Crystal Rains v. Donnie Rains
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2025-CA-1347
JudgeEckerle
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1347-MR
CRYSTAL RAINS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PAUL K. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-CI-00348
DONNIE RAINS AND ELFREDA APPELLEES
RAINS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, ECKERLE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Crystal Rains (“Daughter-in-law”), seeks review
of the Whitley Circuit Court’s order granting partial summary judgment to
Appellees, Donnie Rains (“Father”) and Elfreda Rains (“Mother”) (collectively,
the “Rainses”). After careful review and consideration, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Daughter-in-law married the Rainses’ son, who was also named
Donnie (“Son”). The couple lived in a mobile home located on the Rainses’
property for several years. They relocated elsewhere for about a decade. Then they
returned and eventually moved into a home that they built on the Rainses’ property
in 2006. The Rainses acquiesced to that home’s construction but did not transfer
ownership of the land upon which it was built to Son and Daughter-in-law, who
nonetheless continued to reside there until Father’s death in 2023.
Daughter-in-law filed this action against the Rainses, seeking to be
declared the owner of the land near her home. Originally, she only brought an
adverse possession claim. The Trial Court dismissed that sole claim but allowed
Daughter-in-law leave to file an amended complaint. Therein Daughter-in-law
asserts that she should be “adjudicated the legal owner” of the land at issue “on
theories of estoppel and unjust enrichment.” Trial Court Record (“TR”) at 75.
See, e.g., Stepp v. Leslie, 263 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Ky. 1953) (“As we understand the
law relating to the right to recover for improvements made upon another’s land, the
right may be based upon the theory of estoppel or upon the theory of unjust
enrichment.”). The amended complaint also alleged that the Rainses had
“converted personal property belonging properly to the Plaintiff, being a 1981
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Case 8500 Dozier” by having “refused to turn over said property to the Plaintiff
after rightful demand by her.” TR at 76.
The Rainses filed a motion for summary judgment which, though not
denominated as seeking only partial summary judgment, focuses solely on
Daughter-in-law’s unjust enrichment claim. Indeed, none of the three pleadings
(the Rainses’ motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support thereof,
Daughter-in-law’s response, and the Rainses’ reply) meaningfully addresses
Daughter-in-law’s estoppel or conversion claims. The Trial Court granted, at least
partially, the Rainses’ motion for summary judgment in early July 2025. The
Court held that Daughter-in-law could not prevail on her unjust enrichment claim
because she knew she was not the owner of the property at issue. The order does
not address Daughter-in-law’s estoppel or conversion claims. The order stated that
it was final and appealable but did not state that there was no just reason for delay.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 54.02 requires a Trial Court to recite
that there is no just reason for delay if the Trial Court wishes to allow a party to
appeal from what would otherwise be an interlocutory decision.
Daughter-in-law filed a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate,1
which the Trial Court denied in late July 2025. Neither the motion nor the order
1
“[A] circuit court’s authority for reconsidering an interlocutory order as opposed to a final
judgment is not found in CR 59.05” but “is actually found under common law and in CR 54.02
which make such orders subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
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discussed Daughter-in-law’s estoppel or conversion claims. Again, that CR 59.05
order stated that it was final and appealable, but did not include language stating
that there was no just reason for delay.
In early September of 2025, Daughter-in-law filed a motion to set
aside the Trial Court’s Orders “pursuant to CR 54.02(1)[.]” TR at 159. That
motion asserted that the Trial Court’s prior decisions were not final and appealable
because they had not resolved two claims (estoppel and conversion), and the orders
did not include the requisite language stating “no just reason for delay.”
The Rainses conceded that the previous orders lacked the mandatory,
finality language. The response also seemed to admit that the Rainses had only
sought summary judgment on Daughter-in-law’s unjust enrichment claim. See TR
at 166-67 (“On March 6, 2025, the Rainses . . . filed a motion for summary
judgment . . . arguing that [Daughter-in-law] could not prevail under a theory of
unjust enrichment.”). Finally, the Rainses did not mention Daughter-in-law’s
conversion claim, but (for the first time) explicitly asserted that they were entitled
to summary judgment on Daughter-in-law’s estoppel claim.
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Tax Ease Lien Investments 1,
L.L.C. v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Thus, because the summary judgment order was interlocutory, CR 59.05 was not the
proper procedural mechanism for Daughter-in-law’s post-order motion.
