State v. Mildfelt

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS No. 126,968 STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. JACK REX MILDFELT JR., Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. K.S.A. 20-370(a) requires the court to order any defendant convicted of a crime involving a minor to pay one $400 assessment fee, regardless of the number of convictions in the criminal case. 2. The grammar canon provides that the rules of grammar govern statutory interpretation unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose. Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 3, 2025. Appeal from Saline District Court; RENE YOUNG, judge. Oral argument held May 20, 2026. Opinion filed November 6, 2026. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court on the issue subject to review is reversed. Judgment of the district court is vacated on the issue subject to review, and the case is remanded with directions. Sam Schirer, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant. 1  Tyler W. Winslow, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by WALL, J.: Children's Advocacy Centers provide a child-friendly, multidisciplinary approach to the investigation of child-abuse cases. These centers employ child-forensic- interview professionals to conduct a single interview with an abused child. Other investigatory agencies and officials can watch it through a one-way mirror. This interview method has two notable benefits. It improves the interview's efficacy. And it reduces the trauma a child experiences with multiple interviews. In 2004, the Kansas Legislature created the Children's Advocacy Center fund to help finance these centers in our state. As part of the funding mechanism, the Legislature imposed a fee on defendants convicted of crimes involving a minor victim. This fee is then deposited in the Children's Advocacy Center fund. This appeal involves competing interpretations of K.S.A. 20-370(a), the statute imposing a Children's Advocacy Center fee on defendants convicted of crimes involving minors. The central dispute is whether the Legislature intended to impose this $400 fee on a per-conviction basis, or instead, on a per-defendant basis. A district court ordered Jack Rex Mildfelt Jr., to pay a $400 Children's Advocacy Center fee for each of his six convictions for child-sex crimes, resulting in a $2,400 fee. Mildfelt appealed, arguing that the statute requires him to pay only a single $400 fee. But the Court of Appeals held that the statute's plain language imposes fees on a per- conviction basis. 2  We disagree. K.S.A. 20-370(a) is ambiguous because the text is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation—it could impose one fee per defendant, or it could impose one fee per conviction. But ordinary grammatical rules favor Mildfelt's interpretation. And here, the grammar canon provides the most insightful and persuasive tool for discerning legislative intent. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A jury convicted Mildfelt of six child-sex crimes that involved two minor victims. The district court sentenced Mildfelt to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 100 years. The court also ordered him to pay a Children's Advocacy Center fee of $2,400—$400 for each conviction. Mildfelt appealed, challenging the Children's Advocacy Center fee amount. He argued the relevant statute, K.S.A. 20-370(a), requires him to pay a single $400 fee. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the statute's plain language requires the district court to impose a $400 fee for each conviction of a crime involving a minor victim. State v. Mildfelt, No. 126,968, 2025 WL 2815647, at *4 (Kan. App. 2025) (unpublished opinion). We granted Mildfelt's petition for review and heard oral argument from the parties on May 21, 2026. We have jurisdiction. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (An aggrieved party may petition for review of Court of Appeals decision); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions). 3  ANALYSIS Under K.S.A. 20-370(a), "any defendant convicted of a crime under chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, in which a minor is a victim, shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400 to the clerk of the district court." Mildfelt agrees that this statute applies to him. He questions only how the $400 fee is assessed—per defendant or per conviction. To answer that question, we must interpret K.S.A. 20-370. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, so our review is unlimited. State v. Terrell, 315 Kan. 68, 70, 504 P.3d 405 (2022). When engaging in statutory interpretation, the court's objective is to give effect to the enacting Legislature's intent. State v. Ninh, 320 Kan. 477, 484, 570 P.3d 1169 (2025). To discern legislative intent, we first look at the statute's plain language, giving common words their ordinary meaning. 