Jeffrey Scott James v. Frank Longley
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2025-CA-0625
JudgeA. Jones
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0625-MR
JEFFREY SCOTT JAMES APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MELISSA L. BELLOWS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 22-CI-002747
FRANK LONGLEY; DEVILLE
HOMES, INC.; AND LSC INC.-S7 APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ECKERLE, A. JONES, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
JONES, A., JUDGE: This appeal arises from a physical altercation between the
Appellant, Jeffrey Scott James, and one of the Appellees, Frank Longley, at a
residential construction site in Middletown, Kentucky. James subsequently filed a
civil action against Longley, LSC Inc.-S7 (“LSC”), and Deville Homes, Inc.
(“Deville Homes”) (collectively “Appellees”), seeking damages for injuries he
allegedly suffered during his scuffle with Longley. The Jefferson District Court, as
part of a separate criminal proceeding against Longley arising from the same
incident, determined that Longley was immune from criminal prosecution pursuant
to KRS1 503.085(1). Concluding that it was bound by the district court’s immunity
determination in the criminal action, the circuit court concluded that Longley was
likewise immune from James’s civil action and entered summary judgment in his
favor. The circuit court also entered summary judgment in favor of LSC and
Deville Homes.
The principal question presented is whether a court’s determination
that an individual is immune from criminal prosecution under KRS 503.085(1)
conclusively establishes that individual’s immunity from civil suit arising from the
same conduct. We conclude that it does not. Although KRS 503.085(1) provides
immunity from both criminal prosecution and civil suit for the legally justified use
of force, the statute does not make a determination of immunity in one proceeding
conclusively binding in the other. Nor may the criminal court’s findings in the
criminal proceeding be given preclusive effect with respect to the plaintiff in a civil
suit.
Accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of
Longley and remand this matter for the circuit court to independently consider
whether Longley is entitled to civil immunity. We likewise vacate the summary
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
judgment entered in favor of LSC insofar as genuine issues of material fact remain
concerning whether Longley acted within the scope of his employment. However,
we affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of Deville Homes and the
disposition of James’s independent negligent hiring, retention, and supervision
claim against LSC. We therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2021, Longley was employed as an equipment operator
for LSC, a position he had held for approximately three years. His duties included
operating heavy equipment, laying out job plans, and excavating basements. LSC
performed excavation work for various builders, including Deville Homes.
Longley’s supervisor at LSC was Micah Newman.
On November 17, 2021, LSC assigned Longley to perform excavation
work on property owned by Deville Homes in the Lake Forest subdivision of
Middletown, Kentucky.2 Longley was tasked with excavating a basement and
moving the displaced dirt to an adjoining lot to allow other contractors access to
the construction site. Deville Homes owned three adjoining lots, and Longley was
excavating the middle lot and depositing the dirt on the lot to its right. James
2
Although the circuit court identified November 21, 2021, as the date of the incident, James’s
complaint and the other filings in the record consistently identify November 17, 2021, as the
relevant date. We use the latter date throughout this Opinion.
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owned property adjacent to the lot where Longley was depositing the dirt.
According to James, Longley was depositing the excavated dirt too close to certain
trees located on James’s property.
That morning, James approached Longley to express concerns that the
excavation work was encroaching upon his property. The two exchanged words,
and Longley directed James to contact Deville Homes if he had further concerns
about the work.3 Later that afternoon, James returned to the construction site.
James entered an excavated area where Longley was operating heavy equipment
and approached Longley to discuss the matter further as he believed that Longley
was continuing to damage his property. Another verbal confrontation ensued,
which escalated into a physical altercation between the two men. Although the
parties agree that Longley pushed James, their accounts of the circumstances
surrounding the confrontation and the ensuing physical contact differ markedly.
James maintains that Longley was the aggressor and used excessive force against
him. Longley maintains that he acted in self-defense after James entered the
excavation area, confronted him in a threatening and hostile manner, and refused
repeated requests to leave. James alleges that he sustained physical injuries during
the altercation.
