Chad Stephens v. Herb Geddes Fencing
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2024-CA-0640
JudgeAcree
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2024-CA-0640-MR
CHAD STEPHENS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 22-CI-00035
HERB GEDDES FENCING APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Chad Stephens appeals the Jessamine Circuit Court’s summary
judgment for his former employer, Herb Geddes Fencing (HGF), and dismissing
his claims of retaliatory discharge for pursuing a workers’ compensation claim and
his hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Stephens worked for HGF from 2008 to 2021. In 2016, he injured his
back unrolling heavy chain link fencing. He did not file a workers’ compensation
claim but had back surgery at HGF’s expense. HGF paid him for the eight weeks
of recovery before he returned to work. When he did return to work, he was made
foreman of crews of varying sizes and together they performed the necessary
heavy lifting each job required.
In August 2017, Hubert “Jack” Badgett purchased HGF from the prior
owner, Doug Geddes, and became Stephens’ supervisor. According to Stephens’
deposition testimony, Badgett had a “different style . . . of being a boss, of being an
owner.” When asked to elaborate Stephens explained, “The paperwork that we
received [to perform a fencing job] would have a little less information,” although
that did not “cause a problem.” Badgett had fewer “toolbox talks”—morning
planning sessions for the day—than the previous owner. And Badgett reduced the
crew sizes in reaction to workforce attrition. Stephens had no knowledge whether
any retirement or resignation was because they “didn’t like working for Jack
Badgett[.]” The fact was, Badgett gave Stephens “a little bit more responsibility.”
Two years later, in June 2019, during a company sponsored HGF
employee outing at Kentucky Kingdom in Louisville, an incident occurred in the
swimming pool area. Stephens testified that he was “pretty sure [Badgett] was
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drinking that day, and he reached up and he grabbed my—my nipple piercings and
said something that was little bit off.” Stephens could not recall the words Badgett
spoke, but he told Badgett, “Don’t do that.”
Stephens recalled only one prior incident of unwelcome touching—“a
smack on the ass, to like—I don’t know why. . . . And I had the thought, ‘Well,
that was weird.’” He told Badgett, “Don’t do that.” Stephens testified he and his
co-workers talked about Badgett—“what we would say is, ‘What’s wrong with that
guy? He’s a little weird. Do you think he’s a homo . . . ?’”
Stephens testified about and gave examples of Badgett’s vulgarities in
the workplace which typically involved discussing Badgett’s own genitalia and
physical contact with male workers. When Stephens was asked in deposition, “do
you know, is Jack gay?” he responded, “I have no idea.”
In 2019, after the HGF employee outing, Stephens re-injured his back
at work and filed a workers’ compensation claim. This time, post-surgery recovery
lasted nearly a year. In October 2020, while still recuperating, Stephens discussed
his limitations generally with Badgett, and about his return to work. Even though
there was no light duty position in HGF’s field work, Badgett allowed Stephens to
return to work but urged him to rely on the people he supervised.
On February 8, 2021, the senior claims representative for HGF’s
workers’ compensation carrier informed HGF for the first time that Stephens’
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medical restrictions are permanent, that he could not perform repetitive bending or
stooping and could not lift more than 50 pounds. HGF had no position that could
be performed within those restrictions. HGF informed its workers’ compensation
carrier that HGF could not accommodate Stephens’ permanent medical
restrictions. On February 9, 2021, HGF terminated Stephens’ employment.
On January 20, 2022, Stephens sued HGF. He alleged he was fired in
retaliation for making a workers’ compensation claim. He also alleged a hostile
work environment claim, claiming Badgett subjected him to “lewd and sexual
comments” and “unwanted touching.”
HGF moved for summary judgment. With respect to Stephens’
workers’ compensation retaliation claim, the circuit court determined there was no
genuine issue of material fact and that HGF terminated Stephens due to medical
restrictions HGF could not accommodate. The circuit court observed that
Stephens’ workers’ compensation claim was filed more than 16 months prior to his
discharge, and that Stephens’ discharge only occurred after HGF was notified by
its insurance carrier of the permanency of Stephens’ medical restrictions.
As to Stephens’ sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim,
the circuit court concluded Badgett’s conduct was “inappropriate and in poor taste,
but [did] not rise to the level of sexual harassment, especially considering that both
parties are male,” and that prior to his termination Stephens “never lodged a formal
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complaint or indicated that the behavior altered the conditions of his employment
or created an abusive working environment.”