320 Kan. at 484. But if the statute's plain language is ambiguous, then we may resort to canons of construction and legislative history to resolve the ambiguity. Jarmer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 318 Kan. 671, 673, 546 P.3d 743 (2024). A statute is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. Glaze v. J.K. Williams, 309 Kan. 562, 564, 439 P.3d 920 (2019). I. K.S.A. 20-370(a)'s plain language is ambiguous. Our statutory interpretation begins with K.S.A. 20-370(a)'s plain language. The statute provides that "any defendant convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim, shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400 to the clerk of the district court." K.S.A. 20-370(a). The parties dispute whether the fee is assessed on a per- defendant basis or a per-conviction basis. 4  Both parties present plausible interpretations of K.S.A. 20-370(a) based on the ordinary meaning of the text. So, we find that K.S.A. 20-370(a) is ambiguous. See 309 Kan. at 564 (statute is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to two or more interpretations). Mildfelt argues that the statute's plain language imposes one Children's Advocacy Center fee per defendant. He asserts that the phrase "convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim" sets forth a qualifying status. And any defendant who meets that qualifying status must pay "an assessment fee," meaning one assessment fee. So, the statute effectively imposes fees on a per-defendant basis, regardless of the number of convictions. This is a permissible reading of the statutory text. The State reads the same language to impose the fee on a per-conviction basis. And the panel, adopting the rationale in State v. Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d 236, 563 P.3d 234 (2025), held that this reading was supported by the statute's plain language. Mildfelt, 2025 WL 2815647, at *4. Sanders emphasized that the statute imposes an assessment fee for a "crime" rather than a "case." 65 Kan. App. 2d at 261-62. And after looking at the ordinary meaning of those words and comparing K.S.A. 20-370(a) to other fee statutes, it concluded that K.S.A. 20-370(a)'s plain language requires a defendant to pay an assessment fee for each conviction. It explained that the statute "specifies 'a crime,' which is a singular event . . . . It does not use the term per case or per complaint or per traffic citation." 65 Kan. App. 2d at 264. This is also a permissible reading of the statutory text. But we disagree with the panel's and Sanders' conclusion that the statute's plain language compels this reading. First, the panel's interpretation does not truly resolve the ambiguity. The State acknowledges this fact, pointing to State v. McDuffie, No. 113,987, 2017 WL 2617648 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion). In McDuffie, the panel examined the words "a 5 crime." And like Sanders and the panel below, it acknowledged that "a crime" could mean "one crime." If so, the statute could be read to impose the fees per conviction. 2017 WL 2617648, at *17; see also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary ("a" is "used as a function word before singular nouns when the referent is unspecified "). But "a crime" could also mean "any crime." If so, the statute could be read to impose the fee per defendant, regardless of the number of convictions in the case. 2017 WL 2617648, at *19; see also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary ("a" can mean "any"). In short, the text's plain meaning failed to resolve the ambiguity. Second, Sanders and the panel went beyond the text's ordinary meaning. Sanders looked at other unrelated fee statutes in the Kansas civil and criminal code. It believed that these statutes reinforced its plain-language interpretation. Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d at 262-65. When interpreting a statute, a court may read that statute in pari materia—that is, it may look to other statutes about the same subject matter to discern the legislative intent behind the target statute. State v. Newman-Caddell, 317 Kan. 251, 259, 527 P.3d 911 (2023). As a canon of construction, the in pari materia doctrine may help to resolve ambiguity in a statute. But it may also be useful in plain-language analysis. Reference to other related statutes may help courts decide if the target statute is plain and unambiguous in the first place. And those other statutes "can provide substance and meaning to a court's plain language interpretation" of the target statute. Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022). But Sanders and the panel's attempt to read K.S.A. 20-370(a) in pari materia does not support its conclusion that the statute is unambiguous. To begin with, the other fee statutes are not truly in pari materia with K.S.A. 20-370. None of these statutes were enacted by the same legislative body that adopted K.S.A. 20-370. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244, 93 S. Ct. 477, 34 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1972) (Application of 6 the in pari materia doctrine "makes the most sense when the statutes were enacted by the same legislative body at the same time."). Only one, K.S.A. 20-369, is even in the same section of the Kansas code—as K.S.A. 20-370—article 3 ("District Courts") of chapter 20 ("Courts"). And as detailed in the following section, these other fee statutes serve only to reinforce, rather than resolve, the ambiguity. Given that K.S.A. 20-370(a) is ambiguous, we must now turn to canons of construction and legislative history to resolve that ambiguity. We address both in turn. II. The grammar canon is the only tool that reliably resolves the ambiguity, and it confirms that the Legislature intended K.S.A. 20-370(a) to impose the Children's Advocacy Center fee on a per-defendant basis. When legislative intent is not apparent from a statute's plain language, courts turn to canons of statutory construction. "Canons of construction are accepted rules that help courts determine the intended meaning of statutory text." Martin v. City of Topeka, 322 Kan. 681, 692, 596 P.3d 799 (2026). One such canon is the grammar canon. Because "[w]ords are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them" when interpreting statutes, the "rules of grammar govern unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose." See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 140 (2012). For decades, Kansas courts have relied on grammatical rules to understand legislative intent. See Godsoe v. Harder, 164 Kan. 86, 90, 187 P.2d 515 (1947). And we have consistently used grammar rules to address statutory ambiguities. See State v. Toliver, 306 Kan. 146, 151, 392 P.3d 119 (2017) (applying "the common rules of English grammar" after determining statute was ambiguous). Applying ordinary grammar rules to the statute supports Mildfelt's interpretation. K.S.A. 20-370(a) provides that "any defendant convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor 7 is a victim, shall pay an assessment fee in the amount of $400." The phrase "convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim" is a participial phrase. That is, it is a phrase that uses the participle form of the verb ("convicted") and modifies the preceding noun ("defendant"). See Garner's Modern English Usage 1231 (5th ed. 2022). So, the phrase functions as an adjective describing what type of defendant must pay the fee. Prior panels of the Court of Appeals focused on the term "a crime" in deciding how many fees a defendant must pay. See, e.g., Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d at 261-64; McDuffie, 2017 WL 2617648, at *17-20. But the grammatical structure of the sentence reveals the error in that analysis. The term "a crime" doesn't tell us how many fees should be imposed. Instead, it's part of a phrase telling us which defendants must pay. In addition to identifying which defendants must pay the fee, the statute also tells us how many fees each defendant must pay. Defendants convicted of a crime involving a minor victim must pay "an assessment fee." "An assessment fee" is a singular noun. So, each defendant identified by the participial phrase must pay one $400 fee. The statute's syntax shows that the fee is imposed on a per-qualifying-defendant basis. No other interpretive canons persuasively resolve K.S.A. 20-370(a)'s ambiguity. The Court of Appeals and parties discuss several, including the in pari materia doctrine, the absurdity canon, and the rule of lenity. We address each in turn . First, the panel, relying on Sanders, reasoned that the in pari materia doctrine dispels ambiguity. Sanders looked at other fee statutes in the civil and criminal code. And it concluded that these other fee statutes showed that K.S.A. 20-370(a) imposes a fee for every crime of conviction because the statute used the words "a crime" rather than "per case." Sanders, 65 Kan. App. 2d at 262-65. We disagree. 