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In mid-September of 2025, the Trial Court denied Daughter-in-law’s
CR 54.02 motion. However, the Trial Court included language stating that it was
adding “no just reason for delay” solely to the July 30, 2025, order denying
Daughter-in-law’s procedurally-flawed CR 59.05 motion. That CR 54.02 order
does not address Daughter-in-law’s estoppel or conversion claims. Daughter-in-
law then filed this appeal.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is governed by CR 56.03, which provides that
pretrial adjudication is warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” To determine whether summary
judgment is appropriate, a Trial Court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Inc.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment is appropriate only if it is
impossible, from a practical viewpoint, for the nonmoving party to produce
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in her favor. Id. at 482. “[A] party
opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without
presenting at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue
of material fact for trial.” Id. We review the order granting summary judgment de
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novo since it presents only questions of law. Bruner v. Cooper, 677 S.W.3d 252,
269 (Ky. 2023).
Analysis
A. Timeliness and Limited Scope of This Appeal
Before we may address the merits, we must first ensure that we have
jurisdiction. Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 3(A)(1) provides that
a party must file a notice of appeal “no later than 30 days from the date of notation
of service of the judgment or order appealed from.” Under RAP 2(A)(2), “[t]he
timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.” No party has argued that we
lack jurisdiction, but we “are obligated to address jurisdictional issues sua sponte if
necessary.” Walsh-Stender v. Walsh, 307 S.W.3d 127, 128 n.3 (Ky. App. 2009).
As a result, we must determine if the order granting partial summary judgment or
the order denying Daughter-in-law’s CR 59.05 motion was final and appealable, as
Daughter-in-law undisputedly did not appeal within 30 days of either decision.
There are two manners by which a Trial Court’s decision becomes
final and appealable. First, a decision is inherently final and appealable if it “is a
final order adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding.”
CR 54.01. Here, neither the initial partial summary judgment order nor the order
denying Daughter-in-law’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate is inherently final
because neither resolved all of Daughter-in-law’s claims. Additionally, a decision
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denying a CR 59.05 motion cannot be made final and appealable simply via adding
the language contained in CR 54.02, where it is not otherwise final and appealable.
Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, L.L.C. v. Brown, 340 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App.
2011).
Second, CR 54.01 provides that an interlocutory decision may be
“made final under Rule 54.02.” But the Trial Court did not make its initial partial
summary judgment order final under CR 54.02 because that order did not state
there was “no just reason for delay.” We require strict compliance with CR 54.02
for an interlocutory decision to be deemed final and appealable, Vorherr v.
Coldiron, 525 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Ky. App. 2017), and the partial summary
judgment did not strictly comply with CR 54.02. Moreover, the CR 59.05 order is
inherently non-appealable as interlocutory (and, in any event, did not contain all
the finality language required by CR 54.02). We generally lack jurisdiction over
appeals taken from interlocutory orders, including orders denying CR 59.05 relief.
Ford v. Ford, 578 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Ky. App. 2019). Thus, Daughter-in-law was
not required to appeal from—indeed, could not have properly appealed from—
either the partial summary judgment or the order denying her procedurally-
improper CR 59.05 motion.
Instead, Daughter-in-law was only able to appeal after the Trial Court
agreed in its September CR 54.02 order to add the entire finality language required
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by CR 54.02 to the July CR 59.05 order. In the CR 54.02 decision, the Trial Court
stated that it would retroactively add the “no just reason for delay” language to its
order denying CR 59.05 relief, but made no mention of adding that language to the
original partial summary judgment order.
Although achieving finality in this case has been suboptimal, even
somewhat of a procedural quagmire, we shall exalt practical function over
procedural form to conclude that there is a final and appealable decision here. The
Trial Court plainly wanted Daughter-in-law to be able to appeal the partial
summary judgment decision and made some effort to do so by adding some
language attempting to do so. Though the Trial Court should have stated that it
was adding the CR 54.02 finality language to the partial summary judgment order,
not the inherently interlocutory CR 59.05 order, the inescapable conclusion is that
the Trial Court has now effectively included all the finality language required by
CR 54.02. We thus shall “consider the appeal properly taken from the final
judgment that was the subject of the CR 59.05 motion.” Ford, 578 S.W.3d at 366
(internal quotation marks, italics, and citations omitted). We hold this appeal
timely because Daughter-in-law filed her notice of appeal 30 days after the
issuance of the first decision that included all the requisite CR 54.02 finality
language. We again note that the parties do not argue timeliness or finality but we
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are required to untie this Gordian knot of procedure to establish our own
jurisdiction before we proceed.
However, the Trial Court has not addressed Daughter-in-law’s
estoppel or conversion claims, and Daughter-in-law raises no arguments regarding
the dismissal of her adverse possession claim. We are a Court of review, not an
initial decisionmaker. Yelton v. Yelton, 740 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Ky. App. 2026).
