State v. Contreras

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 127,830 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JORGE PONCE CONTRERAS, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 2. State v. Nunez, 319 Kan. 351, 354, 554 P.3d 656 (2024), did not change Kansas law regarding Apprendi. 3. State v. Nunez, 319 Kan. 351, 354, 554 P.3d 656 (2024), did not discuss what constitutes a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver, because Nunez did not involve a waiver. Ultimately the question regarding a "knowing" waiver is whether the waiver was voluntarily made by a defendant who knew and understood what he or she was doing. 1  Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 66 Kan. App. 2d 182, 579 P.3d 1278 (2025). Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Oral argument held May 19, 2026. Opinion filed September 11, 2026. Judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the sentence in part on the issue subject to review is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed on the issue subject to review. Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Emily Brandt, of the same office, was on the brief for appellant. Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by STEGALL, J.: Jorge Contreras pled no contest to one count of aggravated kidnapping and guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. As part of the plea agreement, the State recommended a grid sentence of 155 months' imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision. The district court sentenced Contreras to 155 months' imprisonment on the aggravated kidnapping count to run concurrent with 32 months' imprisonment for each count of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The district court then pronounced that Contreras would be subject to lifetime postrelease supervision for the aggravated kidnapping count. On the journal entry, the district court checked three boxes indicating it was imposing lifetime postrelease supervision for all three counts. Contreras appealed the lifetime postrelease portion of his sentence for each of these counts. Although Contreras brought his claims for the first time on appeal, a majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals found that prudential exceptions to preservation applied and agreed to consider Contreras' claims. State v. Contreras, 66 Kan. App. 2d 182, 185, 579 P.3d 1278 (2025). 2  The panel found—and the State conceded—that the term of lifetime postrelease supervision imposed in relation to Contreras' aggravated kidnapping conviction was imposed in error. The panel concluded that the maximum term of postrelease supervision the district court could have imposed for this conviction was 36 months. Therefore, the panel remanded Contreras' case with directions to the district court for resentencing. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 193. The State does not ask us to review that holding. The panel also found that the terms of lifetime postrelease supervision imposed in relation to Contreras' aggravated indecent solicitation convictions were imposed in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). The panel found that the district court had improperly engaged in judicial factfinding by relying on Contreras' "admissions" that he was over 18 years old at the time of the crimes to impose lifetime postrelease supervision without first securing a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver. Contreras, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 190; see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004) ("[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."); State v. Nunez, 319 Kan. 351, 354, 554 P.3d 656 (2024) ("[B]efore a sentencing court may rely on a defense admission to increase the defendant's sentence, that admission must have been preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's jury trial right."); see also K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i) ("persons sentenced to imprisonment for a sexually violent crime . . . when the offender was 18 years of age or older, and who are released from prison, shall be released to a mandatory period of postrelease supervision"). 3  The State petitioned this court for review, arguing the panel's reversal of Contreras' lifetime postrelease supervision terms related to his aggravated indecent liberties convictions was incorrect for several reasons. Contreras' case presents a recurring disagreement within our appellate courts which demands clarification and showcases a conflict between decisions made in the Court of Appeals and this court's precedent. Therefore, we granted review. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(E) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 56). FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In March 2024, Contreras pled guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for conduct that occurred between 2019 and 2021. The record on appeal in Contreras' case is replete with references to Contreras' age. By signing an Acknowledgment of Rights and Entry of Plea, Contreras stated that he was 36 years old. The document that constitutes the Plea Agreement states that Contreras was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offenses. The Plea Agreement also specifically referenced that Contreras' case would require lifetime postrelease supervision per K.S.A. 22- 3717(d)(1)(G). This statute states, in part, that "persons sentenced to imprisonment for a sexually violent crime . . . when the offender was 18 years of age or older . . . shall be released to a mandatory period of postrelease supervision." K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i). The Amended Information, dated the same day as Contreras' plea hearing, showed Contreras' birth year as 1987. At the plea hearing, Contreras told the district court that he was 36 years old, and the State specifically said that Contreras was over 18 at the time of the crimes. Suffice to say, as this court acknowledged at oral argument, "[t]his defendant was over 18, everyone knows that." But Contreras' case is not about what "everyone knows," it is about the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees a defendant the right to have a jury decide any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 4 statutory maximum. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.). And, a majority of a panel of the Court of Appeals determined that Contreras' Sixth Amendment rights were, in fact, violated. Thus, the question before this court is not "whether Contreras was at least 18 years old when he committed these crimes," it is "whether Contreras admitted he was at least 18 years old when he committed these crimes following a knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right." Contreras argues that he never waived his jury trial rights regarding the fact of his age. He argues that, regardless of what is in the plea documents or what was said at the plea hearing, he never made any constitutionally sufficient "admissions" regarding his age. Contreras argues first that the Acknowledgment of Rights form incorrectly listed the maximum period of postrelease supervision for aggravated indecent liberties with a child as 24 months. He also points out that, at the plea hearing, the district court asked him his age before securing a jury trial waiver. He points to this hearing to argue that he did not admit his age after he waived his jury trial rights. At the plea hearing the district court asked if Contreras understood his rights as explained by his counsel, to which Contreras replied he had brain tumors and sometimes had difficulty understanding everything. The court then reviewed the maximum sentences and specifically informed Contreras that he may be facing lifetime postrelease supervision. Contreras said that he understood. The court then began to discuss the waivers in the acknowledgment of rights. Specifically, the court said, "You have the right to a speedy trial before a judge or a jury. You get to choose whether you have a judge trial or a jury trial." When asked if he had had enough time to talk to his attorney about these waivers, Contreras replied, "No." The district court took a break and allowed Contreras to discuss these waivers with counsel. Once they returned, counsel specifically stated for the record that they had discussed the 5 plea agreement and waivers, and Contreras had asked questions and eventually stated that he had no additional concerns. Contreras then confirmed he wanted to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Following this waiver, counsel for the State once again mentioned that Contreras was over 18 at the time of the crime. Contreras' age was not discussed again for the remainder of the hearing. The court informed Contreras that he would need to admit all of the facts in the amended information in order to plead guilty, which he subsequently did. Though Contreras' age was never specifically mentioned during the plea hearing, the Amended Information clearly lists Contreras' year of birth as 1987. Before accepting Contreras' plea, the district court gave Contreras "one last opportunity" to have a trial. Contreras said, "I don't feel like I'm prepared or ready to come to trial in four weeks because of my mental issues. I wouldn't be ready to physically or mentally to support a trial." The Court replied, "All right. Well it's your choice. Do you want me to accept your plea today or do you want to have your trial?" To which Contreras responded, "I would like you to accept the plea." Contreras argues that his jury trial waiver was sufficient only with regard to the facts supporting his convictions. He insists the waiver was insufficient with regard to the fact of his age based on his reading of Nunez, 319 Kan. at 354. The panel agreed. For reasons explained below, we do not. The State petitioned this court for review. First, the State asks us to find that the fact that a defendant was over 18 years old in an adult criminal proceeding is not subject to Apprendi's protections unless there is a record or argument to the contrary. Second, the State claims that even if the fact of a defendant's age is subject to Apprendi, the panel erred by finding Contreras did not adequately waive his right to a jury trial before admitting his age. 6  ANALYSIS In this Case, the Fact of a Defendant's Age Is Subject to Apprendi The State first argues that a district court does not engage in judicial factfinding in violation of Apprendi by concluding a defendant in an adult criminal proceeding is at least 18 years old if there is no record or argument to the contrary. The State's argument, while pragmatic, fails to conform to the mandate issued in Apprendi. Apprendi requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. "[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i) clearly requires a factual finding that the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of the crime before a district court imposes lifetime postrelease supervision on that defendant. At oral argument, the State even agreed that "being 18 years of age means lifetime postrelease supervision . . . it is subject to Apprendi." Thus, age is clearly a fact that is subject to Apprendi. Nunez, 319 Kan. at 352 (defendant's age is a fact subject to Apprendi when imposing lifetime postrelease supervision pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3717[d][1][G]). The State is therefore effectively asking this court to create a new exception to Apprendi. We decline to do so. 7 The Panel Misreads Nunez and Nunez Is Not Controlling in this Case Contreras argues, and the panel agreed, that Contreras failed to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial before admitting his age. Contreras cites primarily to Nunez to argue that his age was never "properly 'admitted' such that the sentencing court could have relied on that fact during sentencing without running afoul of Apprendi." 