State v. Riggins

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 126,841 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. WAYNE RICHARD RIGGINS, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT K.S.A. 21-5231(a) provides for self-defense immunity from prosecution and creates an affirmative defense to which the time limits for filing as set out in K.S.A. 22- 3208(4) applies. Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 66 Kan. App. 2d 123, 577 P.3d 646 (2025). Appeal from Butler District Court; CHARLES M. HART, judge. Oral argument held January 29, 2026. Opinion filed October 16, 2026. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court on the issues subject to review is reversed. Judgment of the district court on the issues subject to review is affirmed. James M. Latta, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. Tyler W. Winslow, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee. PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Wayne Richard Riggins of heat of passion voluntary manslaughter and level 7 reckless aggravated battery after he stabbed and killed his uncle's girlfriend, Dana Haynes, and struck his uncle, Jeff Carley, during a 1 fight. Riggins was sentenced to a presumptive 233 months for voluntary manslaughter with a concurrent sentence of 12 months for aggravated battery. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Riggins' voluntary manslaughter conviction, vacated his sentence for that conviction, and ordered resentencing for his aggravated battery conviction. The panel found that the district court improperly relied on testimony from Riggins' preliminary hearing during an evidentiary hearing for immunity based on self-defense. The panel determined that after removing the testimony from the preliminary hearing from consideration, the State had failed to put on any evidence establishing probable cause that Riggins' use of force was not justified. The State filed a petition for review, and Riggins filed a conditional cross-petition for review. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In December 2019, Riggins was involved in a family disturbance with his uncle's girlfriend, Dana Haynes. Riggins' uncle, Jeff Carley, quickly joined the action. Riggins, Carley, and Haynes all lived with Riggins' grandmother, Joyce Crissup, who is Carley's mother. Riggins and Haynes didn't get along, and eventually Crissup told them they had to move out. Riggins moved out almost immediately, but Haynes and Carley stayed. A few days later, Riggins returned to Crissup's house to pick up some laundry. Riggins brought along his girlfriend, Joyce Batemon. Once Riggins and Batemon got to the house, Riggins greeted Crissup and headed to the laundry room toward the back of the house. Crissup testified that she saw Riggins carrying a knife in a leather sheath in his belt. Batemon sat on a couch toward the front of the house and played a game on her phone. On his way to the laundry room, Riggins 2 crossed paths with Haynes, who was on her way to the bathroom. The two began arguing near the kitchen and the details of what happened next vary between accounts. Batemon testified that Haynes came out of a nearby bedroom and approached Riggins in the kitchen. Haynes and Riggins argued and a physical fight ensued. Batemon said she left after the fight started. Carley stated that he heard the fight, heard Haynes calling for help, came out of the bedroom, and saw Riggins on top of Haynes stabbing her with a buck knife as Haynes begged for help. Carley grabbed Riggins, but Riggins swung at him and punched him in the face. After being punched, Carley retreated to attempt to call 911. Crissup ultimately called 911. Neither Crissup nor Carley saw the fight start, but both testified to seeing Riggins stabbing Haynes. Riggins stated that Haynes was enraged and started attacking him with a buck knife she grabbed from a nearby table. Riggins said he was initially empty-handed. Riggins claimed that as he struggled with Haynes, she slashed his leg. He said that he ultimately grabbed the hand in which she was holding the knife and directed it back at her, resulting in Haynes sustaining multiple stab wounds. Riggins dragged Haynes outside, left her there, and then fled. Haynes was taken to the hospital but died a few days later from the stab wounds. Law enforcement found Riggins hiding in the rafters of a friend's garage. The court held a preliminary hearing on January 6, 2021. At that hearing, multiple law enforcement officers testified, as did Crissup and Carley. Sergeant Derek Highbarger testified that he responded to the scene and saw Carley bleeding from his face. Highbarger also saw Haynes propped against the gate of a fence with stab wounds. Highbarger later spoke with Batemon, who told him she believed Riggins acted in self- 3 defense. Sergeant Chris Scheuber testified he located Riggins hiding, and upon being found Riggins immediately stated that Haynes was trying to kill him, he was afraid for his life, and Haynes had cut him. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court found probable cause to bind Riggins over for trial on second-degree murder and aggravated battery. Riggins entered pleas of not guilty and requested a jury trial. On May 28, 2021, Riggins' attorney filed a motion for declaration of self-defense immunity under K.S.A. 21-5231. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, and Batemon and Riggins testified on Riggins' behalf. The State presented no witnesses and instead relied solely on testimony from the preliminary hearing. The district court also relied on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and found "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances at preliminary hearing . . . , and today, under the totality of the circumstances, . . . the State has carried its burden to establish probable cause that the defendant's use of force was not statutorily justified." The case then proceeded to a jury trial where Riggins was convicted of heat-of- passion voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder and a lesser degree, severity level 7, of aggravated battery. The district court then allowed Riggins to proceed pro se in posttrial proceedings. Riggins advanced numerous arguments in various posttrial filings. The district court denied Riggins an evidentiary hearing on his posttrial motions and subsequently denied the motions. Riggins appealed his convictions, and the Court of Appeals reversed Riggins' conviction for voluntary manslaughter—specifically finding that the district court erred by relying on the preliminary hearing testimony when there was no agreement among the parties that the evidence presented could be used at a later hearing and no evidentiary stipulations were made. State v. Riggins, 66 Kan. App. 2d 123, 139, 577 P.3d 646 (2025). Absent such an agreement or stipulation, and because the State called no witnesses at the 4 immunity hearing, the Court of Appeals found that Riggins lacked a meaningful opportunity to test the evidence put on by the State. Therefore, left with only Riggins' and Batemon's testimony at the immunity hearing, the Court of Appeals held that the State had failed to meet its burden to overcome Riggins' affirmative defense of self-defense immunity. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 133-39. Because the panel reversed Riggins' voluntary manslaughter conviction, the panel found that Riggins' other arguments related to that conviction—pertaining to jury instructions and whether the State met its burden to overcome his affirmative defense at trial—were moot. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 139. The panel also found that Riggins did not properly waive his right to posttrial counsel; however, it determined that Riggins had not adequately briefed his position that such an error should be considered structural error. Consequently, the panel found Riggins had abandoned his argument and declined to determine to what degree any such error was prejudicial. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 141. The panel also found that Riggins suffered no prejudice by the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Before the panel, Riggins raised three specific claims: "(1) His trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking immunity from prosecution on the aggravated battery charge; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter; and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask to see the verdict forms or poll the jury when it initially returned an improper verdict." 66 Kan. App. 2d at 142. In light of the panel's reversal of Riggins' voluntary manslaughter conviction, the panel dismissed Riggins' second argument as moot. In considering Riggins' first argument, the panel criticized Riggins' counsel's strategy but ultimately found that 5 because the jury had rejected Riggins' affirmative defense at trial, the State had already disproved Riggins' theory beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the panel found "'the State has already borne an evidentiary burden far higher than the probable cause burden'" required by the immunity statute. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 142. Consequently, the panel found no remedy was available to Riggins. In considering Riggins' third claim, the panel found that Riggins could not have been prejudiced by a rejected jury form. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 144. Riggins lastly argued that he was entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error. The panel determined that all of Riggins' arguments related to his voluntary manslaughter conviction were moot, which only left one error—his waiver of posttrial counsel. The panel determined that because that claim was abandoned, Riggins was not entitled to a new trial. 