Consequently, we decline to be the initial Court to address the merits of the
estoppel or conversion claims.2
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment to the
Rainses on the Unjust Enrichment Claim
To succeed on a claim for unjust enrichment based on the plaintiff’s
having made improvements to land owned by another person, “[t]he party making
the improvements must also have been acting in good faith.” Mullins v. Mullins,
797 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. App. 1990). In that specific context, a plaintiff lacks
good faith if she knew that another person owned the land upon which she made
the improvements. Id.
2
On pages 24 and 25 of her deposition, Daughter-in-law testified that she had gained possession
of the bulldozer mentioned in her complaint. Perhaps Daughter-in-law’s conversion claim is
thus moot. However, Daughter-in-law has not formally withdrawn that claim, and the Trial
Court has not otherwise adjudicated it. We express no opinion on the viability of the conversion
claim (or the estoppel claim), or any potential defenses.
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Here, Daughter-in-law has forthrightly admitted that she knew all
along that the Rainses owned the land at issue:
Q When you guys started building this house, I guess in
’06 is what—right abouts [sic]—
A Uh-huh (affirmative response).
Q --you knew at that time that you didn’t have legal title
to the property, correct?
A Yes, that’s correct. It was more of a trust thing.
Q And at no time were you under the impression that
you had legal title to the property?
A That’s correct.
Crystal Rains Deposition, p. 22-23. Thus, Daughter-in-law cannot prevail on her
unjust enrichment claim. Mullins, 797 S.W.2d at 493.
Our conclusion is not changed by Daughter-in-law’s insistence that
the Rainses had orally promised to transfer ownership of the land at issue. The
statute of frauds, Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 371.010(6), provides in
relevant part that “[n]o action shall be brought to charge any person . . . [u]pon any
contract for the sale of real estate . . . unless the promise, contract, [or] agreement
. . . be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith . . . .” Daughter-
in-law admitted on page 17 of her deposition that there was never a written
contract whereby the Rainses would transfer the land in question to herself and her
husband:
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Q Why do you feel like you’re entitled to the full 13-
acre tract?
A Because it was promised from them [the Rainses] to
[her husband] Donnie and I . . . .
Q So when you say it was promised to you, do you have
any kind of writing at all to support [that belief]?
A It was verbal.
As per our Supreme Court, “[t]he statute of frauds does not lend itself
to the issue of whether there is or is not a contract in existence” but instead is
designed “to prevent the enforcement of a contract unless, by reason of some
exception, the statute of frauds would be found not applicable.” Bennett v. Horton,
592 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1979). An agreement to transfer ownership of real
property which is not written and signed by the parties is unenforceable. Adamson
v. Adamson, 635 S.W.3d 72, 82 (Ky. 2021). Daughter-in-law does not cite an
applicable exception. Thus, any alleged oral promise by the Rainses to transfer
ownership of the land at issue to Daughter-in-law is barred by the statute of frauds.
As our Supreme Court has forcefully held, albeit in a factually
distinguishable case, “where the statute of frauds is clear and unambiguous, as is
the case here, equitable relief should only be granted under the most limited of
circumstances, lest the Court run afoul of judicially amending the statute in
violation of separation of powers.” Farmers Bank and Tr. Co. of Georgetown,
Kentucky v. Willmott Hardwoods, Inc., 171 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Ky. 2005). We thus
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affirm the Trial Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the Rainses on
Daughter-in-law’s unjust enrichment claim.
C. The Improper Citations in Daughter-in-law’s Brief
Finally, we agree with the Rainses that Daughter-in-law’s brief
contains at least four improper citations to case law. Those cites are:
1. On pages five and six of her brief, Daughter-in-law asserts: “Kentucky law
is clear that long-term possession, improvements, and reliance may give rise
to equitable interests sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Sebastian-
Voor Properties, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 265
S.W.3d 190, 194 (Ky. 2008) (summary judgment improper where factual
issues exist regarding property interests and equitable considerations).”3
Sebastian-Voor involves zoning laws and whether equitable estoppel should
be permitted to apply against a governmental entity. That opinion does not
hold that possession, improvements, and reliance create equitable interests
sufficient to prevent summary judgment.
2. Daughter-in-law’s citations on pages six and seven of her brief to Meade v.
Richardson Fuel, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 55 (Ky. App. 2005) are wholly improper.
3
Daughter-in-law’s underlining case names contravenes the requirement in RAP 31(E)(1) that
“[c]ase names should be italicized.”