319 Kan. at 352-53. The panel agreed and found that "[a]ny admissions by Contreras to his age in district court were not preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial, as required in Nunez." Contreras, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 190. In reaching its conclusion, the panel stated that "the Nunez decision modifies Kansas law and substantially impacts the validity of many prior opinions from our court on whether a defendant's age admission cures an Apprendi violation when the district court imposes lifetime postrelease supervision on a conviction for a sexually violent crime." 66 Kan. App. 2d at 185. The panel also stated that: "The holding in Nunez—that before a sentencing court can rely on a defendant's admission to increase the defendant's sentence, that admission must have been preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's jury trial right—modifies prior law in Kansas." 66 Kan. App. 2d at 189. The panel then summarized the impact of Nunez as: "The holding in Nunez teaches us this: Before a district court sentences a defendant to lifetime postrelease supervision for the conviction of a sexually violent crime, it should obtain a jury finding that the defendant was at least 18 years old when they committed the crime or, in the case of a plea, it should obtain a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver that includes informing the defendant they are waiving the right to a jury finding on their age. Then, in obtaining a factual basis for the plea, the district court should ask the defendant to admit or agree to the elements of the crime and 8  the fact they were at least 18 years old when the crime was committed. If the district court follows this procedure, it can impose lifetime postrelease supervision without running afoul of Apprendi." 66 Kan. App. 2d at 189. The panel's decision demonstrates a critical misunderstanding of our decision in Nunez. Today we correct this misunderstanding. Nunez did not "change" Kansas law regarding Apprendi or Blakely. Nunez did, however, condemn an unconstitutional practice—the practice that was used in Nunez' case. Nunez explained that when a defendant has not waived his jury trial rights, a district court may not consider documents containing a defendant's age, such as presentence investigation reports or financial affidavits for court appointed counsel, to be defense admissions for Apprendi purposes. Nunez, 319 Kan. at 353 ("The lower court found that Nunez had sufficiently 'admitted' his age, reasoning that he had listed his age as 32 and his date of birth as 1988 on a financial affidavit for court-appointed counsel. The court also relied on the fact that Nunez filed a presentencing departure motion indicating that he was born in 1988 and that he did not object to the State's presentence investigation report stating Nunez was 32. Additionally, the State pointed out that Nunez clearly stated his age during his sentencing hearing."). To the extent Nunez was inconsistent with any Court of Appeals decisions which allowed this practice to occur, Nunez simply declared that those decisions were wrong under Apprendi. But Nunez did not change Kansas law regarding Apprendi. Apprendi provides that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490; see also State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 405-06, 23 P.3d 801 (2001) (same). "[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303; see also State v. Bello, 289 Kan. 191, 199, 211 P.3d 139 (2009) (same). 9  In Blakely, the defendant entered a guilty plea with very few supporting facts. We note that a valid guilty plea, by definition, must contain a jury trial waiver. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) ("Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. [Citations omitted.]" [Emphasis added.]). Strictly on the basis of the facts contained in Blakely's plea, the court could have imposed a maximum sentence of 53 months. However, the district court later held a hearing resembling a bench trial regarding aggravating factors. After hearing additional evidence, the district court found that Blakely had acted with "'deliberate cruelty'" and elevated his sentence to 90 months. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. The Supreme Court found the judicial determination regarding "deliberate cruelty" violated Apprendi because the district court relied on evidence outside of Blakely's admissions—which were all contained in his guilty plea—in order to elevate his sentence without having a jury determine those facts or having Blakely waive his jury trial rights with regard to those additional admissions. Implicit in the Blakely decision is that for a defendant to admit a fact, other than that of a defendant's criminal history, there must be a jury trial waiver. Waivers of these rights allowing judicial factfinding are explicitly discussed in Blakely. "[T]he Sixth Amendment was not written for the benefit of those who choose to forgo its protection. It guarantees the right to jury trial. It does not guarantee that a particular number of jury trials will actually take place. That more defendants elect to waive that right . . . does not prove that a constitutional provision guaranteeing availability of that option is disserved." 