66 Kan. App. 2d at 144. The State petitioned this court for review arguing the panel erred by reversing Riggins' voluntary manslaughter conviction and by holding that Riggins' right to counsel was violated posttrial. The State argued the panel correctly found that Riggins' motion for a new trial was properly denied. Riggins filed a reply and conditional cross-petition arguing that the panel correctly interpreted the self-defense immunity statute, or alternatively, suggested an interpretation of the statute which would affirm the panel's decision. Riggins also argued the panel erred by finding he abandoned his structural error claim related to his waiver of counsel, or alternatively, by failing to perform a constitutional harmlessness analysis. Riggins next argued that the panel erred by finding no available remedy for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 6  Lastly, Riggins asks this court to "decide any and all issues properly presented to, but not decided by, the Court of Appeals." ANALYSIS Riggins Was Not Entitled to Self-Defense Immunity Under K.S.A. 21-5231(a) Because Riggins' Motion Was Time Barred Under K.S.A. 22-3208(4) When reviewing a challenge to a self-defense immunity ruling, we use a bifurcated standard of review. The district court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial competent evidence; the district court's legal conclusions from those facts are reviewed de novo. State v. Phillips, 312 Kan. 643, 656, 479 P.3d 176 (2021). For context, K.S.A. 21-5231(a) provides for self-defense immunity from prosecution: "(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 21-5226, and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant to K.S.A. 21-5222, 21-5223 or 21-5225, and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force. . . . .... "(c) A prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause." The State argues that the panel's immunity finding was wrong because the State claims that the 21-day deadline in K.S.A. 22-3208(4) barred Riggins' motion to dismiss. "[I]nterpretation and construction of statutes raises questions of law subject to unlimited appellate review." State v. Jones, 298 Kan. 324, 330, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013) (discussing K.S.A. 22-3208[4] and self-defense immunity). 7  K.S.A. 22-3208(4) states, in part: "The motion to dismiss shall be made at any time prior to arraignment or within 21 days after the plea is entered. The period for filing such motion may be enlarged by the court when it shall find that the grounds therefor were not known to the defendant and could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered by the defendant within the period specified herein." Riggins' preliminary hearing was held on January 6, 2021, and he entered not guilty pleas on the same day. Riggins filed his motion for self-defense immunity on May 28, 2021, the State responded on June 1, 2021, and the district court conducted a hearing on June 2, 2021. Factually speaking, there is no question that Riggins filed his immunity motion more than 21 days after January 6, 2021. Additionally, there is no question that self-defense was a defense that Riggins had been actually aware of. The record demonstrates that Riggins filed a pro se self-defense motion in March of 2020. The State responded to that motion within a week, stating that it could not respond due to the lack of specificity of Riggins' motion. The district court acknowledged the existence of this pro se motion at Riggins' June 2021 motions hearing and found that the defense had not actually requested a self-defense immunity hearing until defense counsel had filed a motion for self-defense immunity on May 28, 2021. The district court specifically noted that neither Riggins nor his counsel had discussed an immunity hearing at the January 6, 2021 preliminary hearing. The district court specifically found that Riggins "has had ample time to take this . . . motion up prior to the eve of trial." 8  Riggins does not suggest that the district court erred by finding that he had not requested an immunity hearing until his counsel filed a motion on May 28, 2021. Instead, Riggins argues, and the panel found, that the 21-day time limit in K.S.A. 22-3208(4) does not apply to stand-your-ground immunity claims. Riggins and the panel are wrong. In Jones, the court outright stated that K.S.A. 22-3208(4) applies to motions for self-defense immunity. 298 Kan. at 334. It stated: "The only sensible reading of [K.S.A. 21-5231(a)] is that it creates an affirmative defense to which K.S.A. 22-3208(4) applies." 298 Kan. at 334. Riggins acknowledges this holding in his briefing by stating: "Counsel misspoke in earlier filings when he said that this Court had already held that K.S.A. 22- 3208[4] did not apply to K.S.A. 21-5231." However, even in light of the clear language in Jones, the parties and the panel disagree about whether Jones bars Riggins' motion. In Jones, the central question was whether an immunity claim could be raised for the first time on appeal. The Jones court summarized K.S.A. 22-3208(4) to require: "[T]he [self-defense immunity] defense must be asserted before trial opens or a dispositive plea is entered. Such an assertion is a timely trigger of the State's probable cause burden." 298 Kan. at 334. The court went on to say that: "A defendant who waits to invoke [statutory] immunity until appeal after conviction simply waits too long." 298 Kan. at 334. The panel used this language from Jones to determine "our Supreme Court's holding in Jones suggests an immunity motion is timely if raised before the start of trial or the entry of a guilty or no-contest plea." Riggins, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 131. The panel misreads Jones. K.S.A. 22-3208(4) allows the district court to extend the 21-day deadline only if the court finds "that the grounds therefor were not known to the defendant and could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered by the defendant within the period specified herein." Jones is not inconsistent with the language 9 of K.S.A. 22-3208(4) by saying that a final deadline for the possible time for a defendant to file a motion for immunity is "before trial opens or a dispositive plea is entered." 