3
During his deposition, Longley explained that he told James to contact Deville Homes as
opposed to LSC because there was a sign on the property with Deville Homes’s phone number
on it.
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On June 2, 2022, James filed the underlying civil action in Jefferson
Circuit Court against Longley, LSC, and Deville Homes. James sought damages
for the injuries he allegedly sustained. He also asserted claims against LSC and
Deville Homes based on theories of vicarious liability and negligent hiring,
retention, training, and supervision. The parties thereafter engaged in written
discovery and depositions.
Meanwhile, criminal proceedings arising from the November 17,
2021, incident were initiated against Longley on July 29, 2023, in Jefferson
District Court, Case No. 23-M-009040. On December 4, 2023, Longley moved for
immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to KRS 503.085(1), asserting that his
use of force was legally justified. At a hearing on December 5, 2023, the
Commonwealth orally moved to dismiss the criminal charges with prejudice,
without stipulating that probable cause was lacking. Although Longley did not
oppose dismissal of the charges, he requested that the district court first adjudicate
his immunity motion. The Commonwealth objected, maintaining that its decision
not to prosecute rendered the immunity question moot.
The district court took the matter under advisement. In an order
entered on February 2, 2024, the district court concluded that it retained authority
to decide Longley’s pending immunity motion notwithstanding the
Commonwealth’s request for dismissal. Relying on Rodgers v. Commonwealth,
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285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009), the district court applied the standard governing
criminal immunity under KRS 503.085, which requires consideration of whether
probable cause exists to believe that the defendant’s use of force was unlawful.
In so doing, the district court observed that the Commonwealth’s
submissions consisted principally of the criminal citation and the investigating
detective’s complaint. Longley, in turn, had submitted property deeds, the
complaint filed in James’s civil action, and deposition testimony from James and
Longley. Based on those materials, the district court recounted the circumstances
of the parties’ encounters, including James’s entry onto the construction site, his
confrontation with Longley in the excavation area, and Longley’s asserted concern
for his safety.
Of particular significance, the district court noted that the
Commonwealth had elected not to prosecute the charges and had offered no
substantive argument that probable cause existed to believe Longley’s use of force
was unlawful. The district court stated:
The Commonwealth makes no argument that there is, in
fact, any probable cause which weighs heavily on the
Court. But more importantly, the Court cannot find in
good conscience that the use of force was not legally
justified and as such, finds the Defendant [Longley]
immune from prosecution.
Record (“R.”) at 231.
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Accordingly, the district court expressly determined that Longley was
immune from criminal prosecution under KRS 503.085 and dismissed the charges
with prejudice. Id. James, although listed as the complaining witness, was not a
party to the criminal proceeding.
Following the district court’s ruling, Longley moved for summary
judgment in the civil action on April 19, 2024. He argued that the district court’s
determination of criminal immunity conclusively established his immunity from
James’s civil claims arising from the same incident. LSC and Deville Homes
separately moved for summary judgment on April 24 and April 26, 2024,
respectively. In addition to relying on Longley’s immunity, they asserted that the
evidence was insufficient to establish independent or derivative liability on their
parts.
By that time, the parties had conducted substantial discovery.
Longley had been deposed on May 9, 2023, and LSC’s president, Luke Schultz,
had been deposed on November 27, 2023. During those depositions, Longley
identified Chris Osborne of Deville Homes as an individual who had provided
instructions concerning the excavation project, while Schultz identified Micah
Newman as having greater knowledge of Longley’s work. James subsequently
maintained that summary judgment was premature because he had not obtained
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testimony from those individuals. The record, however, does not reflect any
attempt to depose either witness before the summary judgment motions were filed.
On July 19, 2024, the circuit court entered an Opinion and Order
granting summary judgment in favor of Longley and Deville Homes. The circuit
court concluded that Longley’s immunity from criminal prosecution under KRS
503.085(1) also rendered him immune from James’s civil action. It further
concluded that James had failed to produce sufficient evidence to impose liability
on Deville Homes. The circuit court, however, initially denied LSC’s motion for
summary judgment.