10  "[N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. See Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 488; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968). If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty. Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial." (Emphasis added.) 542 U.S. at 310, 312. We are not alone in reading Blakely this way. See United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 2005) (Seymour, Circuit Judge, concurring) ("The Court has made it clear that a defendant's simple admissions proffered in the absence of 'proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards' may constitute evidence, even overwhelming evidence, in support of a sentencing enhancement, but they do not constitute an 'admission[.]' . . . [O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, a defendant's [and surely a defense counsel's] admission of facts outside the guilty plea context or outside the context of a formal stipulation cannot function as a waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights and does not permit an increase in the relevant statutory maximum sentence."); United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The sentence in the present case was based solely upon the facts admitted by Saldivar– Trujillo as part of his guilty plea. Blakely therefore does not affect the validity of his sentence."); Coffin v. Cate, No. 2:10-CV-00026-JAM EFB P., 2013 WL 6230452, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (unpublished opinion) ("Under Apprendi, a sentence may be imposed on a criminal defendant in one of two ways: either [1] a jury finds the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of facts sufficient to impose the sentence or [2] the defendant waives his right to a jury trial and admits facts sufficient to impose that sentence [i.e. in a guilty plea]. . . . [A] number of state supreme courts have determined that 'admissions' under Apprendi must be accompanied by a jury trial waiver."); People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190, 1192 (Colo. 2006) (holding that "a sentencing court may not use a defendant's 11 admissions to sentence him in the aggravated range unless the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waives his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find the facts that support the aggravated sentence"); State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 650-51 (Minn. 2006) (holding that "a defendant must expressly, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury determination of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure before his statements at his guilty-plea hearing may be used to enhance his sentence"). Turning back to Nunez, in that case, the defendant opted for a jury trial and never waived his jury trial right in part or in full. However, "[n]o evidence of Nunez' age was presented during trial, and the jury did not make a finding regarding Nunez' age." Nunez, 319 Kan. at 355. At sentencing, the district court relied on a financial affidavit, presentencing departure motion, presentence investigation report, and an oral statement by Nunez made at sentencing to determine Nunez was over 18 and therefore subject to lifetime postrelease supervision. The State alleged that these were all "admissions" under Blakely, and a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed. This court reversed, finding that none of the State's cited "evidence" were effective "admissions" under Apprendi because Nunez never waived his right to have all facts which increase his sentence submitted to a jury. We said that: "[B]efore a sentencing court may rely on a defense admission to increase the defendant's sentence, that admission must have been preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver of the defendant's jury trial right. This must be so given that Apprendi is all about preserving and protecting a defendant's jury trial right under the Sixth Amendment. If the jury trial right was not properly waived with respect to any defense admission, that admission may not be considered by a sentencing court without running afoul of Apprendi." 319 Kan. at 354. 12  We specifically noted, consistent with the holding in Blakely, that facts contained in valid plea agreements are considered "admissions" because the valid plea agreement necessarily includes a jury trial waiver. "Many cases within our own state explicitly or implicitly follow this rule by relying on admissions following jury trial waivers, such as those found in guilty pleas. . . . .... "On this record, there is no plausible argument that Nunez waived his jury trial rights with respect to the question of his age. Nunez did not enter any plea agreement, he did not waive his jury trial rights, and he did not stipulate or state his age in open court. Nowhere in the transcripts from his jury trial does any person state or dispute Nunez' age, it is simply never mentioned." (Emphasis added.) 