8  We already explained why the other fee statutes are not in pari materia with K.S.A. 20-370(a). But even if they were, the other fee statutes reinforce, rather than resolve, the ambiguity. First, a sampling of other fee statutes shows that the Legislature usually includes explicit language clarifying whether the fee is assessed per crime or per defendant. For example: • K.S.A. 12-16,119(a) provides that "[a]ny person convicted or diverted . . . of a misdemeanor or felony . . . where fingerprints are required . . . shall pay a separate court cost if [the relevant governing body] votes to adopt such a fee as a booking or processing fee for each complaint." (Emphasis added.) • K.S.A. 20-369(a) provides that "the court may impose a fee . . . against any defendant for crimes involving a family or household . . . in an amount not to exceed $100 per case." (Emphasis added.) • K.S.A. 22-4529 provides that "[a]ny defendant entitled to counsel pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4503 . . . shall pay an application fee in the amount of $100 to the clerk of the district court. . . . Such fee shall be paid regardless of whether the defendant has paid application fees pursuant to this section in any other proceeding." (Emphasis added.) • K.S.A. 28-172a(c) provides that "[i]f a conviction is on more than one count, the docket fee shall be the highest one applicable to any one of the counts. The prosecuting witness or defendant, if assessed the costs , shall pay only one fee. Multiple defendants shall each pay one fee." (Emphases added.) 9  • K.S.A. 28-176(a) provides that "[t]he court shall order any person convicted . . . of a misdemeanor or felony contained in chapters 21, 41 or 65 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated . . . to pay a separate court cost of $400 for every individual offense if forensic science or laboratory services, forensic computer examination services or forensic audio and video examination services are provided, in connection with the investigation." (Emphasis added.) • K.S.A. 2025 Supp. 32-1049a(d) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (e), when the district court notifies the department of a failure to comply with a wildlife and parks citation or failure to comply with a sentence of the district court imposed on violation of a wildlife and parks law or rule and regulation, the court shall assess a reinstatement fee of $50 for each charge or sentence on which the person failed to make satisfaction, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which such citation was originally issued." (Emphasis added.) • K.S.A. 75-724(a) provides "[a]ny person convicted or adjudicated of an offense that . . . requires submission of a DNA sample upon arrest, charging or placement in custody, shall pay a separate court cost of $200 as a Kansas bureau of investigation DNA database fee upon conviction or adjudication." The statute also provides that if the person's DNA is already on file with the KBI, the person must still pay the fee unless they can prove they have already paid the fee and they did not submit any samples for the current offense. K.S.A. 75-724(b). But K.S.A. 20-370(a) clearly lacks the express language found in these other fee statutes. 10  Second, there is no correlation between terms like "crime" and statutes assessing fees on a per-conviction basis. For example, K.S.A. 28-172a(c) imposes one fee per case but refers only to "count." K.S.A. 75-724(a) appears to impose one fee per case but refers only to "offense." And K.S.A. 32-1049a imposes a fee per charge but refers to both "charge" and "citation." In sum, these statutes do not support the conclusion that K.S.A. 20-370(a) imposes a fee on a per-conviction basis just because it uses "crime" rather than a word like "case." The State does not rely on any interpretive canons. But Mildfelt argues that two canons support his reading of the statute—the absurdity canon and the rule of lenity. We have doubts that either of these canons would apply here. But we don't need to decide that question because we have already held that the grammar canon supports Mildfelt's preferred interpretation of K.S.A. 20-370(a). And under that interpretation, the Legislature intended to impose a Children's Advocacy Center fee on a per -qualifying- defendant basis, regardless of the number of convictions in the criminal case. The State also suggests that it may be unclear how this interpretation would apply when a defendant is convicted of crimes involving minor victims in multiple cases. But those are not the facts before us. Our judicial power extends only to the current controversy. Thus, we leave the State's question for another day when that dispute is squarely before us. III. K.S.A. 20-370's legislative history does not clarify whether the Legislature intended the Children's Advocacy Center fee to be imposed on a per-conviction or per- defendant basis. The State does not rely on any interpretive canon to resolve the statutory ambiguity. Instead, it argues that K.S.A. 20-370(a)'s enactment history shows that the Legislature intended to impose the Children's Advocacy Center fee on a per-conviction 11 basis. The State relies on McDuffie, which turned to legislative history to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the