James thereafter moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment
entered in favor of Longley and Deville Homes. LSC likewise sought
reconsideration of the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Following
further proceedings, the circuit court entered separate Opinions and Orders on
April 23, 2025. The circuit court denied James’s motion, reaffirming its
conclusion that it was bound by the district court’s immunity determination.
However, the circuit court granted LSC’s motion for reconsideration, concluding
that even assuming LSC could be held liable for Longley’s conduct
notwithstanding his immunity, the evidence was insufficient to support a judgment
against LSC.
-8-
This appeal followed. Additional facts will be discussed below as
necessary to our analysis.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo
because it involves only questions of law and the existence of disputed material
facts. Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001). Summary
judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR4 56.03. In determining
whether summary judgment was properly granted, we must view the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts in that party’s
favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991).
Additionally, the interpretation of KRS 503.085 presents a question of
law, which we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Love, 334 S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky.
2011).
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-9-
III. ANALYSIS
James raises several challenges to the circuit court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees. His principal argument concerns the circuit
court’s determination that Longley’s immunity from criminal prosecution under
KRS 503.085 conclusively established his immunity from James’s civil action.
James also challenges the dismissal of his claims against LSC and Deville Homes,
contending that genuine issues of material fact remain concerning their liability
and that summary judgment was premature because discovery had not been
completed. We address the immunity question first, followed by the claims against
LSC and Deville Homes.
A. Longley’s Immunity Under KRS 503.085(1).
James first argues that the circuit court erred by concluding that the
district court’s determination of Longley’s immunity from criminal prosecution
conclusively established his immunity from James’s civil action. Specifically,
James maintains that KRS 503.085 does not provide that a determination of
immunity in a criminal proceeding is binding in a subsequent civil action and that
he cannot be bound by findings made in a proceeding to which he was not a party
and in which he had no full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
In granting summary judgment in favor of Longley, the circuit court
concluded that “[a]ccording to the language of KRS 503.085(1), Longley is
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immune from civil suit if found immune from criminal prosecution under the same
set of facts. . . . The Court . . . finds no convincing reason to vacate the District
Court’s Order.” R. at 601.
The circuit court thus interpreted KRS 503.085 as making the district
court’s determination of criminal immunity dispositive of Longley’s immunity
from James’s civil action and moreover treated the matter as if the district court’s
order were before it as part of an appeal. When James subsequently challenged
that conclusion, the circuit court acknowledged his procedural, due process, and
substantive concerns but nevertheless reaffirmed its determination that Longley
was entitled to summary judgment.
In its April 23, 2025, Revised Opinion and Order, the circuit court
explained:
The Court recognizes and very much appreciates the
procedural, due process, and substantive concerns raised
by Mr. James. However, whether the District Court’s
apparent belief that it was required by law to rule on Mr.
Longley’s immunity motion, whether the available record
was sufficiently complete to allow the District Court to
make the necessary findings with any degree of
confidence, whether the Commonwealth’s advocacy was
such that Mr. James was given a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the immunity issue, whether the District Court
fully appreciated the ramifications of doing so (i.e. that
the ruling was not and could not be limited to the pending
criminal case against Mr. Longley), or whether the
District Court’s ultimate decision to grant a motion for
immunity under KRS 503.085 in a case with such
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disparate factual accounts of the precipitating event was
erroneous, are not issues before this Court.
R. at 676-77. The circuit court continued:
This case came before the Court on a motion for
summary judgment and not on appeal from the District
Court, or for a de novo ruling as to whether Mr. Longley
qualifies for immunity under KRS 503.085. As such, and
in ruling on the motion, the Court is obliged to accept the
District Court’s determination that Mr. Longley does
qualify for immunity under KRS 503.085 regardless of
whether or not the Court agrees with that ruling. Rodgers
v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (2009). That
determination having been made, he is as a matter of law
immune from criminal prosecution and civil action
arising out of his use of force against Mr. James on
November [17], 2021. Accordingly, even when viewing
the evidence of record in the light most favorable to Mr.