298 Kan. at 334. The Jones rule simply explains the limit of the district court's discretion to enlarge the 21-day period for filing such a motion. Jones did not discuss the 21-day deadline. Jones explicitly held that K.S.A. 22-3208(4) applies to K.S.A. 21-5231 immunity motions. Further, Jones does not modify K.S.A. 22-3208(4)'s requirements. Therefore, absent a determination that the district court believed the arguments made in Riggins' May 28, 2021 motion "were not known to the defendant and could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered by the defendant within the period specified herein," Riggins' motion should have been time barred. K.S.A. 22-3808(4). The State consistently raised its position that Riggins' motion was time barred. In denying Riggins' immunity motion, the district court acknowledged that "[t]he defendant has had ample time to take this [matter]—this motion up prior to the eve of trial." However, the district court stopped short of making an explicit finding that Riggins' motion was untimely. Nevertheless, this statement by the district court clearly shows that it understood that Riggins was previously aware of a self-defense claim. The record plainly shows that upon being apprehended by officers, Riggins immediately took the position that he acted in self-defense. He also filed a pro se motion alleging self-defense, argued self-defense at the preliminary hearing, and presented Batemon's testimony suggesting he acted in self-defense at the preliminary hearing. Riggins' counsel also mistakenly believed that he had filed a self-defense immunity motion on March 31, 2021. 10  We therefore hold that Riggins' K.S.A. 21-5231 motion was untimely, and we affirm the district court's denial of Riggins' motion. To the extent that the district court did not make an explicit timeliness finding, we affirm the district court as right for the wrong reason. See State v. Parks, 312 Kan. 487, 489, 476 P.3d 794 (2020) ("Appellate courts may affirm a district court as right for the wrong reason 'if an alternative basis exists for the district court's ruling.'"); State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704, 712, 348 P.3d 516 (2015) (If a district court reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied on the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision.). In making this finding, we reverse the panel's holding that Riggins was entitled to self-defense immunity. In finding that Riggins' immunity motion was untimely, we decline to consider any other arguments related to the motion. However, our review of the issues related to Riggins' voluntary manslaughter conviction does not end here. Riggins has also asked this court to review any and all issues properly presented to, but not decided by, the panel. Those issues include alleged jury instruction errors and whether the State met its burden to overcome Riggins' affirmative defense at trial. Based on its finding of immunity, the panel considered these issues to be moot. Because we find that Riggins was not entitled to immunity, we consider each in turn. Alleged Jury Instruction Errors Riggins raises three alleged instructional errors. He argues that the district court should have given two unrequested instructions for imperfect self-defense for both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Riggins also argues that the district court erred by denying his request for an instruction on reckless involuntary manslaughter. 11  "When analyzing jury instructions, appellate courts follow a three-step process: (1) determine whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, in other words, whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue for appeal; (2) consider the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred below; and (3) assess whether the error requires reversal—in other words, whether the error can be deemed harmless." State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 242, 564 P.3d 778 (2025). See K.S.A. 22-3414(3) ("No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction . . . unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict . . . unless the instruction or the failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous."). "At the second step, appellate courts consider whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate, using an unlimited standard of review of the entire record." 320 Kan. at 242. The State concedes that voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are lesser included offenses of second-degree intentional murder. Therefore, all three instructions Riggins challenges here would have been legally appropriate. In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, courts must determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. See State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 727, 559 P.3d 792 (2024). Stated another way, "a defendant is entitled to an instruction based on his or her theory of defense if there is some evidence that would justify a rational factfinding under that theory, even if that evidence is not strong or conclusive." State v. Hardwick, 321 Kan. 519, 530, 582 P.3d 555 (2026); K.S.A. 22- 3414(3) ("In cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime . . . the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime."). 