.5 When asked about whether his company towed vehicles for “any public entities” other than the fairgrounds, airport, and local police departments identified in his deposition, Jones stated that Dave’s Towing had a contract with “the Housing Authority.” V.R., 6/4/25 at 11:56:53-11:57:48. Further, he explained that the Housing Authority had “over 2,000 places, and [Dave’s Towing] towed for every one of them.” V.R., 6/4/25 at 11:57:55-11:58:04. He characterized these impounds as “public tows” from Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or Section 8 properties but did not dispute that tax records could show other residential and commercial non-public properties that were owned by privately-held businesses. V.R., 6/4/25 at 11:59:37-50, 12:25:40- 12:26:15; V.R., 6/5/25 at 2:38:20-40. Pursuant to the Trial Court’s evidentiary order, Vehicle Owners offered the records from the SOS and PVA websites as evidence establishing the ownership of properties listed on the LMPD spreadsheet, which were predominantly identified as limited-liability companies, with some individual 5 We note that the record reflects that Jones was consistently belligerent with opposing counsel and patently defiant about following the Ordinance. He also provided conflicting answers in both his deposition and trial testimony regarding whether he was required to or did in fact accept credit cards and maintain records. -15- owners or trusts. In addition to the properties’ owners’ names, the records showed property tax classifications (e.g., residential apartments, commercial retail, or offices). The Trial Court had already taken some judicial notice of these websites of government records, but not for every purpose sought; and Vehicle Owners did not call a witness to testify regarding the SOS and PVA records. At the close of Vehicle Owners’ case, Dave’s Towing moved for directed verdict, arguing that the KCPA did not apply because Vehicle Owners did not purchase goods or services from Dave’s Towing. Further, it argued that even if the KCPA did apply, Vehicle Owners failed to prove any false, misleading, or deceptive practices and neglected to make proper damage claims under the KCPA as required by CR 8. V.R., 6/4/25 at 2:09-2:11, 2:14-15, 3:02:45-3:03:59. In response, Vehicle Owners argued that “forced purchases” were still purchases, and that Dave’s Towing’s charging of impound fees, when it was not permitted to so under the provisions of the Ordinance, constituted an unfair and deceptive practice. V.R., 6/4/25 at 2:12:30-40, 3:04:00-21. Finding that Vehicle Owners did not purchase services from or employ Dave’s Towing, as defined by the KCPA, the Trial Court granted a directed verdict against Vehicle Owners as to their claims under the KCPA. V.R., 6/4/25 at 3:05:02-3:07:24. After the Trial Court dismissed the KCPA claim, Dave’s Towing moved for a directed verdict and dismissal of all claims for lack of subject-matter -16- jurisdiction. Citing CR 12.02(c), Dave’s Towing argued that, upon dismissal of the KCPA claim, the Vehicle Owners’ claims for damages, which were limited to $138 per representative or presumptive plaintiff, fell well below the statutory jurisdictional prerequisite of $5,000. Further, Dave’s Towing asserted that subject- matter jurisdiction could not be waived and, if in question, must be addressed at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. V.R., 6/4/25 at 3:07:35-3:10:48; 6/5/25 at 10:15:15-10:18:08, 10:20:25-10:21:35. Vehicle Owners countered that because the Trial Court had “original” subject-matter jurisdiction when it certified the Class, it could not later be divested of such jurisdiction once the parties reached trial. V.R., 6/4/25 at 3:19:30-3:20. After reviewing relevant case law and considering the oral arguments of the parties, the Trial Court declined to dismiss the remaining claims. It reasoned that the Vehicle Owners were required to bring their KCPA claim in Circuit Court, specifically stating that “at the time of the [Class] certification, it had to be in here.” V.R., 6/4/25 at 3:23:47-51. And despite recognizing that it “could transfer the case to District Court,” it ultimately declined to do so. Id. at 3:24:25-30. Moreover, when asked to reconsider its reasoning, the Trial Court stated: If you will find me one case where something similar has happened; where the predicate to getting to Circuit Court goes away based on the proof, and therefore, in mid-trial, all other claims which may be viable but would not ordinarily come to Circuit Court just go away because the Court somehow in the middle of trial lost jurisdiction, -17- then I will reconsider that. But . . . once jurisdiction is established in Circuit Court, I don’t think I lose it mid- trial because the count that mandated it be here fails on the proof. V.R., 6/5/25 at 10:18:52-10:19:42. The Trial Court recognized that the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was “murky,” and having been preserved, likely would be appealed, and that the entirety of the complicated case, which had persisted for many years, “will give an appellate court quite a bit to chew on.” V.R., 6/5/25 at 10:26:45-10:27:25. Nonetheless, it denied the motion to dismiss the remaining claims. At this point in the appeal, we must note that it is unfortunate that many of the arguments and the rulings were made orally. While the Trial Court could have requested pretrial, written briefing from the parties on the fine points of jurisdiction, dismissal, and transfer, and then issued a written Opinion and Order, it did not. In our thorough review of the record, we have uncovered snippets of discussions between the Trial Court and counsel for the parties indicating their awareness of the significance