James, it would not be possible for him to prevail on his
claims against Mr. Longley at trial.
Id. at 677.
We agree with the circuit court that it was not sitting in review of the
district court’s criminal immunity determination. Likewise, whether the district
court correctly granted Longley immunity from criminal prosecution is not before
us. The issue before us is whether the circuit court correctly determined that it was
required to accept the district court’s ruling in the criminal case as dispositive of
Longley’s immunity from James’s separate civil action. We disagree with that
conclusion because, as explained below, neither the language of KRS 503.085 nor
the principles governing issue preclusion support it.
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We begin with the language of KRS 503.085, which provides:
(1) A person who uses force as permitted in KRS
503.050,[5] 503.055,[6] 503.070,[7] and 503.080[8] is
justified in using such force and is immune from criminal
prosecution and civil action for the use of such force,
unless the person against whom the force was used is a
peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who was
acting in the performance of his or her official duties and
the officer identified himself or herself in accordance
with any applicable law, or the person using force knew
or reasonably should have known that the person was a
peace officer. As used in this subsection, the term
“criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in
custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.
(2) A law enforcement agency may use standard
procedures for investigating the use of force as described
in subsection (1) of this section, but the agency may not
arrest the person for using force unless it determines that
there is probable cause that the force that was used was
unlawful.
(3) The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees,
court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all
expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any
civil action brought by a plaintiff, if the court finds that
the defendant is immune from prosecution as provided in
subsection (1) of this section.
5
KRS 503.050 relates to the use of force in protection of oneself.
6
KRS 503.055 relates to the use of force regarding the protection of dwellings, residences, or
occupied vehicles.
7
KRS 503.070 relates to the use of force in the protection of another person.
8
KRS 503.080 relates to the use of force to protect one’s dwelling, building, or upon real
property in his or her possession or in the possession of another person for whose protection he
or she acts.
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KRS 503.085.
Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly. Beckham v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cnty., 873
S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1994). We begin with the statutory language, giving its
words their ordinary meaning and considering the statute as a whole. Torian v.
City of Paducah, 739 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Ky. 2025). We may not add language to a
statute that the General Assembly did not include. Commonwealth v. Harrelson,
14 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Ky. 2000).
By its plain terms, KRS 503.085(1) provides immunity from both
criminal prosecution and civil action to a person whose use of force is legally
justified under the enumerated provisions of KRS Chapter 503. The statute thus
recognizes two forms of immunity arising from the same substantive justification
for the use of force. Significantly, however, it does not provide that a judicial
determination of immunity in a criminal proceeding conclusively establishes
immunity in a subsequent civil action. Nor does it state that findings made in a
criminal proceeding are binding upon an individual who was not a party to that
proceeding.
Reading all parts of KRS 503.085 together, we discern no legislative
intent to make a criminal court’s determination of immunity automatically
dispositive in a civil action. Had the General Assembly intended such a result, it
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could have expressly provided that a determination of immunity from criminal
prosecution would conclusively establish immunity from civil liability arising from
the same conduct. It did not do so. Rather, the statute conditions immunity upon
the legally justified use of force, not upon the existence of a prior judicial
determination in a different proceeding.
This distinction is particularly significant because criminal and civil
proceedings involve different parties, serve different purposes, and are governed
by different procedural standards. The Commonwealth prosecutes criminal
offenses on behalf of the public, whereas a civil plaintiff seeks redress for an
alleged injury to private rights. Nothing in KRS 503.085 suggests that the General
Assembly intended to bind a private plaintiff to a criminal immunity determination
obtained in a proceeding in which that plaintiff had no right to control the
presentation of evidence or legal arguments.
Our interpretation finds persuasive support in Kumar v. Patel, 227 So.
3d 557 (Fla. 2017), in which the Supreme Court of Florida considered substantially
similar statutory language and addressed the precise question presented here.