319 Kan. at 354-55. As discussed previously, the Contreras panel misreads Nunez to create some heightened "itemized" jury trial waiver requirement in order for a waiver to be a "knowing waiver." We note that not all panels have adopted this reading of Nunez. See State v. Duckworth, No. 126,677, 2024 WL 4579265, at *4 (Kan. App. 2024) (unpublished opinion) ("Nunez does not clarify how specific a waiver of jury trial on the issue of a defendant's age must be, as Nunez was tried by a jury and did not enter a plea."), rev. denied 320 Kan. 864 (2025). At the outset, we mention that the Contreras' panel's reading of Nunez generally conflicts with the spirit of our caselaw. "We have previously refused to establish or enumerate a 'checklist' to which district courts must adhere in advising defendants of their right to a jury trial, and we will not establish one here." State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 371, 377, 461 P.3d 48 (2020). Because Nunez never waived his jury trial right and the jury in his case found all of the relevant facts necessary (except for his age), the Nunez decision focused on the 13 "single" fact of his age which was found by the district court. Nunez, 319 Kan. at 355 ("Here, there is no question that the jury found facts sufficient to convict Nunez of rape, resulting in his prison sentence of 155 months. But in this case, the defendant's age was not a necessary element of the charged crime and so the jury never considered or found Nunez' age."). The opinion's focus on an isolated fact was a function of the unique circumstances of Nunez' case, i.e. there was only one fact in dispute following a jury trial. Naturally, if there is only one "admission" in dispute, the question of whether there was a valid jury trial waiver must necessarily be asked in context of that admission. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310 ("If appropriate waivers are procured, . . . [e]ven a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial."). Contrary to the panel's application, Nunez did not discuss what constitutes a knowing and voluntary waiver, because in that case there was no waiver. Nunez therefore did not modify our law regarding what makes a waiver "knowing." In answering whether Contreras' jury trial waiver was made knowingly, Nunez is wholly inapplicable. Whether a defendant adequately waives his or her jury trial rights requires an analysis pursuant to our on-point body of caselaw. See, e.g. State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588, 589, 533 P.2d 1225 (1975); State v. Redick, 307 Kan. 797, 804-05, 414 P.3d 1207 (2018); State v. Bentley, 317 Kan. 222, 230, 526 P.3d 1060 (2023). Ultimately the question regarding a "knowing" waiver is "whether the waiver was voluntarily made by a defendant who knew and understood what he was doing." Irving, 216 Kan. at 589; see also State v. Burnett, 194 Kan. 126, 131, 397 P.2d 346 (1964) ("The record clearly discloses that defendant knew and understood what he was doing."). A careful analysis in these cases is warranted because we have clearly stated that the denial of a jury trial right through the failure to obtain a sufficient jury trial waiver before either a bench trial or a guilty plea constitutes structural error. Bentley, 317 Kan. at 232-34. 14 Contreras Admitted His Age Following a Knowing and Voluntary Jury Trial Waiver The State argues that the district court did not engage in judicial factfinding in violation of Apprendi because Contreras admitted his age following an effective jury trial waiver. We agree. At oral argument, Contreras' counsel stated that Contreras' jury trial waiver was valid as to the elements of the crimes he was charged with and pled to; however, counsel argued that Contreras' jury trial waiver was not effective with respect to the fact of Contreras' age. Counsel argued that such an ineffective waiver was equivalent to convicting Contreras of something to which he never pled. Counsel specifically took the position that Contreras was pleading to the facts included in the amended information; however, counsel mistakenly stated that he believed the amended information did not contain Contreras' age. Counsel stated, "If I'm wrong about that, then I'm wrong about that . . . . The record will be what the record will be." The amended information included in the record on appeal clearly states that Contreras' birth year was 1987. The State argues that Contreras waived his jury trial rights with respect to a finding of his age. Contreras' counsel takes the position that Contreras validly waived his jury trial rights with respect to the facts contained in the amended information. Contreras' birth year is in the amended information. By our understanding of the parties' positions in light of a careful review of the record, we find that "there is nothing left for us to decide." Kelly v. Kobach, 322 Kan. 85, 96, 586 P.3d 739 (2026). The parties are in agreement that Contreras admitted he was over 18 at the time of the crimes following an effective jury trial waiver. We see no reason to disagree. Contreras has not argued that his waiver was otherwise ineffective under any of our caselaw which actually evaluates jury trial waivers. Therefore, we find that Contreras has waived those arguments and decline to engage in any further analysis sua sponte. 15 State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021) (An issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned.); State v. Laborde, 303 Kan. 1, 7, 360 P.3d 1080 (2015) ("As a general rule, unless there are exceptional circumstances, appellate courts do not consider issues on appeal that were not raised by the parties."), overruled on other grounds by Balbirnie v. State, 311 Kan. 893, 468 P.3d 334 (2020). Therefore, we find that Contreras admitted his age following a knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver. The district court did not engage in judicial factfinding in violation of Apprendi when it found that Contreras was over 18 years old between 2019 and 2021 when he committed sexually violent crimes. Therefore, the district court correctly imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G)(i). We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the terms of lifetime postrelease supervision for Contreras' convictions of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. Judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the sentence in part on the issue subject to review is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed on the issue subject to review. 16