12  Riggins openly acknowledges that he did not request instructions on imperfect self-defense voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. "Whether a party has preserved a jury instruction issue affects the appellate court's reversibility inquiry at the third step." State v. Peters, 319 Kan. 492, 515, 555 P.3d 1134 (2024). When a party fails to request a jury instruction before the district court, an appellate court reviews for clear error under K.S.A. 22-3414(3). "'Clear error exists when the court is firmly convinced the outcome would have been different had the instruction been given.'" State v. Banks, 322 Kan. ___, 2026 WL 2542017, at *8 (2026) (citing State v. Moore, 319 Kan. 557, 570, 556 P.3d 466 [2024]). "The party claiming clear error has the burden to show both error and prejudice." Mendez, 319 Kan. at 727-28. Riggins did, however, request an instruction for reckless involuntary manslaughter. If the challenging party preserved the issue below, an appellate court applies one of two harmless error tests. If the instructional error impacts a constitutional right, an appellate court assesses whether the error was harmless under the federal constitutional harmless error standard, which is whether there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. When no constitutional right is impacted, an appellate court assesses whether there is no reasonable probability the error affected the trial's outcome in light of the entire record. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 [1967]). Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense Riggins argues that the district court should have given an unrequested voluntary manslaughter instruction under an imperfect self-defense theory. Imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter requires knowingly killing a human being based upon an unreasonable but honest belief that the deadly force was justified. K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(2). 13 "A person is justified in the use of deadly force . . . if such person reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person." K.S.A. 21-5222(b). "Evidence to support a lesser included instruction may come from any source, including solely from a defendant's uncorroborated testimony. State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 594, 343 P.3d 1165 (2015); State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1152, 289 P.3d 85 (2012); cf. State v. Qualls, 309 Kan. 553, 557-58, 439 P.3d 301 (2019) ('Even if the only evidence supporting the defendant's theory consists of the defendant's own testimony, which may be contradicted by all other witnesses and by physical evidence, the defendant may have met his or her burden' to justify a self-defense instruction.)." Hardwick, 321 Kan. at 530-31. Riggins has shown there is some evidence to support the theory that he held an unreasonable but honest belief that deadly force was necessary to protect himself. Riggins testified that Haynes attacked him with a knife, which had been on the kitchen table at the house. Batemon also testified that she saw Haynes attack Riggins with something. Riggins testified that, after Haynes grabbed the knife, he felt threatened. Following his arrest, Riggins also showed authorities cuts on his leg, he claimed were from Haynes. In contrast, the State put on testimony by Crissup who said that Riggins brought the knife to the house. The State also highlighted that the injuries to Riggins' leg were superficial and described by medical personnel as "cat scratches" and treated with gauze. Thus, we conclude that a voluntary manslaughter instruction would have been factually appropriate. Because Riggins did not request this instruction, we must next consider whether the district court's failure to give the instruction constituted clear error. 14  To find clear error, the court must be "'firmly convinced the outcome would have been different had the instruction been given.'" Banks, 322 Kan. at ___, 2026 WL 2542017, at *8 (citing Moore, 319 Kan. at 570). As the party claiming clear error, Riggins has the burden to establish prejudice. Mendez, 319 Kan. at 727-28. He has not. The jury rejected Riggins' theory of perfect self-defense, and by doing so, inherently rejected Riggins' testimony that Haynes attacked Riggins with a knife. Riggins testified that he only felt threatened by Haynes after she grabbed the knife from the table. Riggins has not given us a reason to be firmly convinced that the jury would have determined that, despite rejecting the theory that Haynes attacked Riggins with a knife, Riggins nevertheless held an unreasonable but honest belief that deadly force was required. In fact, even Riggins' own theory of defense and supporting arguments—that he was attacked with a knife and therefore self-defense was objectively reasonable— undermines the heart of an offense which requires an unreasonable belief. Thus, even if the jury believed Riggins' testimony, we are far from firmly convinced it would have found Riggins guilty of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. We also note that because the district court's failure to give the