Florida’s self-defense immunity statute, like KRS 503.085(1), provides that a
person whose use of force is legally justified is immune from both criminal
prosecution and civil actions. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1). The Florida statute
also contains a provision authorizing an award of attorney’s fees and related
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expenses in a civil action when a court finds the defendant immune from
prosecution. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(3).9
In that case, two men, Kumar and Patel, became embroiled in a
barroom dispute that turned physical. During the altercation, Patel struck Kumar
in the face with a glass, permanently blinding his left eye. After Patel was indicted
with felony battery, he moved to dismiss the charges against him based on
immunity pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1). The criminal court determined that
Patel was entitled to statutory immunity and dismissed the charges with prejudice.
Kumar subsequently brought a civil action seeking damages for his injuries. Patel
asserted that the criminal court’s determination necessarily established his
immunity from the civil action. Although the trial court rejected that argument, the
intermediate appellate court agreed with Patel and directed that immunity be
granted. The Florida Supreme Court reversed.
Examining the statutory language, the Kumar court concluded that a
determination of immunity from criminal prosecution did not automatically confer
immunity from a subsequent civil action. 227 So. 3d at 559-61. The Florida
9
Florida amended its self-defense immunity statute in 2017 to add subsection (4), which places
the burden on the party opposing criminal immunity to overcome a prima facie claim by clear
and convincing evidence. See 2017 Fla. Laws ch. 2017-72 § 1; FLA. STAT. § 776.032(4). The
amendment did not alter the provisions governing immunity from criminal prosecution and civil
action or the award of attorney’s fees in civil proceedings. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1), (3).
Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court expressly considered the amendment in Kumar, observing
that the differing burdens of proof further supported separate determinations of criminal and civil
immunity. 227 So. 3d at 561.
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Supreme Court reasoned that although the statute afforded protection against both
criminal prosecution and civil action, it did not provide that an immunity
determination in one proceeding was binding in the other. The court also
considered the statutory provision authorizing attorney’s fees in civil actions as
consistent with a separate judicial determination of civil immunity.
We find Kumar persuasive because the Florida statute and KRS
503.085 employ substantially similar language and establish the same substantive
protections. Both statutes provide immunity from criminal prosecution and civil
action for legally justified force, yet neither expressly provides that a criminal
immunity determination conclusively resolves the issue in a subsequent civil
proceeding. We agree with the Florida Supreme Court that the statutory grant of
both forms of immunity does not, without more, establish that a determination of
one necessarily controls the other.
Accordingly, we conclude that KRS 503.085 does not, by its own
operation, render a determination of criminal immunity binding in a subsequent
civil action arising from the same use of force.10 Whether a prior determination
10
We recognize that a panel of this Court previously reached a contrary conclusion in Albright v.
Childers, Nos. 2017-CA-000669-MR and 2017-CA-000670-MR, 2019 WL 1412490, at *2-3
(Ky. App. Mar. 29, 2019) (unpublished). There, the panel concluded that a determination of
criminal immunity under KRS 503.085 barred a subsequent civil action arising from the same
conduct, both under the statute itself and through collateral estoppel. However, the Supreme
Court of Kentucky subsequently vacated that opinion, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the interlocutory appeal from the denial of immunity. Childers v. Albright, 636
S.W.3d 523, 525-28 (Ky. 2021). The Supreme Court did not reach the question of substantive
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may nevertheless have preclusive effect presents a separate question governed by
the principles of issue preclusion, which we address below.
In Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 740, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
addressed the procedure for determining immunity from criminal prosecution
under KRS 503.085. The Court explained that the statute does not require a trial
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or resolve disputed factual questions
concerning the defendant’s justification for using force. Rather, immunity from
criminal prosecution is determined by whether probable cause exists to believe the
defendant’s use of force was unlawful. Id. at 754-56. If probable cause exists, the
prosecution may proceed, leaving the defendant to assert justification as a defense
at trial. Conversely, if probable cause is lacking, the defendant is entitled to
immunity from prosecution.
