Michael Aaron Joseph v. Shelby Layne Joseph (Dye)
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Date FiledNovember 6, 2026
Docket2026-CA-0735
JudgeCombs
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 6, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2026-CA-0735-ME
MICHAEL AARON JOSEPH APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE S. MARIE HELLARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-D-00032-001
SHELBY LAYNE JOSEPH (DYE) APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, A. JONES, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Michael Aaron Joseph, pro se, appeals from an
Order of the Anderson Circuit Court Family Division extending a prior domestic
violence Order (DVO) against him. After our review, we affirm.
On June 6, 2014, the Appellee, Shelby Layne Joseph (Dye), filed a
domestic violence petition against Michael alleging that he had assaulted her with
a pistol, held her down at gun point, and tattooed the word, “SLUT,” on her back.
Michael was served with summons on June 6, 2014. On June 13, 2014, the court
entered a DVO restraining Michael from committing further acts of abuse or
threats of abuse and from any contact with Shelby effective until June 13, 2017.
Since that time, the family court has extended the DVO several times upon
Shelby’s timely motions, as follows:
04/30/2017: Shelby filed motion to amend to extend
original 2014 DVO.
05/09/2017: Amended DVO entered extending prior DVO
until May 9, 2020.
04/20/2020: Shelby filed motion to amend to extend prior
DVO.
04/28/2020 Amended DVO entered extending prior DVO
until April 28, 2023.
01/30/2023: Shelby filed motion to amend to extend prior
DVO.
04/11/2023: Amended DVO entered extending prior DVO
until April 11, 2026.
Shelby filed the most recent motion on March 25, 2026. On March
31, 2026, the family court heard the motion and entered an Amended DVO --
extended for three years until March 31, 2029. That DVO is the subject of this
appeal. The accompanying March 31, 2026, docket Order reflects the following
findings:
[Michael] registered numerous objections to extension.
However, after a review of the record, and upon
testimony of [Shelby], it is apparent that [Shelby]
continues to be in fear for her safety, and in fact, has a
difficult time even being in the presence of [Michael] for
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the purpose of asking for an extension. [Shelby]
reasonably fears for her safety as a result of the past
history of domestic violence, and [Michael] is attempting
to reach out to family members of [Shelby] which is
concerning to [Shelby].
On April 9, 2026, Michael filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
pursuant to CR1 59.05. By docket Order entered on April 21, 2026, the court
allowed Shelby ten days to respond and advised that the matter would be taken
under submission on May 4, 2026. On April 29, 2026, Shelby filed a response in
letter form. On May 4, 2026, Michael filed a reply to Shelby’s response and a
Form AOC-280 notice of submission for final adjudication.
On May 15, 2026, the family court entered an Opinion and Order
denying Michael’s CR 59.05 motion, noting that it found Shelby’s testimony
credible.
Then on May 20, 2026, Michael filed another motion -- a combined
motion to strike Shelby’s April 29, 2026, ex parte letter and to reconsider findings
of fact to correct the record under CR 52.02. The family court denied both motions
by docket Order entered on June 9, 2026. The court explained that despite lack of
certificate of service, Michael had filed a reply to Shelby’s letter/response; thus, he
had an opportunity to respond. The court considered the remainder of Michael’s
motion to be without merit.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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On June 9, 2026, Michael, pro se, filed a notice of appeal to this Court
from the family court’s Orders of May 15, 2026, and June 9, 2026.
Michael first argues that the family court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the DVO -- thus rendering it void ab initio. In subsection “A” of this argument,
Michael contends that the family court did not have personal jurisdiction over him
“due to a total failure of service regarding the May 2017 extension order.”
The original DVO was entered on June 13, 2014, effective until June
13, 2017. On May 1, 2017, Shelby timely moved to extend it. Hearing was set for
May 9, 2017. The record reflects that notice of hearing was mailed to Michael on
May 2, 2017, but was returned to the court clerk as “unable to forward.” On May
9, 2017, the family court entered an Amended DVO extending the terms of the
prior DVO for three years -- effective until May 9, 2020.
