M.A.T. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2026-CA-0633
JudgeCombs
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2026-CA-0633-ME
M.A.T. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-AD-00026
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; A.F.D.; AND
L.M.T., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, M.A.T. (Father), appeals from an Order of the
Logan Circuit Court terminating his parental rights to his minor child. We affirm.
Father is the legal Father of L.M.T. (the child), a female born on July
12, 2022. The child’s mother is A.F.D. (Mother).
On October 1, 2024, the Cabinet became involved after receiving a
referral from law enforcement, that a two-year old child was living in a home in
deplorable condition. The Cabinet responded to the home and found that the floor
was covered in animal feces and urine, dirty diapers, and trash. There was no clear
walking path due to piled debris and no running water. The home had an insect
infestation. The child appeared dirty and had an odor. Father and Mother were
arrested and charged with endangering the welfare of a minor and child neglect.
The Cabinet sought an emergency custody order and filed a dependency, neglect,
or abuse (DNA) petition in Logan District Court, No. 24-J-00081-001. The
Cabinet was granted custody at the October 4, 2024, temporary removal hearing,
and the child has remained in the Cabinet’s care since that time.
On January 23, 2025, there was an adjudication and both parents
stipulated abuse or neglect due to extreme environmental concerns impacting the
child’s safety and well-being. The district court found that the child was abused or
neglected, committed the child to the Cabinet, and ordered parents to cooperate
with the Cabinet. A separate dispositional hearing was waived. Father’s case plan
tasks included ensuring that all utilities in the home were in working order and that
the home was clean and free of pests and clutter so that the child would have an
appropriate environment to return to. On September 18, 2025, there was a
permanency review and the goal was changed to adoption.
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On September 19, 2025, the Cabinet filed the petition now at issue for
the involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR), alleging that the child is an
abused or neglected child as defined in KRS1 600.020 and that as to each parent,
grounds for termination exist under KRS 625.090(2)(e) and (g).
The matter was tried without a jury on December 12, 2025, and we
have reviewed the recorded proceeding in its entirety. The ongoing Cabinet
worker, Megan Allen testified -- as did Father and Mother. On April 15, 2025, the
circuit court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (FFCL) and entered
Order Terminating Parental Rights and Order of Judgment, which we discuss in
our analysis below.
Father appealed.2 His appointed counsel has filed an Anders3 brief
and a motion to withdraw. By Order of July 27, 2026, this Court passed the
motion to withdraw to the merits and permitted Father to proceed, pro se, and to
file a supplemental and/or reply brief if so desired, he has not done so. We
proceed with our review.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Mother has also appealed in Case No. 2026-CA-0594-ME, and we will render a separate
opinion on her appeal.
3
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
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Concerning termination of parental rights, our Supreme Court
explained the parameters of our review in Cabinet for Health and Family Services
v. H.L.O., 621 S.W.3d 452 (Ky. 2021), as follows:
The termination of parental rights is a particularly
fact-sensitive inquiry, so appellate courts are disinclined
to disturb a trial court’s findings. [Cabinet for Health &
Family Services v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Ky.
2014)]. Where the trial court’s findings are not clearly
erroneous, and they substantially support the TPR, we
will affirm the order. Id. “Clear and convincing proof
does not necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is
sufficient if there is proof of a probative and substantial
nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to
convince ordinarily prudent minded people.” Rowland v.
Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
It is a fundamental right of every parent to raise his
or her own child. K.H., 423 S.W.3d at 209. KRS
625.090 sets forth all the requirements which must be
met before a court in Kentucky can involuntarily
terminate a parent’s rights to his or her child. Because of
the heightened value of the right to parent a child, such
proof must be clear and convincing in nature. Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L.
Ed. 2d 599 (1982). The statute requires the court to find
three critical elements. First, the court must find that the
child has been found to have been abused or neglected by
a court of competent jurisdiction. KRS 625.090(1).
Second, the court must find at least one of the eleven
enumerated grounds for termination exists. KRS
625.090(2). Lastly, even if the Cabinet establishes both
of these elements, the court must still determine that
termination is in the child’s best interest. KRS
625.090(1)(c).
Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).
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Where, as here, counsel files an Anders brief and a motion to
withdraw, “we are obligated to independently review the record and ascertain
whether the appeal is, in fact, void of nonfrivolous grounds for reversal.” A.C. v.
Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 362 S.W.3d 361, 372 (Ky. App. 2012).
That is, we must determine if a meritorious ground exists. However, “Anders
procedures do not require appellate courts to flesh out every conceivable argument
appellant could have raised on appeal; instead, our review is akin to palpable error
review requiring us only to ascertain error which ‘affects the substantial rights of a
party.’ CR[4] 61.02.” A.C., 362 S.W.3d at 370.
In the case before us, the circuit court determined that the child has
been adjudged to be an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1) by
a court of competent jurisdiction.5 At trial, the Cabinet introduced a certified copy
of the record from the underlying DNA proceeding. The January 23, 2025,
Adjudication Order reflects that both parents stipulated neglect or abuse and that
the district court found that the child was abused/neglected as defined in KRS
600.020(1). The first statutory element is satisfied.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
The circuit court also found the child to be abused or neglected by each parent as defined in
KRS 600.020(1) in this proceeding.
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Next, KRS 625.090(2) requires the circuit court to find “by clear and
convincing evidence” the existence of one or more of several enumerated grounds
of parental unfitness. Here, the circuit court concluded that grounds exist under
KRS 625.090(2)(e) and (g) as to each parent. We first address KRS 625.090(2)(e),
which provides:
That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused
to provide or has been substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care and protection for the
child and that there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection, considering
the age of the child[.]
The circuit court found that Father had not availed himself of the
services provided or that he had otherwise failed to make sufficient progress with
his case plan to allow for safe return of the child for the past 14 months during
which the child had been in state care. “[D]uring all that time, ‘for a period of not
less than six (6) months,’ the Respondent parents have been continuously or
repeatedly incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the
Petitioner child. KRS 625.090(2)(e).” The court found that:
Ms. Allen testified that as of the date of the filing of the
petition in this TPR action, the Respondent parents have
not been fully compliant with the Court’s remedial orders
out of the aforesaid DNA action, particularly with respect
to maintaining a safe and sanitary home. Although the
parents are currently taking their medications, neither is
in mental health treatment. Most concerning is the
continued condition of the home. Ms. Allen made a
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home visit on December 8, 2026, four days before the
trial in the matter. The photographs taken by Ms. Allen
of the home that day are appalling (Cabinet’s Exhibit 4).
There was no running water in the home as of the date of
the trial and there is still an infestation of roaches. Even
if it were diligently cleaned, it would be barely livable. It
does not appear to this Court that the parents’ focus has
been on trying to regain custody of their child but on
other priorities. There was testimony regarding issues
with transportation to attend visitation with their
daughter. Ms. Allen testified that in 2025, the parents
attended fourteen (14) of the weekly visits with their
daughter, but they were no call/no show for twenty eight
(28) visits. Yet, there was transportation for
employment. Ms. Allen discussed homeless shelters with
the parents, but as their pets were not allowed, they
declined. . . . As a result of all the foregoing and more,
the Petitioner child has been unable to return safely to
parental custody and care[.]
Ms. Allen’s testimony provides clear and convincing evidence to
support the statutory findings as well as the court’s determination that grounds for
termination of Father’s parental rights exist under KRS 625.090(2)(e). “Under the
language of KRS 625.090(2), the existence of only one of the grounds in that
section needs to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Commonwealth,
Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky.
2010). We need not address the other.
The third statutory element is the child’s best interest. KRS
625.090(3) enumerates six factors that must be considered in deciding whether
termination is in the child’s best interest. These factors are not solely
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determinative as to consideration of a child’s best interest and are subordinate to
the best-interest finding by the court in the exercise of its discretion. D.G.R. v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 364 S.W.3d 106, 115
(Ky. 2012).
When reviewing a family court’s determination of
the best interests of a child, we must apply the abuse of
discretion standard. Absent a showing that a decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles, a family court’s determination on
the issue will not be an abuse of discretion and will be
sustained.
D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 350 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Ky. App.
2011) (citations omitted).
The circuit court’s best-interest analysis is set forth at pages 9-12 of
its FFCL. The court considered the applicable statutory factors and summarized
the evidence upon which it relied. We find no abuse of discretion. The third
statutory element is satisfied.
Accordingly, we affirm. By separate Order, we grant Father’s
counsel’s motion to withdraw.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Darin Higgs Leslie M. Laupp
Oak Grove, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky
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