jury an instruction for voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense was not clear error, that issue may not be considered in any cumulative error analysis. See State v. Waldschmidt, 318 Kan. 633, 662, 546 P.3d 716 (2024) (holding "an unpreserved instructional issue that is not clearly erroneous" is not "considered in a cumulative error analysis"). Involuntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense Next, Riggins argues that the district court should have given an unrequested imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter instruction. Imperfect self-defense 15 involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being done as a lawful act in an unlawful manner—such as the use of excessive force. State v. Dotson, 319 Kan. 32, 52, 551 P.3d 1272 (2024). Again, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Riggins. Under a version of events which puts Riggins in a position to use lawful force, his actions were not excessive. Riggins consistently said that Haynes' injuries were the result of Riggins' attempt to defend himself while attempting to gain control of and redirect the knife. Riggins' own testimony simply does not factually support the instruction. Riggins testified that Haynes received her wounds while the knife was still in her hand, and that after she dropped the knife, he didn't touch it. Instead, he wrestled with Haynes, who was still "aggressing," to keep her away from the knife, and then took her outside. Riggins suggests that because there is conflicting testimony regarding who had the knife and started the fight. He suggests that this conflict creates "some evidence" that he could have defended himself with nonlethal force. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3). But Riggins' position is logically inconsistent. Crissup and Carley testified that they did not see the fight start. Riggins and Batemon testified that Haynes attacked Riggins. As previously discussed, Riggins testified that he was not scared of Haynes until she grabbed the knife. We find no evidence to support that Haynes attacked Riggins with less than lethal force. Therefore, when viewed in the light most favorable to Riggins, Riggins would have been justified in using deadly force in self-defense. Consequently, we find that the district court did not err by declining to give the instruction. 16  Reckless Involuntary Manslaughter As noted above, Riggins did request an instruction at trial for reckless involuntary manslaughter under K.S.A. 21-5405(a)(1). Reckless involuntary manslaughter requires proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a certain harm will follow, and that the disregard was a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise. K.S.A. 21- 5202(j); State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 977, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012). Instructions for reckless involuntary manslaughter are appropriate if the act resulting in death was intentional, but the defendant did not intend the victim's death. State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 725, 449 P.3d 429 (2019) ("The required mental state . . . —unintentional but reckless—pertains to the intent to kill."). "[A] deliberate and voluntary act can result in an unintentional but reckless killing if the specific intent to kill . . . is not proven." State v. Deal, 293 Kan. 872, 882, 269 P.3d 1282 (2012). Riggins suggests that because he testified that he was trying to redirect the knife away from himself, rather than trying to kill Haynes, this instruction would have been factually appropriate. The district court held the only evidence of recklessness presented at trial was Riggins' own self-serving statements, which it found were insufficient to require the court give the instruction. "A defendant is entitled to instructions on the law applicable to his or her defense theory, so long as the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to him or her is sufficient to justify a rational factfinder finding in accordance with that theory. This is true even if [a defendant's] defense theory is only supported by his own testimony. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Montgomery, 322 Kan. 152, 161, 587 P.3d 738 (2026). 17 See Hardwick, 321 Kan. at 530 ("Evidence to support a lesser included instruction may come from any source, including solely from a defendant's uncorroborated testimony."). We agree with Riggins that in the light most favorable to him, an instruction for reckless involuntary manslaughter would have been factually appropriate. Therefore, we must now consider whether this error was harmless. As Riggins has not alleged a violation of a constitutional right, we ask whether there is no reasonable probability the error affected the trial's outcome in light of the entire record. State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249, 256-57, 485 P.3d 614 (2021), on reh'g 315 Kan. 512, 509 P.3d 542 (2022). The State persuasively argues that the court's error was harmless. The autopsy results showed multiple significant injuries to Haynes' head and neck. Haynes suffered multiple blunt force injuries to her head, neck, torso, and upper and lower extremities. Haynes also suffered knife wounds, including stab wounds that were 2 inches, 3 1/4 inches, and 4 3/4 inches deep. Crissup and Carley also testified that they saw Riggins standing over Haynes and stabbing her. Crissup and Carley also testified that they hadn't seen the knife in the house previously. A mixed partial DNA profile with at least one male contributor was found on the handle of the knife. Riggins then fled the scene and went into hiding in a friend's rafters. Further, the jury was instructed on self-defense and rejected that theory, instead finding that Riggins acted "knowingly" in a heat of passion. While it is true that the jury did not find Riggins guilty of an intentional killing, we are convinced there is no reasonable probability that it would have found his actions to be merely reckless. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence at Trial to Disprove Self-Defense as an Affirmative Defense As with the instructional issues, this issue was also not addressed by the panel because it determined that the issue was moot. Riggins, 66 Kan. App. 2d at 139. 18 However, because we have determined that Riggins was not entitled to self-defense immunity and Riggins has asked us to review this issue, it is now properly before this court. Additional facts are included as necessary. "When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses." Mendez, 319 Kan. at 723. "It is only in rare cases where the testimony is so incredible that no reasonable fact-finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that a guilty verdict will be reversed." State v. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 346, 350, 515 P.3d 736 (2022). At trial, the jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of self-defense. Self- defense is an affirmative defense used to justify the act that would otherwise be a crime. State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 714, 510 P.3d 706 (2022). Under that defense, a person is justified in the use of deadly force against another when they have an objectively reasonable belief that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. See K.S.A. 21-5222(a), (b). Once a defendant has satisfied the burden to present competent evidence that the affirmative defense applies, the State has the burden of disproving that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. K.S.A. 21-5108(c); State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387, 1406, 430 P.3d 11 (2018). Riggins argues that his and Batemon's testimony established that Haynes attacked him with a knife. Riggins argues that the evidence presented by the State does nothing to contradict his story. The State put on evidence by Carley and Crissup, and both testified that they did not see the beginning of the fight. Nor did either of them see who started the fight. Riggins argues that this fact alone means the State failed to put on sufficient evidence to disprove self-defense. 19  Riggins ignores that the State offered other circumstantial evidence to rebut Riggins' claim of self-defense. "A conviction for even the greatest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence allows a fact-finder to find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. To be sufficient, the circumstantial evidence need not exclude every other reasonable conclusion." State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 826-27, 511 P.3d 931 (2022); State v. Brown, 316 Kan. 154, 172, 513 P.3d 1207 (2022) (jurors are allowed to make reasonable inferences from evidence). The State presented testimony that Haynes was unarmed and just going to the bathroom when she initially encountered Riggins. The State also presented testimony that neither Crissup nor Carley recognized the knife, but that Crissup saw Riggins carry the knife into the house in a sheath on his belt. Crissup and Carley testified that Riggins affirmatively beat and stabbed Haynes. Forensic evidence suggested that Haynes' hand was not always on the knife. Riggins' DNA was not found on the blade or tip of the knife, which contradicts that Haynes cut Riggins. Riggins stated when he was found that he expected he was "going to go to prison for life" and admitted that he had stabbed Haynes in the head. This evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, could disprove Riggins' self-defense theory beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's rejection of Riggins' self-defense theory and to prove a conviction for voluntary manslaughter based on a heat of passion. The State Has Shown that any Violation of Riggins' Posttrial Right to Counsel Was Harmless Following the jury verdict, Riggins asked the district court to allow him to proceed pro se for the remainder of the posttrial proceedings. The district court granted Riggins' request. Riggins then argued that the district court failed to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Riggins specifically argued that his discussion 20 with the court was inadequate because it omitted any reference to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the consequence of the waiver, the range of punishment, and the nature of the upcoming proceedings. The State seems to concede that the record shows that the district court failed to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver. However, the State argues that the record references a more than hour-long discussion with Riggins off th