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According to Daughter-in-law, “[i]n Meade v Richardson Fuel, Inc., the
Court of Appeals recognized that promissory estoppel may be invoked to
avoid the harsh application of the Statute of Frauds where a party has relied
to their detriment.” Our opinion in Meade does not contain the term
“promissory estoppel,” and the statute of frauds at issue in Meade is not
KRS 371.010 but instead is found in the Uniform Commercial Code, KRS
355.2-201. Even more troubling, page seven of Daughter-in-law’s brief
states: “Moreover, the Kentucky Supreme Court has emphasized that the
Statute of Frauds ‘was not designed to perpetrate fraud, but to prevent it.’
Meade, 166 S.W.3d at 58.” This purported quotation is neither present in
Meade nor is the principle evident in similar language.
3. Pages six and seven of Daughter-in-law’s brief state: “Similarly, Kentucky
courts have long recognized that part performance and reliance may remove
an agreement from the statute of frauds. See McCarthy v. Louisville Cartage
Co., 796 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Ky. App. 1990).” McCarthy does not even contain
the word “performance,” and it does not discuss the statute of frauds.
4. Finally, page eight of Daughter-in-law’s brief states: “At a minimum,
whether Appellees were unjustly enriched is a question of fact that should
have been presented to a jury. See Jones [v. Sparks, 297 S.W. 3d 73] at 78
[Ky. App. 2009)].” Jones does not contain that holding. In fact, the law in
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Kentucky regarding unjust enrichment claims is directly contrary to the
assertion in Daughter-in-law’s brief: “Equitable claims, such as unjust
enrichment, are heard and decided by the trial court, not the jury.” Superior
Steel, Inc. v. Ascent at Roebling's Bridge, L.L.C., 540 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Ky.
2017).
The citation errors in Daughter-in-law’s brief are simply too persistent
and egregious to ignore. It is beyond question that her brief does not satisfy the
requirements in RAP 31(E)(1) and 32(A)(4) requiring proper citations to authority.
See also RAP 11(A)(1). We strongly cautioned the bar in Crowder v. Yussman,
724 S.W.3d 772 (Ky. App. 2025), to ensure briefs submitted to this Court are
scrupulously accurate and contain caselaw that actually exists:
Moreover, we take this opportunity to caution
practitioners of this Commonwealth on the submission of
briefs or citations without confirming their accuracy and
the correctness of the resulting analysis. The abject
failure to conduct due diligence when making arguments
to the Court greatly impacts the profession and
undermines confidence in the skills and knowledge
necessary to practice as an attorney. Failure to verify
substantive legal citations prior to submission to this
Court is not only in derogation of the RAP, but also
violates the attorney’s ethical responsibilities. See
Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.1).
Id. at 779. Unfortunately, Daughter-in-law’s counsel did not follow the rules and
failed to heed our warning. Moreover, counsel inexplicably declined to file a reply
brief once the Rainses pointed out the citation deficiencies in their appellee brief.
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“This Court has the discretion to determine the appropriate penalty for
failure to follow its rules.” Id. Counsel “submitting a brief to a Court of law
without confirming that the cited case law” is accurate “is an affront to the dignity
of the Court system, the legal profession as a whole, the judiciary, the client, and
the public at large.” Id. We could strike Daughter-in-law’s brief, but do not wish
to punish her for her attorney’s mistakes. Id. This point is especially true in the
case sub judice because the improper citations are replete throughout the argument
section, and striking the entire argument section would require us to dismiss the
appeal. Commonwealth v. Roth, 567 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Ky. 2019) (striking a brief
“necessarily requires” dismissing the appeal).
Therefore, we shall instead direct the Clerk of this Court to send a
copy of this opinion to the Office of Bar Counsel at the Kentucky Bar Association.
While we considered a financial sanction, we have rejected that approach given the
severity of the problem in this case. Upon receipt of this Opinion, Bar Counsel
may take whatever professional disciplinary action, if any, it believes to be
warranted. See, e.g., Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. R.C., 661 S.W.3d
305, 318 (Ky. App. 2023) (affirming a Family Court’s decision to refer possible
misconduct by an attorney to the Kentucky Bar Association because “[a] Court has
a right and obligation to refer an attorney to the KBA for suspected misconduct of
which it has direct knowledge”); KRS 26A.080 (“When it comes to the attention of
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any judicial officer that any . . . attorney may have been guilty of unprofessional
conduct, he [or she] shall at once report the matter to the proper investigating and
disciplinary authorities.”).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Whitley Circuit Court is affirmed. The
Clerk of the Court of Appeals is directed to send a copy of this Opinion to the
Kentucky Bar Association, Office of Bar Counsel, 514 W. Main Street, Frankfort,
Kentucky 40601.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Jeremy W. Bryant Jeffrey K. Hill
Corbin, Kentucky Corbin, Kentucky
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