After the circuit court granted summary judgment for HGF and denied
Stephens’ post-judgment motion, he brought this timely appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether summary judgment is appropriate is a legal question
involving no factual findings, so a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo.” Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016)
(citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
The Retaliation Claim
The Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), KRS1 Chapter 342, says,
“No employee shall be harassed, coerced, discharged, or discriminated against in
any manner whatsoever for filing and pursuing a lawful claim under this chapter.”
KRS 342.197(1). Section (3) of KRS 342.197 authorizes a cause of action in
circuit court for a violation of its section (1).
There is no direct evidence of retaliation. In such a case, “the burden
of production and persuasion follows the familiar McDonnell Douglas [v. Green,
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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411 U.S. 792 (1973)] framework.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. McCullough,
123 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Ky. 2003). Under that framework,
First, the complainant must establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. To do so, the employee must demonstrate that
(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant
knew that the plaintiff had done so; (3) adverse
employment action was taken; and (4) that there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. The complainant need not
prove that the sole or even the primary reason for the
termination was related to the protected activity but only
that its pursuit was a substantial and motivating factor in
the decision to terminate.
Once a prima facie case is shown, the burden then
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. If
the employer can provide a legitimate explanation, the
burden then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate
that this reason was merely a pretext for retaliation.
Benningfield v. Fields, 584 S.W.3d 731, 738–39 (Ky. 2019) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Stephens’ burden in opposing summary judgment was to “create a
genuine dispute [of material fact] at each stage of the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry.” Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir. 2000)
(applying McDonnell Douglas framework in Title VII case). See McBrearty v.
Kentucky Community and Tech. College System, 262 S.W.3d 205, 214 (Ky. App.
2008) (citation omitted) (Kentucky courts are persuaded by federal interpretation
in applying McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination cases brought under
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state law.). There is no dispute about Stephens’ satisfaction of the first three
elements of his prima facie case. Our focus is on the fourth and final element.
Stephens’ Prima Facie Claim of Retaliation
As in the Sixth Circuit case of Dixon v. Gonzales, the only question is
whether Stephens “has demonstrated a causal connection between the protected
activity . . . and the adverse employment action . . . [by] proffer[ing] evidence
sufficient to raise the inference that h[is] protected activity was the likely reason
for the adverse action.” 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “The burden of proof at the prima facie stage is
minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put forth some credible evidence that enables
the court to deduce that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory action
and the protected activity.” Id.
Stephens argues that two facts support his prima facie claim of
causation. First, he claims Badgett called him a “liability.” Second, he cites the
timing of the termination and argues the temporal proximity of his claim to the
termination justifies an inference of discrimination or retaliation.
Stephens says Badgett called him a “liability” when terminating him.
He characterizes that as a “retaliatory statement.” Explaining his reasoning,
Stephens says such a characterization is justified “based on his prior workers’
compensation claims” that cost HGF money.
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Stephens also argues that his filing of a workers’ compensation claim
(October 2019) and his termination (February 2021) were sufficiently close in time
to justify the inference of causation. This Court said:
“Close temporal proximity” does not mean that the
employee must be terminated within days or even weeks
of the filing of a workers’ compensation claim. Such a
requirement would shield the employer from liability by
merely waiting months or even years to terminate the
employee. The logical approach is for the court to view
the time between the two events in the context of the entire
circumstances.
Dollar General Partners v. Upchurch, 214 S.W.3d 910, 916 (Ky. App. 2006). In
Upchurch, this Court found a five-month interval, in the context of the entire
circumstances, “was a sufficiently close temporal proximity to establish an
inference that there was causal connection between the protected activity and the
termination.” Id. But see Turner v. City of Paris, Ky., 5:11-CV-351-KSF, 2012
WL 6706164, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 26, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Turner v. City of
Paris, Ky., 534 Fed. App’x 299 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Upchurch, 214 S.W.3d at
916) (Forester, J.; “five months . . . is not ‘very close in time’ under Sixth Circuit
precedent and does not support an inference of causation”).
We are mindful that, at each stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry
including the prima facie stage, “must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only
if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence
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at trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Charalambakis v. Asbury University,
488 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Ky. 2016). Therefore, with no intention of creating a
brightline rule, and privy only to what this record tells, we are unwilling to hold
that Stephens failed to present enough evidence to shift the burden of going
forward to HGF to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Benningfield, 584 S.W.3d at 739.