of the jurisdictional issue prior to trial and of the potential for transfer of the case to District Court for trial. For its case, Dave’s Towing recalled O’Loughlin, Gearhart, and Jones. Additionally, a representative from the Jefferson County Clerk’s Office testified that the office routinely provided owner and lien-holder information to tow operators, including Dave’s Towing. However, the Clerk’s office is only open -18- on weekdays, Mondays through Fridays, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Because tow operators are required to notify the Clerk pursuant to Ordinance § 115.455, the Clerk permitted tow operators to report their tows by email or fax at any point in time, including on the weekends and after hours. The Clerk then processes those requests the next business day. The representative also testified that Dave’s Towing contacted the Clerk almost daily to seek information regarding owners and lien-holders. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:00-3:05. Finally, Dave’s Towing called a manager from Sergio’s, who testified regarding its former contract with Dave’s Towing and its methods of contact for towing vehicles illegally parked in its private parking lot. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:06-3:13. After the close of all of the evidence, Dave’s Towing renewed its motion for a directed verdict and moved to decertify the Class. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:15. Specifically, Dave’s Towing argued that Vehicle Owners failed to establish that the damages suffered by the purported Class members were sufficiently common as to support the continuation of the certification of the Class and failed to present competent evidence for the jury to determine damages without speculating as to which tows originated from private properties. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:15-21, 3:26. Additionally, Dave’s Towing renewed its assertion that the Trial Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:21:09-49. Vehicle Owners also moved for their own directed verdict based on the Trial Court’s partial -19- summary judgment finding Dave’s Towing liable for failing to accept credit card payments as well as evidence that Dave’s Towing did not obtain contemporaneous written authorizations for its tows. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:22:20-3:23:22. Alternatively, Vehicle Owners asked the Trial Court to submit the matter to the jury for a determination of damages based on the LMPD spreadsheet and the records from the SOS and PVA websites. V.R., 6/5/25 at 3:23:23-3:25:34. After considering the parties’ arguments, the Trial Court granted a directed verdict in favor of Dave’s Towing as to the Class-wide claims but granted a separate, contemporaneous directed verdict awarding damages to O’Loughlin and Gearhart on their individual claims as to Dave’s Towing’s violation of the Ordinance’s requirement that it accept credit card payments. V.R., 6/6/25 at 9:27- 9:34. In its written Order, the Trial Court restated that it refuted and denied Dave’s motion on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, referencing the “reasons set out in detail on the record.” R. at 1470. It also declined to address whether to decertify the Class. R. at 1471. Rather, it granted the motion for directed verdict on the basis that Vehicle Owners did not meet their burden to prove that “the thousands of cars towed by [Dave’s Towing] between June 11, 2012[,] and November 16, 2021[,] were towed from private properties as required by law.” R. at 1470, 1473. In addition to the question regarding whether HUD properties were -20- public parking lots, the Trial Court held that “[e]ven if every listed property for which documents have been provided is private, there is not sufficient evidence in the record from which each juror could make that determination. . . . Without evidence in the record, not just to the ownership, but whether that ownership is public or private, a juror is required to speculate or to rely on another juror’s knowledge or opinion, neither of which is permitted.” R. at 1473. Significantly, the Trial Judge orally communicated on the record that it welcomed an appeal, because the case was “replete with issues on both sides that [the Trial Judge] would love to see published law on.” V.R., 6/6/25 at 9:48:19-31. On appeal, Vehicle Owners argue that the Trial Court erred by issuing orders with contradictory results, considered information outside of the record when it independently referenced www.hud.gov, and improperly substituted its own assessment of the evidence for the jury’s as to whether the locations from which Dave’s Towing impounded vehicles were private parking lots. Dave’s Towing asks this Court to affirm the directed verdict in its favor as to the Class based on all the grounds it argued below, including that the Trial Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Dave’s Towing also cross-appeals the Trial Court’s independent, directed verdict awarding O’Loughlin and Gearhart damages on their individual claims, arguing that, once the Trial Court ruled that the KCPA did not apply, the Trial Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining -21- municipal-ordinance claims. II. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Before proceeding to the merits, we must address both parties’ failures to provide preservation statements in their respective briefs. A failure to comply substantially with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) can be grounds for sanctions as we deem appropriate. RAP(10)(B). Specifically, RAP 32(A)(4) and, by extension, RAP 32(C)(1), provide that an appellant or cross- appellant’s opening brief “contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” Our Supreme Court has “strictly mandated compliance with this rule since its inception. . . .” Gasaway v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 298, 310 (Ky. 2023) (citing Skaggs v. Assad, By & Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986)). Further, “[i]t goes without saying that errors to be considered for appellate review must be precisely preserved and identified in the lower court.” Id. The issues presented in this combined appeal and cross-appeal are significantly intertwined, and the parties’ failures to include a preservation statement regarding each issue necessarily frustrates our review. Moreover, as the parties’ motions for directed verdict were presented orally to the Trial Court, they did not preserve their arguments in writing. The lack of a written record of many -22- of the arguments presents the exact reason that our “[a]ppellate procedural rules, including those for briefing, cannot be ignored by appellate advocates.” White v. Fowler, 717 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Ky. App. 2025). Because the rule violations occurring here are less egregious than in other recent cases, we decline to impose more stringent sanctions at this time, but issue an admonishment, coupled with strong caution, to expect no such continued leniency in the future. Additionally, we have arranged our analysis of the multiple issues raised in the appeal and cross-appeal in such a manner and order to address them most efficiently. “We have considered the parties’ extensive arguments and citations to authority but will discuss only the arguments and cited authorities we deem most pertinent, the remainder being without merit, irrelevant, or redundant.” Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29 n.1 (Ky. App. 2021). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW At the conclusion of a jury trial, “a Trial Court may direct a verdict on an issue when there was a ‘complete absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.’” Hamilton v. P.B. Stratton Fam. P’ship, L.L.C., 709 S.W.3d 287, 314 (Ky. App. 2024) (quoting Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (Ky. 1998) and CR 50.01). “It is well-argued and documented that a motion for a directed verdict raises only questions of law as to whether there is any evidence to support a verdict.” Gibbs v. -23- Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing Harris v. Cozatt, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1968)). The matter of whether a Trial Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, which we hold is dispositive of this appeal, is reviewed de novo. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49, 53-54 (Ky. 2007); Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Bradley, 244 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky. App. 2007) (“When a court is alleged to be acting outside of its jurisdiction, the standard of review is de novo.”). IV. ANALYSIS The matter sub judice presents a series of actions by the parties and decisions by the Trial Court that the parties failed to appeal, appealed untimely, or otherwise neglected to make available for appellate review. Although Dave’s Towing repeatedly sought disposition of this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, including a cursory motion for summary judgment in 2018 and an objection to and attempted appeal of the Trial Court’s Class certification in 2024, its motions offered little to no legal support and were either unpersuasive or untimely. Notably, Dave’s Towing could have sought a writ of prohibition but failed to do so. See, e.g., Imhoff v. House, 628 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Ky. 2021) (in the context of a class action, where a “a lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction . . . [a] writ action [may be] correctly initiated in -24- the Court of Appeals”). Consequently, Vehicle Owners’ claims persisted through years of unnecessary litigation, which encompassed multiple, unsuccessful attempts to reach their goals, including two chances to certify the class action. For its most significant argument on appeal, Dave’s Towing asserts that the Trial Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction from the initiation of the class action. Because it did not seek an appellate ruling to stop the trial on that ground, Dave’s Towing now requests that we affirm the Trial Court’s directed verdict dismissing Vehicle Owner’s KCPA claim; reverse the Trial Court’s decisions during the trial, namely, the finding that it retained subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the KCPA claim; decertify the Class; and dismiss all of the Vehicle Owners’ Class-wide and individual claims.6 Its comprehensive request for remedy is perplexing, as it could, and should, have requested that we nullify all of the Trial Court’s actions taken outside its jurisdiction as void ab initio. A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction “It is fundamental that a court must have jurisdiction before it has authority to decide a case. Jurisdiction is the ubiquitous procedural threshold 6 Dave’s Towing did not request that the Circuit Court transfer O’Loughlin’s and Gearhart’s individual claims, which were under the jurisdictional limit, to District Court, where they could have been properly adjudicated. See infra discussion regarding the circumstances and timing that Circuit Court should transfer a case to District Court rather than dismissing. -25- through which all cases and controversies must pass prior to having their substance examined.” Basin Energy Co. v. Howard, 447 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Ky. Ap