The family court had jurisdiction to extend the original 2014 DVO.
Michael was properly before the court, and the DVO was still in effect when
Shelby moved to extend it. “Once a court has acquired subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, challenges to its subsequent rulings and judgment are questions
incident to the exercise of jurisdiction rather than to the existence of jurisdiction.”
Hisle v. Lexington–Fayette Urban County Government, 258 S.W.3d 422, 429–30
(Ky. App. 2008) (quoting Buckalew v. Buckalew, 754 N.E.2d 896, 898 (Ind.
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2001)); see Wooldridge v. Zimmerer, 311 S.W.3d 254, 255-56 (Ky. App. 2010)
(discussing jurisdictional prerequisites for extending DVO).
The issue is one of due process rather than of jurisdiction. Michael did
not receive notice of the May 9, 2017, hearing and thus did not have an opportunity
to be heard. However, Michael did not file a post-judgment motion to set aside the
2017 Amended DVO. Nor did he appeal after the DVO was extended in 2020 and
again in 2023. Indeed, Michael states that he “raised the threshold issue of the
foundational 2017 failure of service for the first time in open court” at a June 9,
2026, hearing.2 (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4, 7.) That objection occurred nine years
after the fact. In light of Michael’s failure to raise the issue within a reasonable
time and his continued participation in subsequent proceedings, we consider the
issue waived.
Subsection “B” of Michael’s first argument concerns an alleged
“irregular entry dated May 9, 2019” on the official docket sheet. There is no entry
on the certified case history dated May 9, 2019, or in 2019 whatsoever.
Michael’s second argument also contains subsections “A” and “B.”
Both lack merit and require no further discussion.
2
June 9, 2026, was the date of the motion hour concerning Michael’s May 20, 2026, combined
motion to strike and motion to reconsider.
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The essence of Michael’s third argument is that the evidence was
insufficient to support extending the DVO. We disagree.
KRS[3] 403.740(4) does not require proof of additional
acts of domestic violence before extending a DVO.
Rather, the absence of additional actions of domestic
violence is merely one factor which the court may
consider in deciding whether to extend a DVO. The trial
court may consider all facts and circumstances, including
the nature, extent and severity of the original acts of
domestic violence, in finding that there is a continuing
need for the DVO.
Cottrell v. Cottrell, 571 S.W.3d 590, 592 (Ky. App. 2019) (citations omitted).
At the March 31, 2026, hearing on Shelby’s motion to extend the
DVO, the court addressed Michael, stating that:
I hear your argument and I understand your argument.
However, I’m not going to ignore what brought, gave rise
to this in the first place . . . . I think it was very serious
and the fact that she [Shelby] tells me today that she’s
having a hard time even being here is not something that
the court takes lightly.
The family court considered all the appropriate factors. As was its
prerogative, the court found Shelby’s testimony credible. Pennie v. Mohamed, 720
S.W.3d 606, 620 (Ky. App. 2025). The evidence presented established sufficient
grounds to reissue the DVO. We find no error.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Michael’s remaining arguments lack merit and do not require further
discussion other than to note that “[a] party cannot invoke CR 59.05 to raise
arguments and to introduce evidence that should have been presented during the
proceedings before the entry of the judgment.” Gullion v. Gullion, 163 S.W.3d
888, 893 (Ky. 2005). Moreover, orders denying CR 59.05 motions “are
interlocutory and not appealable. . . . [W]e construe the attempt to appeal from the
denial of CR 59.05 relief as an appeal from the underlying judgment. . . . [W]e do
not review the family court’s denial of the motion to vacate in itself.” Turner v.
Turner, 672 S.W.3d 43, 49-50 (Ky. App. 2023).
We affirm the Order of the Anderson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael A. Joseph, pro se Shelby Layne Dye, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky Lawrenceburg, Kentucky
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