Importantly, Rodgers addressed only the procedures governing claims
of immunity from criminal prosecution. In adopting the probable cause standard,
immunity. Accordingly, the vacated opinion does not control our resolution of the issue
presented here. Moreover, we disagree with the underlying premise of the prior panel’s
collateral estoppel analysis that the Commonwealth’s interests in a criminal prosecution are
identical to those of the injured party in a subsequent civil action. The Commonwealth
prosecutes criminal offenses to vindicate the public interest in enforcing its criminal laws,
whereas a civil plaintiff seeks redress for injuries to private rights. These distinct interests
cannot be equated merely because both proceedings arise from the same conduct. Nor can the
Commonwealth’s opportunity to litigate the question of criminal immunity substitute for the civil
plaintiff’s right to a full and fair opportunity to litigate the defendant’s entitlement to civil
immunity. Finally, we are aware that Associate Judge Eckerle was the trial judge in the Albright
criminal case and thus had no involvement in the appeal. Likewise, Judge Eckerle was the
original presiding judge in the matter sub judice shortly before her election to this Court. It does
not appear that she made any substantive rulings in the case, and no one has sought to recuse her.
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the Supreme Court relied upon KRS 503.085(2), which expressly governs law
enforcement investigations and arrests, and extended that standard to prosecutors
and courts determining whether criminal charges may proceed. 285 S.W.3d at
754-55. The Court did not consider the procedures governing immunity from civil
actions, much less whether a criminal immunity determination would bind a
plaintiff in subsequent civil litigation. Accordingly, Rodgers does not resolve the
question presented here.
The probable cause standard adopted in Rodgers is rooted in the
criminal process and serves to determine whether a prosecution may proceed. It is
not the standard governing summary judgment in civil litigation. Rather, CR 56
requires the court to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, any genuine issue of material fact remains and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Consequently,
a determination that probable cause is lacking to believe a defendant’s use of force
was unlawful does not necessarily establish that the defendant is entitled to
immunity from civil liability as a matter of law.
Thus, although both proceedings concern whether a defendant’s use of
force was legally justified, they do not necessarily involve the same judicial
inquiry. A criminal court’s determination that probable cause is lacking to believe
the use of force was unlawful does not necessarily establish that, viewing the
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evidence in the light most favorable to the civil plaintiff, no genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning justification. The former determines whether the
Commonwealth may proceed with a criminal prosecution; the latter determines
whether the defendant has established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in
a civil action.
The distinction is particularly significant here. The district court
expressly applied the probable cause standard articulated in Rodgers when it
determined that Longley was immune from criminal prosecution. Moreover, the
Commonwealth had moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice and did not
substantively oppose Longley’s claim of immunity. The district court specifically
observed that the Commonwealth had presented no argument establishing probable
cause to believe Longley’s use of force was unlawful. Its determination therefore
resolved Longley’s entitlement to immunity from criminal prosecution under the
standard applicable to that proceeding. It did not resolve whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to James, established Longley’s entitlement to
immunity from the civil action as a matter of law. Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton,
381 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Ky. 2012) (“[A] motion for summary judgment is generally
an appropriate method for the trial court to determine whether immunity applies.”).
These differences also bear upon whether the district court’s
determination may be given preclusive effect in this litigation. We now turn to that
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question. We next consider whether the district court’s determination that Longley
was immune from criminal prosecution nevertheless precluded James from
litigating Longley’s entitlement to immunity in this civil action under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents the
relitigation of an issue of fact or law that was actually litigated and necessarily
determined in a prior proceeding. Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy
Board, 983 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Ky. 1998). The essential elements of collateral
estoppel are: (1) identity of issues; (2) a final decision or judgment on the merits;
(3) a necessary issue with the party against whom estoppel is asserted having had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate; and (4) a prior losing litigant. Moore v.
Commonwealth, 954 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Ky. 1997) (citing Sedley v. City of West
Buechel, 461 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1970)). These requirements ensure that a litigant is
not bound by a determination reached in a proceeding in which that litigant lacked
a meaningful opportunity to protect his or her interests.