HGF has a strong argument that Stephens’ claim fails even at the
prima facie stage. For that reason, our ruling as to the prima facie claim should be
read as presuming the minimal standard was met for the purpose of appellate
review. As we see it, the sounder basis for affirming the circuit court is the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact that HGF’s legitimate, non-retaliatory
basis for termination was not a pretext.
HGF’s Legitimate, Non-retaliatory Basis for Stephens’ Termination
HGF’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Stephens, as
stated in its brief, was that HGF “did not have light duty work available as
demonstrated” previously in its brief. (Appellee’s Brief at 20). When asked in
deposition “why [Stephens] was terminated[,]” Badgett said: “He brought in a
doctor’s note that said he was permanently, I don’t want to say disabled, but on
light duty. And we don’t have light duty.” (Appellee’s Br. at 4) (quoting Badgett
Dep. at 33:19–23). HGF was not required to create a new position to
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accommodate Stephens’ work restrictions.2 Those facts articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory basis for Stephens’ termination. Pursuant to McDonnell Douglas,
that shifted the burden of going forward back to Stephens to present evidence that
HGF’s alleged legitimate, non-retaliatory basis for termination was mere pretext.
Stephens’ Evidence of Pretext
Stephens never mentions pretext in either his main brief or his reply
brief. He simply repeats the same two facts he alleged to establish his prima facie
claim—(1) that Badgett called him a “liability” and (2) there is sufficiently close
temporal proximity to justify the inference his termination was retaliatory.
Absent Stephens’ presentation of any direct pretext argument, the
Court attempts to read his prima facie claim argument as if in the context of the
inquiry’s pretext stage. First, Stephens claims Badgett called him a liability “based
on his prior workers’ compensation claims” asserting it is proof of retaliation. We
disagree.
2
To the contrary, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, providing guidance to
employers regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act, addressed this circumstance directly,
stating:
The ADA does not require an employer to create a new position . . . in order to
reassign an employee who can no longer perform the essential functions of his/her
original position, with or without a reasonable accommodation.
EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers’ compensation and ADA, 1 Disability Discrimination in
the Workplace § 16:14 (Feb. 2026 Update) (answer to inquiry 23).
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We first note that although Stephens refers to his workers’
compensation claims in the plural, he only filed one claim. Badgett’s predecessor
owner of HGF dissuaded Stephens from formally pursuing a claim for his 2016
workplace injury. That leaves only the claim he brought after a subsequent
workplace accident exacerbated his original injury.
For our review, we accept as fact that Badgett said what Stephens
claimed he said. But we must also accept the fact that, as an employee, Stephens
was a liability, but not necessarily HGF’s liability.
An employer is obligated to compensate an employee he hires and,
without more to the equation, that makes any employee a net liability from the
moment of hiring. But a successful employment relationship is mutually beneficial
and, from the employer’s perspective, makes the productive employee a net asset.
Otherwise, there is no reason to retain him. Obviously, a nonproductive employee
results in an employer’s net liability. Play out that notion in the context of the Act.
If an employee’s inability to be productive is the result of a workplace
injury, he will remain a net liability until he achieves “[o]ne of the primary
purposes” of the Act—“restoration . . . to gainful employment . . . [preferably] with
the same employer or to the same or similar employment.” KRS 342.710(1).
Stephens filed his claim, presumably hoping for such restoration.
Badgett did not terminate Stephens when he filed his claim, apparently sharing the
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same hope. HGF and Badgett allowed the claim process to take its course. The
process and the Act itself ensure that Stephens’ workplace accident and his
resulting inability to be productive do not become HGF’s liability. HGF’s
voluntary election to participate in the Act’s alternative to tort litigation limited its
exposure to liability, and its purchase of workers’ compensation insurance shifted
all remaining liability of retaining Stephens to the insurer. So, in fact, Badgett was
not wrong when he called Stephens a liability. But, because of the Act, he was not
a liability HGF bore directly—at least not until he returned to the payroll despite
his work restrictions. The Act requires the insurer to bear the liability of Stephens’
inability to perform heavy work until the goal of the Act—the employee’s return to
work he performed before his injury—is accomplished.