State's preferred interpretation. But K.S.A. 20-370's enactment history cannot bear the weight of McDuffie's holding. K.S.A. 20-370 was enacted in 2004 through H.B. 2568. L. 2004, ch. 142, § 1. A proponent of the bill testified that requiring criminal defendants to pay a fee to help fund Children's Advocacy Centers "[p]rovides an opportunity to hold perpetrators accountable for the abuse and the strain they place on the child welfare system." See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 2568 Before the Kansas House Corrections and Juvenile Justice Committee (February 5, 2004) (testimony of Brenda Sharpe, Sunflower House President and CEO). But the committee minutes show that the same proponent also said the statute would provide a "token fee" to be paid when perpetrators are convicted. Minutes of the Kansas House Corrections and Juvenile Justice Committee (February 5, 2004). Another proponent described H.B. 2568 as "a funding mechanism for Child Advocacy Centers." Hearing on H.B. 2568 Before the Kansas House Corrections and Juvenile Justice Committee (February 5, 2004) (testimony of Ron Paschal, Chief Attorney of the 18th Judicial District). He also said the bill "places some of the financial burden on the defendant who victimized the child ultimately served by the advocacy center." (Emphasis added.) Hearing on H.B. 2568 Before the Kansas House Corrections and Juvenile Justice Committee (February 5, 2004) (testimony of Ron Paschal, chief attorney of the 18th Judicial District). This legislative history reveals that two H.B. 2568 proponents felt the legislation would (1) provide some funding to Children's Advocacy Centers; and (2) shift some of the financial burden of operating these centers to the defendants who made their services necessary. But no proponent specifically addressed whether the fee was to be imposed on a per-defendant or per-conviction basis. 12  The McDuffie panel reasoned that if the purpose of the statute was to raise money for Children's Advocacy Centers, "one would assume that the legislature intended for defendants to pay a fee for each crime committed against a minor." 2017 WL 2617648, at *20. But this assumption does not align with other evidence in the enactment history. As noted, proponents described the assessment as a "token fee" that "may or may not generate significant income" and that places only "some" of the financial burden on defendants. Hearing on H.B. 2568 Before the Kansas House Corrections and Juvenile Justice Committee (February 5, 2004) (testimony of Ron Paschal, chief attorney of the 18th Judicial District). The McDuffie panel also examined the legislative history behind a later bill amending the statute. In 2013, the Legislature amended K.S.A. 20-370 to increase the fee amount from $100 to $400 and delete language that had given courts discretion to waive the fee. L. 2013, ch. 117, § 1. Senator Greg Smith testified in support of the bill. He said that "[m]onies [for Children's Advocacy Centers] come from a fee assessed against the convicted offender. This fee is used to defer expenses for forensic interviews and other resources for the victims." Hearing on S.B. 88 Before the Kansas House Appropriations Committee (March 18, 2013) (testimony of Senator Greg Smith). He added that "[t]he bill would raise the fee to $400" which was "roughly the cost of a forensic exam." Hearing on S.B. 88 Before the Kansas House Appropriations Committee (March 18, 2013) (testimony of Senator Greg Smith). Committee minutes also show that Senator Smith said "that fees are not collected until the party is found guilty." Minutes of the Kansas House Appropriations Committee (March 18, 2013). The McDuffie panel homed in on those committee minutes recording Senator Smith as saying "that fees are not collected until the party is found guilty." 2017 WL 2617648, at *20. The panel found it significant that Senator Smith had used the plural 13 "fees" with the singular "the party." 2017 WL 2617648, at *20. And the panel noted that "[o]ne would assume that this difference [between "fees" and "a fee"] was recognized, and the minutes, while not necessarily verbatim, accurately reflected the intent of those who testified." 2017 WL 2617648, at *20. But the McDuffie panel places too much weight on this statement. For one, the "remarks of a single legislator who sponsors a bill [ordinarily] are not controlling in analyzing legislative history." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 64 L. Ed. 2d 766 (1980). And the committee minutes may not accurately convey Senator Smith's actual statement. Those minutes caution that "the individual remarks recorded herein have not been transcribed verbatim. Individual remarks as reported herein have not been submitted to the individuals appearing before the committee for editing or corrections." Minutes of the Kansas House Appropriations Committee (March 18, 2013). Finally, in Senator Smith's written testimony, he refers to the "fee" in the singular. That written testimony states that "[m]onies come from a fee assessed against the convicted offender. This fee is used to defer expenses for forensic interviews and other resources for the victims." (Emphas es added.) Hearing on S.B. 88 Before the Kansas House Appropriations Committee (March 18, 2013) (testimony of Senator Greg Smith). In the end, Senator Smith's comments do not definitively support one interpretation over the other. The McDuffie panel also highlighted the fact that a 2013 bill proponent compared the Children's Advocacy Center fee to the KBI lab fee, which expressly provides that the lab fee is imposed "for every individual offense." 2017 WL 2617648, at *20; K.S.A. 28- 176(a). The supporter testified that "[t]he requested amount of $400 is consistent with the 'KBI fee' levied on offenders for processing collection kits in cases including sexual abuse." Hearing on S.B. 88 Before the Kansas House Appropriations Committee (March 18, 2013) (testimony of Amy Boydston, Executive Director of state network of Children's Advocacy Centers). From this, the panel concluded that "the legislature's belief that it 14 was enacting a fee comparable to a KBI laboratory analysis fee further demonstrates that the legislature's intent was to create a one-to-one crime-to-fee ratio." 2017 WL 2617648, at *20. But reading the bill proponent's testimony in context makes clear that she was comparing the KBI lab-fee amount to the Children's Advocacy Center fee amount. She noted that the assessment fee had not been increased since 2004, while the number of Children's Advocacy Centers had continued to grow. The result was each center was receiving half the amount it had received several years before . So the bill's primary purpose was to increase the Children's Advocacy Center fee amount from $100 to $400, putting it on par with the KBI lab-fee amount. She did not analyze or compare the assessment methods for either statutory fee, i.e., per-defendant or per-conviction. In sum, neither party champions a "per-victim" interpretation of the statute. Instead, they focus the dispute on whether the fee is assessed per defendant or per conviction. K.S.A. 20-370's legislative history doesn't convincingly show that the Legislature favored either approach. No legislators or other bill supporters discussed the issue. Viewed selectively and in isolation, some statements arguably support a per- conviction interpretation of K.S.A. 20-370. But others just as convincingly support a per- defendant interpretation. Given the ambiguous and equivocal nature of this history, it fails to tip the scales in favor of either interpretation. CONCLUSION K.S.A. 20-370(a) is ambiguous. We can read the text to support at least two reasonable interpretations: the statute can be read to impose the Children's Advocacy Center fee on either a per-defendant or per-conviction basis. 15  Among all the tools in our statutory-interpretation arsenal, the grammar canon offers the most persuasive evidence of legislative intent here. Courts presume that legislators compose statutory language consistent with ordinary grammar rules. Applying those rules to K.S.A. 20-370(a) shows that "convicted of a crime . . . in which a minor is a victim" is a participial phrase. It modifies the preceding noun—"defendant." Together, the participial phrase and the noun it modifies tell courts which defendants shall pay "an assessment fee"—a singular noun. No other interpretive canons apply or persuasively show that the Legislature intended to impose the fee on a per-conviction basis. K.S.A. 20-370's legislative history does not yield any meaningful insight into which assessment method the Legislature preferred—per-defendant or per-conviction. No evidence in the legislative record addresses the assessment method directly. Portions of this history can be framed to support either interpretation. But none convincingly favors one interpretation over another. We hold that K.S.A. 20-370(a) requires the court to order any defendant convicted of a crime involving a minor to pay one $400 assessment fee, regardless of the number of convictions in the criminal case. We thus reverse the Court of Appeals, vacate the district court's order imposing the $2,400 Children's Advocacy Center fee, and remand the case for the district court to enter an amended journal entry imposing a $400 Children's Advocacy Center fee. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court on the issue subject to review is reversed. Judgment of the district court is vacated on the issue subject to review, and the case is remanded with directions. 16