Here, James was not a party to the criminal proceeding against
Longley. That proceeding was prosecuted by the Commonwealth, which alone
possessed the authority to determine whether to pursue criminal charges, what
evidence to present, and what arguments to advance. Although James was the
alleged victim of Longley’s conduct, he had no corresponding authority to direct
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the prosecution or litigate Longley’s entitlement to criminal immunity. His interest
in obtaining compensation for his alleged injuries was distinct from the
Commonwealth’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth’s opportunity to litigate the issue of criminal immunity cannot be
treated as the equivalent of James having had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
his own claims.11
The circumstances of the criminal proceeding underscore this
distinction. The Commonwealth had already moved to dismiss the charges against
Longley with prejudice and maintained that his motion for immunity was moot.
Rather than substantively contesting his claim of justification, the Commonwealth
declined to advance an argument establishing probable cause to believe Longley’s
use of force was unlawful. Indeed, the district court expressly noted the absence of
such an argument in its order granting immunity. Whatever the Commonwealth’s
11
Our conclusion is consistent with Hurbert by and through Barineau v. Green, ___ So. 3d ___,
2025 WL 2553447 (Ala. Sep. 5, 2025) (per curiam) (not yet released for publication). Although
not identical to KRS 503.085, Alabama’s self-defense immunity statute similarly confers
immunity from both criminal prosecution and civil action without expressly providing that a
criminal immunity determination is binding in subsequent civil litigation. See ALA. CODE §
13A-3-23(f)(1). In Hurbert, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a prior criminal
immunity determination did not preclude the injured party from pursuing a subsequent civil
action under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel. The court further recognized that
entitlement to civil immunity must be independently evaluated under the applicable civil
summary judgment standard, and that while the civil court is not precluded from considering the
criminal judgment, it is not bound by it. Id.
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reasons for pursuing dismissal, its litigation decisions were not James’s to make
and cannot fairly be attributed to him.
Moreover, we disagree with the underlying premise of the prior
panel’s collateral estoppel analysis in Albright that the Commonwealth’s interests
in a criminal prosecution are identical to those of an injured party in a subsequent
civil action. The Commonwealth prosecutes criminal offenses to vindicate the
public interest in enforcing its criminal laws, whereas a civil plaintiff seeks redress
for injuries to private rights. These distinct interests cannot be equated merely
because both proceedings arise from the same conduct. Nor can the
Commonwealth’s opportunity to litigate criminal immunity substitute for the civil
plaintiff’s right to a full and fair opportunity to litigate the defendant’s entitlement
to civil immunity.
The differences between the proceedings extend beyond the identity
and interests of the parties. As previously discussed, the district court’s
determination was ostensibly governed by the probable cause standard articulated
in Rodgers.12 Its ruling established that Longley was entitled to immunity from
12
In Commonwealth v. Bennett, 553 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Ky. App. 2018), we observed that “[i]t is
possible to establish probable cause of unlawfulness at the same time evidence justifying self-
defense exists. However, after such probable cause is shown, the prosecution must proceed and
the fact-finder must weigh the evidence of self-defense to decide whether it is a complete
defense, an imperfect defense, or not justified.” Here, however, it is significant that the
Commonwealth had seemingly abandoned the case, and did not make any arguments regarding
probable cause, even though it must have believed such cause existed when it decided to pursue
the charge against Longley in the first instance.
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criminal prosecution under that standard. It did not determine whether, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to James, Longley was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in the civil action. Thus, even though the proceedings
arose from the same encounter and implicated the same substantive justification
statutes, the questions presented were not necessarily identical for purposes of
issue preclusion.
We need not determine whether the differences in the applicable
procedural standards would, standing alone, defeat collateral estoppel. James’s
lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the criminal proceeding is
sufficient to preclude application of the doctrine. To hold otherwise would permit
the Commonwealth’s discretionary decisions concerning a criminal prosecution to
extinguish the private rights of an individual who neither controlled nor
participated as a party in that proceeding.
Accordingly, the district court’s determination that