So long as Stephens’ injury was not deemed permanent, the potential
existed that he could return, one day, to the heavy duty work he performed prior to
his workplace injury. Unfortunately, medical professionals found Stephens’ work
restrictions were permanent. By definition then, Stephens can never be restored to
gainful employment at HGF. That impossibility is the cause for Stephens’
termination. It is a legitimate, non-retaliatory ground for termination.
“[E]mployers simply are not required to keep an employee on staff
indefinitely in the hope that some position may become available some time in the
future. Moreover, employers are not required to create new positions for disabled
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employees in order to reasonably accommodate the disabled individual.” Milby v.
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2002-CA-000959-MR, 2003 WL 21474209, at
*4 (Ky. App. Jun. 27, 2003) (quoting Monette v. Elec. Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt
Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012)).3 When Stephens was
terminated, he was being paid for work he could not perform. Even if insensitive,
accurately calling Stephens a liability will not support an inference that terminating
him for lack of work he could perform was a mere pretext.
We also find his view of the temporal proximity factor unpersuasive.
When Stephens returned to work after nearly a year of convalescing, his status was
still restriction to light duty with no heavy lifting. With no indication of the
permanency of his restrictions, HGF returned Stephens to the payroll despite
having no light duty work within his medical restrictions. As Badgett testified
without objection, “Everything here [in fence installation] is heavy, for both
leadmen [such as Stephens’ had been before he exacerbated his original injury] and
employees[.]” The reason is that standard fencing materials “come in two hundred
thirty (230) pound rolls.”
3
This Court repeated the same legal concept in Yadon v. Toyotetsu America, Inc., No. 2011-CA-
001243-MR, 2012 WL 2472137, at *6 (Ky. App. Jun. 29, 2012) (An employer, “under Kentucky
law, is not required to create a new position as a reasonable accommodation.”). No published
Kentucky opinion sets out this principle which is universally applied if federal civil rights cases
in federal courts. Therefore, we cite Milby as persuasive.
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This was Stephens’ status for the next four months or so. Badgett had
no reason to believe all hope was gone of Stephens’ “restoration . . . to the same or
similar employment” with HGF before his injury. KRS 342.710(1). In all, about
sixteen months elapsed between Stephens’ filing of a claim and his termination.
“The sooner adverse action is taken after the protected activity, the
stronger the implication that the protected activity caused the adverse action,
particularly if no legitimate reason for the adverse action is evident.” Upchurch,
214 S.W.3d at 916 (quoting McCullough, 123 S.W.3d at 135). Stephens was not
terminated until sixteen months after he filed his claim. And, while it is certainly
true that Badgett wasted no time terminating Stephens once he learned Stephens’
medical restrictions were permanent, the proximity between learning of that
permanency and the termination is not a factor in the calculus of a claim of
retaliation.
Ironically, the near immediacy of Stephens’ termination after Badgett
learned Stephens’ restrictions are permanent justifies the inference that the
“legitimate, non-retaliatory reason” for terminating Stephens was the lack of any
employment position at HGF with duties he could perform.
We affirm the circuit court’s summary judgment on the workers’
compensation retaliation claim. There are no genuine issues of material fact
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regarding the legitimate, non-retaliatory reason HGF terminated Stephens and
HGF is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Stephens’ Hostile Work Environment Claim
That takes us to Stephens’ hostile work environment claim based on
the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA), specifically KRS 344.040(1). Like his
retaliation claim, this claim proceeds under the guidance of federal jurisprudence
interpreting Title VII claims. Title VII is a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
that, like KRS 344.040(1), makes actionable an employer’s discrimination based
on, among other things, sex, including sexual harassment.
“For an atmosphere of sexual harassment or hostility to be actionable,
. . . the offending behavior ‘must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.’” Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146–47 (2004)
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). We measure
severity and pervasiveness by whether “the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . .” Burton v. Kentucky State
Police, 341 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. App. 2011).
The incidents a claimant identifies to illustrate severity and
pervasiveness “must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous
and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive.” Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ. of
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Nicholas Cnty., 30 S.W.3d 793, 798 (Ky. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “[T]he harassment must also be both objectively and
subjectively offensive as determined by ‘looking at all the circumstances.’” Id.
The court reviewing the claim considers “the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s
work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (as
quoted in Ammerman, 30 S.W.3d at 798).
Stephens’ primary, if not only argument on appeal is that the circuit
court “used the wrong standard.” This is demonstrated, he claims, by the court’s
noting “both parties are male,” thereby contradicting the holding in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Indeed, Oncale is clear
that “nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of . . .
sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with
acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.” Id. at 79.
We first note the obvious about this argument—our review is de novo
and it does not matter what standard the circuit court used if the correct result is
reached. However, our de novo review deviates little if at all from the circuit
court’s analysis which properly focused on the principles often repeated since the
Supreme Court of the United States rendered Oncale. We start with that opinion.
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Oncale goes directly to the point, explaining that Title VII “requires
neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so
objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” Id. at
81 (emphasis added). “We have always regarded that requirement as crucial, and
as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in
the workplace—such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation—for
discriminatory ‘conditions of employment.’” Id. (emphasis added).
In the case before us, the circuit court began its grant of summary
judgment by expressly citing Oncale for the point that Stephens’ and Badgett’s
being the same sex did not prohibit the claim from going forward. That beginning
clearly rejected one of HGF’s arguments, abandoned in this appeal, based on the
fact Stephens is also male.
Instead, the court’s finding that Stephens failed to present a viable
claim focused on two material facts about which there is no genuine issue—(1)
prior to his termination, Stephens made no effort to address the issue with more
formality than saying, “Don’t do that”; and (2) neither before nor after his
termination did he ever “indicate[] that the behavior altered the conditions of his
employment or created an abusive working environment.” The circuit court’s
reference to both parties being male appears to be nothing more than an allusion to
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the type of “male-on-male horseplay” Oncale says will not support a claim for
hostile work environment based on sex discrimination.
Stephens argues he could not make a more formal complaint about
Badgett’s conduct before his termination because Badgett is HGF’s owner and a
formal complaint would be futile. We do not take the position that, under those
circumstances, the failure to formally complain disqualifies a claim. We are
saying, however, that putting one’s objection in writing is a way of evidencing a
subjective offensiveness to the conduct that can distinguish it from “male-on-male
horseplay.” Instead, Stephens reacted by talking with his male co-workers about
Badgett being “weird.” Other than that, there is no evidence contemporaneous
with the alleged conduct, or even just pre-termination, that supports the claim that
Stephens found Badgett’s conduct more subjectively offensive than as a topic for
water-cooler conversation.
More significantly, Stephens identifies nothing to support his claim
that Badgett’s conduct was “so objectively offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of
[his] employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. Reading the record in a light most
favorable to Stephens, we find a bald assertion in his complaint that HGF
discriminated against him “in the terms and conditions of his employment due to
his sex (male)” causing him to suffer “humiliation and economic loss which
demands compensation.” However, he fails to present evidence that the conditions
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of his employment were altered in any way. We also looked at Stephens’ response
to the motion for summary judgment in search of such evidence. He argued only
that he “is a member of a protected class” and “was subjected to sexual
harassment.” Stephens appears to conflate his justifiable termination with an
alteration in the conditions of his employment, characterizing the termination itself
as evidence in his hostile work environment claim. We cannot agree with the
illogic that a lawful termination can be an unlawful alteration of employment
conditions for purposes of a discrimination claim.
We share the circuit court’s distaste, even disgust, for Badgett’s crude
behavior and both this Court and that expressed as much in writing, something
Stephens never did before filing his complaint. And while we need not defer to the
circuit court’s reasoning, we also assess the evidence as does that court. The
conduct Stephens says justifies a claim of hostile work environment based on
sexual harassment was, as the circuit court put it, “‘offhand’ and isolated,” or as
Ammerman says, “episodic.” 30 S.W.3d at 798. Again, quoting the circuit court,
“Stephens apparently had no reservations about returning to work after being off
almost a year[.]” That indicated to the circuit court “that he did not subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive.” Similarly, “looking at all the
circumstances” memorialized in the record, this Court sees nothing to suggest
Stephens found Badgett’s conduct so subjectively offensive that he did something
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about it. And although objectively offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities,
Badgett’s conduct was not so offensive that it altered the conditions of Stephens’
employment.
For these reasons, we conclude there were no genuine issues of
material fact regarding Stephens’ claim of a hostile work environment and HGF
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The Jessamine Circuit Court’s January 25, 2024, summary judgment
is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove Jennifer K. Nordstrom
Lexington, Kentucky Jacob A. Lentsch
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Albert B. McQueen
Lexington, Kentucky
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